14 California opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Community Assisting Recovery, Inc. v. Aegis Security Insurancegreen2 sentences2011In Community Assisting , the plaintiff asserted an unfair business practice claim, which the court rejected for lack of any allegations that the defendants had “interfered with the appraisal process, deceived or coerced the insureds to settle for replacement cost less depreciation, or that they engaged in any acts which might have been a breach of the standard form policy.” (Community Assisting, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 894.) Here, by contrast, Doan alleges deception—the use of “secret” depreciation schedules “intended to hide State Farm’s noncompliance with section 2051 from consumers”—as 2011The plaintiff in Community Assisting also asserted an unlawful business practice claim based on the allegation that the defendants were “ ‘adjusting property loss claims on the basis of replacement cost less depreciation rather than on the basis of fair market value, in violation of the mandates set forth in Jefferson ....’” (Community Assisting, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 891, citing Jefferson Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co.green2 sentences2002This argument does not apply to the unfair business practice claim (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 170 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 , 973 P.2d 527 ] [damages are not recoverable on that cause of action]), and does not defeat the cause of action for abuse of process. 2002This argument does not apply to the unfair business practice claim (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 170 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 548 , 973 P.2d 527 ] [damages are not recoverable on that cause of action]), and does not defeat the cause of action for abuse of process. | 1 | 1 |
Osborne v. Subaru of America, Inc.green2 sentences1999Code, § 52, subd. (a).) 7 An order denying certification to an entire class is appealable. ( Richmond, supra, 29 Cal.3d 462, 470; Osborne v. Subaru of America, Inc. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 646, 652, fn. 2 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 815 ].) 8 Both Caro and Dean Witter Reynolds did not consider the due process implications of ordering restitution for absent persons, and only considered whether an unfair business practice claim should proceed as a class action. 1999Code, § 52, subd. (a).) 7 An order denying certification to an entire class is appealable. ( Richmond, supra, 29 Cal.3d 462, 470; Osborne v. Subaru of America, Inc. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 646, 652, fn. 2 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 815 ].) 8 Both Caro and Dean Witter Reynolds did not consider the due process implications of ordering restitution for absent persons, and only considered whether an unfair business practice claim should proceed as a class action. | 1 | 1 |
Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc.green1 sentence1999Code, § 52, subd. (a).) 7 An order denying certification to an entire class is appealable. ( Richmond, supra, 29 Cal.3d 462, 470; Osborne v. Subaru of America, Inc. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 646, 652, fn. 2 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 815 ].) 8 Both Caro and Dean Witter Reynolds did not consider the due process implications of ordering restitution for absent persons, and only considered whether an unfair business practice claim should proceed as a class action. | 1 | 1 |
Perdue v. Crocker National Bankgreen2 sentences1995(Perdue v. Crocker National Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913, 929 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 702 P.2d 503 ]; Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Fisher Development, Inc. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1433, 1441-1442 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 151 ]; Hernandez v. Atlantic Finance Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 65, 72 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 279 ].) Without the unfair business practices claim, the trial court restricted the scope of the evidence introduced at trial to that directly relevant to each individual plaintiff. 1995(Perdue v. Crocker National Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913, 929 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 702 P.2d 503 ]; Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Fisher Development, Inc. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1433, 1441-1442 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 151 ]; Hernandez v. Atlantic Finance Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 65, 72 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 279 ].) Without the unfair business practices claim, the trial court restricted the scope of the evidence introduced at trial to that directly relevant to each individual plaintiff. | 1 | 1 |
Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Fisher Development, Inc.green2 sentences1995(Perdue v. Crocker National Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913, 929 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 702 P.2d 503 ]; Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Fisher Development, Inc. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1433, 1441-1442 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 151 ]; Hernandez v. Atlantic Finance Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 65, 72 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 279 ].) Without the unfair business practices claim, the trial court restricted the scope of the evidence introduced at trial to that directly relevant to each individual plaintiff. 1995(Perdue v. Crocker National Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913, 929 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 702 P.2d 503 ]; Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Fisher Development, Inc. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1433, 1441-1442 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 151 ]; Hernandez v. Atlantic Finance Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 65, 72 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 279 ].) Without the unfair business practices claim, the trial court restricted the scope of the evidence introduced at trial to that directly relevant to each individual plaintiff. | 1 | 1 |
Hernandez v. Atlantic Finance Co. of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences1995(Perdue v. Crocker National Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913, 929 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 702 P.2d 503 ]; Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Fisher Development, Inc. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1433, 1441-1442 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 151 ]; Hernandez v. Atlantic Finance Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 65, 72 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 279 ].) Without the unfair business practices claim, the trial court restricted the scope of the evidence introduced at trial to that directly relevant to each individual plaintiff. 1995(Perdue v. Crocker National Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913, 929 [ 216 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 702 P.2d 503 ]; Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Fisher Development, Inc. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1433, 1441-1442 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 151 ]; Hernandez v. Atlantic Finance Co. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 65, 72 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 279 ].) Without the unfair business practices claim, the trial court restricted the scope of the evidence introduced at trial to that directly relevant to each individual plaintiff. | 1 | 1 |
Shadoan v. World Savings & Loan Assn.green2 sentences1993(Shadoan v. World Savings & Loan Assn. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 97, 101 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 207 ]; People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 509, 530 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 164 , 53 A.L.R.4th 661 ].) But the record here contains no finding of such a practice. 1993(Shadoan v. World Savings & Loan Assn. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 97, 101 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 207 ]; People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 509, 530 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 164 , 53 A.L.R.4th 661 ].) But the record here contains no finding of such a practice. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc.green2 sentences1993(Shadoan v. World Savings & Loan Assn. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 97, 101 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 207 ]; People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 509, 530 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 164 , 53 A.L.R.4th 661 ].) But the record here contains no finding of such a practice. 1993(Shadoan v. World Savings & Loan Assn. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 97, 101 [ 268 Cal.Rptr. 207 ]; People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, Inc. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 509, 530 [ 206 Cal.Rptr. 164 , 53 A.L.R.4th 661 ].) But the record here contains no finding of such a practice. | 1 | 1 |
Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1989(See Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1093, 1095-1096 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 655 ] [expressing the view that only restitution and an injunction are available as remedies here].) Likewise, while a class action should not be routinely certified absent some reason to believe that a class action would be a beneficial procedural mechanism for the resolution of the dispute, the propriety of the class certification is not an issue in this appeal. *1061 We also note it is not entirely clear that a ruling that interest must be paid on security deposits would actually favor tena 1989(See Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1093, 1095-1096 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 655 ] [expressing the view that only restitution and an injunction are available as remedies here].) Likewise, while a class action should not be routinely certified absent some reason to believe that a class action would be a beneficial procedural mechanism for the resolution of the dispute, the propriety of the class certification is not an issue in this appeal. *1061 We also note it is not entirely clear that a ruling that interest must be paid on security deposits would actually favor tena | 1 | 1 |
Burks v. Poppy Construction Co.green2 sentences1985At a minimum, men who wish to be charged the same price as women on “Ladies’ Day” must affirmatively assert their right to equal treatment. 4 Plaintiff also alleged that defendants’ policies constituted an unfair business practice in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17500. 5 Section 52 provides in pertinent part: “(a) Whoever . . . makes any discrimination, distinction or restriction on account of sex . . . contrary to the provisions of section 51 . . ., is liable for each and every such offense for the actual damages, and such amount as may be determined by a jury, or a cour 1985At a minimum, men who wish to be charged the same price as women on “Ladies’ Day” must affirmatively assert their right to equal treatment. 4 Plaintiff also alleged that defendants’ policies constituted an unfair business practice in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17500. 5 Section 52 provides in pertinent part: “(a) Whoever . . . makes any discrimination, distinction or restriction on account of sex . . . contrary to the provisions of section 51 . . ., is liable for each and every such offense for the actual damages, and such amount as may be determined by a jury, or a cour | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
International Engine Parts, Inc. v. Feddersen & Co.
green
2 sentences2019Proc. § 437c, subd. (m)(2) [additional briefing must be permitted to rule on grounds which trial court did not reach].) The parties agree that the statute of limitations for a claim of an accountant's negligence is two years under Code of Civil Procedure 339, subdivision (1). ( Feddersen , supra , 9 Cal.4th at p. 608 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 150 , 888 P.2d 1279 ; Choi , supra , 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 315 , 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 267 .) They also agree that the two-year statute of limitations applies to the unfair business practice claim. 2019Proc. § 437c, subd. (m)(2) [additional briefing must be permitted to rule on grounds which trial court did not reach].) The parties agree that the statute of limitations for a claim of an accountant's negligence is two years under Code of Civil Procedure 339, subdivision (1). ( Feddersen , supra , 9 Cal.4th at p. 608 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 150 , 888 P.2d 1279 ; Choi , supra , 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 315 , 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 267 .) They also agree that the two-year statute of limitations applies to the unfair business practice claim. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Choi v. Sagemark Consulting
green
2 sentences2019Proc. § 437c, subd. (m)(2) [additional briefing must be permitted to rule on grounds which trial court did not reach].) The parties agree that the statute of limitations for a claim of an accountant's negligence is two years under Code of Civil Procedure 339, subdivision (1). ( Feddersen , supra , 9 Cal.4th at p. 608 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 150 , 888 P.2d 1279 ; Choi , supra , 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 315 , 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 267 .) They also agree that the two-year statute of limitations applies to the unfair business practice claim. 2019Proc. § 437c, subd. (m)(2) [additional briefing must be permitted to rule on grounds which trial court did not reach].) The parties agree that the statute of limitations for a claim of an accountant's negligence is two years under Code of Civil Procedure 339, subdivision (1). ( Feddersen , supra , 9 Cal.4th at p. 608 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 150 , 888 P.2d 1279 ; Choi , supra , 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 315 , 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 267 .) They also agree that the two-year statute of limitations applies to the unfair business practice claim. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Yaesu Electronics Corp. v. Tamura
green
1 sentence2022(Yaesu Electronics Corp. v. Tamura (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 8, 13 .) We do not address Abrahams’s argument, as we understand it, that he properly alleged an unfair business practices claim because Askew and TRA violated the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (Civ. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Pastoria v. Nationwide Insurance
green
1 sentence2005(Pastoria v. Nationwide Ins., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 1497 .) We conclude that the balancing test should continue to apply in consumer cases. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
People Ex Rel. Sepulveda v. Highland Federal Savings & Loan
green
2 sentences2003Savings & Loan (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1692 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 555 ]), and an unfair business practice claim against a federal savings association based on its relationship to a brokerage subsidiary (Fenning v. Glenfed, Inc. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1285 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 715 ]). 2003Savings & Loan (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1692 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 555 ]), and an unfair business practice claim against a federal savings association based on its relationship to a brokerage subsidiary (Fenning v. Glenfed, Inc. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1285 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 715 ]). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Fenning v. Glenfed, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003Savings & Loan (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1692 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 555 ]), and an unfair business practice claim against a federal savings association based on its relationship to a brokerage subsidiary (Fenning v. Glenfed, Inc. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1285 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 715 ]). 2003Savings & Loan (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1692 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 555 ]), and an unfair business practice claim against a federal savings association based on its relationship to a brokerage subsidiary (Fenning v. Glenfed, Inc. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1285 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 715 ]). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp.
green
2 sentences1999From this predicate, plaintiffs argued the court should certify the nationwide class because Norwest Mortgage could not satisfy its burden under Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605 [ 236 Cal.Rptr. 605 ] (hereafter Clothesrigger) of showing that (1) the laws of other interested states were in actual conflict with the UCL in a manner that would affect the outcome of the litigation, or (2) the other states had an interest in applying their laws to this dispute, or (3) the laws of other interested states rather than the UCL should be applied under the “comparative impairment 1999From this predicate, plaintiffs argued the court should certify the nationwide class because Norwest Mortgage could not satisfy its burden under Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 605 [ 236 Cal.Rptr. 605 ] (hereafter Clothesrigger) of showing that (1) the laws of other interested states were in actual conflict with the UCL in a manner that would affect the outcome of the litigation, or (2) the other states had an interest in applying their laws to this dispute, or (3) the laws of other interested states rather than the UCL should be applied under the “comparative impairment | 1 | 1999–1999 |
In Re Cox
green
1 sentence1985At a minimum, men who wish to be charged the same price as women on “Ladies’ Day” must affirmatively assert their right to equal treatment. 4 Plaintiff also alleged that defendants’ policies constituted an unfair business practice in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17500. 5 Section 52 provides in pertinent part: “(a) Whoever . . . makes any discrimination, distinction or restriction on account of sex . . . contrary to the provisions of section 51 . . ., is liable for each and every such offense for the actual damages, and such amount as may be determined by a jury, or a cour | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Spiegel, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission
green
1 sentence1984(See also Spiegel, Inc. v. F.T.C. (7th Cir. 1976) 540 F.2d 287, 298 .) Casa Blanca’s practice of providing insufficient nursing personnel was not only an illegal practice but also an unfair business practice in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200. | 1 | 1984–1984 |