Sandoval motion in California

2023(Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 926 .) Second, the fact that Prospective Juror No. 28 answered the questions put to her does not undermine the trial court’s finding, because it does not demonstrate that she was otherwise attentive throughout voir dire. 16 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err by overruling Sandoval’s objection to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror No. 28.

2023(Reynoso, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 926 .) Second, the fact that Prospective Juror No. 28 answered the questions put to her does not undermine the trial court’s finding, because it does not demonstrate that she was otherwise attentive throughout voir dire. 16 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err by overruling Sandoval’s objection to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror No. 28.

2023(Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 977 .) In denying Sandoval’s motion to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor, the trial court considered Sandoval’s criminal history, including multiple prior convictions and prison terms.

2023(Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 977 .) In denying Sandoval’s motion to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor, the trial court considered Sandoval’s criminal history, including multiple prior convictions and prison terms.

2022(Fisher v. State Personnel Board (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1, 23 .) Substantial evidence thus supports the SPB’s finding that Smith was likely to repeat his offending behavior, which in turn supports its decision to uphold Smith’s dismissal.

2022(Fisher v. State Personnel Board (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1, 23 .) Substantial evidence thus supports the SPB’s finding that Smith was likely to repeat his offending behavior, which in turn supports its decision to uphold Smith’s dismissal.

2025Unanimity Instruction Sandoval contends the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on unanimity (e.g., CALCRIM No. 3500) regarding criminal threats. “[T]he jury must agree unanimously the defendant is guilty of a specific crime.” (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 .) “[W]hen the evidence suggests more than one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act.” (Ibid.) “Where no election is made, the court has a duty to instruct sua sponte on the unanimity requirement.” (People v. Curry (200

2025Unanimity Instruction Sandoval contends the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on unanimity (e.g., CALCRIM No. 3500) regarding criminal threats. “[T]he jury must agree unanimously the defendant is guilty of a specific crime.” (People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 .) “[W]hen the evidence suggests more than one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act.” (Ibid.) “Where no election is made, the court has a duty to instruct sua sponte on the unanimity requirement.” (People v. Curry (200

2023(People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 100 .) Sandoval mistakenly relies on cases expressly or implicitly overruled by Wolcott.

2023He asserts that if the People are seeking a “non-bifurcated ‘trial by the jury’ on aggravating factors, then the only way to avoid violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause would be for the entire judgment” to be reversed, because Galvan “knows of no authority for retrial of a part of the charge.” Galvan cites Sealfon v. U.S. (1948) 332 U.S. 575 for the proposition that a “prior verdict of acquittal ‘operates to conclude those matters in issue which have been determined by a previous verdict, even though the offenses be different.’ ” Sealfon held that a defendant who had been acquitted of conspi

2023He asserts that if the People are seeking a “non-bifurcated ‘trial by the jury’ on aggravating factors, then the only way to avoid violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause would be for the entire judgment” to be reversed, because Galvan “knows of no authority for retrial of a part of the charge.” Galvan cites Sealfon v. U.S. (1948) 332 U.S. 575 for the proposition that a “prior verdict of acquittal ‘operates to conclude those matters in issue which have been determined by a previous verdict, even though the offenses be different.’ ” Sealfon held that a defendant who had been acquitted of conspi

2023The Attorney General, citing People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825 , argues that the error is harmless because this court can determine, “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury, applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, unquestionably would have found true at least a single aggravating circumstance had it been submitted to the jury.” (Id. at p. 839; see People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495 , 499 [applying Sandoval test where jury did not find aggravating factors in Senate Bill No. 567 context].) Defendant contends that the Sandoval harmless error standard is not applicable af

2015When the jurors returned, the court admonished them “to disregard the profanity that was used in characterizing the defendant by this witness.” Citing Parker v. Gladden (1966) 385 U.S. 363 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 420 , 87 S.Ct. 468 ], Sandoval argues that Detective Delfín’s comment was inherently prejudicial because he is a state official.

2015When the jurors returned, the court admonished them “to disregard the profanity that was used in characterizing the defendant by this witness.” Citing Parker v. Gladden (1966) 385 U.S. 363 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 420 , 87 S.Ct. 468 ], Sandoval argues that Detective Delfín’s comment was inherently prejudicial because he is a state official.

2015(Ibid.) In reversing the Sandoval defendant’s conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds, the Third District observed that the United States has a treaty with Mexico which addresses diplomatic cooperation in criminal matters. ( Sandoval, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1438-1440.) The treaty contains a provision that “allows the prosecution to request the assistance of Mexican authorities to invite a person in Mexico to come to California and testify and to inform the person concerning the extent to which expenses will be paid.” (Id. at pp. 1438-1439, fn. omitted.) Since the witness had already been l

2014But Sandoval’s criticism misses the mark because as Sengpadychith explained, expert opinion testimony concerning a gang’s primary activities satisfies the burden of proof because the detailed opinion of an expert “implies that the commission of [those crimes] is one of the group’s ‘chief’ or ‘principal’ occupations.” ( Sengpadychith, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 323-324.) Sandoval’s challenge therefore fails. (b) Substantial Evidence Showed Sandoval’s Knowledge of Gang Activity Sandoval challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conclusion he knew his gang engaged in a pattern of cr

2014(See § 186.22, subd. (a) [criminalizing active participation “in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity,” italics added].) But “just as a jury may rely on evidence about a defendant’s personal conduct, as well as expert testimony about gang culture and habits, to make findings concerning a defendant’s active participation in a gang or a pattern of gang activity, it may also rely on the same evidence to infer a defendant’s knowledge of those activities.” ( Carr, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 488-489, fn. omitted.

2013If so, there is no minimum cross-admissibility requirement, as they suggest; indeed, there need be no cross-admissible evidence at all to justify a joint trial of the same class of crime. ( Alcala, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1221-1222; § 954.1.) Next, Allen and Palmer contend that the second Sandoval factor militated in favor of severance, arguing the fact that both crimes were gang related was inflammatory, and that the Martinez shooting was particularly inflammatory because the incident was videotaped and Martinez was shot twice in the head while panhandling.13 We disagree, 12 For convenience

2006(See In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th *117 924, 928 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 713 , 830 P.2d 747 ] [holding “when a defendant demonstrates that ineffective representation at the pretrial stage of a criminal proceeding caused him or her to proceed to trial rather than to accept an offer of a plea bargain that would have been approved by the court, the defendant has been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel”].) 5 Sandoval filed a third motion to augment the record on appeal to include the September 15, 2004 information, and a request that we take judicial notice of this information as well as an

2006(See In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th *117 924, 928 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 713 , 830 P.2d 747 ] [holding “when a defendant demonstrates that ineffective representation at the pretrial stage of a criminal proceeding caused him or her to proceed to trial rather than to accept an offer of a plea bargain that would have been approved by the court, the defendant has been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel”].) 5 Sandoval filed a third motion to augment the record on appeal to include the September 15, 2004 information, and a request that we take judicial notice of this information as well as an