appellant contends hearing in New York

2016The presentment agency established at the Wade hearing (see United States v Wade, 388 US 218 [1967]) that the showup identification of the appellant was properly conducted within close spatial and temporal proximity to the crime (see People v Cuesta, 103 AD3d 913, 915 [2013]; People v Davis, 39 AD3d 873 [2007]).

2016The presentment agency established at the Wade hearing (see United States v Wade, 388 US 218 [1967]) that the showup identification of the appellant was properly conducted within close spatial and temporal proximity to the crime (see People v Cuesta, 103 AD3d 913, 915 [2013]; People v Davis, 39 AD3d 873 [2007]).

2000Such a decision lies within the discretion of the hearing court (see, Matter of Thompson v Thompson, 267 AD2d 516, 519 ; Matter of Farnham v Farnham, 252 AD2d 675 ; Matter of Walker v Tallman, 256 AD2d 1021 ).

2000Such a decision lies within the discretion of the hearing court (see, Matter of Thompson v Thompson, 267 AD2d 516, 519 ; Matter of Farnham v Farnham, 252 AD2d 675 ; Matter of Walker v Tallman, 256 AD2d 1021 ).

2000Such a decision lies within the discretion of the hearing court (see, Matter of Thompson v Thompson, 267 AD2d 516, 519 ; Matter of Farnham v Farnham, 252 AD2d 675 ; Matter of Walker v Tallman, 256 AD2d 1021 ).

1999However, considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the lineup identification (see, People v Harris, 187 AD2d 530 ; People v Lundquist, 151 AD2d 505 ), we find that the hearing court properly denied suppression.

1999However, considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the lineup identification (see, People v Harris, 187 AD2d 530 ; People v Lundquist, 151 AD2d 505 ), we find that the hearing court properly denied suppression.

1991The appellant contends that the factors considered by the court in Santosky (supra), particularly the natural parents’ interest in preservation of the family, are similarly present in an abuse proceeding, and thus due process mandates a higher standard of proof.

1991However, as indicated in Matter of Tammie Z. ( 66 NY2d 1 , supra), this interest is not as compelling in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10 since sustaining the petition results in placement of the child for an initial maximum period of one year (see, Family Ct Act § 1055 [b] [i], as amended by L 1989, ch 458, § 2 [eff Nov. 1, 1989]), rather than in an irrevocable termination of parental rights.

1989The appellant contends that the presumption of legitimacy (see, Matter of Findlay, 253 NY 1 ; see also, Matter of Fay, 44 NY"2d 137) has not been rebutted on the facts.

1960The leading case on advance payment of compensation through the payment of salary not earned is Matter of Baker v. Standard Rolling Mills ( 284 App. Div. 433, 435-436 ) where it was stated: “Compensation does not include wages paid for value received.

1930Matter of Rouss ( 221 N. Y. 81 ) is referred to, where the Court of Appeals held that section 584 of the Penal Law was designed to give an immunity as broad as the constitutional privilege; that the provisions of the statute amount to a grant of amnesty and that the witness is to have the same protection as if he had received a pardon, and it is argued that, this being so, the relator in effect received a pardon the moment his testimony was taken before the grand jury and that the indictment subsequently found is invalid and void.

1924(Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N. Y. 249, 253 .) The appellant contends that this presumption was destroyed as matter of law by sufficient evidence.

1900The history of the. presumption of life or of death of an absent person is very instructively given in the opinion of Surrogate Bradford in the case of Eagle v. Emmet ( 4 Bradf. 117 ), and in speaking of the two presumptions, the learned judge remarks that the practical effect of these two rules, if both are to be taken as subsisting, is that whenever the law is invoked as to rights dependent upon the life or death of an absent party, he is to be deemed as living until the seven years have expired, and after that- is to be, deemed as dead; but that is subject to the qualification that his depa

1896(Prentiss v. Bowden, supra.) The appellant contends that such claim was maintainable under chapter 740 of the Laws of 1894, but the decision of the Court of Appeals, which was not rendered until March, 1895, long after the amendatory statute took effect, seems conclusive against him on this point.

1893Russell may cancel, this contract at any time on giving the party of the second part one week’s notice, and paying one week’s additional salary, the party of the second part agrees to accept one week’s notice of cancellation at any time,” limits the plaintiff’s damage to the two weeks’ salary, and cites in approval of this view the cases of Fisher v. Monroe, 2 Misc.

1890(Fitzpatrick v. Woodruff, 96 N. Y. 561 -565 ; Wooster v. Sage, 67 id. 67; Johnston v. Trask, 40 Hun, 415 ; 116 N. Y. 136 -143; Vyse v. Wakefield, 6 M. & W. 442-451.) The appellant contends that the doctrine of estoppel lies at the foundation of the law as to waiver.

1890(Fitzpatrick v. Woodruff, 96 N. Y. 561 -565 ; Wooster v. Sage, 67 id. 67; Johnston v. Trask, 40 Hun, 415 ; 116 N. Y. 136 -143; Vyse v. Wakefield, 6 M. & W. 442-451.) The appellant contends that the doctrine of estoppel lies at the foundation of the law as to waiver.

1888The appellant contends that this error in the computation of the time made the subsequent order of sale absolutely void; and, in support of this proposition, he cites the case of Stilwell v. Swarthout, 81 N. Y. 109 .