jury after hearing (Indiana) · Go Syfert
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jury after hearing in Indiana

101 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2026 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (21)

CaseFollowedCited
Rhodes v. Wrightgreen
ind · 2004 · cited in 62 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2004–2023
2 sentences

2023“This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person – one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id.

2019"This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person - one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence." Id.

2762
Jason and Justina Kramer v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc.green
ind · 2015 · cited in 14 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2015–2020
2 sentences

2017However, "we carefully assess the trial court's decision to ensure that he was not properly denied his day in court." Id. [13] Our Supreme Court has recently reiterated that "[s]ummary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are particularly fact-sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence." Kramer v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc. , 32 N.E.3d 227 , 231 (Ind. 2015).

2015“Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are particularly fact-sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence.” Kramer v. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc., 32 N.E.3d 227, 231 (Ind. 2015).

1014
Oxley v. Lenngreen
indctapp · 2004 · cited in 5 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2006–2013
2 sentences

2013Summary judgment is “rarely appropriate” in negligence cases, including legal malpractice actions, because such claims “are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind. 2004)); see also Oxley, 819 N.E.2d 851 at 856- 57.

2013Summary judgment is “rarely appropriate” in negligence cases, including legal malpractice actions, because such claims “are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person — one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind.2004); see also Oxley v. Lenn, 819 N.E.2d 851, 856-57 (Ind.Ct.App.2004).

45
M.S.D. of Martinsville v. Jacksongreen
indctapp · 2014 · cited in 3 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2015–2017
2 sentences

2017Id.

2016M.S.D. of Martinsville v. Jackson, 9 N.E.3d 230, 235 (Ind.Ct.App.2014), trans. denied (citations and internal quotations omitted).

23
Kroger Co. v. Plonskigreen
ind · 2010 · cited in 3 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2011–2014
2 sentences

2014See Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 930 N.E.2d 1 (Ind.2010).

2011Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence actions, because “ ‘negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person — one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.’” Id. at 10 (quoting Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind.2004)).

23
Harradon v. Schlamadingergreen
indctapp · 2009 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2016–2025
2 sentences

2025“In negligence cases, summary judgment is rarely appropriate because such cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Harradon v. Schlamadinger, 913 N.E.2d 297, 300 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. [12] “Under our common law, all dogs, regardless of breed or size, are presumed to be harmless domestic animals.” Pozanski ex rel.

2016Harradon v. Schlamadinger, 913 N.E.2d 297, 300 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

22
Jill Miller v. Rosehill Hotels, LLC d/b/a Holiday Inn Express Intercontinental Hotel Group d/b/a Holiday Inn Expressgreen
indctapp · 2015 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
2 sentences

2020Miller v. Rosehill Hotels, LLC, 45 N.E.3d 15, 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). [24] Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because such cases are particularly fact-sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence.

2020Miller v. Rosehill Hotels, LLC, 45 N.E.3d 15, 19 (Ind. Ct. App 2015) (citing Kramer v. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc., 32 N.E.3d 227, 231 (Ind. 2015)). [10] Harjinder argues that Gurdwara Hargobind had a duty, which arose from the foreseeability of his injury, to take reasonable precautions to protect him from Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 20A-CT-959 | September 8, 2020 Page 13 of 23 injury at the hands of others at the temple.

22
Countrymark Cooperative, Inc. v. Hammesgreen
indctapp · 2008 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014“This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person – one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Countrymark Coop., Inc. v. Hammes, 892 N.E.2d 683, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied (quoting Rhodes v. Wright, 805 4 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. 2004)) (explaining why summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases).

2014“This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Countrymark Coop., Inc. v. Hammes, 892 N.E.2d 683, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied (quoting Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. 2004)).

22
Graves v. Johnsongreen
indctapp · 2007 · cited in 3 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009(Graves v. Johnson, 862 N.E.2d 716, 719 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). - Moreover, in negligence cases, summary judgment is rarely appropriate because they are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person-one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.

2009Id. (citing Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind.2004)).

13
Reed v. Reidgreen
ind · 2012 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2017–2026
2 sentences

2026Furthermore, “[t]o the extent we ‘have any doubts concerning the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, we must resolve those doubts in favor of the nonmoving party.’” Z.D., 217 N.E.3d at 532 (quoting Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 303 (Ind. 2012)).

2017Rather, “[w]e construe all factual inferences in the non-moving party’s favor and resolve all doubts as to the existence of a material issue against the moving party.” Reed, 980 N.E.2d at 285 . [22] “Summary judgment must be carefully considered in negligence cases because they are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by the objective reasonable person standard–one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Cox v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 837 N.E.2d 1075, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

12
Cox v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc.green
indctapp · 2005 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2006–2017
2 sentences

2017Rather, “[w]e construe all factual inferences in the non-moving party’s favor and resolve all doubts as to the existence of a material issue against the moving party.” Reed, 980 N.E.2d at 285 . [22] “Summary judgment must be carefully considered in negligence cases because they are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by the objective reasonable person standard–one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Cox v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 837 N.E.2d 1075, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

2006Id.

12
Antonio Hughley v. State of Indiana, The Consolidated City of Indianapolis/Marion County, and The Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Departmentgreen
ind · 2014 · cited in 2 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2015–2017
2 sentences

2017However, "we carefully assess the trial court's decision to ensure that he was not properly denied his day in court." Id. [13] Our Supreme Court has recently reiterated that "[s]ummary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are particularly fact-sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence." Kramer v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc. , 32 N.E.3d 227 , 231 (Ind. 2015).

2015“Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are particularly fact-sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence.” Kramer v. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc., --- N.E.3d ---, No. 71S03-1506-CT-350 (Ind. June 3, 2015). [6] Our Supreme Court has very recently cautioned that “[a]s long as competent evidence has been designated in response to a summary judgment motion, . . . ‘weighing [the evidence]—no matter how decisively the scales may seem to tip—[i

12
Poznanski Ex Rel. Poznanski v. Horvathgreen
ind · 2003 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025Pozanski v. Horvath, 788 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Ind. 2003).

11
Babes Showclub, Jaba, Inc. v. Lairgreen
ind · 2009 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
1 sentence

2023“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a negligence action, the defendant must demonstrate that the undisputed material facts negate at least one of the elements essential to plaintiff’s claim or that the claim is barred by an affirmative defense.” Id. [9] In its relatively recent restatement of Indiana’s firefighter’s rule, which was originally established in 1893, the Indiana Supreme Court explained that the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-945 | October 23, 2023 Page 6 of 11 rule “allows no claim by a professional emergency responder for the negligence that creates the

11
Corey McAlpin v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2017 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2564 | June 17, 2020 Page 30 of 32 of citizens whose collective experience allows it to “draw wiser and safer conclusions” than any one person could. 80 N.E.3d at 162 (internal citations omitted).

11
Kathy L. Siner, Personal Representative of the Estate of Geraldine A. Siner v. Kindred Hospital Limited Partnership, d/b/a Kindred Hospital of Indianapolisgreen
ind · 2016 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016See Siner, 51 N.E.3d at 1188 ; Jarboe, 644 N.E.2d at 123 .

11
Woodruff v. Indiana Family & Social Services Administrationgreen
ind · 2012 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015Admin., 964 N.E.2d 784, 790 (Ind. 2012). 5 Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are particularly fact-sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence.

11
The People v. Schmidtgreen
ill · 1936 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014“This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person – one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Countrymark Coop., Inc. v. Hammes, 892 N.E.2d 683, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied (quoting Rhodes v. Wright, 805 4 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. 2004)) (explaining why summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases).

11
Kopczynski Ex Rel. Palmer v. Bargersgreen
ind · 2008 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
1 sentence

2009The trial court granted summary judgment because it found the Kings did not owe a duty to Kenneth. "[The existence of a duty is ordinarily a question of law for the court to decide, but it may turn on factual issues that must be resolved by the trier of fact" Kopczsynski v. Barger, 887 N.E.2d 928, 981 (Ind.2008).

11
Schoop's Restaurant v. Hardygreen
indctapp · 2007 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
11
Knight v. Maersk Container Service Co.green
massappct · 2000 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (12)

CaseCitedYears
Winfrey v. NLMP, INC. green
indctapp · 2012
2 sentences

2015“Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence.” Id.

2014“Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are particularly fact sensitive and are 4 governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence.” Id.

32014–2017
Tibbs v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. green
ind · 1996
2 sentences

2026“This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id.

2016“This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id. [41] In order for Ideal to obtain summary judgment in its favor on this negligent hiringAetention claim, it was required to designate evidence to affirmatively negate, or demonstrate that .one of these elements of Restatement § 317 was not satisfied.

22016–2026
Steel v. Rust green
indctapp · 2005
2 sentences

2013"This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person-one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence." Id. (citing Rhodes, 805 N.E.2d at 387 ).

2005Id.

22005–2013
Winchell v. Guy green
indctapp · 2006
2 sentences

2007Id. (citing Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind.2004)).

2007“In negligence cases, summary judgment is rarely appropriate because they are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person — one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id. at 1026-27 .

22007–2007
Wyatt Severance v. New Castle Community School Corporation a/k/a New Castle Career Center, and Turner Melton green
indctapp · 2017
2 sentences

2023“This standard is best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id.

2023“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a negligence action, the defendant must demonstrate that the undisputed material facts negate at least one of the elements essential to plaintiff’s claim or that the claim is barred by an affirmative defense.” Id. [9] In its relatively recent restatement of Indiana’s firefighter’s rule, which was originally established in 1893, the Indiana Supreme Court explained that the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-945 | October 23, 2023 Page 6 of 11 rule “allows no claim by a professional emergency responder for the negligence that creates the

12023–2023
Marvin Podemski v. Praxair, Inc. and Antibus Scales & Systems, Inc. green
indctapp · 2017
1 sentence

2018"Generally, summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are particularly fact-sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence." Id.

12018–2018
Victor J. DiMaggio III v. Elias Rosario Elias Rosario v. Victor J. DiMiaggio III green
indctapp · 2016
1 sentence

2017However, we will affirm the "trial court's entry of summary judgment if it can be sustained on any theory or basis in the record." DiMaggio v. Rosario , 52 N.E.3d 896 , 904 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). [14] To prevail on his negligence claim, Martin must prove that Hayduk and Stafford: 1) owed Martin a duty; 2) breached that duty; and 3) proximately caused Martin's injuries.

12017–2017
Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers of Indiana, Inc. green
ind · 1994
1 sentence

2016See Siner, 51 N.E.3d at 1188 ; Jarboe, 644 N.E.2d at 123 .

12016–2016
Sparks v. White green
indctapp · 2008
1 sentence

2015Sparks, 899 N.E.2d at 23 .

12015–2015
Douglass v. Irvin green
ind · 1990
1 sentence

2015Id. (citing Douglass, 549 N.E.2d at 369 ).

12015–2015
Charles Pickering v. Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC d/b/a Horseshoe Southern Indiana green
indctapp · 2013
1 sentence

2013Id.

12013–2013
Buise v. State green
ind · 1972
11977–1977

Statutes the citing opinions construe

IN § Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3 (5) IN § Ind. Code § 34-51-2-2 (4) IN § Ind. Code § 34-51-2-5 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IN 101 (1977–2026) PA 5 (1928–2026) OK 5 (1924–2018) IL 5 (1902–2019) TN 5 (1975–2025) GA 4 (1943–1989) CA 4 (1930–2022) MO 3 (1899–2008) AR 3 (1993–2017) OH 3 (1972–2020) AZ 2 (1987–2008) SC 2 (2000–2025) MS 2 (1961–1971) WY 2 (1994–2008)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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