fair trial challenge in Illinois

2026People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187 (2005).

2024In People v. Glasper, our supreme court equated the second prong of plain- error review with structural error, asserting that “automatic reversal is only required where an error is deemed ‘structural,’ i.e., a systematic error which serves to ‘erode the integrity of the judicial process and undermine the fairness of the defendant’s trial.’ ” 234 Ill. 2d 173, 197-98 (2009) (quoting Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186 ). ¶ 32 As our supreme court noted in People v. Thompson, “[a] finding that defendant was tried by a biased jury would certainly satisfy the second prong of plain-error review because it wo

2024In People v. Glasper, our supreme court equated the second prong of plain- error review with structural error, asserting that “automatic reversal is only required where an error is deemed ‘structural,’ i.e., a systematic error which serves to ‘erode the integrity of the judicial process and undermine the fairness of the defendant’s trial.’ ” 234 Ill. 2d 173, 197-98 (2009) (quoting Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186 ). ¶ 32 As our supreme court noted in People v. Thompson, “[a] finding that defendant was tried by a biased jury would certainly satisfy the second prong of plain-error review because it wo

2021People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 614 , (2010) (“A finding that defendant was tried by a biased jury would certainly satisfy the second prong of plain-error review because it would affect his right to a fair trial and challenge the integrity of the judicial process.”). ¶ 64 Second, because the evidence in this case is circumstantial and because there is no eyewitness testimony or forensic or video evidence that establishes defendant committed the burglary and arson, the evidence in this case can only be considered closely balanced.

2023People v. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d 181, 191 (2008).

2012People v. Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d 181, 191 (2008); People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 177 (2005).

2007App. 3d at 492-93 (holding that defendant was deprived of a fair trial when defense counsel failed to tender a jury instruction because there was a reasonable probability that being advised of the proper burden of proof, the jury could have been persuaded to conclude that defendant was compelled to commit the crime); Pegram, 124 Ill. 2d at 173-74 (court held that “ ‘[fundamental fairness includes *** seeing to it that certain basic instructions, essential to a fair determination of the case by the jury, are given.’ [Citation.] *** [T]he omission [of a compulsion instruction] ‘removed from the

2007Either way, counsel would have been at fault for the failure. 58 No. 1-04-2709 been persuaded to conclude that defendant was compelled to commit the crime); Pegram, 124 Ill. 2d at 173-74 (court held that “‘[f]undamental fairness includes *** seeing to it that certain basic instructions, essential to a fair determination of the case by the jury, are given.’ [Citation.] ***[T]he omission [of a compulsion instruction] ‘removed from the jury’s consideration a disputed issue essential to the determination of defendant’s guilt or innocence.’ [Citation.]”) For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and re

2002Ed. 2d at 533 , 106 S. Ct. at 1345 (central to the right to a fair trial is the principle that “ ‘one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial’ ”), quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485-86 , 56 L.

2002Ed. 2d at 533 , 106 S. Ct. at 1345 (central to the right to a fair trial is the principle that “ ‘one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial’ ”), quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485-86 , 56 L.

2002Ed. 2d at 533 , 106 S. Ct. at 1345 (central to the right to a fair trial is the principle that “ ‘one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial’ ”), quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485-86 , 56 L.

2002To safeguard the presumption of innocence, "courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process" and must "carefully guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt." Williams, 425 U.S. at 503 , 96 S.Ct. at 1693 , 48 L.Ed.2d at 130 , see also Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 567 , 106 S.Ct. at 1345 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 533 (central to the right to a fair trial is the principle that "`one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence

2000Scott, 148 Ill. 2d at 545 (“Given the fact defendant argued the relevance of the character evidence, we find that these references did not deny defendant a fair trial”).

2000Scott, 148 Ill.2d at 545 , 171 Ill.Dec. 365 , 594 N.E.2d 217 ("Given the fact defendant argued the relevance of the character evidence, we find that these references did not deny defendant a fair trial").

2022People v. Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 50 (shackling); People v. Foster, 80 Ill.

2021Id.

2018“A special interrogatory is in proper form if (1) it relates to an ultimate issue of fact upon which the rights of the parties depend, and (2) an answer responsive thereto is inconsistent with some general verdict that might be returned.” Simmons v. Garces, 198 Ill. 2d 541, 555 (2002).

2017"A special interrogatory is in proper form if (1) it relates to an ultimate issue of fact upon which the rights of the parties depend, and (2) an answer responsive thereto is inconsistent with some general verdict that might be returned." Simmons v. Garces , 198 Ill. 2d 541 , 555, 261 Ill.Dec. 471 , 763 N.E.2d 720 (2002).

2024In People v. Glasper, our supreme court equated the second prong of plain- error review with structural error, asserting that “automatic reversal is only required where an error is deemed ‘structural,’ i.e., a systematic error which serves to ‘erode the integrity of the judicial process and undermine the fairness of the defendant’s trial.’ ” 234 Ill. 2d 173, 197-98 (2009) (quoting Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 186 ). ¶ 32 As our supreme court noted in People v. Thompson, “[a] finding that defendant was tried by a biased jury would certainly satisfy the second prong of plain-error review because it wo

2024As a result, the “more common case[ ]” is one in which the court finds a serious “potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses.” Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988). ¶ 57 As for the second step of the two-part test governing State challenges to a defendant’s counsel of choice on conflict-of-interest grounds, our supreme court has identified several interests or factors which may be considered in determining whether the interests threatened by the conflict or potential conflict are weighty enough to overcome the presumpt

2022People v. Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 50 (shackling); People v. Foster, 80 Ill.

2015(Emphasis added.) Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 614 . ¶ 49 We now turn to the question of whether the error in this case was “so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565 . ¶ 50 Convicting a defendant of an uncharged offense that is not a lesser-included offense of a charged offense violates the defendant’s “fundamental due process right to notice of the charges brought against him.” Kolton, 219 Ill. 2d at 359 (citing People v. DiLorenzo, 169 Ill. 2