102 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1981–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Madden v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Therefore, before a defendant is entitled to the submission of a jury instruction under article 38.23(a), a defendant must meet three requirements: (1) The evidence heard by the jury must raise an issue of fact; (2) The evidence on that fact must be affirmatively contested; and (3) That contested factual issue must be material to the lawfulness of the challenged conduct in obtaining the evidence. - 13 - 04-22-00295-CR Id. 2022The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has clarified the applicability of this law, explaining that a defendant must demonstrate the following three conditions before he is entitled to a submission of a jury instruction under Article 38.23(a): (1) The evidence heard by the jury must raise an issue of fact; (2) The evidence on that fact must be affirmatively contested; and (3) That contested factual issue must be material to the lawfulness of the challenged conduct in obtaining the evidence. 10 Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim. | 35 | 74 |
Oursbourn v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Id.; cf. Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 177 (Tex. Crim. 2012Id.; see also Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 177 (Tex.Crim.App.2008). | 9 | 9 |
Hamal, Angela Doddgreen2 sentences2025Id. at 510 ; Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. 2024Hamal v. State, 390 S.W.3d 302, 306 (Tex. Crim. | 4 | 4 |
Holmes v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Holmes v. State, 248 S.W.3d 194 , 199–200 (Tex. Crim. 2010Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex.Crim.App.2007); see also Holmes v. State, 248 S.W.3d 194, 199 (Tex.Crim.App.2008) (“There is, of course, nothing to instruct the jury about if the suppression question is one of law only, and there is nothing to instruct the jury about unless there is affirmative evidence that raises a contested fact issue.”). | 2 | 2 |
Kiefer v. Continental Airlines, Inc.green2 sentences2011See Kiefer v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc. , 10 S.W.3d 34, 37 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (citing Tex. R. 2011See Kiefer v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 10 S.W.3d 34, 37 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (citing Tex.R.App. | 2 | 2 |
Huizar v. Stategreen2 sentences2021The Huizar opinion observed, “[w]hile [Article 37.07] section 3(a) says nothing about the submission of a jury instruction to this effect, such instruction is logically required if the jury is to consider the extraneous-offense and bad-act evidence under the statutorily prescribed reasonable-doubt standard.” Huizar v. State, 12 S.W.3d 479, 484 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) [Emphasis added]. 2006The Huizar opinion observed that “[w]hile section 3(a) says nothing about the submission of a jury instruction to this effect, such instruction is logically required if the jury is to consider the extraneous offense and bad act evidence under the statutorily prescribed reasonable-doubt standard.” Id. at 484 . | 1 | 2 |
Wooten, Codiem Renoirgreen1 sentence2020To justify the submission of a jury instruction on sudden passion at the punishment phase, the record must at least minimally support an inference: 1) that the defendant in fact acted under the immediate influence of a passion such as terror, anger, rage, or resentment; 2) that [her] sudden passion was in fact induced by some provocation by the deceased or another acting with him, which provocation would commonly produce such a passion 3 in a person of ordinary temper; 3) that [s]he committed the murder before regaining [her] capacity for cool reflection; and 4) that a causal connection existe | 1 | 1 |
Jeffley v. Stategreen1 sentence2018App. 1976) (lack of memory is insufficient evidence to require the submission of a jury instruction on insanity defense); Jeffley, 938 S.W.2d at 516 (expert testimony of a hypothetical possibility that defendant suffered from a lack of memory is insufficient to require submission of a jury instruction on insanity); Nutter v. State, 93 S.W.3d 130 , 131–32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (holding that the existence of a mental disease, alone, does not establish legal insanity; 22 instead, the defendant must establish that he was mentally ill at the time of the offense to the point | 1 | 1 |
Schorlemer v. Reyesgreen2 sentences2001See Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex.1995); Schorlemer v. Reyes, 974 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). 2001See Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex.1995); Schorlemer v. Reyes, 974 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). | 1 | 1 |
Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crewsgreen2 sentences2001See Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex.1995); Schorlemer v. Reyes, 974 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). 2001See Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex.1995); Schorlemer v. Reyes, 974 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hall v. State
green
2 sentences2015A. The Applicable Law Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. Crim. 2015A. The Applicable Law Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Pierce v. State
green
2 sentences2008Id. at *15 (citing 40 George E. 2008Id. at *15 (citing 40 George E. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
Allen v. Allen
green
2 sentences2007Allen, 966 S.W.2d at 660 ; M.N. 2007Allen, 966 S.W.2d at 660 ; M.N. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Young v. State
green
2 sentences1988The evidence did not warrant the submission of a jury instruction on “imperfect self-defense.” Young v. State, 530 S.W.2d 120 (Tex.Crim.App.1975) addressed the situation like the present one: [I]t is equally well settled that if the court’s instruction limits the accused’s right of self-defense by a charge on provoking the difficulty, then the jury should be advised in a proper instruction under the facts that the accused’s right of self-defense would not necessarily be abridged by the fact that he carried arms to the scene of the difficulty if such instruction is supported by the evidence. 1988The evidence did not warrant the submission of a jury instruction on “imperfect self-defense.” Young v. State, 530 S.W.2d 120 (Tex.Crim.App.1975) addressed the situation like the present one: [I]t is equally well settled that if the court’s instruction limits the accused’s right of self-defense by a charge on provoking the difficulty, then the jury should be advised in a proper instruction under the facts that the accused’s right of self-defense would not necessarily be abridged by the fact that he carried arms to the scene of the difficulty if such instruction is supported by the evidence. | 2 | 1988–1988 |
Beltran, Ricardo v. State
green
1 sentence2020To justify the submission of a jury instruction on sudden passion at the punishment phase, the record must at least minimally support an inference: 1) that the defendant in fact acted under the immediate influence of a passion such as terror, anger, rage, or resentment; 2) that [her] sudden passion was in fact induced by some provocation by the deceased or another acting with him, which provocation would commonly produce such a passion 3 in a person of ordinary temper; 3) that [s]he committed the murder before regaining [her] capacity for cool reflection; and 4) that a causal connection existe | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Nutter v. State
green
1 sentence2018App. 1976) (lack of memory is insufficient evidence to require the submission of a jury instruction on insanity defense); Jeffley, 938 S.W.2d at 516 (expert testimony of a hypothetical possibility that defendant suffered from a lack of memory is insufficient to require submission of a jury instruction on insanity); Nutter v. State, 93 S.W.3d 130 , 131–32 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (holding that the existence of a mental disease, alone, does not establish legal insanity; 22 instead, the defendant must establish that he was mentally ill at the time of the offense to the point | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Andrew J. Serrano v. State
green
2 sentences2017“Before a defendant is entitled to the submission of a jury instruction under article 38.23, (1) the evidence heard by the jury must raise an issue of fact, (2) the evidence on that fact must be affirmatively contested, and (3) that contested factual issue must be material to the lawfulness of the challenged conduct in obtaining the evidence.” Serrano, 464 S.W.3d at 7 . 2017Thus, “there must be a genuine dispute about a material issue of fact before an article 38.23 instruction is warranted; if there is no disputed fact issue, the legality of the conduct is determined by the court alone, as a matter of law.” Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
JVA Operating Co. v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co.
green
1 sentence2015Id. at 511 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Garza v. State
green
1 sentence2014Id. 10 To be entitled to the submission of a jury instruction under article 38.23(a), the contested fact issue must be material to the lawfulness of the challenged conduct in obtaining the evidence. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Cornet v. State
green
1 sentence2014The Medical-Care Defense Is Available to Nonmedical Professionals The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently held, in Cornet v. State, 359 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Fields v. State
green
1 sentence2006The Huizar opinion observed that "[w]hile section 3(a) says nothing about the submission of a jury instruction to this effect, such instruction is logically required if the jury is to consider the extraneous offense and bad act evidence under the statutorily prescribed reasonable-doubt standard." Id. at 484 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Arline v. State
green
2 sentences2000Absent such instruction, the jury might apply a standard of proof less than reasonable doubt in its determination of the defendant's connection to such offenses and bad acts, contrary to section 3(a). [7] Section 3(a)'s requirement that the jury be satisfied of the defendant's culpability in the extraneous offenses and bad acts is thus "law applicable to the case" in the non-capital punishment context. [8] Cf. Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348 , 352 fn. 4 (Tex.Crim. 2000Absent such instruction, the jury might apply a standard of proof less than reasonable doubt in its determination of the defendant’s connection to such offenses and bad acts, contrary to section 3(a). 7 Section 3(a)’s requirement that the jury be satisfied of the defendant’s culpability in the extraneous offenses and bad acts is thus “law applicable to the case” in the non-capital punishment context. 8 Cf. Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348 , 352 fn. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (recognizing that “statutorily defined word or phrase must be included in the charge as part of the ‘law applicable to the cas | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Rodriquez v. State
green
1 sentence1981Rodriguez v. State, 544 S.W.2d 382 (Tex.Cr.App.). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.