federal automobile exception in Pennsylvania

2025Appellant concludes his argument by assuming that the denial of his suppression motion was proof that the suppression court incorrectly applied outdated law prior to Alexander: Here, the trial court relied on [Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014)], which previously had extended the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement to claims based on the broader protection of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

2024In reaching this conclusion, the Court expressly overruled Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102 ([Pa.] 2014), which had adopted the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement that allowed police to conduct a warrantless vehicle search based solely on probable cause, with no exigency required beyond the inherent mobility of a motor vehicle.

2013As our Court explained in Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544 (Pa.Super.2011): Our Supreme Court has never recognized the federal automobile exception to permit a warrantless search of or seizure from a motor vehicle under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 10 Instead, in at least five cases, majorities of our Supreme Court have rejected the federal automobile exception in favor of what the plurality in [Commonwealth v. McCree, 592 Pa. 238 , 924 A.2d 621 (2007) ] dubbed the “limited automobile exception.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145 , 541 A.2d 1381, 1383 (1988); Commo

2013As our Court explained in Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544 (Pa.Super.2011): Our Supreme Court has never recognized the federal automobile exception to permit a warrantless search of or seizure from a motor vehicle under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 10 Instead, in at least five cases, majorities of our Supreme Court have rejected the federal automobile exception in favor of what the plurality in [Commonwealth v. McCree, 592 Pa. 238 , 924 A.2d 621 (2007) ] dubbed the “limited automobile exception.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145 , 541 A.2d 1381, 1383 (1988); Commo

2013As our Court explained in Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544 (Pa.Super.2011): Our Supreme Court has never recognized the federal automobile exception to permit a warrantless search of or seizure from a motor vehicle under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 10 Instead, in at least five cases, majorities of our Supreme Court have rejected the federal automobile exception in favor of what the plurality in [Commonwealth v. McCree, 592 Pa. 238 , 924 A.2d 621 (2007) ] dubbed the “limited automobile exception.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145 , 541 A.2d 1381, 1383 (1988); Commo

2013As our Court explained in Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544 (Pa.Super.2011): Our Supreme Court has never recognized the federal automobile exception to permit a warrantless search of or seizure from a motor vehicle under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 10 Instead, in at least five cases, majorities of our Supreme Court have rejected the federal automobile exception in favor of what the plurality in [Commonwealth v. McCree, 592 Pa. 238 , 924 A.2d 621 (2007) ] dubbed the “limited automobile exception.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145 , 541 A.2d 1381, 1383 (1988); Commo

2017“Curtilage” is an area adjacent to one’s home that is nonetheless afforded the same constitutional protections as one’s home because it is "associated with the sanctity of a man's home and privacies of life.” Commonwealth v. Oglialoro, 525 Pa. 250 , 579 A.2d 1288, 1292 (1990); Commonwealth v. Lee, 972 A.2d 1 , 3 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2009).

2017“Curtilage” is an area adjacent to one’s home that is nonetheless afforded the same constitutional protections as one’s home because it is "associated with the sanctity of a man's home and privacies of life.” Commonwealth v. Oglialoro, 525 Pa. 250 , 579 A.2d 1288, 1292 (1990); Commonwealth v. Lee, 972 A.2d 1 , 3 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2009).

2017Commonwealth v. Loughnane, 128 A.3d 806, 817 (Pa. Super. 2015).

2017Commonwealth v. Loughnane, 128 A.3d 806, 817 (Pa. Super. 2015).

2017In Gary, a majority of the Court adopted the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement, albeit without' any majority rationale for doing so. 3 See generally, e.g., Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 536, 547-49 (Pa. 2016) (explaining the precedential aspects of our prior decision in Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 623 Pa. 564 , 83 A.3d 901 (2013), which produced, in part, a majority holding but not a majority opinion).

2017In Gary, a majority of the Court adopted the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement, albeit without' any majority rationale for doing so. 3 See generally, e.g., Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 147 A.3d 536, 547-49 (Pa. 2016) (explaining the precedential aspects of our prior decision in Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 623 Pa. 564 , 83 A.3d 901 (2013), which produced, in part, a majority holding but not a majority opinion).

2024Judgment of sentence affirmed. ____________________________________________ 2 “We granted Appellant Keith Alexander (“Alexander”)’s petition for allowance of appeal asking this Court to overrule or limit Commonwealth v. Gary, 625 Pa. 183 , 91 A.3d 102 (2014) (OAJC), a plurality result announcing that, without limitation, the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution applies in Pennsylvania.” Alexander, 243 A.3d at 180 (footnotes omitted). -5- J-S11021-24 Date: 7/17/2024 -6-

2019In Commonwealth v. Gary , 625 Pa. 183 , 91 A.3d 102 (2014) (plurality opinion), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the federal automobile exception, holding "[t]he prerequisite for a warrantless search of a motor vehicle is probable cause to search; no exigency beyond the inherent mobility of a motor vehicle is required." Id. at 138 .

2025See, e.g., Wolfel, 233 A.3d at 790 (stating that the “material distinctions in the application of the respective federal and state charters, the relevant, controlling difference—i.e., the expanded application of the state exclusionary rule—is now apparent and manifest”); Alexander, 243 A.3d at 181 (rejecting the federal automobile exception, holding that Article I, Section 8 affords greater protection to the citizens of our Commonwealth than the Fourth Amendment, and reaffirming its prior decisions that Article I, Section 8 requires both a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances to

2024This Court “granted allowance of appeal to clarify the 6 If Saunders’s suppression challenge were premised on the Fourth Amendment only, rather than both the federal and state constitutions, there would be at least two additional grounds for lawful access to the firearm: the federal automobile exception, and Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (“Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest . . . if . . . it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”). [J-5-2024] - 13 standard for the plain view exception to the warrant requirem

2020In comparison, “we have not adopted the full federal automobile exception.” Id. (quoting McCree, 924 A.2d at 629 ).

2014See Perry, 798 A.2d at 708 (Castille J., concurring) (“That probable cause arose unexpectedly is all the exigency I would require under Article I, Section 8 — since that is all that is required by the actual holdings of this Court’s cases explicating the automobile exception ... and since any other rule is unjustifiably hostile to perfectly reasonable police conduct.”); Hernandez, 935 A.2d at 1290 (Saylor, J., concurring) (“I believe that ... adoption of the federal automobile exception subject to a warrant-when-practicable requirement, represents an appropriate stance and an essential resolut

2020In Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 553 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc),7 the court explained, “Our Supreme Court has never recognized the federal automobile exception . . . .

2013As our Court explained in Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544 (Pa.Super.2011): Our Supreme Court has never recognized the federal automobile exception to permit a warrantless search of or seizure from a motor vehicle under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 10 Instead, in at least five cases, majorities of our Supreme Court have rejected the federal automobile exception in favor of what the plurality in [Commonwealth v. McCree, 592 Pa. 238 , 924 A.2d 621 (2007) ] dubbed the “limited automobile exception.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145 , 541 A.2d 1381, 1383 (1988); Commo

2013As our Court explained in Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544 (Pa.Super.2011): Our Supreme Court has never recognized the federal automobile exception to permit a warrantless search of or seizure from a motor vehicle under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 10 Instead, in at least five cases, majorities of our Supreme Court have rejected the federal automobile exception in favor of what the plurality in [Commonwealth v. McCree, 592 Pa. 238 , 924 A.2d 621 (2007) ] dubbed the “limited automobile exception.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145 , 541 A.2d 1381, 1383 (1988); Commo

2013As our Court explained in Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544 (Pa.Super.2011): Our Supreme Court has never recognized the federal automobile exception to permit a warrantless search of or seizure from a motor vehicle under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 10 Instead, in at least five cases, majorities of our Supreme Court have rejected the federal automobile exception in favor of what the plurality in [Commonwealth v. McCree, 592 Pa. 238 , 924 A.2d 621 (2007) ] dubbed the “limited automobile exception.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145 , 541 A.2d 1381, 1383 (1988); Commo

2013As our Court explained in Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544 (Pa.Super.2011): Our Supreme Court has never recognized the federal automobile exception to permit a warrantless search of or seizure from a motor vehicle under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 10 Instead, in at least five cases, majorities of our Supreme Court have rejected the federal automobile exception in favor of what the plurality in [Commonwealth v. McCree, 592 Pa. 238 , 924 A.2d 621 (2007) ] dubbed the “limited automobile exception.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145 , 541 A.2d 1381, 1383 (1988); Commo

2013As our Court explained in Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544 (Pa.Super.2011): Our Supreme Court has never recognized the federal automobile exception to permit a warrantless search of or seizure from a motor vehicle under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 10 Instead, in at least five cases, majorities of our Supreme Court have rejected the federal automobile exception in favor of what the plurality in [Commonwealth v. McCree, 592 Pa. 238 , 924 A.2d 621 (2007) ] dubbed the “limited automobile exception.” Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145 , 541 A.2d 1381, 1383 (1988); Commo

2024Id. at 720 n.3 (citing Carroll).

2024He described the limited automobile exception that he rejected as permitting a warrantless search when police did not have the opportunity “to secure a search warrant before probable cause to search the vehicle arose unexpectedly[.]” Id. at 706 (Castille, J., concurring).

2016See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gary, 625 Pa. 183, 242 , 91 A.3d 102, 138 (2014) (plurality) (reflecting the present culmination of decades of controversy via the adoption of the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement as a matter of state constitutional law); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 616 Pa. 277, 289-90 , 47 A.3d 797, 804-05 (2012) (refusing to enforce an independent-source requirement under the Pennsylvania Constitution in the absence of police misconduct). 3 Notably, the remedial aspect of suppression is indirect, as the exclusion of evidence does not, “strictly speaking, remed

2016See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gary, 625 Pa. 183, 242 , 91 A.3d 102, 138 (2014) (plurality) (reflecting the present culmination of decades of controversy via the adoption of the federal automobile exception to the warrant requirement as a matter of state constitutional law); Commonwealth v. Henderson, 616 Pa. 277, 289-90 , 47 A.3d 797, 804-05 (2012) (refusing to enforce an independent-source requirement under the Pennsylvania Constitution in the absence of police misconduct). 3 Notably, the remedial aspect of suppression is indirect, as the exclusion of evidence does not, “strictly speaking, remed

2015See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 577 [ 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 ] (1991).

2015See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 577 [ 111 S.Ct. 1982 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 ] (1991).

2021This exception allowed police at the time the incident occurred to conduct a warrantless search or seizure of an automobile so long as it is supported by probable cause, and no separate finding of exigent circumstances was required.12 Loughnane, 173 A.3d at 741 .

2020Id. at 735 n.1 (“The lead opinion in Gary was designated as an ‘Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court’ . . . because while a majority of the Court supported the adoption of the federal automobile exception, only a plurality joined in the rationale behind it.”).

2022See Commonwealth v. Collins, 950 A.2d 1041, 1045 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc). -4- J-A26008-22 unaffected by that holding.

2020Regarding the “limited automobile exception,” the dissenting opinion characterized the majority’s discussion as unnecessary and represented a “disputable interpretation of the status of the law in Pennsylvania[.]” Collins, 950 A.2d at 1048 n.8 (Donohue, J., dissenting). 7 This author also wrote the opinion in Brown. [J-51-2020] - 14 Supreme Court have rejected the federal automobile exception in favor of what the plurality in McCree dubbed the ‘limited automobile exception.’ ” 2.

2020In Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d 855 (Pa. 2018), we noted that the Commonwealth did not suggest that the police officers had probable cause to suspect the vehicle contained drugs and stated “there is no cause for discussion of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement as an alternative basis to support the search.” Id. at 865 n.11 (citing Gary for its adoption of the federal automobile exception).

2020In Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d 855 (Pa. 2018), we noted that the Commonwealth did not suggest that the police officers had probable cause to suspect the vehicle contained drugs and stated “there is no cause for discussion of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement as an alternative basis to support the search.” Id. at 865 n.11 (citing Gary for its adoption of the federal automobile exception).

2019See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999) (provided police are authorized to perform a warrantless search of a vehicle, “a package [in the car] may be searched, whether or not its owner is present as a passenger or otherwise, because it may contain the contraband that the officer has reason to believe is in the -5- J-S61035-18 car”); see also In re I.M.S., 124 A.3d 311, 317 (Pa. Super. 2015) (holding that in light of our adoption of the federal automobile exception in Gary, the rule announced in Houghton applies).

2019Therefore, "where police possess probable cause to search a car, a warrantless search is permissible." Davis , supra , 188 A.3d at 458 , quoting In re I.M.S. , 124 A.3d 311 , 317 (Pa. Super. 2015).

2018Before the Gary decision was announced, "in order for police officers to conduct a lawful search of an automobile without a warrant, the officers were required to have probable cause and exigent circumstances." Commonwealth v. Hudson , 92 A.3d 1235 , 1241 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied , 630 Pa. 734 , 106 A.3d 724 (2014).

2017Hudson, 92 A.3d at 1242-43 (citations to record omitted).3 ____________________________________________ 3 The dissent would affirm the trial court’s suppression order by relying on three specific cases; notably, each of these cases was decided prior to Gary – before adoption of the federal automobile exception.

2015Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891 , 556 N.E.2d 69, 78 (1990) (acknowledging that a vehicle's mobility can create an exigency).

2015Commonwealth v. Cast, 407 Mass. 891 , 556 N.E.2d 69, 78 (1990) (acknowledging that a vehicle's mobility can create an exigency).

2015Historically, automobiles have been subject to an exception from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for two reasons: (1) the inherent mobility of the vehicle; and (2) a vehicle’s owner’s expectation of privacy is “significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office.” Id. at 110, quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985).

2015Historically, automobiles have been subject to an exception from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for two reasons: (1) the inherent mobility of the vehicle; and (2) a vehicle’s owner’s expectation of privacy is “significantly less than that relating to one’s home or office.” Id. at 110, quoting California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 , 105 S.Ct. 2066 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985).

2025See, e.g., Wolfel, 233 A.3d at 790 (stating that the “material distinctions in the application of the respective federal and state charters, the relevant, controlling difference—i.e., the expanded application of the state exclusionary rule—is now apparent and manifest”); Alexander, 243 A.3d at 181 (rejecting the federal automobile exception, holding that Article I, Section 8 affords greater protection to the citizens of our Commonwealth than the Fourth Amendment, and reaffirming its prior decisions that Article I, Section 8 requires both a showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances to