14 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Gomezgreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 36, 39 (recognizing New Mexico's strong preference for warrants and concluding that the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement is inconsistent with that distinct state characteristic); State v. Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, ¶¶ 24, 26 , 146 N.M. 32 , 206 P.3d 143 , cert. granted, 2008-NMCERT-012 , 145 N.M. 572 , 203 P.3d 103 (citing the distinct New Mexico characteristic of a preference for a reasonableness analysis over the bright line rules used by the federal courts in the context of search and seizure and concluding that the blanket federal rule 2009See, e.g., Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 36, 39 (recognizing New Mexico’s strong preference for warrants and concluding that the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement is inconsistent with that distinct state characteristic); State v. Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, ¶¶ 24, 26 , 146 N.M. 32 , 206 P.3d 143 , cert. granted, 2008-NMCERT-012 , 145 N.M. 572 , 203 P.3d 103 (citing the distinct New Mexico characteristic of a preference for a reasonableness analysis over the bright line rules used by the federal courts in the context of search and seizure and concluding that the blanket federal rule | 5 | 7 |
Wyoming v. Houghtongreen2 sentences2013The State relies on language in Ross stating that “[a] lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search.” 456 U.S. at 820-21 ; see Houghton, 526 U.S. at 301-02 (applying Ross to conclude that, when there is probable cause to search an automobile, the officers may search containers found within the automobile regardless of ownership and without the need for “individualized probable cause” for each container). {44} 2013The State relies on language in Ross stating that “[a] lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search.” 456 U.S. at 820-21 ; see Houghton, 526 U.S. at 301-02 (applying Ross to conclude that, when there is probable cause to search an automobile, the officers may search containers found within the automobile regardless of ownership and without the need for “individualized probable cause” for each container). {44} | 3 | 3 |
State v. Weidnergreen2 sentences2009See generally State v. Weidner, 2007-NMCA-063 , 141 N.M. 582 , 158 P.3d 10 1025 (recognizing that New Mexico has rejected the federal automobile exception 11 which allows a warrantless seizure of an object in a vehicle without having to make 12 a particularized showing of exigent circumstances). 2009See generally State v. Weidner, 2007-NMCA-063 , 141 N.M. 582 , 158 P.3d 10 1025 (recognizing that New Mexico has rejected the federal automobile exception 11 which allows a warrantless seizure of an object in a vehicle without having to make 12 a particularized showing of exigent circumstances). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Rossgreen2 sentences2013The State relies on language in Ross stating that “[a] lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search.” 456 U.S. at 820-21 ; see Houghton, 526 U.S. at 301-02 (applying Ross to conclude that, when there is probable cause to search an automobile, the officers may search containers found within the automobile regardless of ownership and without the need for “individualized probable cause” for each container). {44} 2013The State relies on language in Ross stating that “[a] lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search.” 456 U.S. at 820-21 ; see Houghton, 526 U.S. at 301-02 (applying Ross to conclude that, when there is probable cause to search an automobile, the officers may search containers found within the automobile regardless of ownership and without the need for “individualized probable cause” for each container). {44} | 1 | 4 |
State v. Ochoagreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 36, 39 (recognizing New Mexico’s strong preference for warrants and concluding that the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement is inconsistent with that distinct state characteristic); State v. Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, ¶¶ 24, 26 , 146 N.M. 32 , 206 P.3d 143 , cert. granted, 2008-NMCERT-012 , 145 N.M. 572 , 203 P.3d 103 (citing the distinct New Mexico characteristic of a preference for a reasonableness analysis over the bright line rules used by the federal courts in the context of search and seizure and concluding that the blanket federal rule 2009See, e.g., Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 36, 39 (recognizing New Mexico’s strong preference for warrants and concluding that the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement is inconsistent with that distinct state characteristic); State v. Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, ¶¶ 24, 26 , 146 N.M. 32 , 206 P.3d 143 , cert. granted, 2008-NMCERT-012 , 145 N.M. 572 , 203 P.3d 103 (citing the distinct New Mexico characteristic of a preference for a reasonableness analysis over the bright line rules used by the federal courts in the context of search and seizure and concluding that the blanket federal rule | 1 | 1 |
State v. Friesgreen1 sentence2009See generally State v. Weidner, 2007-NMCA-063 , 141 N.M. 582 , 158 P.3d 10 1025 (recognizing that New Mexico has rejected the federal automobile exception 11 which allows a warrantless seizure of an object in a vehicle without having to make 12 a particularized showing of exigent circumstances). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Attawaygreen2 sentences2008“The myriad rules, exceptions, and exceptions to exceptions that flourish in the jurisprudence of search and seizure are often no more than factual manifestations of the constitutional requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable.” State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 145 , 870 P.2d 103, 107 (1994), modified on other grounds by State v. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 13-20 , 138 N.M. 9 , 116 P.3d 80 . {25} The exception to the warrant requirement at issue in the present case is an investigatory stop supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause that the traffic code has 2008“The myriad rules, exceptions, and exceptions to exceptions that flourish in the jurisprudence of search and seizure are often no more than factual manifestations of the constitutional requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable.” State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 145 , 870 P.2d 103, 107 (1994), modified on other grounds by State v. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 13-20 , 138 N.M. 9 , 116 P.3d 80 . {25} The exception to the warrant requirement at issue in the present case is an investigatory stop supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause that the traffic code has | 1 | 1 |
State v. Granvillegreen2 sentences2008See Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 18 , 140 N.M. 345 , 142 P.3d 933 (“We avoid bright-line, per se rules in determining reasonableness; instead we consider the facts of each case.”); Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 37-44 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 (rejecting the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement and requiring officers to have reasonable basis to believe that a particular exigency exists to search a vehicle); Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 18 , 140 N.M. 345 , 142 P.3d 933 (“In all cases that invoke [ajrticle II, [sjection 10, the ultimate question is reasonableness.”). 2008See Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 18 , 140 N.M. 345 , 142 P.3d 933 (“We avoid bright-line, per se rules in determining reasonableness; instead we consider the facts of each case.”); Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 37-44 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 (rejecting the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement and requiring officers to have reasonable basis to believe that a particular exigency exists to search a vehicle); Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 18 , 140 N.M. 345 , 142 P.3d 933 (“In all cases that invoke [ajrticle II, [sjection 10, the ultimate question is reasonableness.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Granvillegreen2 sentences2008See Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 18 , 140 N.M. 345 , 142 P.3d 933 (“We avoid bright-line, per se rules in determining reasonableness; instead we consider the facts of each case.”); Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 37-44 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 (rejecting the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement and requiring officers to have reasonable basis to believe that a particular exigency exists to search a vehicle); Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 18 , 140 N.M. 345 , 142 P.3d 933 (“In all cases that invoke [ajrticle II, [sjection 10, the ultimate question is reasonableness.”). 2008See Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 18 , 140 N.M. 345 , 142 P.3d 933 (“We avoid bright-line, per se rules in determining reasonableness; instead we consider the facts of each case.”); Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 37-44 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 (rejecting the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement and requiring officers to have reasonable basis to believe that a particular exigency exists to search a vehicle); Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 18 , 140 N.M. 345 , 142 P.3d 933 (“In all cases that invoke [ajrticle II, [sjection 10, the ultimate question is reasonableness.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences2007See Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 29 , 138 N.M. 1 , 116 P.3d 72 ; Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 34, 35, 39, 44 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 . {8} In Gomez, the officer encountered the defendant when he responded to a report of a “party disturbance.” 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 4-5 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 . 2007See Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, ¶ 29 , 138 N.M. 1 , 116 P.3d 72 ; Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 34, 35, 39, 44 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 . {8} In Gomez, the officer encountered the defendant when he responded to a report of a “party disturbance.” 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 4-5 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Woodruffgreen2 sentences2001See State v. Woodruff, 1997-NMSC-061, ¶ 25 , 124 N.M. 388 , 951 P.2d 605 . 2001See State v. Woodruff, 1997-NMSC-061, ¶ 25 , 124 N.M. 388 , 951 P.2d 605 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Cardenas-Alvarez
green
2 sentences2022“In rejecting the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement, [our Supreme] Court dismissed the notion that an individual lowers his expectation of privacy when he enters an automobile, and elected instead to provide motorists with a ‘layer of protection’ from unreasonable searches and seizures that is unavailable at the federal level.” Id. 2022“In rejecting the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement, [our Supreme] Court dismissed the notion that an individual lowers his expectation of privacy when he enters an automobile, and elected instead to provide motorists with a ‘layer of protection’ from unreasonable searches and seizures that is unavailable at the federal level.” Id. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Garcia v. State
green
2 sentences2009See, e.g., Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 36, 39 (recognizing New Mexico’s strong preference for warrants and concluding that the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement is inconsistent with that distinct state characteristic); State v. Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, ¶¶ 24, 26 , 146 N.M. 32 , 206 P.3d 143 , cert. granted, 2008-NMCERT-012 , 145 N.M. 572 , 203 P.3d 103 (citing the distinct New Mexico characteristic of a preference for a reasonableness analysis over the bright line rules used by the federal courts in the context of search and seizure and concluding that the blanket federal rule 2009See, e.g., Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 36, 39 (recognizing New Mexico’s strong preference for warrants and concluding that the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement is inconsistent with that distinct state characteristic); State v. Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, ¶¶ 24, 26 , 146 N.M. 32 , 206 P.3d 143 , cert. granted, 2008-NMCERT-012 , 145 N.M. 572 , 203 P.3d 103 (citing the distinct New Mexico characteristic of a preference for a reasonableness analysis over the bright line rules used by the federal courts in the context of search and seizure and concluding that the blanket federal rule | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Lopez
green
2 sentences2008“The myriad rules, exceptions, and exceptions to exceptions that flourish in the jurisprudence of search and seizure are often no more than factual manifestations of the constitutional requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable.” State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 145 , 870 P.2d 103, 107 (1994), modified on other grounds by State v. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 13-20 , 138 N.M. 9 , 116 P.3d 80 . {25} The exception to the warrant requirement at issue in the present case is an investigatory stop supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause that the traffic code has 2008“The myriad rules, exceptions, and exceptions to exceptions that flourish in the jurisprudence of search and seizure are often no more than factual manifestations of the constitutional requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable.” State v. Attaway, 117 N.M. 141, 145 , 870 P.2d 103, 107 (1994), modified on other grounds by State v. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ¶¶ 13-20 , 138 N.M. 9 , 116 P.3d 80 . {25} The exception to the warrant requirement at issue in the present case is an investigatory stop supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause that the traffic code has | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2007See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 39 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 ; Jones, 2002-NMCA-019, ¶ 14 , 131 N.M. 586 , 40 P.3d 1030 . {12} Along the same path, the State argues that the intrusion in the present case should be treated as de minimis and reasonable, as was the intrusion permitted in State v. Romero, 2002-NMCA-064 , 132 N.M. 364 , 48 P.3d 102 . 2007See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 39 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 ; Jones, 2002-NMCA-019, ¶ 14 , 131 N.M. 586 , 40 P.3d 1030 . {12} Along the same path, the State argues that the intrusion in the present case should be treated as de minimis and reasonable, as was the intrusion permitted in State v. Romero, 2002-NMCA-064 , 132 N.M. 364 , 48 P.3d 102 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2007See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 39 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 ; Jones, 2002-NMCA-019, ¶ 14 , 131 N.M. 586 , 40 P.3d 1030 . {12} Along the same path, the State argues that the intrusion in the present case should be treated as de minimis and reasonable, as was the intrusion permitted in State v. Romero, 2002-NMCA-064 , 132 N.M. 364 , 48 P.3d 102 . 2007See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 39 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 ; Jones, 2002-NMCA-019, ¶ 14 , 131 N.M. 586 , 40 P.3d 1030 . {12} Along the same path, the State argues that the intrusion in the present case should be treated as de minimis and reasonable, as was the intrusion permitted in State v. Romero, 2002-NMCA-064 , 132 N.M. 364 , 48 P.3d 102 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Romero
green
2 sentences2007See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 39 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 ; Jones, 2002-NMCA-019, ¶ 14 , 131 N.M. 586 , 40 P.3d 1030 . {12} Along the same path, the State argues that the intrusion in the present case should be treated as de minimis and reasonable, as was the intrusion permitted in State v. Romero, 2002-NMCA-064 , 132 N.M. 364 , 48 P.3d 102 . 2007See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 39 , 122 N.M. 777 , 932 P.2d 1 ; Jones, 2002-NMCA-019, ¶ 14 , 131 N.M. 586 , 40 P.3d 1030 . {12} Along the same path, the State argues that the intrusion in the present case should be treated as de minimis and reasonable, as was the intrusion permitted in State v. Romero, 2002-NMCA-064 , 132 N.M. 364 , 48 P.3d 102 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.