lifetime requirement in California

2018It does not impose a lifetime bar on an incumbent's ability to run for a previously held seat and instead limits the member's ability to run for more than two consecutive terms. ( Conde v. City of San Diego (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 346 , 349-351, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 ( Conde ).) As all parties agree, the term limit provision also does not preclude a *818 council member from residing in and representing one district for two terms, then moving to another district and representing that district for two terms.

2018It does not impose a lifetime bar on an incumbent's ability to run for a previously held seat and instead limits the member's ability to run for more than two consecutive terms. ( Conde v. City of San Diego (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 346 , 349-351, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 ( Conde ).) As all parties agree, the term limit provision also does not preclude a *818 council member from residing in and representing one district for two terms, then moving to another district and representing that district for two terms.

2016The Court of Appeal wrote, “We presume that the trial court was aware of and correctly applied the applicable law (People v. Coddington (2000) 23 5 According to the Attorney General, this section has now been renumbered section 290.006. 11 Cal.4th 529, 644 , disapproved on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001 ) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13 ) and that, had it intended to impose a registration requirement under section 290 . . . it would have imposed a lifetime requirement in the required fashion.” ( King, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1308-1309.) The Court of Appeal concluded that th

2015(People v. King (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1308 ; § 290.006.) CDCR notes that sex offender registration is a lifetime requirement for convicted sex offenders. (§ 290, subds. (b) & (c).) But a trial court also may impose a sex offender registration requirement as a condition of probation.

2014(See In re J.V. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 909, 914 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 491 ] [the “bare assertion of prejudice is not enough”]; cf. People v. Zaidi, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1488-1489 [defendant made more than “a naked assertion” of prejudice when he “supported his petition with a declaration that” “[h]ad he known [registration as a sex offender] was a lifetime requirement, he would never have entered his plea and would have insisted on going to trial”].) Archer cites In re Carabes (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 927 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 65 ].

2014(See In re J.V. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 909, 914 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 491 ] [the “bare assertion of prejudice is not enough”]; cf. People v. Zaidi, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1488-1489 [defendant made more than “a naked assertion” of prejudice when he “supported his petition with a declaration that” “[h]ad he known [registration as a sex offender] was a lifetime requirement, he would never have entered his plea and would have insisted on going to trial”].) Archer cites In re Carabes (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 927 [ 193 Cal.Rptr. 65 ].

2014(See In re J.V. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 909, 914 [the “bare assertion of prejudice is not enough”]; cf. People v. Zaidi, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1488-1489 [defendant made more than “a naked assertion” of prejudice when he “supported his petition with a declaration that . . . [h]ad he known [registration as a sex offender] was a lifetime requirement, he would never have entered his plea and would have insisted on going to trial”].) Archer cites In re Carabes (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 927 .

2014Subdivision (g) of section 3003, currently provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other law, an inmate who is released on parole for a violation of Section 288 or 288.5 whom the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation determines poses a high risk to the public shall not be placed or reside, for 3 “As always, we begin with the canons of statutory construction.” (People v. Talibdeen (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1151, 1154 .) We apply the “plain meaning rule” to statutory language in that “[w]ords used in a statute [are] . . . given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the language is c

2014Subdivision (g) of section 3003, currently provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other law, an inmate who is released on parole for a violation of Section 288 or 288.5 whom the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation determines poses a high risk to the public shall not be placed or reside, for 3 “As always, we begin with the canons of statutory construction.” (People v. Talibdeen (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1151, 1154 .) We apply the “plain meaning rule” to statutory language in that “[w]ords used in a statute [are] . . . given the meaning they bear in ordinary use. [Citations.] If the language is c

2013Although the registration requirement, like the firearms prohibition, is not penal (People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1197 ), the firearms prohibition lacks the important element of “ignominy” that qualifies the registration requirement as an exception to the general rule that direct consequences are limited to penal consequences. 7 Despite the fact that the firearms prohibition is of long standing, Hackworth points to no case in any jurisdiction that has held the prohibition to be a direct consequence of a felony conviction, instead of a collateral consequence.5 Because Hackworth ha

2007Duty to Advise That Registration Is a Lifetime Obligation Defendant asserts that under the rule enunciated in Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 531 P.2d 1086 ] (Bunnell), the trial court was required to inform him that registration is a lifetime requirement.

2007Duty to Advise That Registration Is a Lifetime Obligation Defendant asserts that under the rule enunciated in Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 302 , 531 P.2d 1086 ] (Bunnell), the trial court was required to inform him that registration is a lifetime requirement.

2007They argue that by advising him that he could be ordered to register as a sex offender pursuant to Penal Code section 290 if the probation department deemed it appropriate, the court sufficiently alerted him to the possibility of registration “with all of the attendant consequences.” The People urge that notice of the potential registration did not make his plea any less voluntary because the court did not “read the entire statute with its myriad responsibilities and contingencies,” e.g., annual registration within five days of the defendant’s birthday, providing DNA samples, etc. The People r

2007They argue that by advising him that he could be ordered to register as a sex offender pursuant to Penal Code section 290 if the probation department deemed it appropriate, the court sufficiently alerted him to the possibility of registration “with all of the attendant consequences.” The People urge that notice of the potential registration did not make his plea any less voluntary because the court did not “read the entire statute with its myriad responsibilities and contingencies,” e.g., annual registration within five days of the defendant’s birthday, providing DNA samples, etc. The People r

2007At the outset we observe that the rule articulated in People v. Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1013 is inapplicable to this case.

2007We presume that the trial court was aware of and correctly applied the applicable law (People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th *1309 529, 644 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528 , 2 P.3d 1081 ], disapproved on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 , 25 P.3d 618 ]) and that, had it intended to impose a registration requirement under section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(E), it would have imposed a lifetime requirement in the required fashion. 5 Accordingly, we conclude that the registration requirement was not imposed under the provisions of subdivision (

2007We presume that the trial court was aware of and correctly applied the applicable law (People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th *1309 529, 644 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528 , 2 P.3d 1081 ], disapproved on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 , 25 P.3d 618 ]) and that, had it intended to impose a registration requirement under section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(E), it would have imposed a lifetime requirement in the required fashion. 5 Accordingly, we conclude that the registration requirement was not imposed under the provisions of subdivision (

2006(See Newland, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 711 .) The overriding purpose for the lifetime bar is to protect community care clients who might be harmed by an unfit employee.

2002In addition, any change in residence address must be reported within 10 days to the appropriate agency. (§ 186.32.) While the provision creates a burden for the registrant, unlike the lifetime requirement for sex offenders it is limited to five years after the last imposition of a registration requirement. (§ 186.32, subd. (c); cf. In re Luisa Z. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 978, 983 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 231 ].) Thus, we conclude that registration is intended to serve legitimate purposes other than punishment, and that the effect of the requirement is not “so punitive in fact that it must be regarded as

1991Significantly, unlike Proposition 140, the Texas act apparently was not aimed at limiting the powers of incumbency, but was based on the “rational predicate” that an affected justice will be less inclined to abuse his position or neglect his duties because of the justice’s aspirations for higher office. (457 U.S. at p. 968 [ 73 L.Ed.2d at p. 519 ].) In De Bottari v. Melendez (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 910 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 256 ], the Court of Appeal struck down a local ordinance prohibiting recalled council members from running for city council within a year of the recall.

1991Significantly, unlike Proposition 140, the Texas act apparently was not aimed at limiting the powers of incumbency, but was based on the “rational predicate” that an affected justice will be less inclined to abuse his position or neglect his duties because of the justice’s aspirations for higher office. (457 U.S. at p. 968 [ 73 L.Ed.2d at p. 519 ].) In De Bottari v. Melendez (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 910 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 256 ], the Court of Appeal struck down a local ordinance prohibiting recalled council members from running for city council within a year of the recall.

1991Significantly, unlike Proposition 140, the Texas act apparently was not aimed at limiting the powers of incumbency, but was based on the "rational predicate" that an affected justice will be less inclined to abuse his position or neglect his duties because of the justice's aspirations for higher office. (457 U.S. at p. 968 [ 73 L.Ed.2d at p. 519 ].) In De Bottari v. Melendez (1975) 44 Cal. App.3d 910 [ 119 Cal. Rptr. 256 ], the Court of Appeal struck down a local ordinance prohibiting recalled council members from running for city council within a year of the recall.

1991Significantly, unlike Proposition 140, the Texas act apparently was not aimed at limiting the powers of incumbency, but was based on the “rational predicate” that an affected justice will be less inclined to abuse his position or neglect his duties because of the justice’s aspirations for higher office. (457 U.S. at p. 968 [ 73 L.Ed.2d at p. 519 ].) In De Bottari v. Melendez (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 910 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 256 ], the Court of Appeal struck down a local ordinance prohibiting recalled council members from running for city council within a year of the recall.

1973The court reasoned that section 647 was not intended “to apply to activities, such as theatrical performances, which are prima facie within the ambit of First Amendment protection.” ( 1 Cal.3d at p. 826 .) It based this determination in large degree upon the requirement of section 290 that persons convicted under section 647, subdivision (a), must register as sex offenders, stating that “It would be irrational to impose upon an actor in a theatrical performance or its director a lifetime requirement of registration as a sexual offender because he may have performed or aided in the performance