equivalent claim in Wisconsin

2024The gravamen of Repka’s argument is that, had the Town approved the shared driveway, the exceptions to the County ordinance’s frontage requirement would have been met, and we address and reject that argument in the text. 13 No. 2023AP1178 proposed in the petition, the County reasonably determined that the petition violates the frontage requirement in the County ordinance, as explained above. ¶27 Moreover, “an attack based on the arbitrariness or unreasonableness of a legislative action is the equivalent of a claim of unconstitutionality based on a denial of equal protection of the laws or due

2024The gravamen of Repka’s argument is that, had the Town approved the shared driveway, the exceptions to the County ordinance’s frontage requirement would have been met, and we address and reject that argument in the text. 13 No. 2023AP1178 proposed in the petition, the County reasonably determined that the petition violates the frontage requirement in the County ordinance, as explained above. ¶27 Moreover, “an attack based on the arbitrariness or unreasonableness of a legislative action is the equivalent of a claim of unconstitutionality based on a denial of equal protection of the laws or due

2024The gravamen of Repka’s argument is that, had the Town approved the shared driveway, the exceptions to the County ordinance’s frontage requirement would have been met, and we address and reject that argument in the text. 13 No. 2023AP1178 proposed in the petition, the County reasonably determined that the petition violates the frontage requirement in the County ordinance, as explained above. ¶27 Moreover, “an attack based on the arbitrariness or unreasonableness of a legislative action is the equivalent of a claim of unconstitutionality based on a denial of equal protection of the laws or due

2024The statutory materiality requirement is the equivalent of the requirement of prejudice under Brady; “‘evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Harris, 272 Wis. 2d 80, ¶14 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). ¶16 Courts on appeal “independently review whether a due process violation has occurred, but we accept the trial court’s findings of historical fact unless clearly erroneous.” Wayerski, 385 Wis. 2d 344, ¶35 . 4 The States does not ar

2002Armada Broad., Inc. v. Stirn, 183 Wis. 2d 463, 470 , 516 N.W.2d 357 (1994). ¶ 11.

2002Armada Broad., Inc. v. Stirn, 183 Wis. 2d 463, 470 , 516 N.W.2d 357 (1994). ¶ 11.

2002More recently, however, the supreme court has noted that the necessary party inquiry under § 803.03(l)(b), 1 (whether a person who "claims an interest relating to the subject of the action... is so situated that the disposition in the person's absence may ... [a] s a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest") is the equivalent of the inquiry under Wis. Stat. § 803.09 (1) to determine whether a person is entitled to intervene in an action "as a matter *221 of right." City of Madison v. WERC, 2000 WI 39 , ¶ 11 n.8, 234 Wis. 2d 550 , 610 N.W.2d 94 . 6 Whethe

2002More recently, however, the supreme court has noted that the necessary party inquiry under § 803.03(l)(b), 1 (whether a person who "claims an interest relating to the subject of the action... is so situated that the disposition in the person's absence may ... [a] s a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest") is the equivalent of the inquiry under Wis. Stat. § 803.09 (1) to determine whether a person is entitled to intervene in an action "as a matter *221 of right." City of Madison v. WERC, 2000 WI 39 , ¶ 11 n.8, 234 Wis. 2d 550 , 610 N.W.2d 94 . 6 Whethe

1997As the supreme court noted in Buhler , "an attack based on the arbitrariness or unreasonableness of a legislative action is the equivalent of a claim of unconstitutionality based on a denial of equal protection of the laws or due process." Id. at 143 , 146 N.W.2d at 406 .) The parties dispute whether it was proper for the trial court to consider the evidence submitted by McGinnity, which consisted of copies of seven rezoning petitions which had been approved by the county board and Phelps in 1994 and 1995.

1984The Judicial Commission cites United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1982), upholding the provisions of the federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 USC secs. 3161 et seq., in support of its contention that the Wisconsin doctrine of separation of powers is the equivalent of a doctrine of “shared powers” according to which one branch of government may exercise its authority in an area constitutionally established in another branch so long as its actions do not unreasonably burden or sub-tantially interfere with the exercise by that other branch of its authority within the area.

1984The Judicial Commission cites United States v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691 (4th Cir. 1982), upholding the provisions of the federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 USC secs. 3161 et seq., in support of its contention that the Wisconsin doctrine of separation of powers is the equivalent of a doctrine of "shared powers" according to which one branch of government may exercise its authority in an area constitutionally established in another branch so long as its actions do not unreasonably burden or substantially interfere with the exercise by that other branch of its authority within the area.

1975Sailer v. Barnousky (1884), 60 Wis. 169, 171 , 18 N. W. 763 .

1975Sailer v. Barnousky (1884), 60 Wis. 169, 171 , 18 N. W. 763 .

1914It must have been understood by counsel and the court, hence presumably by the jury, as stating the substantial equivalent of the rule laid down in Poertner v. Poertner, 66 Wis. 644 , 29 N. W. 386 .

1914It must have been understood by counsel and the court, hence presumably by the jury, as stating the substantial equivalent of the rule laid down in Poertner v. Poertner, 66 Wis. 644 , 29 N. W. 386 .