14 California opinions name it 3 courts 2006–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Catholic Healthcare Westgreen2 sentences2025(See Jones v. Catholic Healthcare West (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 300, 307 [“Courts routinely construe . . . words like ‘shall’ or ‘must’ as mandatory.”]; accord, Howitson v. Evans Hotels, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 475 , 493.) The meal period waiver provisions at issue here in section 512 and section 11(A) of the wage orders do not require a written waiver (let alone in mandatory language). 2025(See Jones v. Catholic Healthcare West (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 300, 307 [“Courts routinely construe . . . words like ‘shall’ or ‘must’ as mandatory.”]; accord, Howitson v. Evans Hotels, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 475 , 493.) The meal period waiver provisions at issue here in section 512 and section 11(A) of the wage orders do not require a written waiver (let alone in mandatory language). | 3 | 3 |
Morillion v. Royal Packing Co.green2 sentences2018"Time worked" does not include time during which employees "are relieved of any duty or employer control and are free to come and go as they please." ( Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1037, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 315 , 273 P.3d 513 ; see Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575 , 584, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3 , 995 P.2d 139 [finding persuasive the DLSE's interpretation of "hours worked," namely, " 'Under California law it is only necessary that the worker be subject to the "control of the employer" in order to be entitled to compensation.' "].) Where there is no control, no compensation for "hou 2018"Time worked" does not include time during which employees "are relieved of any duty or employer control and are free to come and go as they please." ( Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1037, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 315 , 273 P.3d 513 ; see Morillion v. Royal Packing Co. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 575 , 584, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3 , 995 P.2d 139 [finding persuasive the DLSE's interpretation of "hours worked," namely, " 'Under California law it is only necessary that the worker be subject to the "control of the employer" in order to be entitled to compensation.' "].) Where there is no control, no compensation for "hou | 2 | 2 |
Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2025In their view, Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th 1004 , interpreted the same meal period waiver provisions at issue in this case and supports their reading of the statute and wage orders. 2025In their view, Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th 1004 , interpreted the same meal period waiver provisions at issue in this case and supports their reading of the statute and wage orders. | 1 | 9 |
Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc.green2 sentences2018Defendant made the employees work for part of the meal period, did not pay them for the time worked, and in addition did not comply with the meal period requirement - which is "not aimed at protecting or providing employees' wages," but instead is concerned with "ensuring the health and welfare of employees by requiring that employers provide meal and rest periods as mandated by the IWC." ( Kirby , supra , 53 Cal.4th at p. 1255, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 173 , 274 P.3d 1160 .) In short, Kirby does not support defendant's assertion that premium pay is plaintiffs' exclusive remedy for two different violat 2018Defendant made the employees work for part of the meal period, did not pay them for the time worked, and in addition did not comply with the meal period requirement - which is "not aimed at protecting or providing employees' wages," but instead is concerned with "ensuring the health and welfare of employees by requiring that employers provide meal and rest periods as mandated by the IWC." ( Kirby , supra , 53 Cal.4th at p. 1255, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 173 , 274 P.3d 1160 .) In short, Kirby does not support defendant's assertion that premium pay is plaintiffs' exclusive remedy for two different violat | 1 | 2 |
Palacio v. Jan & Gail's Care Homes, Inc.green1 sentence2019Palacio held that the employer "was *418 not obligated to comply with subdivision 11(A)" by including a provision in the agreements giving the employees the right to revoke them. ( Palacio , at pp. 1140-1141, 196 Cal.Rptr.3d 110 .) Similarly, in an October 17, 2016 opinion letter, the DLSE responded to the question "whether a meal period waiver is required to be signed by employees exempt from duty free meal periods under [subdivision 11(E) ]" by reference to Palacio . | 1 | 1 |
Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Commissiongreen2 sentences2006Plaintiffs invoke the general rule that “where exceptions to a general rule are specified by statute, other exceptions are not to be presumed unless a contrary legislative intent can be discerned.” *437 (Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 116 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 580 , 939 P.2d 1280 ].) “Under the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, if exemptions are specified in a statute, we may not imply additional exemptions unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary. 2006Plaintiffs invoke the general rule that “where exceptions to a general rule are specified by statute, other exceptions are not to be presumed unless a contrary legislative intent can be discerned.” *437 (Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 116 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 580 , 939 P.2d 1280 ].) “Under the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, if exemptions are specified in a statute, we may not imply additional exemptions unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC
green
1 sentence2023Donohue confirms that at the class certification stage, “records showing short and delayed meal periods” as well as missed meal periods, create a rebuttable presumption that there was a meal period violation. ( Donohue, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 74, 76.) In light of the guidance in Donohue, the evidence submitted, and the attendant presumption of a violation, the trial court’s determination that individual issues would predominate over class-wide issues on such a claim is no longer supported. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
TRB Investments, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance
green
1 sentence2021(See TRB Investments, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 23, 31–32.) Because the parties did not have the benefit of this decision when litigating the defendant’s summary judgment motion and the plaintiff’s summary adjudication motion, they should now be afforded another opportunity to present relevant evidence 29 DONOHUE v. AMN SERVICES, LLC Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. concerning AMN’s compliance with Brinker. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo
green
2 sentences2016After the trial court issued its decertification order, the Supreme Court clarified that Wal-Mart does not “stand for the broad proposition that a representative sample is an impermissible means of establishing classwide liability.” (Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo (2016) 577 U.S. _ , _ [ 194 L.Ed.2d 124 , 136 S.Ct. 1036, 1048 ] (Tyson).) “A representative or statistical sample, like all evidence, is a means to establish or defend against liability. 2016After the trial court issued its decertification order, the Supreme Court clarified that Wal-Mart does not “stand for the broad proposition that a representative sample is an impermissible means of establishing classwide liability.” (Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo (2016) 577 U.S. _ , _ [ 194 L.Ed.2d 124 , 136 S.Ct. 1036, 1048 ] (Tyson).) “A representative or statistical sample, like all evidence, is a means to establish or defend against liability. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Small v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2012(Small v. Superior Court, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 230 .) Thus, the meal period requirement contained in section 11 of Wage Order No. 9 was adopted or amended under the authority of sections 516 and 517 in addition to section 512, and section 12 of Wage Order No. 9 regarding rest periods was adopted or amended under the authority of sections 516 and 517. 27 Because the meal and rest period requirements in Wage Order No. 9 existed in 2001 under the authority of chapter 1 of part 2 of division 2 of the Labor Code, consisting of sections 500 through 558, they did not apply to Thurman, since, | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.