declaratory relief claim in California

2013The declaratory relief claim arises from a contract dispute; it does not arise from actions taken by [the defendant] in furtherance of his constitutional rights.” (Id. at p. 1309; see City of Cotati v. Cashman, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 80 [action for declaratory relief was based on controversy regarding constitutionality of local ordinance, not on the filing of another action seeking contrary declaration].) In the present case, plaintiff’s claim is not for declaratory relief to determine the disputed meaning of the settlement agreement but for damages for having allegedly breached the agreement

2011(Cotati, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 72.) In ruling on the owners’ anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court found that the city’s state lawsuit arose from the owners’ filing of the earlier federal court action, and struck the city’s declaratory relief claim.

2024Employee Pension Plan (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497 [“Where, as here, a party has a fully matured cause of action for money, the party must seek the remedy of damages, and not pursue a declaratory relief claim.”].) The complaint alleges the Petrosian defendants, aided by the Buchalter defendants, embezzled money from the Corporation and, after the April 30, 2020 termination of the relationship, used the management services agreements to exclude Williams and take over the practice.

2022Employee Pension Plan (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497 [“Where, as here, a party has a fully matured cause of action for money, the party must seek the remedy of damages, and not pursue a declaratory relief claim.”].) The second amended complaint alleged the Petrosian defendants, aided by the Wells Fargo defendants, embezzled money from the Corporation’s accounts from 2018, when the accounts were opened, through March 31, 2020, when the parties terminated their relationship.

2022(Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 53-54 [demurrer is proper when the plaintiff has not stated sufficient facts to support a statutory claim and the declaratory relief claim is derivative of the statutory claim].) 14 On April 5, 2021, IEHP filed a request for judicial notice of (1) a Medi-Cal provider agreement; (2) a U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Claim Form (CMS-1500 Form); (3) an official department compliance statement for payment of noncontracted provider claims; (4) the department’s March 11, 2015 decision regarding amendment or repeal of regulation

2022(Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 53-54 [demurrer is proper when the plaintiff has not stated sufficient facts to support a statutory claim and the declaratory relief claim is derivative of the statutory claim].) 14 On April 5, 2021, IEHP filed a request for judicial notice of (1) a Medi-Cal provider agreement; (2) a U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Claim Form (CMS-1500 Form); (3) an official department compliance statement for payment of noncontracted provider claims; (4) the department’s March 11, 2015 decision regarding amendment or repeal of regulation

2016(Jenkins, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 513 .) The plaintiff did not dispute that her loan could be assigned or that she had defaulted on it and remained in arrears. {Id. at p. 514.) Even if one of the assignments of the note and deed of trust was improper in some respect, the appellate court reasoned, “Jenkins is not the victim of such invalid transfer[] because her obligations under the note remained unchanged.

2015(Market Lofts Community Assn. v. 9th Street Market Lofts, LLC (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 924, 931 ; 20 Jenkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497, 513 .) “In order for a party to pursue an action for declaratory relief, the ‘“actual, present controversy must be pleaded specifically . . . .”’ [Citation.] Thus, a claim must provide specific facts, as opposed to conclusions of law, which show a ‘“controversy of concrete actuality.”’ [Citation.]” (Jenkins, at pp. 513-514, original italics.) The party asserting the claim must be a party interested in the alleged controversy.

2021(Id. at p. 800.) For support, the court cited only Ochs v. PacifiCare of California (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 782, 794 (Ochs).

2021(Id. at p. 800.) For support, the court cited only Ochs v. PacifiCare of California (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 782, 794 (Ochs).

2015(Gomes, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 1156 .) Indeed, if the generic assertion made here were enough, particularly in the face of the record evidence, the Gomes “exception” would swallow the rule, and the non-judicial foreclosure process would effectively be transmuted into a judicial one.8 For these reasons, the Satos’ declaratory relief claim was properly dismissed.

2015The declaratory relief claim also contains a broad allegation that there is a present controversy whether the “Assignment, Substitution of Trustee, Notice of Default, and Notice of Sale are invalid and void and do not comply with law.” The trial court sustained the demurrer to the declaratory relief action based on Gomes, which held that there is no declaratory relief action to determine an entity’s authority to initiate a nonjudicial foreclosure because the “recognition of the right to bring a lawsuit to determine a nominee’s authorization to proceed with foreclosure on behalf of the notehold

1994Co. (1973) 30 Cal. App.3d 341, 344 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 208 ]), not in a declaratory relief claim. 6 We caution that the issue litigated on summary judgment was not whether the statutory bar of section 877 applied to Fireman’s “breach of the implied covenant” claim; that is, the court did not decide that the “good faith order” statutorily barred Fireman’s action as one for indemnity among “joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract.” Instead, the issue litigated and decided below was whether Fireman’s was collaterally estopped from claiming the settlement was in “bad" faith when it had previous

1994Co. (1973) 30 Cal. App.3d 341, 344 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 208 ]), not in a declaratory relief claim. 6 We caution that the issue litigated on summary judgment was not whether the statutory bar of section 877 applied to Fireman’s “breach of the implied covenant” claim; that is, the court did not decide that the “good faith order” statutorily barred Fireman’s action as one for indemnity among “joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract.” Instead, the issue litigated and decided below was whether Fireman’s was collaterally estopped from claiming the settlement was in “bad" faith when it had previous

2026(Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559 ; Lee v. Silveira (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 527, 546 .) An actual controversy must relate to the legal rights and duties of the parties, and not extend to potential controversies that are conjectural, anticipated to occur in the future, or constitute an attempt to obtain an advisory opinion from the court.

2024“To qualify for declaratory relief, [a party must] demonstrate its action present[s] two essential elements: ‘(1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to [the party’s] rights or obligations.’ ” (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1582 .) A trial court may dismiss a declaratory relief claim at the demurrer stage where it is “ ‘wholly derivative’ ” of a deficient cause of action.

2026In Kachlon v. Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 316, the Court of Appeal affirmed an attorneys’ fee award under Civil Code section 1717, finding causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief and to quiet title were “ ‘action[s] on a contract,’ ” even though “the remedy sought . . . was equitable.” (Id. at pp. 346-348.) The declaratory relief claim “sought a declaration that [an underlying] promissory note 13 must be cancelled because it had been paid in full, and that [a related] deed of trust must be reconveyed because the foreclosure violated the terms of the deed of trust.” (Id. at

2026In Kachlon v. Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 316 , the Court of Appeal affirmed an attorneys’ fee award under Civil Code section 1717, finding causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief and to quiet title were “ ‘action[s] on a contract,’ ” even though “the remedy sought . . . was equitable.” (Id. at pp. 346-348.) The declaratory relief claim “sought a declaration that [an underlying] promissory note 13 must be cancelled because it had been paid in full, and that [a related] deed of trust must be reconveyed because the foreclosure violated the terms of the deed of trust.” (Id. at

2024Proc., § 1060.) “Declaratory relief pursuant to this section has frequently been used as a means of settling controversies between parties to a contract regarding the nature of their contractual rights and obligations.” (Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 634, 647 .) Likewise, “‘“[t]he correct interpretation of a statute is a particularly suitable subject for a judicial declaration. [Citation.] Resort to declaratory relief therefore is appropriate to attain judicial clarification of the parties’ rights and obligations under the applicable law.”’” (City of Lancaster v. Netflix, Inc

2016(Osseous, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 360 ; Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 634, 639 (Meyer); Baldwin v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 393 , 407–408 (Baldwin).) “Declaratory relief operates prospectively to declare future rights, rather than to redress past wrongs. [Citation.] Where, as here, a party has a fully matured cause of action for money, the party must seek the remedy of damages, and not pursue a declaratory relief claim.” (Canova v. Trustees of Imperial Irrigation Dist.

2023(Bower v. AT&T Mobility, LLC (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1552 [de novo standard of review for demurrer rulings].) A. Successive Demurrers As she did below, Herron argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide Feast’s second demurrer to the declaratory relief claim under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (b), which states: “A party demurring to a pleading that has been amended after a demurrer to an earlier version of the pleading was sustained shall not demur to any portion of the amended complaint, cross-complaint, or answer on grounds that could have been raise

2015A. Standard of Review "In reviewing a judgment following the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend, we decide de novo whether the complaint states facts sufficient to state a cause of action." (Bower v. AT&T Mobility, LLC (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1552 .) "We treat the demurrer as admitting all facts properly pleaded, but we do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law." (Ibid.) We may also consider documents 7 attached to the complaint and matters subject to judicial notice.3 (Hoffman v. Smithwoods RV Park, LLC (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 390, 400 .) "A rev

2022(Steinberg v. Chiang (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 338, 343 .) Here, the trial court sustained Ascentium’s demurrer on the ground that cross-complainants’ cause of action “does not allege an actual controversy with Ascentium because it is based on past events, not on a current controversy, and/or appears to set forth alleged defenses to Plaintiff Alliance Funding Group’s claims, rather than proper subjects of a declaratory relief claim.” Accordingly, we review the trial court’s determination that cross-complainants’ cause of action “does not allege an actual controversy with Ascentium” de novo, and t

2018Proc., § 1061 )." *931 Steinberg , at p. 343, 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 249 ; In re Tobacco Cases II , at p. 804, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 881 .) This is a matter within the trial court's sound discretion "except in the extreme circumstances where relief is 'entirely appropriate' such that a trial court would abuse its discretion in denying relief ... or where relief would never be necessary or proper." ( Steinberg , at p. 343, 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 249 .) In the proceedings below, neither the parties nor the trial court distinguished between these two prongs of the declaratory relief analysis.

2007(Babb v. Superior Court (1971) 3 Cal.3d 841, 848 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 179 , 479 P.2d 379 ].) Where, as here, a party has a fully matured cause of action for money, the party must seek the remedy of damages, and not pursue a declaratory relief claim.

2007(Babb v. Superior Court (1971) 3 Cal.3d 841, 848 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 179 , 479 P.2d 379 ].) Where, as here, a party has a fully matured cause of action for money, the party must seek the remedy of damages, and not pursue a declaratory relief claim.

2016(Osseous, supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 360 ; Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 634, 639 (Meyer); Baldwin v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 393 , 407–408 (Baldwin).) “Declaratory relief operates prospectively to declare future rights, rather than to redress past wrongs. [Citation.] Where, as here, a party has a fully matured cause of action for money, the party must seek the remedy of damages, and not pursue a declaratory relief claim.” (Canova v. Trustees of Imperial Irrigation Dist.

2015Our Supreme Court has held: “‘“The purpose of a declaratory judgment is to ‘serve some practical end in quieting or stabilizing an uncertain or disputed jural relation.’” [Citation.] “Another purpose is to liquidate doubts with respect 11 to uncertainties or controversies which might otherwise result in subsequent litigation [citation].” [Citation.]’” (Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 634, 647 ; accord, Osseous Technologies of American, Inc. v. DiscoveryOrtho Partners LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 357, 364 .) We defer to the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by s

1993(International Assn, of Fire Fighters v. City of Palo Alto (1963) 60 Cal.2d 295, 301-302 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 842 , 384 P.2d 170 ]; Weissman v. Lakewood Water & Power Co. (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 652, 656 [ 343 P.2d 776 ].) On appeal, courts have held that if a plaintiff or cross-complainant has other means of seeking a determination of their rights, then a trial judge may sustain a general demurrer to a declaratory relief claim.

1993(International Assn, of Fire Fighters v. City of Palo Alto (1963) 60 Cal.2d 295, 301-302 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 842 , 384 P.2d 170 ]; Weissman v. Lakewood Water & Power Co. (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 652, 656 [ 343 P.2d 776 ].) On appeal, courts have held that if a plaintiff or cross-complainant has other means of seeking a determination of their rights, then a trial judge may sustain a general demurrer to a declaratory relief claim.

2026(ABF Capital Corp. v. Berglass, supra, 37. 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 832 [judicial estoppel is invoked “to prevent judicial fraud from a litigant’s deceitful assertion of a position completely inconsistent with one previously asserted”; “[t]he inconsistent position generally must be factual in nature”].) To the contrary, “[l]egal arguments can be considered at any stage in a case … that involves purely legal issues and undisputed facts.” (Field v. Bowen (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 346, 355, fn. 3 .) E.