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103 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rhodes v. Wrightgreen2 sentences2026We conclude, however, that Employer did not raise these arguments below. cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id. [13] This Court has held: “Negligent retention and supervision is a distinct tort from respondeat superior; it may impose liability on an employer when an employee ‘steps beyond the recognized scope of his [or her] employment to commit a tortious injury upon a third party.’” Scott v. Retz, 916 N.E.2d 252, 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Clark v. Aris, 2023“This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person – one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id. | 27 | 63 |
Jason and Justina Kramer v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc.green2 sentences2017However, "we carefully assess the trial court's decision to ensure that he was not properly denied his day in court." Id. [13] Our Supreme Court has recently reiterated that "[s]ummary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are particularly fact-sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence." Kramer v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc. , 32 N.E.3d 227 , 231 (Ind. 2015). 2015“Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are particularly fact-sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence.” Kramer v. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc., 32 N.E.3d 227, 231 (Ind. 2015). | 11 | 15 |
Oxley v. Lenngreen2 sentences2013Summary judgment is “rarely appropriate” in negligence cases, including legal malpractice actions, because such claims “are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind. 2004)); see also Oxley, 819 N.E.2d 851 at 856- 57. 2013Summary judgment is “rarely appropriate” in negligence cases, including legal malpractice actions, because such claims “are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person — one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind.2004); see also Oxley v. Lenn, 819 N.E.2d 851, 856-57 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). | 4 | 5 |
M.S.D. of Martinsville v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2017Id. 2016M.S.D. of Martinsville v. Jackson, 9 N.E.3d 230, 235 (Ind.Ct.App.2014), trans. denied (citations and internal quotations omitted). | 2 | 3 |
Kroger Co. v. Plonskired2 sentences2014See Kroger Co. v. Plonski, 930 N.E.2d 1 (Ind.2010). 2011Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence actions, because “ ‘negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person — one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.’” Id. at 10 (quoting Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind.2004)). | 2 | 3 |
Harradon v. Schlamadingergreen2 sentences2025“In negligence cases, summary judgment is rarely appropriate because such cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Harradon v. Schlamadinger, 913 N.E.2d 297, 300 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. [12] “Under our common law, all dogs, regardless of breed or size, are presumed to be harmless domestic animals.” Pozanski ex rel. 2016Harradon v. Schlamadinger, 913 N.E.2d 297, 300 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). | 2 | 2 |
Jill Miller v. Rosehill Hotels, LLC d/b/a Holiday Inn Express Intercontinental Hotel Group d/b/a Holiday Inn Expressgreen2 sentences2020Miller v. Rosehill Hotels, LLC, 45 N.E.3d 15, 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). [24] Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because such cases are particularly fact-sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence. 2020Miller v. Rosehill Hotels, LLC, 45 N.E.3d 15, 19 (Ind. Ct. App 2015) (citing Kramer v. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc., 32 N.E.3d 227, 231 (Ind. 2015)). [10] Harjinder argues that Gurdwara Hargobind had a duty, which arose from the foreseeability of his injury, to take reasonable precautions to protect him from injury at the hands of others at the temple. | 2 | 2 |
Countrymark Cooperative, Inc. v. Hammesgreen2 sentences2014“This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person – one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Countrymark Coop., Inc. v. Hammes, 892 N.E.2d 683, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied (quoting Rhodes v. Wright, 805 4 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. 2004)) (explaining why summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases). 2014“This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Countrymark Coop., Inc. v. Hammes, 892 N.E.2d 683, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied (quoting Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ind. 2004)). | 2 | 2 |
Graves v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2009Id. (citing Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind.2004)). 2009(Graves v. Johnson, 862 N.E.2d 716, 719 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). - Moreover, in negligence cases, summary judgment is rarely appropriate because they are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person-one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence. | 1 | 3 |
Reed v. Reidgreen2 sentences2026Furthermore, “[t]o the extent we ‘have any doubts concerning the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, we must resolve those doubts in favor of the nonmoving party.’” Z.D., 217 N.E.3d at 532 (quoting Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 303 (Ind. 2012)). 2017Rather, “[w]e construe all factual inferences in the non-moving party’s favor and resolve all doubts as to the existence of a material issue against the moving party.” Reed, 980 N.E.2d at 285 . [22] “Summary judgment must be carefully considered in negligence cases because they are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by the objective reasonable person standard–one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Cox v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 837 N.E.2d 1075, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). | 1 | 2 |
Cox v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc.green2 sentences2017Rather, “[w]e construe all factual inferences in the non-moving party’s favor and resolve all doubts as to the existence of a material issue against the moving party.” Reed, 980 N.E.2d at 285 . [22] “Summary judgment must be carefully considered in negligence cases because they are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by the objective reasonable person standard–one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Cox v. Stoughton Trailers, Inc., 837 N.E.2d 1075, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 2006Id. | 1 | 2 |
Antonio Hughley v. State of Indiana, The Consolidated City of Indianapolis/Marion County, and The Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Departmentgreen2 sentences2017However, "we carefully assess the trial court's decision to ensure that he was not properly denied his day in court." Id. [13] Our Supreme Court has recently reiterated that "[s]ummary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are particularly fact-sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence." Kramer v. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc. , 32 N.E.3d 227 , 231 (Ind. 2015). 2015“Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are particularly fact-sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence.” Kramer v. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Fort Wayne-S. Bend, Inc., --- N.E.3d ---, No. 71S03-1506-CT-350 (Ind. June 3, 2015). [6] Our Supreme Court has very recently cautioned that “[a]s long as competent evidence has been designated in response to a summary judgment motion, . . . ‘weighing [the evidence]—no matter how decisively the scales may seem to tip—[i | 1 | 2 |
Webb v. Jarvisyellow1 sentence2026“Negligent retention and supervision is a species of negligence and has the following elements: 1) a duty of care owed by an employer to a third person; 2) breach of that duty; and 3) injury to the third person proximately caused by the employer’s breach.” Id. [14] Employer argues that it did not have a duty to J.M., but our Courts have held that the “duty of an employer to a person harmed by the conduct of an employee” is as follows: 4 To determine whether an employer owed a duty of care to the plaintiff—i.e., “a person harmed by the conduct of an 4 Employer argues that we should apply the th | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. Retzgreen1 sentence2026We conclude, however, that Employer did not raise these arguments below. cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id. [13] This Court has held: “Negligent retention and supervision is a distinct tort from respondeat superior; it may impose liability on an employer when an employee ‘steps beyond the recognized scope of his [or her] employment to commit a tortious injury upon a third party.’” Scott v. Retz, 916 N.E.2d 252, 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Clark v. Aris, | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Aris, Inc.green2 sentences2026“Negligent retention and supervision is a species of negligence and has the following elements: 1) a duty of care owed by an employer to a third person; 2) breach of that duty; and 3) injury to the third person proximately caused by the employer’s breach.” Id. [14] Employer argues that it did not have a duty to J.M., but our Courts have held that the “duty of an employer to a person harmed by the conduct of an employee” is as follows: 4 To determine whether an employer owed a duty of care to the plaintiff—i.e., “a person harmed by the conduct of an 4 Employer argues that we should apply the th 2026We conclude, however, that Employer did not raise these arguments below. cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id. [13] This Court has held: “Negligent retention and supervision is a distinct tort from respondeat superior; it may impose liability on an employer when an employee ‘steps beyond the recognized scope of his [or her] employment to commit a tortious injury upon a third party.’” Scott v. Retz, 916 N.E.2d 252, 257 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Clark v. Aris, | 1 | 1 |
Poznanski Ex Rel. Poznanski v. Horvathgreen1 sentence2025Pozanski v. Horvath, 788 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Ind. 2003). | 1 | 1 |
Babes Showclub, Jaba, Inc. v. Lairgreen1 sentence2023“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a negligence action, the defendant must demonstrate that the undisputed material facts negate at least one of the elements essential to plaintiff’s claim or that the claim is barred by an affirmative defense.” Id. [9] In its relatively recent restatement of Indiana’s firefighter’s rule, which was originally established in 1893, the Indiana Supreme Court explained that the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-945 | October 23, 2023 Page 6 of 11 rule “allows no claim by a professional emergency responder for the negligence that creates the | 1 | 1 |
Corey McAlpin v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2020The Court rejected a defendant’s argument that the State need to have presented “what he calls the ‘best evidence’” – that children typically use the park “even while school is in session” – and framed the inquiry as “not whether the verdict was based on the ‘best evidence’ but whether it was based on a reasonable inference.” Id. at 163 . 2020And that objective, fact-intensive standard is “best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” After all, the jury is a body 8 Eldridge objected on hearsay grounds as Officer Coryell stated: “I spoke with two separate people there and they said they had approximately eighteen kids . . .” Transcript Volume II at 101. of citizens whose collective experience allows it to “draw wiser and safer conclusions” than any one person could. 80 N.E.3d at 162 (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Kathy L. Siner, Personal Representative of the Estate of Geraldine A. Siner v. Kindred Hospital Limited Partnership, d/b/a Kindred Hospital of Indianapolisgreen1 sentence2016See Siner, 51 N.E.3d at 1188 ; Jarboe, 644 N.E.2d at 123 . | 1 | 1 |
| Woodruff v. Indiana Family & Social Services Administrationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| The People v. Schmidtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kopczynski Ex Rel. Palmer v. Bargersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schoop's Restaurant v. Hardygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Winfrey v. NLMP, INC.
green
2 sentences2015“Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence.” Id. 2014“Summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are particularly fact sensitive and are 4 governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence.” Id. | 3 | 2014–2017 |
Tibbs v. Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc.
green
2 sentences2026“This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id. 2016“This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id. [41] In order for Ideal to obtain summary judgment in its favor on this negligent hiringAetention claim, it was required to designate evidence to affirmatively negate, or demonstrate that .one of these elements of Restatement § 317 was not satisfied. | 2 | 2016–2026 |
Steel v. Rust
green
2 sentences2013"This is because negligence cases are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person-one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence." Id. (citing Rhodes, 805 N.E.2d at 387 ). 2005Id. | 2 | 2005–2013 |
Winchell v. Guy
green
2 sentences2007Id. (citing Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382, 387 (Ind.2004)). 2007“In negligence cases, summary judgment is rarely appropriate because they are particularly fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person — one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id. at 1026-27 . | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Z D v. COMMUNITY HEALTH NETWORK
green
1 sentence2026Furthermore, “[t]o the extent we ‘have any doubts concerning the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, we must resolve those doubts in favor of the nonmoving party.’” Z.D., 217 N.E.3d at 532 (quoting Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 303 (Ind. 2012)). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Wyatt Severance v. New Castle Community School Corporation a/k/a New Castle Career Center, and Turner Melton
green
2 sentences2023“To prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a negligence action, the defendant must demonstrate that the undisputed material facts negate at least one of the elements essential to plaintiff’s claim or that the claim is barred by an affirmative defense.” Id. [9] In its relatively recent restatement of Indiana’s firefighter’s rule, which was originally established in 1893, the Indiana Supreme Court explained that the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-945 | October 23, 2023 Page 6 of 11 rule “allows no claim by a professional emergency responder for the negligence that creates the 2023“This standard is best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.” Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Marvin Podemski v. Praxair, Inc. and Antibus Scales & Systems, Inc.
green
1 sentence2018"Generally, summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are particularly fact-sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person, which is best applied by a jury after hearing all the evidence." Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Victor J. DiMaggio III v. Elias Rosario Elias Rosario v. Victor J. DiMiaggio III
green
1 sentence2017However, we will affirm the "trial court's entry of summary judgment if it can be sustained on any theory or basis in the record." DiMaggio v. Rosario , 52 N.E.3d 896 , 904 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). [14] To prevail on his negligence claim, Martin must prove that Hayduk and Stafford: 1) owed Martin a duty; 2) breached that duty; and 3) proximately caused Martin's injuries. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
cluster 2765899
neutral
1 sentence2017To recover on a theory of negligence, a plaintiff must establish three elements: “(1) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1612-CT-2937 | August 16, 2017 Page 10 of 31 injury to the plaintiff resulting from the defendant’s breach.” Rodriguez v. U.S. Steel Corp., 24 N.E.3d 474 , 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied (2015). [23] Appellants argue that “the record demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the circumstances giving rise to the occurrence and because [A | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers of Indiana, Inc.
green
1 sentence2016See Siner, 51 N.E.3d at 1188 ; Jarboe, 644 N.E.2d at 123 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Sparks v. White
green
1 sentence2015Sparks, 899 N.E.2d at 23 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Douglass v. Irvin green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Charles Pickering v. Caesars Riverboat Casino, LLC d/b/a Horseshoe Southern Indiana green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Buise v. State green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.