14 California opinions name it 2 courts 1921–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Banco Mercantil, S. A. v. Sauls Inc.green2 sentences2021Additionally, “[i]n order to prove the third essential [element], it is necessary that the evidence show not only that the party claiming the estoppel did not have actual knowledge of the true facts but that he did not have notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge; the convenient or ready means of acquiring knowledge being the equivalent of knowledge.” (Banco Mercantil, S.A. v. Sauls, Inc. (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 316, 323 .) Plaintiffs cite general statements in newsletters and letters dating back to the firs 2012The first element of estoppel, that PERS knew the true facts, requires proof of either actual knowledge or of “careless and culpable conduct resulting in the deception of the party entitled to claim the estoppel.” (Banco Mercantil v. Sauls Inc. (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 316, 323 [ 295 P.2d 55 ].) In light of Pleasanton’s failure to report the extra payments as special compensation as required by the PERS operations manual, we cannot deem PERS’s failure to recognize the reporting discrepancy sooner “careless and culpable.” 11 Further, the party claiming an estoppel must also prove it “did not have | 4 | 6 |
Nilson v. Sarmentgreen2 sentences1961Co. v. Seaboard Dairy Credit Corp., 1 Cal.2d 121, 128 [ 34 P.2d 139 ]; Rockefeller v. Smith, 104 Cal.App. 544, 550 [ 286 P. 487 ].) To prove such ignorance “it is necessary that the evidence show not only that the party claiming the estoppel did not have actual knowledge of the true facts but that he did not have notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge; the convenient or ready means of acquiring knowledge being the equivalent of knowledge.” (Banco Mercantil v. Sauls Inc., 140 Cal.App.2d 316, 323 [ 295 P.2d 1958Corp. v. Gandy, 200 Cal. 284, 298 [ 253 P. 137 ] ; Nilson v. Sarment, 153 Cal. 524, 531-532 [ 96 P. 315 , 126 Am.St.Rep. 91 ].) Whether or not appellants’ counsel was reasonably justified in assuming that the motions for change of venue had been abandoned without taking the readily available means of ascertaining the truth presented a question for the trial court and on the record before us we cannot interfere with its decision. | 3 | 3 |
Olson v. Cornwellgreen2 sentences1967(Olson v. Cornwell, 134 Cal.App. 419, 428 [ 25 P.2d 879 ].)” (Ibid., p. 6.) 9 It is obvious that the slightest amount of *590 inquiry would have disclosed the existence of the other two 1958 leases which, if they do create an easement appurtenant to parcel A, would have informed Geneva more than adequately. 1967(Olson v. Cornwell, 134 Cal.App. 419, 428 [ 25 P.2d 879 ].)” (Ibid., p. 6.) 9 It is obvious that the slightest amount of *590 inquiry would have disclosed the existence of the other two 1958 leases which, if they do create an easement appurtenant to parcel A, would have informed Geneva more than adequately. | 2 | 2 |
Lusitanian-American Development Co. v. Seaboard Dairy Credit Corp.green2 sentences1961Co. v. Seaboard Dairy Credit Corp., 1 Cal.2d 121, 128 [ 34 P.2d 139 ]; Rockefeller v. Smith, 104 Cal.App. 544, 550 [ 286 P. 487 ].) To prove such ignorance “it is necessary that the evidence show not only that the party claiming the estoppel did not have actual knowledge of the true facts but that he did not have notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge; the convenient or ready means of acquiring knowledge being the equivalent of knowledge.” (Banco Mercantil v. Sauls Inc., 140 Cal.App.2d 316, 323 [ 295 P.2d 1961Co. v. Seaboard Dairy Credit Corp., 1 Cal.2d 121, 128 [ 34 P.2d 139 ]; Rockefeller v. Smith, 104 Cal.App. 544, 550 [ 286 P. 487 ].) To prove such ignorance “it is necessary that the evidence show not only that the party claiming the estoppel did not have actual knowledge of the true facts but that he did not have notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge; the convenient or ready means of acquiring knowledge being the equivalent of knowledge.” (Banco Mercantil v. Sauls Inc., 140 Cal.App.2d 316, 323 [ 295 P.2d | 2 | 2 |
Jones v. Coultergreen2 sentences1961Corp. v. Gandy, 200 Cal. 284, 297 [ 253 P. 137 ]; Jones v. Coulter, 75 Cal.App. 540, 550-551 [ 243 P. 487 ].) The determination by the trial court upon the issue of estoppel is supported by the evidence and the law. 1961Corp. v. Gandy, 200 Cal. 284, 297 [ 253 P. 137 ]; Jones v. Coulter, 75 Cal.App. 540, 550-551 [ 243 P. 487 ].) The determination by the trial court upon the issue of estoppel is supported by the evidence and the law. | 2 | 2 |
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Gandygreen2 sentences1961Corp. v. Gandy, 200 Cal. 284, 297 [ 253 P. 137 ]; Jones v. Coulter, 75 Cal.App. 540, 550-551 [ 243 P. 487 ].) The determination by the trial court upon the issue of estoppel is supported by the evidence and the law. 1961Corp. v. Gandy, 200 Cal. 284, 297 [ 253 P. 137 ]; Jones v. Coulter, 75 Cal.App. 540, 550-551 [ 243 P. 487 ].) The determination by the trial court upon the issue of estoppel is supported by the evidence and the law. | 2 | 2 |
Dean v. Parkergreen2 sentences1961Co. v. Seaboard Dairy Credit Corp., 1 Cal.2d 121, 128 [ 34 P.2d 139 ]; Rockefeller v. Smith, 104 Cal.App. 544, 550 [ 286 P. 487 ].) To prove such ignorance “it is necessary that the evidence show not only that the party claiming the estoppel did not have actual knowledge of the true facts but that he did not have notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge; the convenient or ready means of acquiring knowledge being the equivalent of knowledge.” (Banco Mercantil v. Sauls Inc., 140 Cal.App.2d 316, 323 [ 295 P.2d 1961Co. v. Seaboard Dairy Credit Corp., 1 Cal.2d 121, 128 [ 34 P.2d 139 ]; Rockefeller v. Smith, 104 Cal.App. 544, 550 [ 286 P. 487 ].) To prove such ignorance “it is necessary that the evidence show not only that the party claiming the estoppel did not have actual knowledge of the true facts but that he did not have notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge; the convenient or ready means of acquiring knowledge being the equivalent of knowledge.” (Banco Mercantil v. Sauls Inc., 140 Cal.App.2d 316, 323 [ 295 P.2d | 1 | 2 |
Selinger v. Millygreen2 sentences1967Co. v. Pacific Finance Corp. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 773 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 448 , 356 P.2d 192 ]; Banco Mercantil v. Sauls Inc. (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 316 [ 295 P.2d 55 ]; Safway Steel Products, Inc. v. Lefever (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 489 [ 256 P.2d 32 ].) In order to prove this element, “it is necessary that the evidence show not only that the party claiming the estoppel did not have actual knowledge of the true facts but that he did not have notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge; the convenient or ready means of acqu 1967Co. v. Pacific Finance Corp. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 773 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 448 , 356 P.2d 192 ]; Banco Mercantil v. Sauls Inc. (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 316 [ 295 P.2d 55 ]; Safway Steel Products, Inc. v. Lefever (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 489 [ 256 P.2d 32 ].) In order to prove this element, “it is necessary that the evidence show not only that the party claiming the estoppel did not have actual knowledge of the true facts but that he did not have notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge; the convenient or ready means of acqu | 1 | 1 |
Rockefeller v. Smithgreen2 sentences1961Co. v. Seaboard Dairy Credit Corp., 1 Cal.2d 121, 128 [ 34 P.2d 139 ]; Rockefeller v. Smith, 104 Cal.App. 544, 550 [ 286 P. 487 ].) To prove such ignorance “it is necessary that the evidence show not only that the party claiming the estoppel did not have actual knowledge of the true facts but that he did not have notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge; the convenient or ready means of acquiring knowledge being the equivalent of knowledge.” (Banco Mercantil v. Sauls Inc., 140 Cal.App.2d 316, 323 [ 295 P.2d 1961Co. v. Seaboard Dairy Credit Corp., 1 Cal.2d 121, 128 [ 34 P.2d 139 ]; Rockefeller v. Smith, 104 Cal.App. 544, 550 [ 286 P. 487 ].) To prove such ignorance “it is necessary that the evidence show not only that the party claiming the estoppel did not have actual knowledge of the true facts but that he did not have notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge; the convenient or ready means of acquiring knowledge being the equivalent of knowledge.” (Banco Mercantil v. Sauls Inc., 140 Cal.App.2d 316, 323 [ 295 P.2d | 1 | 1 |
Benson v. Andrewsgreen1 sentence1958Corp., 1 Cal.2d 121, 128 [ 34 P.2d 139 ]; Benson v. Andrews, 138 Cal.App.2d 123, 138 [ 292 P.2d 389 ]; 18 Cal. Jur.2d, Estoppel, § 5, p. 407.) One is not ignorant of the facts, in the sense in which that term is used in the doctrine of estoppel, if he has “notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge.” (Banco Mercantil v. Sauls Inc., 140 Cal.App.2d 316, 323 [ 295 P.2d 55 ] ; General Motors Accept. | 1 | 1 |
Merchants' Ad-Sign Co. v. Sterlinggreen2 sentences1956Corp. v. Gandy, supra, pp. 297-298 ; Nilson v. Sarment, 153 Cal. 524, 531-532 [ 96 P. 315 , 126 Am.St.Rep. 91 ]; Jones v. Coulter, 75 Cal.App. 540, 550-551 [ 243 P. 487 ]; Merchants' Ad-Sign Co. v. Sterling, 124 Cal. 429, 434 [ 57 P. 468 , 71 Am.St.Rep. 94 , 46 L.R.A. 142 ]; Bank of America v. Pacific Ready-Cut Homes, supra). 1956Corp. v. Gandy, supra, pp. 297-298 ; Nilson v. Sarment, 153 Cal. 524, 531-532 [ 96 P. 315 , 126 Am.St.Rep. 91 ]; Jones v. Coulter, 75 Cal.App. 540, 550-551 [ 243 P. 487 ]; Merchants' Ad-Sign Co. v. Sterling, 124 Cal. 429, 434 [ 57 P. 468 , 71 Am.St.Rep. 94 , 46 L.R.A. 142 ]; Bank of America v. Pacific Ready-Cut Homes, supra). | 1 | 1 |
Callahan v. Martingreen2 sentences1951(Dobbins v. Economic Gas Co., 182 Cal. 616, 620 [ 189 P. 1073 ].) Recordation of an assignment of an interest in the minerals “imparts constructive notice to a subsequent grantee of the fee in the general estate.” (Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal.2d 110, 113 [ 43 P.2d 788 , 101 A.L.R. 871 ].) Whenever a party has information or knowledge of extraneous facts which of themselves do not amount to or tend to show actual notice but which are sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry respecting a conflicting interest, claim or right, and the circumstances are such that the inquiry, if made a 1951(Dobbins v. Economic Gas Co., 182 Cal. 616, 620 [ 189 P. 1073 ].) Recordation of an assignment of an interest in the minerals “imparts constructive notice to a subsequent grantee of the fee in the general estate.” (Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal.2d 110, 113 [ 43 P.2d 788 , 101 A.L.R. 871 ].) Whenever a party has information or knowledge of extraneous facts which of themselves do not amount to or tend to show actual notice but which are sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry respecting a conflicting interest, claim or right, and the circumstances are such that the inquiry, if made a | 1 | 1 |
Dobbins v. Economic Gas Co.green2 sentences1951(Dobbins v. Economic Gas Co., 182 Cal. 616, 620 [ 189 P. 1073 ].) Recordation of an assignment of an interest in the minerals “imparts constructive notice to a subsequent grantee of the fee in the general estate.” (Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal.2d 110, 113 [ 43 P.2d 788 , 101 A.L.R. 871 ].) Whenever a party has information or knowledge of extraneous facts which of themselves do not amount to or tend to show actual notice but which are sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry respecting a conflicting interest, claim or right, and the circumstances are such that the inquiry, if made a 1951(Dobbins v. Economic Gas Co., 182 Cal. 616, 620 [ 189 P. 1073 ].) Recordation of an assignment of an interest in the minerals “imparts constructive notice to a subsequent grantee of the fee in the general estate.” (Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal.2d 110, 113 [ 43 P.2d 788 , 101 A.L.R. 871 ].) Whenever a party has information or knowledge of extraneous facts which of themselves do not amount to or tend to show actual notice but which are sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry respecting a conflicting interest, claim or right, and the circumstances are such that the inquiry, if made a | 1 | 1 |
Seeger v. Odellgreen2 sentences1945(See Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal.2d 409, 414 [ 115 P.2d 977 , 136 A.L.R. 1291 ].) Accordingly, we must now determine whether plaintiff has brought himself within the exception to the statute of limitations. [15a] Plaintiff's evidence, if believed, disclosed certain factors that may have tended to discourage the making of an exhaustive independent investigation, and we cannot hold, as a matter of law, that any of the circumstances known to plaintiff should have put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry. 1945(See Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal.2d 409, 414 [ 115 P.2d 977 , 136 A.L.R. 1291 ].) Accordingly, we must now determine whether plaintiff has brought himself within the exception to the statute of limitations. [15a] Plaintiff's evidence, if believed, disclosed certain factors that may have tended to discourage the making of an exhaustive independent investigation, and we cannot hold, as a matter of law, that any of the circumstances known to plaintiff should have put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry. | 1 | 1 |
Tarke v. Binghamgreen1 sentence1945(Tarke v. Bingham, 123 Cal. 163, 166 [ 55 P. 759 ].) Innocent parties do not carry the burden of inquiry. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Penny
neutral
2 sentences1961Co. v. Seaboard Dairy Credit Corp., 1 Cal.2d 121, 128 [ 34 P.2d 139 ]; Rockefeller v. Smith, 104 Cal.App. 544, 550 [ 286 P. 487 ].) To prove such ignorance “it is necessary that the evidence show not only that the party claiming the estoppel did not have actual knowledge of the true facts but that he did not have notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge; the convenient or ready means of acquiring knowledge being the equivalent of knowledge.” (Banco Mercantil v. Sauls Inc., 140 Cal.App.2d 316, 323 [ 295 P.2d 1956In order to prove the third essential, it is necessary that the evidence show not only that the party claiming the estoppel did not have actual knowledge of the true facts but that he did not have notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge; the convenient or ready means of acquiring knowledge being the equivalent of knowledge (Smith v. Penny, 44 Cal. 161 ; Dean v. Parker, 88 Cal. 283 [ 26 P. 91 ]; General Motors Accept. | 2 | 1956–1961 |
City of Pleasanton v. Board of Administration of Public Employees' Retirement System
green
1 sentence2014In addition, it appears Soto’s attorney acted unreasonably by failing to research the statutory scheme for himself. “[T]he party claiming an estoppel must also prove it ‘did not have actual knowledge of the true facts [and] did not have notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge.’ [Citation.]” (City of Pleasanton v. Board of Administration, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 544 .) Contrary to Soto’s brief on appeal, the $25,000 limit had nothing to do with the particular assistant district attorney handling the ca | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Brown v. Copp
green
2 sentences1967In Brown v. Copp, 105 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 232 P.2d 868 ], it is said: ' ‘ Whenever a party has information or knowledge of extraneous facts which of themselves do not amount or tend to show actual notice but which are sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry respecting a conflicting interest, claim or right, and the circumstances are such that the inquiry, if made and followed up with reasonable care and diligence, would lead to knowledge of the interest, claim or right which really exists, then the party is absolutely charged with constructive notice of such interest, claim or right 1967In Brown v. Copp, 105 Cal.App.2d 1 [ 232 P.2d 868 ], it is said: ' ‘ Whenever a party has information or knowledge of extraneous facts which of themselves do not amount or tend to show actual notice but which are sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry respecting a conflicting interest, claim or right, and the circumstances are such that the inquiry, if made and followed up with reasonable care and diligence, would lead to knowledge of the interest, claim or right which really exists, then the party is absolutely charged with constructive notice of such interest, claim or right | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Safway Steel Products, Inc. v. Lefever
green
2 sentences1967Co. v. Pacific Finance Corp. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 773 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 448 , 356 P.2d 192 ]; Banco Mercantil v. Sauls Inc. (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 316 [ 295 P.2d 55 ]; Safway Steel Products, Inc. v. Lefever (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 489 [ 256 P.2d 32 ].) In order to prove this element, “it is necessary that the evidence show not only that the party claiming the estoppel did not have actual knowledge of the true facts but that he did not have notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge; the convenient or ready means of acqu 1967Co. v. Pacific Finance Corp. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 773 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 448 , 356 P.2d 192 ]; Banco Mercantil v. Sauls Inc. (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 316 [ 295 P.2d 55 ]; Safway Steel Products, Inc. v. Lefever (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 489 [ 256 P.2d 32 ].) In order to prove this element, “it is necessary that the evidence show not only that the party claiming the estoppel did not have actual knowledge of the true facts but that he did not have notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge; the convenient or ready means of acqu | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Crestline Mobile Homes Manufacturing Co. v. Pacific Finance Corp.
green
2 sentences1967Co. v. Pacific Finance Corp. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 773 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 448 , 356 P.2d 192 ]; Banco Mercantil v. Sauls Inc. (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 316 [ 295 P.2d 55 ]; Safway Steel Products, Inc. v. Lefever (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 489 [ 256 P.2d 32 ].) In order to prove this element, “it is necessary that the evidence show not only that the party claiming the estoppel did not have actual knowledge of the true facts but that he did not have notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge; the convenient or ready means of acqu 1967Co. v. Pacific Finance Corp. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 773 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 448 , 356 P.2d 192 ]; Banco Mercantil v. Sauls Inc. (1956) 140 Cal.App.2d 316 [ 295 P.2d 55 ]; Safway Steel Products, Inc. v. Lefever (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 489 [ 256 P.2d 32 ].) In order to prove this element, “it is necessary that the evidence show not only that the party claiming the estoppel did not have actual knowledge of the true facts but that he did not have notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge; the convenient or ready means of acqu | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Cobb v. Baxter
green
1 sentence1958Corp., 1 Cal.2d 121, 128 [ 34 P.2d 139 ]; Benson v. Andrews, 138 Cal.App.2d 123, 138 [ 292 P.2d 389 ]; 18 Cal. Jur.2d, Estoppel, § 5, p. 407.) One is not ignorant of the facts, in the sense in which that term is used in the doctrine of estoppel, if he has “notice of facts sufficient to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry, the pursuit of which would have led to actual knowledge.” (Banco Mercantil v. Sauls Inc., 140 Cal.App.2d 316, 323 [ 295 P.2d 55 ] ; General Motors Accept. | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Bernheim v. Cerf
green
1 sentence1945(Tarke v. Bingham, 123 Cal. 163, 166 [ 55 P. 759 ].) Innocent parties do not carry the burden of inquiry. | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Kenniff v. Caulfield
green
2 sentences1933Where a plaintiff asserts title under a prior unrecorded deed, and the defendant claims under a recorded deed, the burden is upon the latter to prove that he is a purchaser in good faith for a valuable consideration and without notice, actual or constructive, prior and down to the time of payment (Kenniff v. Caulfield, 140 Cal. 34 [ 73 Pac. 803 ] ; Bell v. Pleasant, 145 Cal. 410 [ 78 Pac. 957 , 104 Am. 1933Where a plaintiff asserts title under a prior unrecorded deed, and the defendant claims under a recorded deed, the burden is upon the latter to prove that he is a purchaser in good faith for a valuable consideration and without notice, actual or constructive, prior and down to the time of payment (Kenniff v. Caulfield, 140 Cal. 34 [ 73 Pac. 803 ] ; Bell v. Pleasant, 145 Cal. 410 [ 78 Pac. 957 , 104 Am. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Bell v. Pleasant
green
2 sentences1933Where a plaintiff asserts title under a prior unrecorded deed, and the defendant claims under a recorded deed, the burden is upon the latter to prove that he is a purchaser in good faith for a valuable consideration and without notice, actual or constructive, prior and down to the time of payment (Kenniff v. Caulfield, 140 Cal. 34 [ 73 Pac. 803 ] ; Bell v. Pleasant, 145 Cal. 410 [ 78 Pac. 957 , 104 Am. 1933Where a plaintiff asserts title under a prior unrecorded deed, and the defendant claims under a recorded deed, the burden is upon the latter to prove that he is a purchaser in good faith for a valuable consideration and without notice, actual or constructive, prior and down to the time of payment (Kenniff v. Caulfield, 140 Cal. 34 [ 73 Pac. 803 ] ; Bell v. Pleasant, 145 Cal. 410 [ 78 Pac. 957 , 104 Am. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Ex parte Sotomayor
neutral
1 sentence1921Appellant, however, insists that the finding is not supported by the evidence in that, while conceding the defendants had no personal knowledge of plaintiff’s rights, it nevertheless shows their attorneys received notice, the character of which was such as to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry as to plaintiff’s rights, and that such notice must be imputed to defendants, who as principals must be deemed chargeable with constructive notice. [2] “ Knowledge by notice to attorney or counsel or agent acquired during the negotiations for a purchase is constructive notice to their principal.” | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Fortis v. Fortis
green
1 sentence1921Appellant, however, insists that the finding is not supported by the evidence in that, while conceding the defendants had no personal knowledge of plaintiff’s rights, it nevertheless shows their attorneys received notice, the character of which was such as to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry as to plaintiff’s rights, and that such notice must be imputed to defendants, who as principals must be deemed chargeable with constructive notice. [2] “ Knowledge by notice to attorney or counsel or agent acquired during the negotiations for a purchase is constructive notice to their principal.” | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Bank of Mendocino v. Baker
green
2 sentences1921Appellant, however, insists that the finding is not supported by the evidence in that, while conceding the defendants had no personal knowledge of plaintiff’s rights, it nevertheless shows their attorneys received notice, the character of which was such as to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry as to plaintiff’s rights, and that such notice must be imputed to defendants, who as principals must be deemed chargeable with constructive notice. [2] “ Knowledge by notice to attorney or counsel or agent acquired during the negotiations for a purchase is constructive notice to their principal.” 1921R A. 833, 22 Pac. 1037 ].) Conceding the law as stated, appellant insists that the evidence shows that one of the attorneys for defendants had sufficient notice to put him upon inquiry as to the plaintiff’s interest in the subject of the controversy. | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Watson v. Sutro
green
1 sentence1921Appellant, however, insists that the finding is not supported by the evidence in that, while conceding the defendants had no personal knowledge of plaintiff’s rights, it nevertheless shows their attorneys received notice, the character of which was such as to put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry as to plaintiff’s rights, and that such notice must be imputed to defendants, who as principals must be deemed chargeable with constructive notice. [2] “ Knowledge by notice to attorney or counsel or agent acquired during the negotiations for a purchase is constructive notice to their principal.” | 1 | 1921–1921 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.