14 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wolcott v. Administrative Director of the Courts.green2 sentences2023In Wolcott, the supreme court held that the procedures used by the ADLRO in that case, namely, sending the driver whose license had been revoked a "cryptic and unclear computer printout" indicating prior alcohol enforcement contacts, which an ADLRO hearing officer considered in determining the length of the driver's license revocation period, denied him due process. 148 Hawai#i at 409-10, 477 P.3d at 849–50. 2023In Wolcott, the supreme court held that the procedures used by the ADLRO in that case, namely, sending the driver whose license had been revoked a "cryptic and unclear computer printout" indicating prior alcohol enforcement contacts, which an ADLRO hearing officer considered in determining the length of the driver's license revocation period, denied him due process. 148 Hawai#i at 409-10, 477 P.3d at 849–50. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Higagreen2 sentences1997See supra note 5; see also Toyomura, 80 Hawai'i at 18 , 904 P.2d at 903 ("[Tjhe Administrative Revocation Program, including the ADLRO hearing mechanism, is not 'punitive' by its very nature, but rather serves ... legitimate, nonpunitive, and purely remedial functions[.]” (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) (Some brackets added and some deleted.)); Higa, 79 Hawai'i at 6 , 897 P.2d at 933 ("[T]he purpose of the administrative revocation process is not to 'punish' ...; it is to safeguard the public and reduce traffic fatalities caused by those driving while under the influence of alcohol.”). 1997See supra note 5; see also Toyomura, 80 Hawai'i at 18 , 904 P.2d at 903 ("[Tjhe Administrative Revocation Program, including the ADLRO hearing mechanism, is not 'punitive' by its very nature, but rather serves ... legitimate, nonpunitive, and purely remedial functions[.]” (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) (Some brackets added and some deleted.)); Higa, 79 Hawai'i at 6 , 897 P.2d at 933 ("[T]he purpose of the administrative revocation process is not to 'punish' ...; it is to safeguard the public and reduce traffic fatalities caused by those driving while under the influence of alcohol.”). | 1 | 2 |
Lanai Co., Inc. v. Land Use Com'ngreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., Lanai Co. v. Land Use Comm'n, 105 Hawai #i 296, 318, 97 P.3d 372, 394 (2004) ("If the legislature intended to grant the LUC enforcement powers, it could have expressly provided the LUC with such power."); Morgan v. Plan. 2025See, e.g., Lanai Co. v. Land Use Comm'n, 105 Hawai #i 296, 318, 97 P.3d 372, 394 (2004) ("If the legislature intended to grant the LUC enforcement powers, it could have expressly provided the LUC with such power."); Morgan v. Plan. | 1 | 1 |
Custer v. Administrative Director of the Courtsgreen2 sentences2010Dir. of the Courts, 108 Hawai'i 350, 356 , 120 P.3d 249, 255 (2005), held that under the then-existing statutes, the Director, acting through an ADLRO hearing officer during the administrative hearing process, did not have the authority to increase the period of revocation imposed by the administrative review decision. 2010Dir. of the Courts, 108 Hawai'i 350, 356 , 120 P.3d 249, 255 (2005), held that under the then-existing statutes, the Director, acting through an ADLRO hearing officer during the administrative hearing process, did not have the authority to increase the period of revocation imposed by the administrative review decision. | 1 | 1 |
Dunaway v. Administrative Director of the Courtsgreen1 sentence2007Dir. of Courts, 108 Hawai`i 78, 83, 117 P.3d 109, 114 (2005). (2) Regarding Engel's objection to the ADLRO's hearing procedure, we struggle to pinpoint the defect and its purported harm. | 1 | 1 |
Freitas v. Administrative Director of the Courtsgreen2 sentences2005To intimate otherwise, as the partial majority opinion in Part III does, see majority opinion at 39, note 2, 116 P.3d at 681, note 2 , would obscure the "automatic reversal" rule under the sixth amendment applied in criminal cases, and the balancing test we had adopted in Freitas I to be applied where the due process clause pertains. [16] Nonetheless, the majority cites to United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24 (1st Cir.1998), a sixth amendment right to a public trial case, for the proposition that this court should be "hesitant to displace the ADLRO hearing officer's judgment call in these circ 2005To intimate otherwise, as the partial majority opinion in Part III does, see majority opinion at 39, note 2, 116 P.3d at 681, note 2 , would obscure the "automatic reversal" rule under the sixth amendment applied in criminal cases, and the balancing test we had adopted in Freitas I to be applied where the due process clause pertains. [16] Nonetheless, the majority cites to United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24 (1st Cir.1998), a sixth amendment right to a public trial case, for the proposition that this court should be "hesitant to displace the ADLRO hearing officer's judgment call in these circ | 1 | 1 |
Desmond v. Administrative Director of the Courtsgreen2 sentences2005Dir. of the Courts, 91 Hawai'i 212, 220 , 982 P.2d 346, 354 (App.1998), rev’d on other grounds, 90 Hawai'i 301 , 978 P.2d 739 (1998) (holding that hearing officers should inform the parties of the procedures at the beginning of the hearing); (4) the court erred in holding the ADLRO had jurisdiction because (a) the arresting officer had failed to sign the jurat on the Notice of Administrative Revocation and instead had signed the Certified Statement of Dismissal and (b) the procedure in HRS § 291E, Part III, which requires a valid chemical test result or refusal to confer jurisdiction on the AD 2005Dir. of the Courts, 91 Hawai'i 212, 220 , 982 P.2d 346, 354 (App.1998), rev’d on other grounds, 90 Hawai'i 301 , 978 P.2d 739 (1998) (holding that hearing officers should inform the parties of the procedures at the beginning of the hearing); (4) the court erred in holding the ADLRO had jurisdiction because (a) the arresting officer had failed to sign the jurat on the Notice of Administrative Revocation and instead had signed the Certified Statement of Dismissal and (b) the procedure in HRS § 291E, Part III, which requires a valid chemical test result or refusal to confer jurisdiction on the AD | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robert P. Deluca, Sr., United States of America v. Gerard T. Ouimette, United States of America v. Gerard T. Ouimettegreen2 sentences2005We are thus "hesitant to displace [the ADLRO hearing officer]'s judgment call in [these] circumstances." DeLuca, 137 F.3d at 34 . 2005We are thus "hesitant to displace [the ADLRO hearing officer]'s judgment call in [these] circumstances." DeLuca, 137 F.3d at 34 . | 1 | 1 |
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroftgreen1 sentence2004These demand a “fair hearing, ” essential alike to the validity of the administrative regulation and to the maintenance of public confidence in the value and soundness of this important governmental process ... [therefore,] when governmental agencies adjudicate or malee binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process. 195 F.Supp.2d at 943 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Norton v. Administrative Director of the Courtgreen2 sentences2000Norton v. Administrative Director of the Court, 80 Hawai'i 197, 201 , 908 P.2d 545, 549 (1995). 2000Norton v. Administrative Director of the Court, 80 Hawai'i 197, 201 , 908 P.2d 545, 549 (1995). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Toyomuragreen2 sentences1997See supra note 5; see also Toyomura, 80 Hawai'i at 18 , 904 P.2d at 903 ("[Tjhe Administrative Revocation Program, including the ADLRO hearing mechanism, is not 'punitive' by its very nature, but rather serves ... legitimate, nonpunitive, and purely remedial functions[.]” (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) (Some brackets added and some deleted.)); Higa, 79 Hawai'i at 6 , 897 P.2d at 933 ("[T]he purpose of the administrative revocation process is not to 'punish' ...; it is to safeguard the public and reduce traffic fatalities caused by those driving while under the influence of alcohol.”). 1997See supra note 5; see also Toyomura, 80 Hawai'i at 18 , 904 P.2d at 903 ("[Tjhe Administrative Revocation Program, including the ADLRO hearing mechanism, is not 'punitive' by its very nature, but rather serves ... legitimate, nonpunitive, and purely remedial functions[.]” (Citation and quotation marks omitted.) (Some brackets added and some deleted.)); Higa, 79 Hawai'i at 6 , 897 P.2d at 933 ("[T]he purpose of the administrative revocation process is not to 'punish' ...; it is to safeguard the public and reduce traffic fatalities caused by those driving while under the influence of alcohol.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Slupecki v. Administrative Director of the Courts
green
2 sentences2023The court first recognized that "a driver's license is a constitutionally protected interest and due process must be provided before one can be deprived of his or her license." Id. at 414, 477 P.3d at 854 (brackets omitted) (quoting Slupecki, 110 Hawai#i at 413, 133 P.3d at 1205 ). 2023The court first recognized that "a driver's license is a constitutionally protected interest and due process must be provided before one can be deprived of his or her license." Id. at 414, 477 P.3d at 854 (brackets omitted) (quoting Slupecki, 110 Hawai#i at 413, 133 P.3d at 1205 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Kernan v. Tanaka
green
2 sentences2020At an ADLRO hearing, the respondent must have the “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Kernan, 75 Haw. at 22 , 856 P.2d at 1218 . 2020At an ADLRO hearing, the respondent must have the “opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Kernan, 75 Haw. at 22 , 856 P.2d at 1218 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Freitas v. Administrative Director of the Courts
green
2 sentences2005In any event, Freitas does not argue that the ADLRO hearing officer erred in applying that portion of the three-part formulation outlined in Freitas I. 104 Hawai`i at 489, 92 P.3d at 999 . 2005In any event, Freitas does not argue that the ADLRO hearing officer erred in applying that portion of the three-part formulation outlined in Freitas I. 104 Hawai`i at 489, 92 P.3d at 999 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences2005Similarly, in Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162 (Ind.1997), the Indiana Supreme Court held that courtroom security procedures requiring that each person who was unknown to the officer at the door show identification and sign in did not amount to "exclusion" of anyone and, thus, did not implicate the right to public trial. 2005Similarly, in Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162 (Ind.1997), the Indiana Supreme Court held that courtroom security procedures requiring that each person who was unknown to the officer at the door show identification and sign in did not amount to "exclusion" of anyone and, thus, did not implicate the right to public trial. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Desmond v. Administrative Director of the Courts
green
2 sentences2005Dir. of the Courts, 91 Hawai'i 212, 220 , 982 P.2d 346, 354 (App.1998), rev’d on other grounds, 90 Hawai'i 301 , 978 P.2d 739 (1998) (holding that hearing officers should inform the parties of the procedures at the beginning of the hearing); (4) the court erred in holding the ADLRO had jurisdiction because (a) the arresting officer had failed to sign the jurat on the Notice of Administrative Revocation and instead had signed the Certified Statement of Dismissal and (b) the procedure in HRS § 291E, Part III, which requires a valid chemical test result or refusal to confer jurisdiction on the AD 2005Dir. of the Courts, 91 Hawai'i 212, 220 , 982 P.2d 346, 354 (App.1998), rev’d on other grounds, 90 Hawai'i 301 , 978 P.2d 739 (1998) (holding that hearing officers should inform the parties of the procedures at the beginning of the hearing); (4) the court erred in holding the ADLRO had jurisdiction because (a) the arresting officer had failed to sign the jurat on the Notice of Administrative Revocation and instead had signed the Certified Statement of Dismissal and (b) the procedure in HRS § 291E, Part III, which requires a valid chemical test result or refusal to confer jurisdiction on the AD | 1 | 2005–2005 |
cluster 731292
green
2 sentences2005Accordingly, the hearing officer made findings that “specifically support!] any measures taken beyond what is customarily permitted” in order to “substantiate the need for these additional precautions!.]” In United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 , 118 S.Ct. 79 , 139 L.Ed.2d 37 (1997), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court’s requirement that all persons entering the courtroom provide identification did not violate the defendants’ constitutional rights. 2005Accordingly, the hearing officer made findings that "specifically support[ ] any measures taken beyond what is customarily permitted" in order to "substantiate the need for these additional precautions[.]" In United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 , 118 S.Ct. 79 , 139 L.Ed.2d 37 (1997), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court's requirement that all persons entering the courtroom provide identification did not violate the defendants' constitutional rights. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Hudson ex rel. Hudson v. Bloomfield Hills Public Schools
green
2 sentences2005Accordingly, the hearing officer made findings that “specifically support!] any measures taken beyond what is customarily permitted” in order to “substantiate the need for these additional precautions!.]” In United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 , 118 S.Ct. 79 , 139 L.Ed.2d 37 (1997), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court’s requirement that all persons entering the courtroom provide identification did not violate the defendants’ constitutional rights. 2005Accordingly, the hearing officer made findings that "specifically support[ ] any measures taken beyond what is customarily permitted" in order to "substantiate the need for these additional precautions[.]" In United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 , 118 S.Ct. 79 , 139 L.Ed.2d 37 (1997), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court's requirement that all persons entering the courtroom provide identification did not violate the defendants' constitutional rights. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Guido v. Cuvo
green
2 sentences2005Accordingly, the hearing officer made findings that “specifically support!] any measures taken beyond what is customarily permitted” in order to “substantiate the need for these additional precautions!.]” In United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 , 118 S.Ct. 79 , 139 L.Ed.2d 37 (1997), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court’s requirement that all persons entering the courtroom provide identification did not violate the defendants’ constitutional rights. 2005Accordingly, the hearing officer made findings that "specifically support[ ] any measures taken beyond what is customarily permitted" in order to "substantiate the need for these additional precautions[.]" In United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 , 118 S.Ct. 79 , 139 L.Ed.2d 37 (1997), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court's requirement that all persons entering the courtroom provide identification did not violate the defendants' constitutional rights. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Kranyik v. City of West Melbourne
green
2 sentences2005Accordingly, the hearing officer made findings that “specifically support!] any measures taken beyond what is customarily permitted” in order to “substantiate the need for these additional precautions!.]” In United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 , 118 S.Ct. 79 , 139 L.Ed.2d 37 (1997), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court’s requirement that all persons entering the courtroom provide identification did not violate the defendants’ constitutional rights. 2005Accordingly, the hearing officer made findings that "specifically support[ ] any measures taken beyond what is customarily permitted" in order to "substantiate the need for these additional precautions[.]" In United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 822 , 118 S.Ct. 79 , 139 L.Ed.2d 37 (1997), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court's requirement that all persons entering the courtroom provide identification did not violate the defendants' constitutional rights. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Castro v. Administrative Director of the Court
neutral
2 sentences2002Accordingly, we reverse the May 7, 2001 decision of the Intermediate Court of Appeals [2] (the ICA) affirming the court's February 1, 2000 judgment that failed to account for that finding, see Castro v. Administrative Director of the Courts, State of Hawai`i, 98 Hawai`i 53, 41 P.3d 715 (Haw. 2002Accordingly, we reverse the May 7, 2001 decision of the Intermediate Court of Appeals [2] (the ICA) affirming the court's February 1, 2000 judgment that failed to account for that finding, see Castro v. Administrative Director of the Courts, State of Hawai`i, 98 Hawai`i 53, 41 P.3d 715 (Haw. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Alvey
green
2 sentences1995Finally, as Higa admits, the ADLRO officer and the prosecution are “not in privity per se” and “the prosecutors do not represent the government at the ADL-RO.” Higa also relies on State v. Alvey, 67 Haw. 49 , 678 P.2d 5 (1984), in support of his position that the ADLRO proceeding should bar a subsequent criminal proceeding on res judicata grounds. 1995Finally, as Higa admits, the ADLRO officer and the prosecution are “not in privity per se” and “the prosecutors do not represent the government at the ADL-RO.” Higa also relies on State v. Alvey, 67 Haw. 49 , 678 P.2d 5 (1984), in support of his position that the ADLRO proceeding should bar a subsequent criminal proceeding on res judicata grounds. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.