Craddock test in Texas

2026USB filed a timely motion for new trial three weeks after the default judgment was signed. 1 Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1939) (setting forth a three-prong test for setting aside default judgment: (1) defendant’s failure to answer was due to mistake or accident and not intentional or the result of conscious indifference, (2) defendant sets up a meritorious defense, and (3) the granting of a new trial will not result in delay or otherwise prejudice the plaintiff). 2 In its motion for new trial and at the hearing thereon, USB relied upon the equit

2026See Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126 ; Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778, 779 (Tex. 1987) (stating that Craddock test applies to post-answer default judgments).

2025Id. at 925–26 (“When a defaulting party moving for new trial meets all three elements of the Craddock test, then a trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to grant a new trial.” (citing Old Republic Ins.

2025Id. at 925–26 (“When a defaulting party moving for new trial meets all three elements of the Craddock test, then a trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to grant a new trial.” (citing Old Republic Ins.

2026Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992); 1 Solar Solution, LLC, 2025 WL 2989767 , at *4. 3 To support the motion for new trial, the defendant must make factual allegations that are supported by evidence, such as affidavits, setting forth facts which, if true, satisfy the Craddock standard. 1 Solar Solution, LLC, 2025 WL 2989767 , at *3.

2026Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992); 1 Solar Solution, LLC, 2025 WL 2989767 , at *4. 3 To support the motion for new trial, the defendant must make factual allegations that are supported by evidence, such as affidavits, setting forth facts which, if true, satisfy the Craddock standard. 1 Solar Solution, LLC, 2025 WL 2989767 , at *3.

2025See LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 778 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. 1989) (The Craddock factors apply to all default judgments, those “entered on [the] failure of a defendant to file an answer and those entered on failure to appear for trial.” (citing Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. 1966))).

2025See LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 778 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. 1989) (The Craddock factors apply to all default judgments, those “entered on [the] failure of a defendant to file an answer and those entered on failure to appear for trial.” (citing Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. 1966))).

2025Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1994) (“Affidavits attached to 7 the motion for new trial do not have to be offered into evidence in order to be considered by the trial court for the meritorious defense element or any other element of the Craddock test.”); Puri, 973 S.W.2d at 712 (“A motion for new trial to set aside a default judgment is a complaint on which evidence must be heard.” (citing Tex. R.

2025Div. v. Evans, 889 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1994) (“Affidavits attached to 7 the motion for new trial do not have to be offered into evidence in order to be considered by the trial court for the meritorious defense element or any other element of the Craddock test.”); Puri, 973 S.W.2d at 712 (“A motion for new trial to set aside a default judgment is a complaint on which evidence must be heard.” (citing Tex. R.

2026The supreme court emphasized that its purpose in adopting the Craddock standard was to “alleviate unduly harsh and unjust results at a point in time when the defaulting party has no other remedy available.” Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. 2002).

2026The supreme court emphasized that its purpose in adopting the Craddock standard was to “alleviate unduly harsh and unjust results at a point in time when the defaulting party has no other remedy available.” Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. 2002).

2016After a default judgment, the “trial court abuses its discretion by not granting a new trial when all three elements of the Craddock test are met.” Id. (citing Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Tex.1992)).

2016After a default judgment, the “trial court abuses its discretion by not granting a new trial when all three elements of the Craddock test are met.” Id. (citing Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Tex.1992)).

2026See Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126 ; Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778, 779 (Tex. 1987) (stating that Craddock test applies to post-answer default judgments).

2025“When a defaulting party moving for new trial meets all three elements of the Craddock test, then a trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to grant a new trial.” Id. (citing Old Republic Ins. v. Scott, 873 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Tex. 1994)).

2023Based on our disposition of this appeal, however, it is not necessary that we consider the modified test. –3– 126; Lopez v. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d 721, 722 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam) (applying Craddock test to post-answer default judgments).

2019The evidence that Ramirez attached to his motion for new trial may be sufficient for Hendrickson to satisfy the first Craddock element, see Lopez v. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d 721, 723 (1988) (party who fails to appear for trial because he did not receive notice of trial setting satisfies first prong of Craddock test), but it is of no assistance to Ramirez, who has never asserted that he was not notified of the hearing in the underlying case.

2026The Craddock test has three elements: “(1) the failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference but was due to a mistake or accident, (2) the defendant sets up a meritorious defense, and (3) the motion is filed at such time that granting a new trial would not result in delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112 , 114–15 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)).

2026The Craddock test has three elements: “(1) the failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference but was due to a mistake or accident, (2) the defendant sets up a meritorious defense, and (3) the motion is filed at such time that granting a new trial would not result in delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112 , 114–15 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)).

2026Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752 , 754–55 (Tex. 2012) (explaining that while lack of proper service constitutes error on the face of the record in the context of restricted appeals, a different analysis—the Craddock test—applies on appeal when considering a default judgment that has been attacked by equitable motion for new trial).

2026Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752 , 754–55 (Tex. 2012) (explaining that while lack of proper service constitutes error on the face of the record in the context of restricted appeals, a different analysis—the Craddock test—applies on appeal when considering a default judgment that has been attacked by equitable motion for new trial).

2025See, e.g., Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743 , 744–46 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (holding defendant satisfied first element of Craddock test where “[h]er sworn motion for new trial asserted that she failed to appear at the December 13th trial because she never received notice of the setting”).

2024See Mathis v. Lockwood, 166 S.W.3d 743, 744, 746 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (holding defendant satisfied first element of Craddock test where “[h]er sworn motion for new trial asserted that she failed to appear at the December 13th trial because she never received notice of the setting”); see also Carillo v. Zaragoza, No. 05-23-00282-CV, 2024 WL 2873635 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 7, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (concluding same where client submitted an affidavit stating he received no notice of the default judgment hearing and attorney also testified unequivocally he never received notice o

2024See Strackbein v. Prewitt, 671 S.W.2d 37 , 38–39 (Tex. 1984) (holding affidavits may be considered in Craddock analysis, stating, “It is sufficient that the movant’s motion and affidavits set forth facts which, if true, would negate intentional or consciously indifferent conduct.”). 44 offer them into evidence.

2024When, as here, the trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing and the party who obtained the default judgment controverts the defaulting party’s allegations of mistake or accident, the trial court must “make an essentially factual inquiry into the acts and knowledge of the defaulting defendant to determine whether his failure to answer was intentional.” Gotcher v. Barnett, 757 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (citation omitted); see also Strackbein, 671 S.W.2d at 38–39 (noting affidavits may be considered in Craddock analysis); Wal- Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kelley,

2025Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. 2006). 3 Even if a defendant does not satisfy the Craddock test, a trial court has broad discretion to determine that another ground identified in the defendant’s motion constitutes “good cause” to order a new trial following a default judgment.

2025Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. 2006). 3 Even if a defendant does not satisfy the Craddock test, a trial court has broad discretion to determine that another ground identified in the defendant’s motion constitutes “good cause” to order a new trial following a default judgment.

2024In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 114–15 (applying Craddock standard in parental termination case); Comanche Nation v. Fox, 128 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (“Texas appellate courts have routinely applied the Craddock test to SAPCRs.”); In re A.P.P., 74 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (applying Craddock in appeal of default judgment where mother was removed as sole managing conservator of child); Lowe v. Lowe, 971 S.W.2d 720 , 722-23 55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (applying Craddock in appeal of default judgment that named father sole

2024In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 114–15 (applying Craddock standard in parental termination case); Comanche Nation v. Fox, 128 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (“Texas appellate courts have routinely applied the Craddock test to SAPCRs.”); In re A.P.P., 74 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (applying Craddock in appeal of default judgment where mother was removed as sole managing conservator of child); Lowe v. Lowe, 971 S.W.2d 720 , 722-23 55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (applying Craddock in appeal of default judgment that named father sole

2017See Estate of Pollack v. McMurrey, 858 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Tex. 1993) (quoting Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966) (explaining that establishing a meritorious defense under Craddock requires not only alleging facts that constitute a defense to the cause of action asserted by plaintiff but also supporting those facts by affidavits or other evidence proving prima facie that the defendant has a meritorious defense); Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Tex. 1992) (explaining that conclusory allegations are insufficient to satisfy the Craddock test).

2017See Estate of Pollack v. McMurrey, 858 S.W.2d 388, 392 (Tex. 1993) (quoting Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966) (explaining that establishing a meritorious defense under Craddock requires not only alleging facts that constitute a defense to the cause of action asserted by plaintiff but also supporting those facts by affidavits or other evidence proving prima facie that the defendant has a meritorious defense); Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Tex. 1992) (explaining that conclusory allegations are insufficient to satisfy the Craddock test).

2023Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 388 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Tex. 2012) (applying Craddock standard to party’s failure to answer).

2015A defendant satisfies the first prong of the Craddock test when “its factual assertions, if true, negate intentional or consciously indifferent conduct by the defendant and the factual assertions are not controverted by the plaintiff.” Milestone, 388 S.W.3d at 310 .

2014Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126, has been applied to divorce proceedings.3 See Prince v. Prince, 912 S.W.2d 367, 369-70 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ); Burgess v. Burgess, 834 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); cf. Little v. Little, 705 S.W.2d 153, 153-54 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, writ dism'd) (stating that although the Craddock test is applicable to motions for new trial after a default judgment in a divorce action, it may be superceded by the best interest of the child test).

2014Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126, has been applied to divorce proceedings.3 See Prince v. Prince, 912 S.W.2d 367, 369-70 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ); Burgess v. Burgess, 834 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); cf. Little v. Little, 705 S.W.2d 153, 153-54 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, writ dism'd) (stating that although the Craddock test is applicable to motions for new trial after a default judgment in a divorce action, it may be superceded by the best interest of the child test).

2014Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126, has been applied to divorce proceedings.3 See Prince v. Prince, 912 S.W.2d 367, 369-70 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ); Burgess v. Burgess, 834 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); cf. Little v. Little, 705 S.W.2d 153, 153-54 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, writ dism'd) (stating that although the Craddock test is applicable to motions for new trial after a default judgment in a divorce action, it may be superceded by the best interest of the child test).

2014Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126, has been applied to divorce proceedings.3 See Prince v. Prince, 912 S.W.2d 367, 369-70 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ); Burgess v. Burgess, 834 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); cf. Little v. Little, 705 S.W.2d 153, 153-54 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, writ dism'd) (stating that although the Craddock test is applicable to motions for new trial after a default judgment in a divorce action, it may be superceded by the best interest of the child test).

2024In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 114–15 (applying Craddock standard in parental termination case); Comanche Nation v. Fox, 128 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (“Texas appellate courts have routinely applied the Craddock test to SAPCRs.”); In re A.P.P., 74 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (applying Craddock in appeal of default judgment where mother was removed as sole managing conservator of child); Lowe v. Lowe, 971 S.W.2d 720 , 722-23 55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (applying Craddock in appeal of default judgment that named father sole

2024In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 114–15 (applying Craddock standard in parental termination case); Comanche Nation v. Fox, 128 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (“Texas appellate courts have routinely applied the Craddock test to SAPCRs.”); In re A.P.P., 74 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (applying Craddock in appeal of default judgment where mother was removed as sole managing conservator of child); Lowe v. Lowe, 971 S.W.2d 720 , 722-23 55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (applying Craddock in appeal of default judgment that named father sole

2024In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 114–15 (applying Craddock standard in parental termination case); Comanche Nation v. Fox, 128 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (“Texas appellate courts have routinely applied the Craddock test to SAPCRs.”); In re A.P.P., 74 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (applying Craddock in appeal of default judgment where mother was removed as sole managing conservator of child); Lowe v. Lowe, 971 S.W.2d 720 , 722-23 55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (applying Craddock in appeal of default judgment that named father sole

2024In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 114–15 (applying Craddock standard in parental termination case); Comanche Nation v. Fox, 128 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (“Texas appellate courts have routinely applied the Craddock test to SAPCRs.”); In re A.P.P., 74 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (applying Craddock in appeal of default judgment where mother was removed as sole managing conservator of child); Lowe v. Lowe, 971 S.W.2d 720 , 722-23 55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (applying Craddock in appeal of default judgment that named father sole

2014See Freeman v. Pevehouse, 79 S.W.3d 637, 648 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (holding that, because appellant failed to satisfy the first element of the Craddock test, the trial court did not err when it denied his motion for new trial).

2014See Freeman v. Pevehouse, 79 S.W.3d 637, 648 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (holding that, because appellant failed to satisfy the first element of the Craddock test, the trial court did not err when it denied his motion for new trial).

2021But see In re R.H., 75 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (citing Nichols v. TMJ Co., 742 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. App.— Dallas 1987, no writ) (holding the Craddock test applies when a defendant who was represented at trial seeks a new trial because his absence prevented his attorney from presenting material evidence in his behalf)).

2021But see In re R.H., 75 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Tex. App.— San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (citing Nichols v. TMJ Co., 742 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. App.— Dallas 1987, no writ) (holding the Craddock test applies when a defendant who was represented at trial seeks a new trial because his absence prevented his attorney from presenting material evidence in his behalf)).

2021However, “not every act of a defendant that could be characterized as a mistake of law is sufficient excuse.” Walker v. Gutierrez, 111 S.W.3d 56, 63 (Tex. 2003); see Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992) (uncontroverted affidavit that defendant did not answer because it did not think it could be held liable was insufficient to negate conscious indifference). –6– The defaulting party has the burden to present facts establishing all three parts of the Craddock standard.

2021However, “not every act of a defendant that could be characterized as a mistake of law is sufficient excuse.” Walker v. Gutierrez, 111 S.W.3d 56, 63 (Tex. 2003); see Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992) (uncontroverted affidavit that defendant did not answer because it did not think it could be held liable was insufficient to negate conscious indifference). –6– The defaulting party has the burden to present facts establishing all three parts of the Craddock standard.

2025“When a defaulting party moving for new trial meets all three elements of the Craddock test, then a trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to grant a new trial.” Id. (citing Old Republic Ins. v. Scott, 873 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Tex. 1994)).

2025“When a defaulting party moving for new trial meets all three elements of the Craddock test, then a trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to grant a new trial.” Id. (citing Old Republic Ins. v. Scott, 873 S.W.2d 381, 382 (Tex. 1994)).

2024When, as here, the trial court conducts an evidentiary hearing and the party who obtained the default judgment controverts the defaulting party’s allegations of mistake or accident, the trial court must “make an essentially factual inquiry into the acts and knowledge of the defaulting defendant to determine whether his failure to answer was intentional.” Gotcher v. Barnett, 757 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (citation omitted); see also Strackbein, 671 S.W.2d at 38–39 (noting affidavits may be considered in Craddock analysis); Wal- Mart Stores, Inc. v. Kelley,

2021Gotcher v. Barnett, 757 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).

2015As the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals noted in Jackson v. Mares: The purpose of the final element of the Craddock rule, however, is to protect a plaintiff against the sort of undue delay or injury which disadvantages him in presenting the merits of his case at a 20 new trial, such as loss of witnesses or other valuable evidence upon retrial. 802 S.W.2d 48, 52 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).

2015As the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals noted in Jackson v. Mares: The purpose of the final element of the Craddock rule, however, is to protect a plaintiff against the sort of undue delay or injury which disadvantages him in presenting the merits of his case at a 20 new trial, such as loss of witnesses or other valuable evidence upon retrial. 802 S.W.2d 48, 52 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).

2023The Craddock rule applies to post-answer default judgments, Dolgencorp, 288 S.W.3d at 926 , and to summary judgments, Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005).

2023The Craddock rule applies to post-answer default judgments, Dolgencorp, 288 S.W.3d at 926 , and to summary judgments, Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Tex. 2005).

2018Thus, the court held the pro se litigant “was entitled to raise them in her motion for new trial.” Id.; see also Wash. v. McMillan, 898 S.W.2d 392, 393 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, no writ) (holding that Craddock standard “applies in the summary judgment context”).

2012See Washington, 898 S.W.2d at 396 (“We further agree ... that ‘basic fairness’ also militates in favor of applying the Craddock standard in the summary judgment context.” (quoting Krchnak v. Fulton, 759 S.W.2d 524, 528-29 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1988, writ denied)).