factors set forth rule in California

1991In evaluating whether to exercise its discretionary dismissal powers, a trial court is to consider the factors set forth in rule 373(e) of the California Rules of Court. 8 (Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 349 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ].) The competing considerations which a trial court must consider when exercising discretion to dismiss were described by the Court of Appeal in Schumpert v. Tishman Co. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 598, 602-603 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 810 ], as follows: “It has been aptly remarked that section 583.420 and the other dismissal-for-delay statutes ser

1991In evaluating whether to exercise its discretionary dismissal powers, a trial court is to consider the factors set forth in rule 373(e) of the California Rules of Court. 8 (Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 349 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ].) The competing considerations which a trial court must consider when exercising discretion to dismiss were described by the Court of Appeal in Schumpert v. Tishman Co. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 598, 602-603 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 810 ], as follows: “It has been aptly remarked that section 583.420 and the other dismissal-for-delay statutes ser

1991In evaluating whether to exercise its discretionary dismissal powers, a trial court is to consider the factors set forth in rule 373(e) of the California Rules of Court. 8 (Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 349 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ].) The competing considerations which a trial court must consider when exercising discretion to dismiss were described by the Court of Appeal in Schumpert v. Tishman Co. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 598, 602-603 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 810 ], as follows: “It has been aptly remarked that section 583.420 and the other dismissal-for-delay statutes ser

1991In evaluating whether to exercise its discretionary dismissal powers, a trial court is to consider the factors set forth in rule 373(e) of the California Rules of Court. 8 (Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 349 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ].) The competing considerations which a trial court must consider when exercising discretion to dismiss were described by the Court of Appeal in Schumpert v. Tishman Co. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 598, 602-603 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 810 ], as follows: “It has been aptly remarked that section 583.420 and the other dismissal-for-delay statutes ser

1991(Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 561 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 669 P.2d 9 ]; accord, Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 346 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ]; Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1533 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 605 ].) Because the considerations are the same, the Supreme Court has held that *878 upon a motion for preferential trial setting, the trial court may not only deny that motion, but may also dismiss the action sua sponte.

1991(Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 561 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 669 P.2d 9 ]; accord, Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 346 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ]; Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1533 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 605 ].) Because the considerations are the same, the Supreme Court has held that *878 upon a motion for preferential trial setting, the trial court may not only deny that motion, but may also dismiss the action sua sponte.

2024(People v. Stuart, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 178 .) Here, the trial court found defendant was presumptively ineligible for probation pursuant to section 1203(e)(3), which applies to “[a]ny person who willfully inflicted great bodily injury . . . in the perpetration of the crime of which that person has been convicted.” In People v. Lewis (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 837, 853 (Lewis), the court interpreted section 1203(e)(3) as requiring that the defendant “intend[ed] to cause great bodily injury or torture, not merely that the crime resulted in great bodily injury or torture.” This interpretation

2023(Cf. Osborne v. Todd Farm Service (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 43, 50 [evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion].) Conceding that the trial court may have properly excluded the Abir declaration, ACTS asserts the evidence in Medina’s declaration alone shows its entitlement to more than 5 percent of the attorney fees in this case, arguing that that evidence is relevant to several of the factors set forth in rule 7.955(b) of the California Rules of Court.

2013(People v. Battle (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 62 (Battle); rule 4.409 [“Relevant criteria enumerated in [the rules of court] ... will be deemed to have been considered unless the record affirmatively reflects otherwise”].) None of the factors cited by appellant affirmatively establishes the court was unaware of and/or failed to consider the factors set forth in rule 4.414.

2001The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.' [Citation.]" (Italics added.) Similarly, in Estate of Trunin (1989) 49 Cal.3d 868, 873-874 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 93 , 782 P.2d 232 , the Supreme Court held that "`[e]very [probate] attorney should be fully and fairly paid for his [or her] services, having in mind their nature, their difficulty, the value

2001The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.' [Citation.]" (Italics added.) Similarly, in Estate of Trunin (1989) 49 Cal.3d 868, 873-874 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 93 , 782 P.2d 232 , the Supreme Court held that "`[e]very [probate] attorney should be fully and fairly paid for his [or her] services, having in mind their nature, their difficulty, the value

2001The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.' [Citation.]" (Italics added.) Similarly, in Estate of Trunin (1989) 49 Cal.3d 868, 873-874 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 93 , 782 P.2d 232 , the Supreme Court held that "`[e]very [probate] attorney should be fully and fairly paid for his [or her] services, having in mind their nature, their difficulty, the value

2001The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.' [Citation.]" (Italics added.) Similarly, in Estate of Trunin (1989) 49 Cal.3d 868, 873-874 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 93 , 782 P.2d 232 , the Supreme Court held that "`[e]very [probate] attorney should be fully and fairly paid for his [or her] services, having in mind their nature, their difficulty, the value

2001The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.' [Citation.]" (Italics added.) Similarly, in Estate of Trunin (1989) 49 Cal.3d 868, 873-874 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 93 , 782 P.2d 232 , the Supreme Court held that "`[e]very [probate] attorney should be fully and fairly paid for his [or her] services, having in mind their nature, their difficulty, the value

2001The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.' [Citation.]" (Italics added.) Similarly, in Estate of Trunin (1989) 49 Cal.3d 868, 873-874 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 93 , 782 P.2d 232 , the Supreme Court held that "`[e]very [probate] attorney should be fully and fairly paid for his [or her] services, having in mind their nature, their difficulty, the value

1991In evaluating whether to exercise its discretionary dismissal powers, a trial court is to consider the factors set forth in rule 373(e) of the California Rules of Court. 8 (Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 349 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ].) The competing considerations which a trial court must consider when exercising discretion to dismiss were described by the Court of Appeal in Schumpert v. Tishman Co. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 598, 602-603 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 810 ], as follows: “It has been aptly remarked that section 583.420 and the other dismissal-for-delay statutes ser

1991In evaluating whether to exercise its discretionary dismissal powers, a trial court is to consider the factors set forth in rule 373(e) of the California Rules of Court. 8 (Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 349 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ].) The competing considerations which a trial court must consider when exercising discretion to dismiss were described by the Court of Appeal in Schumpert v. Tishman Co. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 598, 602-603 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 810 ], as follows: “It has been aptly remarked that section 583.420 and the other dismissal-for-delay statutes ser

1991In evaluating whether to exercise its discretionary dismissal powers, a trial court is to consider the factors set forth in rule 373(e) of the California Rules of Court. 8 (Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 349 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ].) The competing considerations which a trial court must consider when exercising discretion to dismiss were described by the Court of Appeal in Schumpert v. Tishman Co. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 598, 602-603 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 810 ], as follows: “It has been aptly remarked that section 583.420 and the other dismissal-for-delay statutes ser

1991In evaluating whether to exercise its discretionary dismissal powers, a trial court is to consider the factors set forth in rule 373(e) of the California Rules of Court. 8 (Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 349 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ].) The competing considerations which a trial court must consider when exercising discretion to dismiss were described by the Court of Appeal in Schumpert v. Tishman Co. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 598, 602-603 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 810 ], as follows: “It has been aptly remarked that section 583.420 and the other dismissal-for-delay statutes ser

1991In evaluating whether to exercise its discretionary dismissal powers, a trial court is to consider the factors set forth in rule 373(e) of the California Rules of Court. 8 (Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 349 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ].) The competing considerations which a trial court must consider when exercising discretion to dismiss were described by the Court of Appeal in Schumpert v. Tishman Co. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 598, 602-603 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 810 ], as follows: “It has been aptly remarked that section 583.420 and the other dismissal-for-delay statutes ser

1991In evaluating whether to exercise its discretionary dismissal powers, a trial court is to consider the factors set forth in rule 373(e) of the California Rules of Court. 8 (Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 349 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ].) The competing considerations which a trial court must consider when exercising discretion to dismiss were described by the Court of Appeal in Schumpert v. Tishman Co. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 598, 602-603 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 810 ], as follows: “It has been aptly remarked that section 583.420 and the other dismissal-for-delay statutes ser

1991In evaluating whether to exercise its discretionary dismissal powers, a trial court is to consider the factors set forth in rule 373(e) of the California Rules of Court. 8 (Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 349 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ].) The competing considerations which a trial court must consider when exercising discretion to dismiss were described by the Court of Appeal in Schumpert v. Tishman Co. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 598, 602-603 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 810 ], as follows: “It has been aptly remarked that section 583.420 and the other dismissal-for-delay statutes ser

1991In evaluating whether to exercise its discretionary dismissal powers, a trial court is to consider the factors set forth in rule 373(e) of the California Rules of Court. 8 (Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 349 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ].) The competing considerations which a trial court must consider when exercising discretion to dismiss were described by the Court of Appeal in Schumpert v. Tishman Co. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 598, 602-603 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 810 ], as follows: “It has been aptly remarked that section 583.420 and the other dismissal-for-delay statutes ser

1991(Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 561 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 669 P.2d 9 ]; accord, Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 346 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ]; Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1533 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 605 ].) Because the considerations are the same, the Supreme Court has held that *878 upon a motion for preferential trial setting, the trial court may not only deny that motion, but may also dismiss the action sua sponte.

1991(Wilson v. Sunshine Meat & Liquor Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 554, 561 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 773 , 669 P.2d 9 ]; accord, Salas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 342, 346 [ 228 Cal.Rptr. 504 , 721 P.2d 590 ]; Cordova v. Vons Grocery Co. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1533 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 605 ].) Because the considerations are the same, the Supreme Court has held that *878 upon a motion for preferential trial setting, the trial court may not only deny that motion, but may also dismiss the action sua sponte.

1980It was stated in Lopez v. Larson (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 383, 399-400 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 912 ], a case very similar procedurally to the case at bench, that “[i]t is true that a number of cases have indicated that a court may consider as a factor in justification of prosecutorial de *488 lay an exceptional press of business or burdensome workload on plaintiff’s attorney and his law firm. [Citations.] In all of the cited cases, however, the unusual press of business or burdensome workload of the plaintiff’s attorney or his law firm was only one among several factors justifying the delay.. . .

1980It was stated in Lopez v. Larson (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 383, 399-400 [ 153 Cal.Rptr. 912 ], a case very similar procedurally to the case at bench, that “[i]t is true that a number of cases have indicated that a court may consider as a factor in justification of prosecutorial de *488 lay an exceptional press of business or burdensome workload on plaintiff’s attorney and his law firm. [Citations.] In all of the cited cases, however, the unusual press of business or burdensome workload of the plaintiff’s attorney or his law firm was only one among several factors justifying the delay.. . .