Texas exclusionary rule in Texas

2019“The Texas exclusionary rule applies to illegal searches or seizures conducted by law enforcement officers or ‘other persons,’ even when those other persons are not acting in conjunction with, or at the request of, government officials.” Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d 28, 36 (Tex. Crim.

2018Applicable Law The Texas exclusionary rule found in Article 38.23 is “broader than its federal counterpart”; it applies to “‘other persons,’ even when those other persons are not acting in conjunction with, or at the request of, government officials.” Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d 28, 34, 36 (Tex. Crim.

2016The Court of Criminal Appeals,' however, has recognized that exceptions to the federal exclusionary rule are only applicable to the Texas exclusionary rule if they are consistent with the plain language of article 38.23. • Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 861 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 472 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Tex.Crim.App.2015) (comparing .Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 473 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) to State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex.Crim.App,1996)); see Greer, 2015 WL 6366737 , at *3; Tercero, 467 S.W.3d at 10-11 ; State v. Esher, No. 05-14-00694-CR

2004See State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268 (Tex.Cr.App.1996)(inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the federal exclusionary rule, not the Texas exclusionary rule); Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.Cr.App. 1992); Oliver v. State, 711 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1986, pet’n ref'd)(Texas does not recognize the independent source doctrine as an exception to Article 38.23), cited in Garcia v. State, supra at 799; see also Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988)(discussing the independent source doctrine).

2016The Court of Criminal Appeals,' however, has recognized that exceptions to the federal exclusionary rule are only applicable to the Texas exclusionary rule if they are consistent with the plain language of article 38.23. • Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 861 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 472 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Tex.Crim.App.2015) (comparing .Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 473 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) to State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex.Crim.App,1996)); see Greer, 2015 WL 6366737 , at *3; Tercero, 467 S.W.3d at 10-11 ; State v. Esher, No. 05-14-00694-CR

2015See Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 861 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. granted) (citing Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 473 (Tex.Crim.App.2013)); State v. Jackson, 435 S.W.3d 819, 831 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2014, pet. granted) (“an officer’s good faith reliance on the law or existing precedent is not recognized as an exception to the Texas exclusionary rule”).

2015Since “the Texas good faith exception is more limited than the scope of its federal counterpart . . . an officer’s good faith reliance on the law or existing precedent is not recognized as an exception to the Texas exclusionary rule.” State v. Jackson, 435 S.W.3d 819, 831 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2014, pet. granted) (citations omitted).

2015Since "the Texas good faith exception is more limited than the scope of its federal counterpart ... an officer's good faith reliance on the law or existing precedent is not recognized as an exception to the Texas exclusionary rule." State v. Jackson, 435 S.W.3d 819, 831 (Tex.App. - Eastland 2014, pet. granted) (citations omitted). 3 PD-0077-15 STATE OF TEXAS V.

2016The Court of Criminal Appeals,' however, has recognized that exceptions to the federal exclusionary rule are only applicable to the Texas exclusionary rule if they are consistent with the plain language of article 38.23. • Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 861 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 472 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Tex.Crim.App.2015) (comparing .Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 473 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) to State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex.Crim.App,1996)); see Greer, 2015 WL 6366737 , at *3; Tercero, 467 S.W.3d at 10-11 ; State v. Esher, No. 05-14-00694-CR

2015Art. 38.23 (2012); Douds, 434 S.W.3d at 862 (Good- faith exceptions of Davis and Krull do not apply to the Texas exclusionary rule). xi.

2017According to him, the disclosure that Carrion fabricated evidence in his case renders that evidence (the drugs seized from Pena’s car) inadmissible under the Fourth Amendment and state law.3 According to him, the fabricated evidence was subject to suppression under the Texas exclusionary rule because we have held that a violation of the “tampering with or fabricating physical evidence” statute “bars the admission of other evidence obtained through that violation.” Wilson v. State, 311 S.W.3d 452, 464 (Tex. Crim.

2016Greer v. State, No. 01-14-00033-CR, 2015 WL 6366737 , at *2 ,(Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 22, 2015, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see Wilson, 311 S.W.3d at 458 (noting that article 38.23 “prohibits the use .of a much broader category of ‘illegally obtained’ evidence” than federal rule and “includes evidence that is obtained in violation of Texas laws as well as that obtained in violation of the federal and state constitution”). ■ The State contends the blood, draw evidence is not excludable under the Texas exclusionary rule because it was not obtained “in. viola

2016See Greer v. State, No. 01-14-00033-CR, 2015 WL 6366737 , at ⅜3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 22, 2015, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Burks v. State, 454 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2015, pet. ref'd); State v. Esher, No. 05-14-00694-CR, 2015 WL 4527715 , at *4 (Tex.App.-Dallas July 27, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); State v. Jacksoh, 435 S.W.3d 819, 831 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2014), rev’d on other grounds,• 464 S.W.3d 724, 734 (Tex. Crim.App.2015); Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 862 (Tex.App.-Houston' [14th Dist.] 2014), rev'd o

2016The trial court ruled that the exclusionary rule did “not apply to exclude the blood draw results because Officer Brown reasonably believed his actions were lawful.” The trial court, further found that “Officer Brown’s belief that no warrant was needed for the bipod draw was reasonable.” “[T]here is no exception under the Texas exclusionary rule for a good faith reliance upon a statute.” Id. at 224 (citing Weems v. State, 434 S.W.3d 655, 666-67 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. granted)).

2016App. 2013) (concluding that “independent source doctrine” may be basis for admitting otherwise inadmissible evidence because that doctrine “is consistent with the plain terms of the Texas exclusionary rule”); State v. Johnson, 871 S.W.2d 744, 750-51 (Tex. Crim.

2013Moreover, given this Court’s rationale for determining in Johnson that the attenuation doctrine is consistent with the Texas exclusionary rule, that same rationale leads us to conclude that the independent source doctrine is also compatible with it. 8 See Johnson, 871 S.W.2d at 750-51 .

2016Proc. art. 38.23(b) (emphasis added). 16 similar mandatory-blood-draw cases.44 Because the blood-draw evidence in this case was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in suppressing the evidence pursuant to the Texas exclusionary rule.45 We overrule the State’s first point of error. 44 See, e.g., Molden, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1539, at *12-14 ; Hill, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1540, at *11-13 ; Roop, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1541, at *16-17 ; Munoz, 474 S.W.3d at 16 ; Tercero, 467 S.W.3d at 10-11 ; B

2015The court relied on this Court’s original decision in Villarreal, Villarreal 2014 WL 6734178 , and on its own opinion in Burks v. State, 4 454 S.W.3d 705, 707-08 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth, pet. filed) that the Texas exclusionary rule did not apply to a warrantless seizure.

2016See Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (“[W]e must enforce the statute as written, excluding all illegally obtained evidence, with the single exception as set out in the statute.”).

2004See State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268 (Tex.Cr.App.1996)(inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the federal exclusionary rule, not the Texas exclusionary rule); Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.Cr.App. 1992); Oliver v. State, 711 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1986, pet’n ref'd)(Texas does not recognize the independent source doctrine as an exception to Article 38.23), cited in Garcia v. State, supra at 799; see also Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 , 108 S.Ct. 2529 , 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988)(discussing the independent source doctrine).

2016The Court of Criminal Appeals,' however, has recognized that exceptions to the federal exclusionary rule are only applicable to the Texas exclusionary rule if they are consistent with the plain language of article 38.23. • Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 861 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 472 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Tex.Crim.App.2015) (comparing .Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 473 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) to State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex.Crim.App,1996)); see Greer, 2015 WL 6366737 , at *3; Tercero, 467 S.W.3d at 10-11 ; State v. Esher, No. 05-14-00694-CR

2016Proc. art. 38.23(b) (emphasis added). 16 similar mandatory-blood-draw cases.44 Because the blood-draw evidence in this case was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in suppressing the evidence pursuant to the Texas exclusionary rule.45 We overrule the State’s first point of error. 44 See, e.g., Molden, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1539, at *12-14 ; Hill, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1540, at *11-13 ; Roop, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 1541, at *16-17 ; Munoz, 474 S.W.3d at 16 ; Tercero, 467 S.W.3d at 10-11 ; B

2022See Manns v. State, 122 S.W.3d 171 , 192 n.97 (Tex. Crim.

2013See Manns, 122 S.W.3d at 192 n.97. 12 The Callaghan court rejected such argument and specifically found that the federal causation analysis from Hudson was consistent with the required causation analysis for the Texas exclusionary rule. 222 S.W.3d at 615–16.

2017If the search or seizure violated the law, the Texas exclusionary rule is applicable to “‘other persons,’ even when those other persons are not acting in conjunction with, or at the request of, government officials.” Miles, 241 S.W.3d at 36 ; see also Cobb v. State, 85 S.W.3d 258 , 270–71 (Tex. Crim.

2017If the search or seizure violated the law, the Texas exclusionary rule is applicable to “ ‘other persons,’ even when those other persons are not acting in conjunction with, or at the request of, government officials.” Miles, 241 S.W.3d at 36 ; see also Cobb v. State, 85 S.W.3d 258, 270-71 (Tex. Crim.

2017State v. Jackson, 464 S.W.3d 724, 741 (Tex. Crim.

2016See Greer v. State, No. 01-14-00033-CR, 2015 WL 6366737 , at ⅜3 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 22, 2015, pet. filed) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Burks v. State, 454 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2015, pet. ref'd); State v. Esher, No. 05-14-00694-CR, 2015 WL 4527715 , at *4 (Tex.App.-Dallas July 27, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); State v. Jacksoh, 435 S.W.3d 819, 831 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2014), rev’d on other grounds,• 464 S.W.3d 724, 734 (Tex. Crim.App.2015); Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 862 (Tex.App.-Houston' [14th Dist.] 2014), rev'd o

2017See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2488-91 , 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) (discussing the scope of privacy interests at stake in a cell phone search); see Miles, 241 S.W.3d at 36 n.33 (only those acts which violate a person’s privacy rights or property rights are subject' to the state or federal exclusionary rule).

2017See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2488-91 , 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) (discussing the scope of privacy interests at stake in a cell phone search); see Miles, 241 S.W.3d at 36 n.33 (only those acts which violate a person’s privacy rights or property rights are subject' to the state or federal exclusionary rule).

2016The Court of Criminal Appeals,' however, has recognized that exceptions to the federal exclusionary rule are only applicable to the Texas exclusionary rule if they are consistent with the plain language of article 38.23. • Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 861 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 472 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Tex.Crim.App.2015) (comparing .Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 473 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) to State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex.Crim.App,1996)); see Greer, 2015 WL 6366737 , at *3; Tercero, 467 S.W.3d at 10-11 ; State v. Esher, No. 05-14-00694-CR

2016The Court of Criminal Appeals,' however, has recognized that exceptions to the federal exclusionary rule are only applicable to the Texas exclusionary rule if they are consistent with the plain language of article 38.23. • Douds v. State, 434 S.W.3d 842, 861 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 472 S.W.3d 670, 677 (Tex.Crim.App.2015) (comparing .Wehrenberg v. State, 416 S.W.3d 458, 473 (Tex.Crim.App.2013) to State v. Daugherty, 931 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex.Crim.App,1996)); see Greer, 2015 WL 6366737 , at *3; Tercero, 467 S.W.3d at 10-11 ; State v. Esher, No. 05-14-00694-CR

2015Importantly, “[o]nly those acts which violate a person’s privacy rights or property interests are subject to the state ... exclusionary rule.” Id. at 36 n. 33 (citing Chavez v. State, 9 S.W.3d 817, 822-23 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (Price, J., concurring)).

2014Thus, appellant lacks standing as a matter of law to complain about Officer Pray conducting an investigation outside his jurisdiction. 8 As Judge Price explained in a concurring opinion in Chavez, “unless someone’s privacy or property interests are illegally infringed upon in the obtainment of evidence, the core rationale for [the Texas exclusionary rule] is not met and its use is unwarranted.” Id. at 822 (Price, J., concurring).

2015See Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964). 5 The Texas exclusionary rule, Article 38.23, is broader in scope and provides more protection to a suspect than its federal counterpart.

2015See Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex. 1964). 5 The Texas exclusionary rule, Article 38.23, is broader in scope and provides more protection to a suspect than its federal counterpart.

2008See Macklin v. State , 861 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd).

2008See Macklin v. State, 861 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d).

2008Article 38.23(a) is the Texas exclusionary rule. (5) There is a definite distinction between the admissibility of evidence under the first sentence of article 38.23(a), which is decided solely by the trial court, and the second sentence concerning the jury's role under article 38.23(a) in considering evidence that has already been admitted before the jury. (6) This distinction is well explained in Pierce v. State , 32 S.W.3d 247, 251 (Tex. Crim.

2008The seizure of the cocaine was without a warrant and appellant’s arrest was warrantless. 5 Article 38.23(a) provides: No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or the 7 admissibility of evidence under the first sentence of article 38.23(a), which is decided solely by the trial court, and the second sentence concerning the jury’s role under article 38.23(a) in considering evidence that has already been admitted before the jury.6 This distinction is well explained in Pierce v. State, 32 S.W.3d 247, 251 (Te

1991Cf. Walter v. U.S., 447 U.S. 649 , 100 S.Ct. 2395 , 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980). [6] We note that appellee, in his motion to suppress, also contested the seizure of his blood sample under the Texas exclusionary rule.

1991Cf. Walter v. U.S., 447 U.S. 649 , 100 S.Ct. 2395 , 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980). [6] We note that appellee, in his motion to suppress, also contested the seizure of his blood sample under the Texas exclusionary rule.