open and obvious danger rule in Indiana

1988With these defenses ..., there is no need to extend the open and obvious danger test....'" Bridgewater, supra at 489 (quoting Law, supra, at 681 ) (citations omitted).

1988The court clarified the effect of the open and obvious danger doctrine in Bridgewater v. Economy Engineering Co. (1985), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 484 .

1990Co. (1985), Ind. App., 475 N.E.2d 717 (notwithstanding evidence showing unguarded chain and sprocket mechanism was unreasonably dangerous, the open and obvious danger rule did apply to preclude manufacturer liability); Ragsdale v. K-Mart Corp. (1984), Ind. App., 468 N.E.2d 524 (summary judgment upheld applying open and obvious danger rule as proper consideration for determining whether plaintiff acted reasonably in exposing himself to danger); Law v. Yukon Delta, Inc. (1984), Ind. App., 458 N.E.2d 677 (open and obvious danger rule applies objective test to determine whether plaintiff should ha

1990Co. (1985), Ind.App., 475 N.E.2d 717 (notwithstanding evidence showing unguarded chain and sprocket mechanism was unreasonably dangerous, the open and obvious danger rule did apply to preclude manufacturer liability); Ragsdale v. K-Mart Corp. (1984), Ind.App., 468 N.E.2d 524 (summary judgment upheld applying open and obvious danger rule as proper consideration for determining whether plaintiff acted reasonably in exposing himself to danger); Low v. Yukon Delte, Inc. (1984), Ind.App., 458 N.E.2d 677 (open and obvious danger rule applies objective test to determine whether plaintiff should have

1995Miller, 551 N.E.2d at 1143 .

1990Co. (1985), Ind. App., 475 N.E.2d 717 (notwithstanding evidence showing unguarded chain and sprocket mechanism was unreasonably dangerous, the open and obvious danger rule did apply to preclude manufacturer liability); Ragsdale v. K-Mart Corp. (1984), Ind. App., 468 N.E.2d 524 (summary judgment upheld applying open and obvious danger rule as proper consideration for determining whether plaintiff acted reasonably in exposing himself to danger); Law v. Yukon Delta, Inc. (1984), Ind. App., 458 N.E.2d 677 (open and obvious danger rule applies objective test to determine whether plaintiff should ha

1990Co. (1985), Ind.App., 475 N.E.2d 717 (notwithstanding evidence showing unguarded chain and sprocket mechanism was unreasonably dangerous, the open and obvious danger rule did apply to preclude manufacturer liability); Ragsdale v. K-Mart Corp. (1984), Ind.App., 468 N.E.2d 524 (summary judgment upheld applying open and obvious danger rule as proper consideration for determining whether plaintiff acted reasonably in exposing himself to danger); Low v. Yukon Delte, Inc. (1984), Ind.App., 458 N.E.2d 677 (open and obvious danger rule applies objective test to determine whether plaintiff should have

1990Co. (1985), Ind. App., 475 N.E.2d 717 (notwithstanding evidence showing unguarded chain and sprocket mechanism was unreasonably dangerous, the open and obvious danger rule did apply to preclude manufacturer liability); Ragsdale v. K-Mart Corp. (1984), Ind. App., 468 N.E.2d 524 (summary judgment upheld applying open and obvious danger rule as proper consideration for determining whether plaintiff acted reasonably in exposing himself to danger); Law v. Yukon Delta, Inc. (1984), Ind. App., 458 N.E.2d 677 (open and obvious danger rule applies objective test to determine whether plaintiff should ha

1990Co. (1985), Ind.App., 475 N.E.2d 717 (notwithstanding evidence showing unguarded chain and sprocket mechanism was unreasonably dangerous, the open and obvious danger rule did apply to preclude manufacturer liability); Ragsdale v. K-Mart Corp. (1984), Ind.App., 468 N.E.2d 524 (summary judgment upheld applying open and obvious danger rule as proper consideration for determining whether plaintiff acted reasonably in exposing himself to danger); Low v. Yukon Delte, Inc. (1984), Ind.App., 458 N.E.2d 677 (open and obvious danger rule applies objective test to determine whether plaintiff should have

1990Co. (1985), Ind. App., 475 N.E.2d 717 (notwithstanding evidence showing unguarded chain and sprocket mechanism was unreasonably dangerous, the open and obvious danger rule did apply to preclude manufacturer liability); Ragsdale v. K-Mart Corp. (1984), Ind. App., 468 N.E.2d 524 (summary judgment upheld applying open and obvious danger rule as proper consideration for determining whether plaintiff acted reasonably in exposing himself to danger); Law v. Yukon Delta, Inc. (1984), Ind. App., 458 N.E.2d 677 (open and obvious danger rule applies objective test to determine whether plaintiff should ha

1990Co. (1985), Ind.App., 475 N.E.2d 717 (notwithstanding evidence showing unguarded chain and sprocket mechanism was unreasonably dangerous, the open and obvious danger rule did apply to preclude manufacturer liability); Ragsdale v. K-Mart Corp. (1984), Ind.App., 468 N.E.2d 524 (summary judgment upheld applying open and obvious danger rule as proper consideration for determining whether plaintiff acted reasonably in exposing himself to danger); Low v. Yukon Delte, Inc. (1984), Ind.App., 458 N.E.2d 677 (open and obvious danger rule applies objective test to determine whether plaintiff should have

1988Parker v. Heasler Plumbing & Heating Co. (1964), Wyo. 388 P.2d 516 ; Maas v. Dreher (1969), 10 Ariz.App. 520 , 460 P.2d 191 .

1988Parker v. Heasler Plumbing & Heating Co. (1964), Wyo. 388 P.2d 516 ; Maas v. Dreher (1969), 10 Ariz.App. 520 , 460 P.2d 191 .

1988Lucas v. Frazee (1984), Ind. App., 471 N.E.2d 1163 ; Miller v. State (1983), Ind. App., 449 N.E.2d 1119 . [2] The studies showed crane operators misjudged the distance 85% of the time, while signalmen were wrong 80% of the time. [3] Campo was overruled by Micallef v. Miehle Co. (1976), 39 N.Y.2d 376 , 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 , 348 N.E.2d 571 , which rejected the open and obvious danger doctrine as a complete bar to recovery. [4] FMC also argues the trial court erred when it ruled FMC could not address this issue during voir dire.

1988Parker v. Heasler Plumbing & Heating Co. (1964), Wyo. 388 P.2d 516 ; Maas v. Dreher (1969), 10 Ariz.App. 520 , 460 P.2d 191 .

1988Parker v. Heasler Plumbing & Heating Co. (1964), Wyo. 388 P.2d 516 ; Maas v. Dreher (1969), 10 Ariz. App. 520 , 460 P.2d 191 .

1988E.g., Miller v. Todd (1988), Ind.App., 518 N.E.2d 1124 ; Kroger Co. Savon Store v. Presnell (1987), Ind.App., 515 N.E.2d 538 , trans. denied; Angola State Bank v. Butler Mfg.

1988E.g., Miller v. Todd (1988), Ind. App., 518 N.E.2d 1124 ; Kroger Co. Sav-on Store v. Presnell (1987), Ind. App., 515 N.E.2d 538 , trans. denied; Angola State Bank v. Butler Mfg.

1988Campo was overruled by Micallef v. Miehle Co. (1976), 39 N.Y.2d 376 , 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 , 348 N.E.2d 571 , which rejected the open and obvious danger doctrine as a complete bar to recovery. .

1988Campo was overruled by Micallef v. Miehle Co. (1976), 39 N.Y.2d 376 , 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 , 348 N.E.2d 571 , which rejected the open and obvious danger doctrine as a complete bar to recovery. .

1988E.g., Miller v. Todd (1988), Ind.App., 518 N.E.2d 1124 ; Kroger Co. Savon Store v. Presnell (1987), Ind.App., 515 N.E.2d 538 , trans. denied; Angola State Bank v. Butler Mfg.

1988E.g., Miller v. Todd (1988), Ind. App., 518 N.E.2d 1124 ; Kroger Co. Sav-on Store v. Presnell (1987), Ind. App., 515 N.E.2d 538 , trans. denied; Angola State Bank v. Butler Mfg.

1988Lucas v. Frazee (1984), Ind. App., 471 N.E.2d 1163 ; Miller v. State (1983), Ind. App., 449 N.E.2d 1119 . [2] The studies showed crane operators misjudged the distance 85% of the time, while signalmen were wrong 80% of the time. [3] Campo was overruled by Micallef v. Miehle Co. (1976), 39 N.Y.2d 376 , 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 , 348 N.E.2d 571 , which rejected the open and obvious danger doctrine as a complete bar to recovery. [4] FMC also argues the trial court erred when it ruled FMC could not address this issue during voir dire.

1988Although Brown was a negligence action against the power company, which the court held was not subject to the open and obvious danger rule, the court in reversing summary judgment for the defendant, stated: "We are unable to say as a matter of law that Brown exposed himself to dangers so obvious, imminent, and glaring that no reasonable man exercising due care for his safety would have hazarded them." Id. at 798 .

1988Although Brown was a negligence action against the power company, which the court held was not subject to the open and obvious danger rule, the court in reversing summary judgment for the defendant, stated: "We are unable to say as a matter of law that Brown exposed himself to dangers so obvious, imminent, and glaring that no reasonable man exercising due care for his safety would have hazarded them." Id. at 798 .

1986In Law, the open and obvious danger rule derived from Bemis Co., Inc. v. Rubush (1981), Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1058 (Hunter and DeBruler, J.J., dissenting), cert. den. (1982), 459 U.S. 825 , 103 S.Ct. 57 , 74 L.Ed.2d 61 , was applied to deny recovery to a repairman who knowingly walked onto a wet and slippery floor and was injured.

1986In Law, the open and obvious danger rule derived from Bemis Co., Inc. v. Rubush (1981), Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1058 (Hunter and DeBruler, J.J., dissenting), cert. den. (1982), 459 U.S. 825 , 103 S.Ct. 57 , 74 L.Ed.2d 61 , was applied to deny recovery to a repairman who knowingly walked onto a wet and slippery floor and was injured.

1986In Law, the open and obvious danger rule derived from Bemis Co., Inc. v. Rubush (1981), Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1058 (Hunter and DeBruler, J.J., dissenting), cert. den. (1982), 459 U.S. 825 , 103 S.Ct. 57 , 74 L.Ed.2d 61 , was applied to deny recovery to a repairman who knowingly walked onto a wet and slippery floor and was injured.

1983The only other argument by Bliss as to how we might regard the error in giving the instruction as cured by the verdict is that Shanks, supra, applies so as to permit Bliss to have completely delegated the duty to warn the ultimate users of the product of the dangers associated with its use to the *286 second party employer, Regency, who purchased it.