fair trial violation in Kansas

2021A defendant will be granted relief if the prosecutorial error deprived him or her of a fair trial under the standard set out in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), for a constitutional wrong.

2021A defendant will be granted relief if the prosecutorial error deprived him or her of a fair trial under the standard set out in State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541 , Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), for a constitutional wrong.

2017On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court held Carter's counsel's conduct denied Carter the right to counsel and a fair trial when defense counsel imposed a guilt-based defense against Carter's wishes. 270 Kan. at 441 , 14 P.3d 1138 . *162 The State argues Carter is distinguishable because, in Carter , the defendant told the district court he was not satisfied with his counsel's theory of defense and here, White never expressed dissatisfaction with his counsel's theory of defense.

2017On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court held Carter's counsel's conduct denied Carter the right to counsel and a fair trial when defense counsel imposed a guilt-based defense against Carter's wishes. 270 Kan. at 441 , 14 P.3d 1138 . *162 The State argues Carter is distinguishable because, in Carter , the defendant told the district court he was not satisfied with his counsel's theory of defense and here, White never expressed dissatisfaction with his counsel's theory of defense.

2014He asks this court to hold “a defendant’s right to testify on his own behalf is so basic to a fair trial that its violation constitutes structural error and requires automatic reversal.” Gibson analogizes his case to State v. Jones, 290 Kan. 373, 382 , 228 P.3d 394 (2010), in which the court held structural error occurred when a district court denied the right to self-representation to a defendant at a preliminary hearing.

2014He asks this court to hold “a defendant’s right to testify on his own behalf is so basic to a fair trial that its violation constitutes structural error and requires automatic reversal.” Gibson analogizes his case to State v. Jones, 290 Kan. 373, 382 , 228 P.3d 394 (2010), in which the court held structural error occurred when a district court denied the right to self-representation to a defendant at a preliminary hearing.

2012See McKissick v. Frye, 255 Kan. 566 , 876 P.2d 1371 (1994) (opposing counsel’s remarks are reversible error if the parties have not had a fair trial); Sledd v. Reed, 246 Kan. 112, 117 , 785 P.2d 694 (1990) (same); Henderson v. Hassur, 225 Kan. 678, 693 , 594 P.2d 650 (1979) (same); Kleibrink v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 224 Kan. 437 , Syl. ¶ 6, 581 P.2d 372 (1978) (same).

2012See McKissick v. Frye, 255 Kan. 566 , 876 P.2d 1371 (1994) (opposing counsel’s remarks are reversible error if the parties have not had a fair trial); Sledd v. Reed, 246 Kan. 112, 117 , 785 P.2d 694 (1990) (same); Henderson v. Hassur, 225 Kan. 678, 693 , 594 P.2d 650 (1979) (same); Kleibrink v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 224 Kan. 437 , Syl. ¶ 6, 581 P.2d 372 (1978) (same).

2012See McKissick v. Frye, 255 Kan. 566 , 876 P.2d 1371 (1994) (opposing counsel’s remarks are reversible error if the parties have not had a fair trial); Sledd v. Reed, 246 Kan. 112, 117 , 785 P.2d 694 (1990) (same); Henderson v. Hassur, 225 Kan. 678, 693 , 594 P.2d 650 (1979) (same); Kleibrink v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 224 Kan. 437 , Syl. ¶ 6, 581 P.2d 372 (1978) (same).

2012See McKissick v. Frye, 255 Kan. 566 , 876 P.2d 1371 (1994) (opposing counsel’s remarks are reversible error if the parties have not had a fair trial); Sledd v. Reed, 246 Kan. 112, 117 , 785 P.2d 694 (1990) (same); Henderson v. Hassur, 225 Kan. 678, 693 , 594 P.2d 650 (1979) (same); Kleibrink v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 224 Kan. 437 , Syl. ¶ 6, 581 P.2d 372 (1978) (same).

2012In Smith v. Blakey, Administrator, 213 Kan. 91 , 515 P.2d 1062 (1973), the driver of an automobile sued the automobile’s owner for personal injuries stemming from an accident.

2012In Smith v. Blakey, Administrator, 213 Kan. 91 , 515 P.2d 1062 (1973), the driver of an automobile sued the automobile’s owner for personal injuries stemming from an accident.

2012See McKissick v. Frye, 255 Kan. 566 , 876 P.2d 1371 (1994) (opposing counsel’s remarks are reversible error if the parties have not had a fair trial); Sledd v. Reed, 246 Kan. 112, 117 , 785 P.2d 694 (1990) (same); Henderson v. Hassur, 225 Kan. 678, 693 , 594 P.2d 650 (1979) (same); Kleibrink v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 224 Kan. 437 , Syl. ¶ 6, 581 P.2d 372 (1978) (same).

2012See McKissick v. Frye, 255 Kan. 566 , 876 P.2d 1371 (1994) (opposing counsel’s remarks are reversible error if the parties have not had a fair trial); Sledd v. Reed, 246 Kan. 112, 117 , 785 P.2d 694 (1990) (same); Henderson v. Hassur, 225 Kan. 678, 693 , 594 P.2d 650 (1979) (same); Kleibrink v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co., 224 Kan. 437 , Syl. ¶ 6, 581 P.2d 372 (1978) (same).

2012In re Care hr Treatment of Foster, 280 Kan. 845 , Syl. ¶ 2, 127 P.3d 277 (2006).

2012In re Care hr Treatment of Foster, 280 Kan. 845 , Syl. ¶ 2, 127 P.3d 277 (2006).

2006The court found that comments improperly characterized the defendant as a liar but did not so prejudice the jury against him so as to deny him a fair trial under the standard applicable at that time, i.e.: “Improper remarks made in closing argument are grounds for reversal only when they are so gross and flagrant as to prejudice the juiy against the accused and deny him or her a fair trial.” 255 Kan. at 134-35 .

1992In Gonzales , this court upheld the exclusion of “evidence of the tendency of a victim of attempted rape and felony murder to form ‘social acquaintances with men on a spontaneous basis.’ ” 245 Kan. 691 , Syl. ¶ 2.

1978Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. at 490 .

1975We are aware of Naylor v. Railway Co., 66 Kan. 407 , 71 Pac. 835 , which the plaintiffs have cited.

1975We are aware of Naylor v. Railway Co., 66 Kan. 407 , 71 Pac. 835 , which the plaintiffs have cited.

1974A defendant is not deprived of a fair trial in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by publicity attending the trial proceedings when he fails to show that a single member of the jury was made aware of the publicity; and when it does not appear the publicity was massive, pervasive or disruptive of the trial proceedings.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) (See also State v. Platz, 214 Kan. 74 , Syl. ¶ 3, 519 P. 2d 1097 .

1974A defendant is not deprived of a fair trial in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by publicity attending the trial proceedings when he fails to show that a single member of the jury was made aware of the publicity; and when it does not appear the publicity was massive, pervasive or disruptive of the trial proceedings.” (Syl. ¶ 2.) (See also State v. Platz, 214 Kan. 74 , Syl. ¶ 3, 519 P. 2d 1097 .