cursory analysis in California

2016We agree with the Palos Verdes Estates court that public use of the right-of-way is not limited to travel and that streets “may be employed to serve important social, expressive, and aesthetic functions.” (Palos Verdes Estates, supra, 583 F.3d at p. 723 .) We believe the La Cañada Flintridge court reached the wrong result through a cursory analysis, in which it interpreted “incommode” too narrowly and adopted a myopic view of the function of public roads.

2016We agree with the Palos Verdes Estates court that public use of the right-of-way is not limited to travel and that streets “may be employed to serve important social, expressive, and aesthetic functions.” (Palos Verdes Estates, supra, 583 F.3d at p. 723 .) We believe the La Cañada Flintridge court reached the wrong result through a cursory analysis, in which it interpreted “incommode” too narrowly and adopted a myopic view of the function of public roads.

2025(People v. Perez, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 7–9 [excusing failure to object on confrontation clause grounds in addition to hearsay grounds in trial conducted prior to People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 ].) He does make a cursory claim that objection on other grounds would have been futile, but given the careful attention the court gave to curing the hearsay and lack of foundation objections by crafting a limiting instruction, we cannot say that, had other grounds for objection been raised, the court surely would have rejected them out of hand or seen no reason to invite the prosecution to i

2025(People v. Denard (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1012 , 1030–1031, fn. 10.) We do not agree that this asserted error rises to the magnitude of a due process violation or otherwise implicates defendant’s substantial rights in a manner that requires us to excuse his forfeiture.

2025(People v. Perez, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 7–9 [excusing failure to object on confrontation clause grounds in addition to hearsay grounds in trial conducted prior to People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 ].) He does make a cursory claim that objection on other grounds would have been futile, but given the careful attention the court gave to curing the hearsay and lack of foundation objections by crafting a limiting instruction, we cannot say that, had other grounds for objection been raised, the court surely would have rejected them out of hand or seen no reason to invite the prosecution to i

2025(People v. Perez, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 7–9 [excusing failure to object on confrontation clause grounds in addition to hearsay grounds in trial conducted prior to People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 ].) He does make a cursory claim that objection on other grounds would have been futile, but given the careful attention the court gave to curing the hearsay and lack of foundation objections by crafting a limiting instruction, we cannot say that, had other grounds for objection been raised, the court surely would have rejected them out of hand or seen no reason to invite the prosecution to i

2024(People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 436 .) Lopez-Flores presents only a cursory analysis of prejudice from the purported error in failing to instruct on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.

2022(Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140 .) “[W]e cannot reverse an attorney fee award solely for lack of an explanation by the trial court.

2019(See Sierra Club v. City of Orange, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 543–544 [EIR was not required to discuss inconsistencies with county general plan where proposed project would be subject to city general plan if approved].) On reply, plaintiffs do not dispute these facts or explain why the City would be required to evaluate the alleged inconsistencies. 19 Plaintiffs also make a cursory claim that “The City’s findings that the Project is consistent with area plans and policies is not supported by substantial evidence” (italics added), but they do not discuss that contention substantively or pro

2016The court emphasized “[i]ndependent judgment review ‘ “does not mean that the preliminary work performed 11 by the administrative board in sifting the evidence and in making its findings is wasted effort. . . . [I]n weighing the evidence the courts can and should be assisted by the findings of the board.” ’ [Citation.]” (San Diego Unified, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1141 .) The court also criticized the trial court’s rejection of the commission’s decision and its credibility findings, particularly given the cursory analysis provided by the trial court: “We recognize that the trial court is e

2015We need not resolve this issue—although we note it is soundly rejected in both Siller and Bendetti—because we conclude Safaie failed to satisfy even the minimal evidentiary standard established in those cases. 2 (Bendetti, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 871 .) “[N]ot specious,” the showing suggested by Siller and adopted by Bendetti, is not a traditional evidentiary standard.

2013(MacDonald, at p. 699.)7 In any event, we conclude that the 1946 grant from Fleet to the Donovans satisfies the requirement that "there ' " 'should be some written evidence' " ' indicating what property was affected by the restrictions." (Citizens, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 358 .) The 1946 grant deed specifically described the portion of Lot 4 retained by Fleet and burdened by the building restriction, and sufficiently described the portion of Lot 4 being conveyed.

2013Because the Oceanside court’s cursory analysis of the applicability of section 1462 was unnecessary to its decision, and its cited authority does not support its conclusion on that point, we do not view Oceanside as persuasive authority for the proposition that a covenant in a grant of real property that directly benefits the conveyed property does not run under section 1462 if it correspondingly burdens property the grantor retains. 6 Although the MacDonald court stated that the plaintiffs in that case were “technically correct at law" in arguing that the covenant in question did not particul

2013Because the Oceanside court’s cursory analysis of the applicability of section 1462 was unnecessary to its decision, and its cited authority does not support its conclusion on that point, we do not view Oceanside as persuasive authority for the proposition that a covenant in a grant of real property that directly benefits the conveyed property does not run under section 1462 if it correspondingly burdens property the grantor retains. 6 Although the MacDonald court stated that the plaintiffs in that case were “technically correct at law" in arguing that the covenant in question did not particul

2013Because the Oceanside court's cursory analysis of the applicability of section 1462 was unnecessary to its decision, and its cited authority does not support its conclusion on that point, we do not view Oceanside as persuasive authority for the proposition that a covenant in a grant of real property that directly benefits the conveyed property does not run under section 1462 if it correspondingly burdens property the grantor retains. 6 Although the MacDonald court stated that the plaintiffs in that case were "technically correct at law" in arguing that the covenant in question did not particul

2013Because the Oceanside court’s cursory analysis of the applicability of section 1462 was unnecessary to its decision, and its cited authority does not support its conclusion on that point, we do not view Oceanside as persuasive authority for the proposition that a covenant in a grant of real property that directly benefits the conveyed property does not run under section 1462 if it correspondingly burdens property the grantor retains. 6 Although the MacDonald court stated that the plaintiffs in that case were “technically correct at law" in arguing that the covenant in question did not particul

2013Because the Oceanside court’s cursory analysis of the applicability of section 1462 was unnecessary to its decision, and its cited authority does not support its conclusion on that point, we do not view Oceanside as persuasive authority for the proposition that a covenant in a grant of real property that directly benefits the conveyed property does not run under section 1462 if it correspondingly burdens property the grantor retains. 6 Although the MacDonald court stated that the plaintiffs in that case were “technically correct at law" in arguing that the covenant in question did not particul

1991In McNeal , the trial court received a note from a juror indicating the juror had personal knowledge about the case which “. . . definitely had a bearing on the way she will vote.” ( 90 Cal.App.3d at p. 835 .) The trial court made a cursory inquiry of the juror, and the appellate court reversed holding that section 1120 mandated a more extensive inquiry. 4 (Id. at p. 837.) In Burgener , the jury foreman informed the trial court in chambers that one of the jurors had been intoxicated on the previous day and was presently *1480 intoxicated as well.

1980It is.. . apparent that the examination requirement is couched in such vague and ambiguous language as to furnish the committee with no adequate standards for applying said requirement.” ( 233 Cal.App.2d at p. 60 .) Cursory analysis of Rosner v. Eden Township Hospital Dist., supra, does lend some support to the majority’s position.

1967(See, e.g., People v. Shroyer (1962) supra, 203 Cal. App.2d 478, 482-483 ; People v. O'Ward (1959) 168 Cal. App.2d 127, 131 [ 335 P.2d 762 ]; People v. Loignon (1958) 160 Cal. App.2d 412, 417 [ 325 P.2d 541 ].) The scope of the inquiry will, of course, vary according to the seriousness of the crime charged. [1b] On the basis of *673 the excerpts from the transcript set out hereinbefore, we entertain grave doubts as to the sufficiency of the court's cursory inquiry into defendant's competency to represent himself in this case.

1967(See, e.g., People v. Shroyer (1962) supra, 203 Cal.App.2d 478, 482-483 ; People v. O’Ward (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 127, 131 [ 335 P.2d 762 ] ; People v. Loignon (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 412, 417 [ 325 P.2d 541 ].) The scope of the inquiry will, of course, vary according to the seriousness of the crime charged, On the basis of the excerpts from the transcript set out hereinbefore, we entertain grave doubts as to the sufficiency of the court’s cursory inquiry into defendant’s competency to represent himself in this case.