Duran rule in California

2002As is indicated by this court’s opinion in Duran , even when the record in an individual case establishes that it is appropriate to impose some restraint upon the defendant as a security measure, a trial court properly must authorize the least obtrusive or restrictive restraint that effectively will serve the specified security purposes. ( Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d 282, 291 ; accord, Spain v. Rushen (9th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 712 .) In recent years, a number of appellate court decisions have suggested that, as a general matter, a stun belt should be viewed as a less restrictive and presumptively l

1984As we noted, the Supreme Court in Duran said, “The rules articulated hereinafter are applicable to the shackling of defendants and defense witnesses, since the considerations supporting use of physical restraints are similar in each instance. [Citation.]” (People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 288, fn. 4 .) Defendant correctly points out that we cannot read the foregoing as dictum, since the Supreme Court had before it, inter alia, the trial court’s denial of defendant Duran’s motion to allow inmate witnesses to appear before the jury without restraints.

2026(People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1217; see, e.g., Redd, at p. 730, & id., fn. 19 [hearsay objection did not preserve confrontation clause argument]; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 892 [same], superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 63, fn. 8; San Diego Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550, 574 [appellant’s “hearsay objections in the trial court were insufficient to preserve [his] constitutional claim” under the confrontation clause].) 14 We now consider Duran’s claim that the court erred as a matter of state law

2026(People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1217; see, e.g., Redd, at p. 730, & id., fn. 19 [hearsay objection did not preserve confrontation clause argument]; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 892 [same], superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 63, fn. 8; San Diego Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550, 574 [appellant’s “hearsay objections in the trial court were insufficient to preserve [his] constitutional claim” under the confrontation clause].) 14 We now consider Duran’s claim that the court erred as a matter of state law

2026(People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 617, fn. 38 , overruled on other grounds by Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046 , 1069 & fn. 13 and superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327 , 355–356; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.47(c)(2) [to maintain confidentiality parties can move to file a document under seal].) 4 On November 1, 2024, the trial court denied Duran’s motion for a continuance.

2026(People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1217; see, e.g., Redd, at p. 730, & id., fn. 19 [hearsay objection did not preserve confrontation clause argument]; People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 892 [same], superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 63, fn. 8; San Diego Police Dept. v. Geoffrey S. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 550, 574 [appellant’s “hearsay objections in the trial court were insufficient to preserve [his] constitutional claim” under the confrontation clause].) 14 We now consider Duran’s claim that the court erred as a matter of state law

2026“If sampling is used to estimate the extent of a party’s liability, care must be taken to ensure that the methodology produces reliable results.” (Duran, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 42.) “To be reliable, the sample must be sufficiently large and free from bias caused by various sampling errors.” (Id. at p. 22.) The facial persuasiveness of sampling data, whether tending to favor plaintiffs or the defense, does not justify drawing inferences “ ‘from the part to the whole’ ” if the methodology is unsound.

2024Admission of Bertram’s Interview with Duran Because we find the pretext call was properly admitted, we also reject Duran’s claim that the trial court improperly admitted evidence traceable back to the pretext call as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 652 [“[b]ecause the tree was not poisonous, its fruit was not tainted”].)6 Therefore, Duran’s subsequent interview with law enforcement is also admissible. c.

2013The imposition of physical restraints in the absence of a record showing of violence or a threat of violence or other nonconforming conduct will be deemed to constitute an abuse of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 651 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22 .) A trial court must make its own independent determination of the need for physical restraints, and may not rely solely on the judgment of court security personnel (People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1218 ; People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 841 ) or on

2002As is indicated by this court’s opinion in Duran , even when the record in an individual case establishes that it is appropriate to impose some restraint upon the defendant as a security measure, a trial court properly must authorize the least obtrusive or restrictive restraint that effectively will serve the specified security purposes. ( Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d 282, 291 ; accord, Spain v. Rushen (9th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 712 .) In recent years, a number of appellate court decisions have suggested that, as a general matter, a stun belt should be viewed as a less restrictive and presumptively l

2002As is indicated by this court’s opinion in Duran , even when the record in an individual case establishes that it is appropriate to impose some restraint upon the defendant as a security measure, a trial court properly must authorize the least obtrusive or restrictive restraint that effectively will serve the specified security purposes. ( Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d 282, 291 ; accord, Spain v. Rushen (9th Cir. 1989) 883 F.2d 712 .) In recent years, a number of appellate court decisions have suggested that, as a general matter, a stun belt should be viewed as a less restrictive and presumptively l

1984(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) Since the trial court based its decision to shackle defendant’s witnesses solely on the violent backgrounds of the witnesses, and without any showing *196 that the witnesses would attempt escape or otherwise disrupt the proceedings of the court, the trial court erroneously abused its discretion.

1984(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [ 20 Cal.Rptr. 321 , 369 P.2d 937 ].) Since the trial court based its decision to shackle defendant’s witnesses solely on the violent backgrounds of the witnesses, and without any showing *196 that the witnesses would attempt escape or otherwise disrupt the proceedings of the court, the trial court erroneously abused its discretion.

1976It has been held that the movement of a victim can constitute kidnaping for the purpose of robbery only if it (1) is not merely incidental to the commission of a robbery and (2) substantially increases the risk of harm beyond that inherent in the crime of robbery. ( In re Earley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 122, 127 [ 120 Cal. Rptr. 881 , 534 P.2d 721 ]; People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139 [ 80 Cal. Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , 43 A.L.R.3d 677 ].) Appellants concede that the movement of the Ayalas over a distance of five or six miles was not merely incidental to the commission of the robbery.

1976It has been held that the movement of a victim can constitute kidnaping for the purpose of robbery only if it (1) is not merely incidental to the commission of a robbery and (2) substantially increases the risk of harm beyond that inherent in the crime of robbery. ( In re Earley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 122, 127 [ 120 Cal. Rptr. 881 , 534 P.2d 721 ]; People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139 [ 80 Cal. Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , 43 A.L.R.3d 677 ].) Appellants concede that the movement of the Ayalas over a distance of five or six miles was not merely incidental to the commission of the robbery.

1976It has been held that the movement of a victim can constitute kidnaping for the purpose of robbery only if it (1) is not merely incidental to the commission of a robbery and (2) substantially increases the risk of harm beyond that inherent in the crime of robbery. ( In re Earley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 122, 127 [ 120 Cal. Rptr. 881 , 534 P.2d 721 ]; People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139 [ 80 Cal. Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , 43 A.L.R.3d 677 ].) Appellants concede that the movement of the Ayalas over a distance of five or six miles was not merely incidental to the commission of the robbery.

1976It has been held that the movement of a victim can constitute kidnaping for the purpose of robbery only if it (1) is not merely incidental to the commission of a robbery and (2) substantially increases the risk of harm beyond that inherent in the crime of robbery. ( In re Earley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 122, 127 [ 120 Cal. Rptr. 881 , 534 P.2d 721 ]; People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1139 [ 80 Cal. Rptr. 897 , 459 P.2d 225 , 43 A.L.R.3d 677 ].) Appellants concede that the movement of the Ayalas over a distance of five or six miles was not merely incidental to the commission of the robbery.