14 California opinions name it 3 courts 1982–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
L.A. All. for Survival v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2019The scrutiny applied to content-based and content-neutral regulations under the liberty of speech clause in the California Constitution is the same as that applied in the First Amendment context. ( Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352 , 364, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 993 P.2d 334 ( Alliance ).) Because we conclude Defendant did not demonstrate a compelling interest, we do not reach the narrow tailoring component of strict scrutiny. 2019The scrutiny applied to content-based and content-neutral regulations under the liberty of speech clause in the California Constitution is the same as that applied in the First Amendment context. ( Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352 , 364, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 993 P.2d 334 ( Alliance ).) Because we conclude Defendant did not demonstrate a compelling interest, we do not reach the narrow tailoring component of strict scrutiny. | 6 | 9 |
Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Boardgreen2 sentences2019(Reed, supra, 135 S.Ct. at p. 2227 ; Fashion Valley, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 869 .) “Narrowly drawn” in such context means it is the “least restrictive means of achieving [the] compelling . . . interest.” (McCullen v. Coakley (2014) 573 U.S. 464 , 478 (McCullen).) This is an extremely demanding standard. “‘It is rare that a regulation 1 The scrutiny applied to content-based and content-neutral regulations under the liberty of speech clause in the California Constitution is the same as that applied in the First Amendment context. 2012A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” 8 This clause, known as the liberty of speech clause, “is broader and more protective than the free speech clause of the First Amendment. [Citations.]” (Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352, 366-367 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 993 P.2d 334 ] (Los Angeles Alliance).) For example, “the California Constitution protects the right to free speech in a shopping mall, even though the federal Constitution does not. . . .” (Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850, 862 | 4 | 5 |
Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Centergreen2 sentences2012A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” 8 This clause, known as the liberty of speech clause, “is broader and more protective than the free speech clause of the First Amendment. [Citations.]” (Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352, 366-367 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 993 P.2d 334 ] (Los Angeles Alliance).) For example, “the California Constitution protects the right to free speech in a shopping mall, even though the federal Constitution does not. . . .” (Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850, 862 2012A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.” 8 This clause, known as the liberty of speech clause, “is broader and more protective than the free speech clause of the First Amendment. [Citations.]” (Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352, 366-367 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 993 P.2d 334 ] (Los Angeles Alliance).) For example, “the California Constitution protects the right to free speech in a shopping mall, even though the federal Constitution does not. . . .” (Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850, 862 | 3 | 5 |
People v. Fogelsongreen2 sentences2000A. An ordinance such as the one here at issue plainly implicates the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution. ( People v. Fogelson (1978) 21 Cal.3d 158 , 145 Cal.Rptr. 542 , 577 P.2d 677 (Fogelson ) [ordinance regulating solicitation on city property posed an impermissible *8 restriction on speech under art. 2000A. An ordinance such as the one here at issue plainly implicates the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution. ( People v. Fogelson (1978) 21 Cal.3d 158 , 145 Cal.Rptr. 542 , 577 P.2d 677 (Fogelson ) [ordinance regulating solicitation on city property posed an impermissible *8 restriction on speech under art. | 2 | 2 |
Prisoners Union v. Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2009The court departed somewhat from the United States Supreme Court’s rendering of the public forum doctrine, and instead articulated a more protective version based on the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution. ( 154 Cal.App.3d at p. 1169 .) The court rejected an all-or-nothing approach to the issue of whether government property is a public forum, viewing the public forum question as “a continuum, with public streets and parks at one end and government institutions like hospitals and prisons at the other.” (Id. at p. 1164.) Instead, adopting the analysis formulated by then Cou 2009The court departed somewhat from the United States Supreme Court’s rendering of the public forum doctrine, and instead articulated a more protective version based on the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution. ( 154 Cal.App.3d at p. 1169 .) The court rejected an all-or-nothing approach to the issue of whether government property is a public forum, viewing the public forum question as “a continuum, with public streets and parks at one end and government institutions like hospitals and prisons at the other.” (Id. at p. 1164.) Instead, adopting the analysis formulated by then Cou | 2 | 2 |
Wilson v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2000(Dailey v. Superior Court (1896) 112 Cal. 94, 97-98 [ 44 P. 458 ] [the liberty of speech clause “is the broader, and gives . . . greater liberty” than the First Amendment]; Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 851, 866, fn. 5 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 884 P.2d 116 ] [“As a general matter, the liberty of speech clause in the California Constitution is more protective of speech than its federal counterpart”]; Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa (1985) 39 Cal.3d 501, 519 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 703 P.2d 1119 ] [liberty of speech clause is “ ‘more definitive and inclus 2000(Dailey v. Superior Court (1896) 112 Cal. 94, 97-98 [ 44 P. 458 ] [the liberty of speech clause “is the broader, and gives . . . greater liberty” than the First Amendment]; Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 851, 866, fn. 5 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 884 P.2d 116 ] [“As a general matter, the liberty of speech clause in the California Constitution is more protective of speech than its federal counterpart”]; Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa (1985) 39 Cal.3d 501, 519 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 703 P.2d 1119 ] [liberty of speech clause is “ ‘more definitive and inclus | 2 | 2 |
Ward v. Rock Against Racismgreen2 sentences2010(Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989) 491 U.S. 781, 791 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 661 , 109 S.Ct. 2746 ].) The Ninth Circuit asked this court to determine whether LAX is a public forum under the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution. 2010(Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989) 491 U.S. 781, 791 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 661 , 109 S.Ct. 2746 ].) The Ninth Circuit asked this court to determine whether LAX is a public forum under the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution. | 1 | 2 |
Jamison v. Texasgreen2 sentences2012This right extends to the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word.” (Jamison v. Texas (1943) 318 U.S. 413, 416 [ 87 L.Ed. 869, 872 , 63 S.Ct. 669 ].) III Challenged Provisions of the Policy A. Intermediate Scrutiny “In order to qualify for intermediate scrutiny, a time, place, and manner regulation of protected speech must be content neutral, in contrast to content-based regulations, which are subjected to strict scrutiny. [Citation.] To be content neutral, a regulation must ‘be “justified” by legitimate concerns that are unrelated to any “disagreement 2012This right extends to the communication of ideas by handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word.” (Jamison v. Texas (1943) 318 U.S. 413, 416 [ 87 L.Ed. 869, 872 , 63 S.Ct. 669 ].) III Challenged Provisions of the Policy A. Intermediate Scrutiny “In order to qualify for intermediate scrutiny, a time, place, and manner regulation of protected speech must be content neutral, in contrast to content-based regulations, which are subjected to strict scrutiny. [Citation.] To be content neutral, a regulation must ‘be “justified” by legitimate concerns that are unrelated to any “disagreement | 1 | 1 |
International Society for Krishna Consciousness of California Inc. v. City of Los Angelesgreen1 sentence2012Society for Krishna Consciousness of California, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2008) 530 F.3d 768, 775 [certifying to Cal. Supreme Court the question of whether Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) is a public forum under the liberty of speech clause of the Cal. Const.]. 9 ) In Carreras v. Anaheim (9th Cir. 1985) 768 F.2d 1039 (Carreras), 1045, the Ninth Circuit stated: “the test under California law is whether the communicative activity ‘is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.’ [Citations.]” 10 Applying that test, the court fou | 1 | 1 |
Virginia v. Blackgreen2 sentences2011I, § 2, subd. (a).) “The state Constitution’s free speech provision is ‘at least as broad’ as [citation] and in some ways is broader than [citations] the comparable provision of the federal Constitution’s First Amendment.” (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 958-959 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 ]; see Baba, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 513.) Not all speech, however, is protected by the First Amendment or the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution. “ ‘The First Amendment permits “restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are ‘of such s 2011I, § 2, subd. (a).) “The state Constitution’s free speech provision is ‘at least as broad’ as [citation] and in some ways is broader than [citations] the comparable provision of the federal Constitution’s First Amendment.” (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 958-959 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 ]; see Baba, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 513.) Not all speech, however, is protected by the First Amendment or the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution. “ ‘The First Amendment permits “restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are ‘of such s | 1 | 1 |
cluster 2144green2 sentences2011(Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1984) 466 U.S. 485, 504 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 502 , 104 S.Ct. 1949 ].)” (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1249 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ]; see also United States v. Stevens (2010) 559 U.S._,___ [ 176 L.Ed.2d 435 , 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1584 ] (Stevens) [speech restrictions are constitutionally permitted “ ‘in a few limited areas,’ ” including obscenity, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct]; United States v. Williams (2008) 553 U.S. 285, 297-298 [ 170 L.Ed.2d 6 2011(Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1984) 466 U.S. 485, 504 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 502 , 104 S.Ct. 1949 ].)” (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1249 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ]; see also United States v. Stevens (2010) 559 U.S._,___ [ 176 L.Ed.2d 435 , 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1584 ] (Stevens) [speech restrictions are constitutionally permitted “ ‘in a few limited areas,’ ” including obscenity, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct]; United States v. Williams (2008) 553 U.S. 285, 297-298 [ 170 L.Ed.2d 6 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2011(Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1984) 466 U.S. 485, 504 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 502 , 104 S.Ct. 1949 ].)” (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1249 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ]; see also United States v. Stevens (2010) 559 U.S._,___ [ 176 L.Ed.2d 435 , 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1584 ] (Stevens) [speech restrictions are constitutionally permitted “ ‘in a few limited areas,’ ” including obscenity, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct]; United States v. Williams (2008) 553 U.S. 285, 297-298 [ 170 L.Ed.2d 6 2011(Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1984) 466 U.S. 485, 504 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 502 , 104 S.Ct. 1949 ].)” (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1249 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ]; see also United States v. Stevens (2010) 559 U.S._,___ [ 176 L.Ed.2d 435 , 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1584 ] (Stevens) [speech restrictions are constitutionally permitted “ ‘in a few limited areas,’ ” including obscenity, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct]; United States v. Williams (2008) 553 U.S. 285, 297-298 [ 170 L.Ed.2d 6 | 1 | 1 |
Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc.green2 sentences2011(Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1984) 466 U.S. 485, 504 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 502 , 104 S.Ct. 1949 ].)” (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1249 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ]; see also United States v. Stevens (2010) 559 U.S._,___ [ 176 L.Ed.2d 435 , 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1584 ] (Stevens) [speech restrictions are constitutionally permitted “ ‘in a few limited areas,’ ” including obscenity, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct]; United States v. Williams (2008) 553 U.S. 285, 297-298 [ 170 L.Ed.2d 6 2011(Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1984) 466 U.S. 485, 504 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 502 , 104 S.Ct. 1949 ].)” (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1249 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ]; see also United States v. Stevens (2010) 559 U.S._,___ [ 176 L.Ed.2d 435 , 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1584 ] (Stevens) [speech restrictions are constitutionally permitted “ ‘in a few limited areas,’ ” including obscenity, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct]; United States v. Williams (2008) 553 U.S. 285, 297-298 [ 170 L.Ed.2d 6 | 1 | 1 |
Snatchko v. Westfield llCgreen2 sentences2011(Pruneyard, at p. 910; Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850, 862 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 288 , 172 P.3d 742 ] (Fashion Valley).) Thus, “[a] shopping mall is a public forum in which persons may reasonably exercise their right of free speech guaranteed by ... the California Constitution.” (Fashion Valley, supra, at pp. 869-870 .) “Shopping malls may enact and enforce reasonable regulations of the time, place and manner of such free expression to assure that these activities do not interfere with the normal business operations of the mall, but they may not prohi 2011(Pruneyard, at p. 910; Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850, 862 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 288 , 172 P.3d 742 ] (Fashion Valley).) Thus, “[a] shopping mall is a public forum in which persons may reasonably exercise their right of free speech guaranteed by ... the California Constitution.” (Fashion Valley, supra, at pp. 869-870 .) “Shopping malls may enact and enforce reasonable regulations of the time, place and manner of such free expression to assure that these activities do not interfere with the normal business operations of the mall, but they may not prohi | 1 | 1 |
Kasky v. Nike, Inc.green2 sentences2011I, § 2, subd. (a).) “The state Constitution’s free speech provision is ‘at least as broad’ as [citation] and in some ways is broader than [citations] the comparable provision of the federal Constitution’s First Amendment.” (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 958-959 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 ]; see Baba, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 513.) Not all speech, however, is protected by the First Amendment or the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution. “ ‘The First Amendment permits “restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are ‘of such s 2011I, § 2, subd. (a).) “The state Constitution’s free speech provision is ‘at least as broad’ as [citation] and in some ways is broader than [citations] the comparable provision of the federal Constitution’s First Amendment.” (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 958-959 [ 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 45 P.3d 243 ]; see Baba, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 513.) Not all speech, however, is protected by the First Amendment or the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution. “ ‘The First Amendment permits “restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are ‘of such s | 1 | 1 |
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.green2 sentences2011(Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1984) 466 U.S. 485, 504 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 502 , 104 S.Ct. 1949 ].)” (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1249 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ]; see also United States v. Stevens (2010) 559 U.S._,___ [ 176 L.Ed.2d 435 , 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1584 ] (Stevens) [speech restrictions are constitutionally permitted “ ‘in a few limited areas,’ ” including obscenity, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct]; United States v. Williams (2008) 553 U.S. 285, 297-298 [ 170 L.Ed.2d 6 2011(Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1984) 466 U.S. 485, 504 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 502 , 104 S.Ct. 1949 ].)” (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1249 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 521 ]; see also United States v. Stevens (2010) 559 U.S._,___ [ 176 L.Ed.2d 435 , 130 S.Ct. 1577, 1584 ] (Stevens) [speech restrictions are constitutionally permitted “ ‘in a few limited areas,’ ” including obscenity, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct]; United States v. Williams (2008) 553 U.S. 285, 297-298 [ 170 L.Ed.2d 6 | 1 | 1 |
Haguer v. Committee for Industrial Organizationgreen2 sentences2010O. (1939) 307 U.S. 496, 515-516 [ 83 L.Ed. 1423 , 59 S.Ct. 954 ].) Even in a public forum, the right of free speech may be restricted by reasonable restrictions on its time, place, or manner. ( Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989) 491 U.S. 781, 791 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 661 , 109 S.Ct. 2746 ].) (4) The Ninth Circuit asked this court to determine whether LAX is a public forum under the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution. 2010O. (1939) 307 U.S. 496, 515-516 [ 83 L.Ed. 1423 , 59 S.Ct. 954 ].) Even in a public forum, the right of free speech may be restricted by reasonable restrictions on its time, place, or manner. ( Ward v. Rock Against Racism (1989) 491 U.S. 781, 791 [ 105 L.Ed.2d 661 , 109 S.Ct. 2746 ].) (4) The Ninth Circuit asked this court to determine whether LAX is a public forum under the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution. | 1 | 1 |
Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Kawamuragreen2 sentences2009(See, e.g., Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352, 366-367 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 993 P.2d 334 ], and cases cited therein.) The liberty of speech clause has been interpreted more broadly than the First Amendment in several areas, including recognizing privately owned shopping centers as public forums subject to free speech protections (Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850, 862-863 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 288 , 172 P.3d 742 ]) and according greater protection to certain types of commercial speech (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. 2009(See, e.g., Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352, 366-367 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 993 P.2d 334 ], and cases cited therein.) The liberty of speech clause has been interpreted more broadly than the First Amendment in several areas, including recognizing privately owned shopping centers as public forums subject to free speech protections (Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850, 862-863 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 288 , 172 P.3d 742 ]) and according greater protection to certain types of commercial speech (Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Glazegreen2 sentences2000(Dailey v. Superior Court (1896) 112 Cal. 94, 97-98 [ 44 P. 458 ] [the liberty of speech clause “is the broader, and gives . . . greater liberty” than the First Amendment]; Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 851, 866, fn. 5 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 884 P.2d 116 ] [“As a general matter, the liberty of speech clause in the California Constitution is more protective of speech than its federal counterpart”]; Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa (1985) 39 Cal.3d 501, 519 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 703 P.2d 1119 ] [liberty of speech clause is “ ‘more definitive and inclus 2000(Dailey v. Superior Court (1896) 112 Cal. 94, 97-98 [ 44 P. 458 ] [the liberty of speech clause “is the broader, and gives . . . greater liberty” than the First Amendment]; Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 851, 866, fn. 5 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 884 P.2d 116 ] [“As a general matter, the liberty of speech clause in the California Constitution is more protective of speech than its federal counterpart”]; Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa (1985) 39 Cal.3d 501, 519 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 703 P.2d 1119 ] [liberty of speech clause is “ ‘more definitive and inclus | 1 | 1 |
| Spiritual Psychic Science Church of Truth, Inc. v. City of Azusagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gonzales v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| San Diego Unified Port v. U.S. Citizens Patrolgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginiagreen | 1 | 1 |
Gospel Army v. City of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2000Indeed, contrary to the majority's implication, these early cases did not involve any challenge at all based on the First Amendment or the liberty of speech clause of article 1, section 2 of the California Constitution. ( Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 248 , 163 P.2d 704 [ordinance did not deny religious liberty under Cal. Const. art. 1, § 21]; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, supra, 28 Cal.2d at p. 470-472, 171 P.2d 8 [accord]; Matter of Application of Dart, supra, 172 Cal. 47, 56 , 155 P. 63 [permit requirements invalid as violating the right of free exercise of re 2000Indeed, contrary to the majority's implication, these early cases did not involve any challenge at all based on the First Amendment or the liberty of speech clause of article 1, section 2 of the California Constitution. ( Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 248 , 163 P.2d 704 [ordinance did not deny religious liberty under Cal. Const. art. 1, § 21]; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, supra, 28 Cal.2d at p. 470-472, 171 P.2d 8 [accord]; Matter of Application of Dart, supra, 172 Cal. 47, 56 , 155 P. 63 [permit requirements invalid as violating the right of free exercise of re | 1 | 1 |
| Allred v. Shawleygreen | 1 | 1 |
Dulaney v. Municipal Courtgreen2 sentences2000(See e.g., Dulaney v. Municipal Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 77, 84-85 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 777 , 520 P.2d 1 ] (Dulaney).) 7 As plaintiffs note, decisions applying the liberty of speech clause, like those applying the First Amendment, long have recognized that in order to qualify for intermediate scrutiny (i.e., time, place, and manner) review, a regulation must be “content neutral” (e.g., Savage, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1573 ), and that if a regulation is content based, it is subject to the more stringent strict scrutiny standard. 2000(See e.g., Dulaney v. Municipal Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 77, 84-85 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 777 , 520 P.2d 1 ] (Dulaney).) 7 As plaintiffs note, decisions applying the liberty of speech clause, like those applying the First Amendment, long have recognized that in order to qualify for intermediate scrutiny (i.e., time, place, and manner) review, a regulation must be “content neutral” (e.g., Savage, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1573 ), and that if a regulation is content based, it is subject to the more stringent strict scrutiny standard. | 1 | 1 |
Rescue Army v. Municipal Courtgreen2 sentences2000Indeed, contrary to the majority's implication, these early cases did not involve any challenge at all based on the First Amendment or the liberty of speech clause of article 1, section 2 of the California Constitution. ( Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 248 , 163 P.2d 704 [ordinance did not deny religious liberty under Cal. Const. art. 1, § 21]; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, supra, 28 Cal.2d at p. 470-472, 171 P.2d 8 [accord]; Matter of Application of Dart, supra, 172 Cal. 47, 56 , 155 P. 63 [permit requirements invalid as violating the right of free exercise of re 2000Indeed, contrary to the majority's implication, these early cases did not involve any challenge at all based on the First Amendment or the liberty of speech clause of article 1, section 2 of the California Constitution. ( Gospel Army v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 248 , 163 P.2d 704 [ordinance did not deny religious liberty under Cal. Const. art. 1, § 21]; Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, supra, 28 Cal.2d at p. 470-472, 171 P.2d 8 [accord]; Matter of Application of Dart, supra, 172 Cal. 47, 56 , 155 P. 63 [permit requirements invalid as violating the right of free exercise of re | 1 | 1 |
| Griset v. Fair Political Practices Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environmentgreen | 1 | 1 |
Dailey v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2000(Dailey v. Superior Court (1896) 112 Cal. 94, 97-98 [ 44 P. 458 ] [the liberty of speech clause “is the broader, and gives . . . greater liberty” than the First Amendment]; Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 851, 866, fn. 5 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 884 P.2d 116 ] [“As a general matter, the liberty of speech clause in the California Constitution is more protective of speech than its federal counterpart”]; Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa (1985) 39 Cal.3d 501, 519 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 703 P.2d 1119 ] [liberty of speech clause is “ ‘more definitive and inclus 2000(Dailey v. Superior Court (1896) 112 Cal. 94, 97-98 [ 44 P. 458 ] [the liberty of speech clause “is the broader, and gives . . . greater liberty” than the First Amendment]; Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 851, 866, fn. 5 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 659 , 884 P.2d 116 ] [“As a general matter, the liberty of speech clause in the California Constitution is more protective of speech than its federal counterpart”]; Spiritual Psychic Science Church v. City of Azusa (1985) 39 Cal.3d 501, 519 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 703 P.2d 1119 ] [liberty of speech clause is “ ‘more definitive and inclus | 1 | 1 |
| Frisby v. Schultzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
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| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
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U.C. Nuclear Weapons Labs Conversion Project v. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory
green
2 sentences2009The court departed somewhat from the United States Supreme Court’s rendering of the public forum doctrine, and instead articulated a more protective version based on the liberty of speech clause of the California Constitution. ( 154 Cal.App.3d at p. 1169 .) The court rejected an all-or-nothing approach to the issue of whether government property is a public forum, viewing the public forum question as “a continuum, with public streets and parks at one end and government institutions like hospitals and prisons at the other.” (Id. at p. 1164.) Instead, adopting the analysis formulated by then Cou 2000Nuclear Weapons, supra, 154 Cal.App.3d 1157, 1164 ; Prisoners Union v. Department of Corrections (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 930, 938 [ 185 Cal.Rptr. 634 ].) Merely because our provision is worded more expansively and has been interpreted as more protective than the First Amendment, however, does not mean that it is broader than the First Amendment in all its applications. 12 In this regard, defendants acknowledge that the California Constitution is independent and that federal decisions interpreting the First Amendment are not controlling. | 2 | 2000–2009 |
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn.
green
1 sentence2019(Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 352, 364 (Alliance).) 7 restricting speech because of its content will ever be permissible.’” (Brown, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 799 .) In contrast, a content-neutral restriction—i.e., one which concerns the time, place, or manner of speech—is subject to intermediate scrutiny. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Reed v. Town of Gilbert
green
1 sentence2019(Reed, supra, 135 S.Ct. at p. 2227 ; Fashion Valley, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 869 .) “Narrowly drawn” in such context means it is the “least restrictive means of achieving [the] compelling . . . interest.” (McCullen v. Coakley (2014) 573 U.S. 464 , 478 (McCullen).) This is an extremely demanding standard. “‘It is rare that a regulation 1 The scrutiny applied to content-based and content-neutral regulations under the liberty of speech clause in the California Constitution is the same as that applied in the First Amendment context. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Jack Carreras v. City Of Anaheim
green
1 sentence2012Society for Krishna Consciousness of California, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2008) 530 F.3d 768, 775 [certifying to Cal. Supreme Court the question of whether Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) is a public forum under the liberty of speech clause of the Cal. Const.]. 9 ) In Carreras v. Anaheim (9th Cir. 1985) 768 F.2d 1039 (Carreras), 1045, the Ninth Circuit stated: “the test under California law is whether the communicative activity ‘is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.’ [Citations.]” 10 Applying that test, the court fou | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Alternatives for California Women, Inc. v. County of Contra Costa green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| New National Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Village of South Holland v. Stein green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Schmid
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2 sentences2000Council (1981) 96 Wash.2d 230 , 635 P.2d 108, 115-116 ; State v. Schmid (1980) 84 N.J. 535 , 423 A.2d 615, 626-627 ; Village of South Holland v. Stein (1940) 373 Ill. 472 , 26 N.E.2d 868, 871 .) [11] *10 This court, and the California Courts of Appeal, likewise have indicated that the California liberty of speech clause is broader and more protective than the free speech clause of the First Amendment. ( Dailey v. Superior Court (1896) 112 Cal. 94, 97-98 , 44 P. 458 [the liberty of speech clause "is the broader, and gives ... greater liberty" than the First Amendment]; Griset v. Fair Political 2000Council (1981) 96 Wash.2d 230 , 635 P.2d 108, 115-116 ; State v. Schmid (1980) 84 N.J. 535 , 423 A.2d 615, 626-627 ; Village of South Holland v. Stein (1940) 373 Ill. 472 , 26 N.E.2d 868, 871 .) [11] *10 This court, and the California Courts of Appeal, likewise have indicated that the California liberty of speech clause is broader and more protective than the free speech clause of the First Amendment. ( Dailey v. Superior Court (1896) 112 Cal. 94, 97-98 , 44 P. 458 [the liberty of speech clause "is the broader, and gives ... greater liberty" than the First Amendment]; Griset v. Fair Political | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental Council
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2 sentences2000Council (1981) 96 Wash.2d 230 , 635 P.2d 108, 115-116 ; State v. Schmid (1980) 84 N.J. 535 , 423 A.2d 615, 626-627 ; Village of South Holland v. Stein (1940) 373 Ill. 472 , 26 N.E.2d 868, 871 .) [11] *10 This court, and the California Courts of Appeal, likewise have indicated that the California liberty of speech clause is broader and more protective than the free speech clause of the First Amendment. ( Dailey v. Superior Court (1896) 112 Cal. 94, 97-98 , 44 P. 458 [the liberty of speech clause "is the broader, and gives ... greater liberty" than the First Amendment]; Griset v. Fair Political 2000Council (1981) 96 Wash.2d 230 , 635 P.2d 108, 115-116 ; State v. Schmid (1980) 84 N.J. 535 , 423 A.2d 615, 626-627 ; Village of South Holland v. Stein (1940) 373 Ill. 472 , 26 N.E.2d 868, 871 .) [11] *10 This court, and the California Courts of Appeal, likewise have indicated that the California liberty of speech clause is broader and more protective than the free speech clause of the First Amendment. ( Dailey v. Superior Court (1896) 112 Cal. 94, 97-98 , 44 P. 458 [the liberty of speech clause "is the broader, and gives ... greater liberty" than the First Amendment]; Griset v. Fair Political | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Savage v. Trammell Crow Co.
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2 sentences2000(See e.g., Dulaney v. Municipal Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 77, 84-85 , 112 Cal.Rptr. 777 , 520 P.2d 1 (Dulaney ).) [7] As plaintiffs note, decisions applying the liberty of speech clause, like those applying the First Amendment, long have recognized that in order to qualify for intermediate scrutiny (i.e., time, place, and manner) review, a regulation must be "content neutral" (e.g., Savage, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1573 , 273 Cal.Rptr. 302 ), and that if a regulation is content based, it is subject to the more stringent strict scrutiny standard. 2000(See e.g., Dulaney v. Municipal Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 77, 84-85 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 777 , 520 P.2d 1 ] (Dulaney).) 7 As plaintiffs note, decisions applying the liberty of speech clause, like those applying the First Amendment, long have recognized that in order to qualify for intermediate scrutiny (i.e., time, place, and manner) review, a regulation must be “content neutral” (e.g., Savage, supra, 223 Cal.App.3d at p. 1573 ), and that if a regulation is content based, it is subject to the more stringent strict scrutiny standard. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Matter of Application of Dart green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Federated Publications, Inc. v. Kurtz green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State Ex Rel. Herald Mail Co. v. Hamilton green | 1 | 1982–1982 |