supermajority vote requirement in California

2021Nowhere does Proposition 13 mention, let alone purport to repeal, the constitutionally-backed requirement in the Elections Code that a local initiative measure take effect when it garners a majority of votes cast.” (All Persons, at pp. 715–716.) Second, Kennedy Wholesale applied the principle that, because the initiative power is “ ‘ “ ‘ “one of the most precious rights of our democratic process,” ’ ” ’ . . . ‘we must “resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of the exercise of this precious right” ’ . . . . [Citation.] Applying that principle here, we will reject a construction of article XIII

2021Nowhere does Proposition 13 mention, let alone purport to repeal, the constitutionally-backed requirement in the Elections Code that a local initiative measure take effect when it garners a majority of votes cast.” (All Persons, at pp. 715–716.) Second, Kennedy Wholesale applied the principle that, because the initiative power is “ ‘ “ ‘ “one of the most precious rights of our democratic process,” ’ ” ’ . . . ‘we must “resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of the exercise of this precious right” ’ . . . . [Citation.] Applying that principle here, we will reject a construction of article XIII

2021(Citing Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d 245 ; Altadena Library Dist. v. Bloodgood (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 585, 587 ; City of Dublin v. County of Alameda (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 264 .) Nowak is mistaken, as none of these cases addresses whether the supermajority vote requirement in article XIIIA, section 4 applies to a citizens’ initiative.

2021(Citing Kennedy Wholesale, supra, 53 Cal.3d 245 ; Altadena Library Dist. v. Bloodgood (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 585, 587 ; City of Dublin v. County of Alameda (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 264 .) Nowak is mistaken, as none of these cases addresses whether the supermajority vote requirement in article XIIIA, section 4 applies to a citizens’ initiative.

2021XIII A, § 3].) 6 power to raise taxes in the future by statutory initiative.’ [Citation.] ‘To the contrary,’ Proposition 13 was directed against ‘ “spendthrift politicians” ’ and in favor of restoring ‘ “government of, for and by the people.” ’ [Citation.] This populist theme, the Court found, was inconsistent with the claim that voters intended Proposition 13 to limit their own power to raise taxes by initiative.” (All Persons, at p. 716.) All Persons reasoned that “[n]one of the evidence Kennedy Wholesale cites is specific to section 3, as distinct from section 4, of article XIII A;” moreove

1994(See Rider, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 7-8, citing Richmond, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 206 .) As noted by the Rider court, the dissenting opinion in Richmond “observed that the majority’s analysis in Richmond could be used to readily circumvent the supermajority vote requirement of [article XIII A,] section 4 ‘by the simple creation of a district which is geographically precisely coterminous with a county, but which lacks its real property taxing power ....

2021C, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 710, quoting Associated Home Builders, etc. Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582 , 594–595; see also HJTA, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 237.) It was on that basis that we declined to “hobble[] the exercise of the initiative power by lashing it to a supermajority vote requirement.” (Matter of Prop.

2021C, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 710, quoting Associated Home Builders, etc. Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582 , 594–595; see also HJTA, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 237.) It was on that basis that we declined to “hobble[] the exercise of the initiative power by lashing it to a supermajority vote requirement.” (Matter of Prop.

2021XIII A, § 3].) 6 power to raise taxes in the future by statutory initiative.’ [Citation.] ‘To the contrary,’ Proposition 13 was directed against ‘ “spendthrift politicians” ’ and in favor of restoring ‘ “government of, for and by the people.” ’ [Citation.] This populist theme, the Court found, was inconsistent with the claim that voters intended Proposition 13 to limit their own power to raise taxes by initiative.” (All Persons, at p. 716.) All Persons reasoned that “[n]one of the evidence Kennedy Wholesale cites is specific to section 3, as distinct from section 4, of article XIII A;” moreove

2021XIII A, § 3].) 6 power to raise taxes in the future by statutory initiative.’ [Citation.] ‘To the contrary,’ Proposition 13 was directed against ‘ “spendthrift politicians” ’ and in favor of restoring ‘ “government of, for and by the people.” ’ [Citation.] This populist theme, the Court found, was inconsistent with the claim that voters intended Proposition 13 to limit their own power to raise taxes by initiative.” (All Persons, at p. 716.) All Persons reasoned that “[n]one of the evidence Kennedy Wholesale cites is specific to section 3, as distinct from section 4, of article XIII A;” moreove

2024(Wilde, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1112 .) These definitional changes affected which charges are subject to the supermajority vote requirement in the Legislature or voter approval requirements at the local level for new taxes.

2020(Bank of Elk Grove v. Joliet (Ill.Ct.App. 1988) 525 N.E. 2d 569 , 570–571.) California law is to the contrary, as clearly spelled out in the cases we have already considered.

2010Their principal contention, within which the others are subsumed, is that the City and Agency control Cuesta Villas, and therefore the senior housing project cannot be considered “privately owned.” Taxpayers claim the principles enunciated in Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 , 820 P.2d 1000 ] (Rider I)—-where the Supreme Court held that an intent to circumvent Proposition 13 could be inferred where the plaintiffs proved a newly created tax agency was “essentially controlled” by a city or county that otherwise would have had to comply with a supermajority vote

2010Their principal contention, within which the others are subsumed, is that the City and Agency control Cuesta Villas, and therefore the senior housing project cannot be considered “privately owned.” Taxpayers claim the principles enunciated in Rider v. County of San Diego (1991) 1 Cal.4th 1 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 490 , 820 P.2d 1000 ] (Rider I)—-where the Supreme Court held that an intent to circumvent Proposition 13 could be inferred where the plaintiffs proved a newly created tax agency was “essentially controlled” by a city or county that otherwise would have had to comply with a supermajority vote

2010But, as is apparent from the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Rider v. City of San Diego (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1035 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 , 959 P.2d 347 ] (Rider II), they do not.

2010But, as is apparent from the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Rider v. City of San Diego (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1035 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 189 , 959 P.2d 347 ] (Rider II), they do not.

2001(Id. at p. 799.) In reaching this conclusion, the court discussed California history in the late 1800’s, and, in so doing, briefly characterized the predecessor to article IV, section 16 as an “absolute ban on special legislation.” ( 2 Cal.3d at p. 776 .) The United States Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari in Westbrook , and then vacated the Westbrook decision after it decided Gordon v. Lance (1971) 403 U.S. 1 [ 91 S.Ct. 1889 , 29 L.Ed.2d 273 ], which held a supermajority vote requirement for the adoption of a tax does not violate federal equal protection rights.

2001(Id. at p. 799.) In reaching this conclusion, the court discussed California history in the late 1800’s, and, in so doing, briefly characterized the predecessor to article IV, section 16 as an “absolute ban on special legislation.” ( 2 Cal.3d at p. 776 .) The United States Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari in Westbrook , and then vacated the Westbrook decision after it decided Gordon v. Lance (1971) 403 U.S. 1 [ 91 S.Ct. 1889 , 29 L.Ed.2d 273 ], which held a supermajority vote requirement for the adoption of a tax does not violate federal equal protection rights.

2001(Id. at p. 799.) In reaching this conclusion, the court discussed California history in the late 1800’s, and, in so doing, briefly characterized the predecessor to article IV, section 16 as an “absolute ban on special legislation.” ( 2 Cal.3d at p. 776 .) The United States Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari in Westbrook , and then vacated the Westbrook decision after it decided Gordon v. Lance (1971) 403 U.S. 1 [ 91 S.Ct. 1889 , 29 L.Ed.2d 273 ], which held a supermajority vote requirement for the adoption of a tax does not violate federal equal protection rights.