substantive merits claim in California

2023(See, e.g., House v. Mitra QSR KNE LLC, supra, 796 Fed.Appx. 783 , 786 [“If a party does not have standing, then there is no federal jurisdiction, and ‘the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’ ”].)11 Under California law, by contrast, “lack of standing as a real party in interest is not jurisdictional; it is equivalent only to a failure to state a cause of action.” (County of Riverside v. Loma Linda University (1981) 11 As explained in The Rossdale Group, LLC v. Walton (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 936 (Rossdale Group), “ ‘Properly understood,

2023(See, e.g., House v. Mitra QSR KNE LLC, supra, 796 Fed.Appx. 783 , 786 [“If a party does not have standing, then there is no federal jurisdiction, and ‘the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.’ ”].)11 Under California law, by contrast, “lack of standing as a real party in interest is not jurisdictional; it is equivalent only to a failure to state a cause of action.” (County of Riverside v. Loma Linda University (1981) 11 As explained in The Rossdale Group, LLC v. Walton (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 936 (Rossdale Group), “ ‘Properly understood,

2017Proc., § 367.) Its purpose is to "protect a defendant from harassment from other claimants on the same demand." ( Redevelopment Agency of San Diego v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co . (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 912 , 921, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 317 .) Section 367"is not the equivalent of, and provides no occasion to import, federal-style 'standing' requirements." ( Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 980 , 991, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 426 ( Jasmine Networks ).) "Properly understood, the concept of 'standing' contemplates a requirement that the plaintiff 'establish an entitlement to judicia

2017Proc., § 367.) Its purpose is to "protect a defendant from harassment from other claimants on the same demand." ( Redevelopment Agency of San Diego v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co . (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 912 , 921, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 317 .) Section 367"is not the equivalent of, and provides no occasion to import, federal-style 'standing' requirements." ( Jasmine Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 980 , 991, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 426 ( Jasmine Networks ).) "Properly understood, the concept of 'standing' contemplates a requirement that the plaintiff 'establish an entitlement to judicia

2026The “termination must reflect on the merits of the underlying action.” (Lackner v. LaCroix (1979) 25 Cal.3d 747, 750 .) “It is apparent ‘favorable’ termination does not occur merely because a party complained against has prevailed in an underlying action.

2025Instead, relying on Moncharsh, Sargon concluded that the plaintiff there had not waived an illegality defense to arbitration by not raising it in the trial court pre- award—because the claim would not have been a proper basis for 30 opposing a petition to compel arbitration under section 1281.2 in the first instance, the defense in that case going not to revocation of the arbitration contract but to the substantive merits of the claim. ( Sargon, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 761–762, citing Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 29–30.) Here, by contrast, Madrigal entered into the joint stipulation tha

2025Instead, relying on Moncharsh, Sargon concluded that the plaintiff there had not waived an illegality defense to arbitration by not raising it in the trial court pre- award—because the claim would not have been a proper basis for 30 opposing a petition to compel arbitration under section 1281.2 in the first instance, the defense in that case going not to revocation of the arbitration contract but to the substantive merits of the claim. ( Sargon, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 761–762, citing Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 29–30.) Here, by contrast, Madrigal entered into the joint stipulation tha

2022(Smith v. Americania Motor Lodge (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 1, 8-9 ; but see Christian v. Goodwin (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 650, 655 [five-year-old child is incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law].) In any event, D.D. did not object at trial and we need not decide the substantive merits of this claim of error.

2020(See id. at pp. 1525-1527, citing Warren, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 1303 for notion that a resolution based on the statute of limitations “does not constitute a favorable termination because it does not reflect on the merits of the action.”) The JSJ court reasoned: “Res judicata, as the statute of limitations, is a defense that does not go to the substantive merits of the claim.

2020(See id. at pp. 1525-1527, citing Warren, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 1303 for notion that a resolution based on the statute of limitations “does not constitute a favorable termination because it does not reflect on the merits of the action.”) The JSJ court reasoned: “Res judicata, as the statute of limitations, is a defense that does not go to the substantive merits of the claim.

2020Neither is it a determination of the actual ‘innocence’ of a party.” (JSJ, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1525 .) It is “not concerned with the actual merits of a prior adjudication but solely with the need for finality.” (Id. at pp. 1525-1256.) “[T]he doctrine is an affirmative defense, which as a matter of procedure, bars the claim—just as the statute of limitations does—whether the claim is meritorious or not.” (Id. at p. 1526.) Thus, “the successful invocation of the defense of res judicata in the underlying claim is not a determination on the merits for purposes of a malicious prosecution a

2000Although Eisen focused on notice costs, the high court expressed its agreement with Miller v. Mackey International, Inc. (5th Cir. 1971) 452 F.2d 424 (Miller), a case specifically holding that a trial court could not consider the substantive merits of a claim for relief when passing on a motion for a class action.

2000In Miller , the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals emphasized that the propriety of a class action is “basically a procedural question” and that “[a] suit may be a proper class action, conforming to Rule 23, and still be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.” ( 452 F.2d at p. 427 .) The circuit court explained: “Rule 23 delineates the scope of inquiry to be exercised by a district judge in passing on a class action motion.

1984(See generally People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835, 840-848 [ 120 Cal. Rptr. 83 , 533 P.2d 211 ].) He contends that because the dispositive order in Ramos I reversed only the penalty judgment and affirmed the judgment in all other respects ( 30 Cal.3d at p. 602 ), that decision necessarily upheld the special circumstance finding which defendant may not reopen at this time.

1984(See generally People v. Shuey (1975) 13 Cal.3d 835, 840-848 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 83 , 533 P.2d 211 ].) He contends that because the dispositive order in Ramos I reversed only the penalty judgment and affirmed the judgment in all other respects ( 30 Cal.3d at p. 602 ), that decision necessarily upheld the special circumstance finding which defendant may not reopen at this time.