one-year time bar in Washington

2023RCW 10.73.100(6); State v. Miller, 185 Wn.2d 111, 114 , 371 P.3d 528 (2016).

2023RCW 10.73.100(6); State v. Miller, 185 Wn.2d 111, 114 , 371 P.3d 528 (2016).

2024The Houston-Sconiers substantive rule, which applies retroactively on collateral review, provides that “courts may not impose ‘certain adult sentences . . . on juveniles who possess such diminished culpability that the adult standard SRA ranges and enhancements would be disproportionate punishment.’ ” Hinton, 3 RCW 10.73.100(7) provides that the one-year time bar under RCW 10.73.090(1) does not apply when [t]here has been a significant change in the law, whether substantive or procedural, which is material to the conviction, sentence, or other order entered in a criminal or civil proceeding in

2024According to Fisher, under In re Personal Restraint of Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d 255 , 474 P.3d 524 (2020) and In re Personal Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220 , 474 P.3d 507 (2020), both decided by the Washington Supreme Court on September 17, 2020, the rules, announced in State v. Houston-Sconiers apply retroactively to juvenile sentencing.

2022Restraint of Meippen, 193 Wn.2d 310, 315 , 440 P.3d 978 (2019); RCW 10.73.100(6).

2021“A petitioner can overcome the one-year time bar if [they] can identify (1) a significant change in the law, (2) that is material to [their] conviction or sentence, and (3) that applies retroactively.” Id. 4 No. 79139-7-I/5 remand for resentencing in accordance with Houston-Sconiers.

2018Restraint Petition ofHeidi Charlene Fero, No. 92975-1 Fero's lucidity and alternative cause evidence is insufficient to probably change the result at trial, thus her collateral challenge does not fall within the newly discovered evidence exception and the one-year time bar precludes any relief.^' 7ti.; RCW 10.73.100(1); In re Adams, 178 Wn.2d at 422 .

2018Restraint Petition ofHeidi Charlene Fero, No. 92975-1 Fero's lucidity and alternative cause evidence is insufficient to probably change the result at trial, thus her collateral challenge does not fall within the newly discovered evidence exception and the one-year time bar precludes any relief.^' 7ti.; RCW 10.73.100(1); In re Adams, 178 Wn.2d at 422 .

2016Restraint of Gentry, 179 Wn.2d 614, 625 , 316 P.3d 1020 (2014). ¶5 Miller contends that his late-filed petition is excused from the one-year time bar because Mulholland qualifies as a significant change in the law under RCW 10.73.100(6).

2016Restraint of Gentry, 179 Wn.2d 614, 625 , 316 P.3d 1020 (2014). ¶5 Miller contends that his late-filed petition is excused from the one-year time bar because Mulholland qualifies as a significant change in the law under RCW 10.73.100(6).

2015Mr. Erhart argued his public trial claim fell within the RCW 10.73.100(6) exemption to the one-year time bar because Wise, 176 Wn.2d 1 , was a significant change in the law that was material and retroactively applicable to his case.

2015Mr. Erhart argued his public trial claim fell within the RCW 10.73.100(6) exemption to the one-year time bar because Wise, 176 Wn.2d 1 , was a significant change in the law that was material and retroactively applicable to his case.

2000Consecutive sentences may only be imposed under the exceptional sentence provisions of RCW 9.94A.120 and 9.94A.390(2)(g) or any other provision of RCW 9.94A.390." [3] Cf. In re Personal Restraint of Fleming, 129 Wash.2d 529, 534 , 919 P.2d 66 (1996) (untimely filing of a restitution order was not a valid basis for collateral relief, because court at one time "had the authority to order restitution," but merely "did so in an untimely manner"). [4] In Carle and Moore , we had no need to address the one-year time bar and other RCW 10.73 restrictions, since those restrictions went into effect in 1

2000Consecutive sentences may only be imposed under the exceptional sentence provisions of RCW 9.94A.120 and 9.94A.390(2)(g) or any other provision of RCW 9.94A.390." [3] Cf. In re Personal Restraint of Fleming, 129 Wash.2d 529, 534 , 919 P.2d 66 (1996) (untimely filing of a restitution order was not a valid basis for collateral relief, because court at one time "had the authority to order restitution," but merely "did so in an untimely manner"). [4] In Carle and Moore , we had no need to address the one-year time bar and other RCW 10.73 restrictions, since those restrictions went into effect in 1

2024The legislature placed the burden on petitioners to show that they fall under an exception to the one-year time bar. 6 barred. 134 Wn.2d at 940 .

2024Id.

2024Restraint of Fletcher, No. 101144-0 (Stephens, J., dissenting) The majority points to In re Personal Restraint of Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861 , 50 P.3d 618 (2002), to assert that facial invalidity can be shown based on an incorrectly calculated offender score, but the case does not stand for that proposition.

2019Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo, and our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s meaning and intent.5 We look first to the language of the statute for its plain meaning.6 Where a statute is unambiguous, we do not need to construe its terms.7 A statute is not ambiguous merely because different interpretations are conceivable.8 Only after concluding a statute is ambiguous do we apply the rules of statutory construction, including harmonizing it with related statutes.9 And only after applying the rules of statutory 2 RCW 10.73.090. ~ RCW 10.73.100(

2024Restraint of Fletcher, No. 101144-0 (Stephens, J., dissenting) The majority points to In re Personal Restraint of Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861 , 50 P.3d 618 (2002), to assert that facial invalidity can be shown based on an incorrectly calculated offender score, but the case does not stand for that proposition.

2019Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo, and our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s meaning and intent.5 We look first to the language of the statute for its plain meaning.6 Where a statute is unambiguous, we do not need to construe its terms.7 A statute is not ambiguous merely because different interpretations are conceivable.8 Only after concluding a statute is ambiguous do we apply the rules of statutory construction, including harmonizing it with related statutes.9 And only after applying the rules of statutory 2 RCW 10.73.090. ~ RCW 10.73.100(

2024In that opinion, the Court of Appeals concluded that State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015), was a significant and retroactive change in law that provided an exemption to the one-year time bar under RCW 10.73.100(6).

2024In that opinion, the Court of Appeals concluded that State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680 , 358 P.3d 359 (2015), was a significant and retroactive change in law that provided an exemption to the one-year time bar under RCW 10.73.100(6).

2015Tsai argued his motion was exempt from the one-year time bar in RCW 10.73.090(1) under RCW 10.73.100(6) because Padilla and State v. Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d 163 , 249 P.3d 1015 (2011) (applying Padilla) effected a significant, material change in the law that applies retroactively.

2015Tsai argued his motion was exempt from the one-year time bar in RCW 10.73.090(1) under RCW 10.73.100(6) because Padilla and State v. Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d 163 , 249 P.3d 1015 (2011) (applying Padilla) effected a significant, material change in the law that applies retroactively. ¶6 The trial court initially denied Tsai’s 2011 motion, holding it was time barred.

2015Tsai argued his motion was exempt from the one-year time bar in RCW 10.73.090(1) under RCW 10.73.100(6) because Padilla and State v. Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d 163 , 249 P.3d 1015 (2011) (applying Padilla) effected a significant, material change in the law that applies retroactively.

2015Tsai argued his motion was exempt from the one-year time bar in RCW 10.73.090(1) under RCW 10.73.100(6) because Padilla and State v. Sandoval, 171 Wn.2d 163 , 249 P.3d 1015 (2011) (applying Padilla) effected a significant, material change in the law that applies retroactively. ¶6 The trial court initially denied Tsai’s 2011 motion, holding it was time barred.

2011McKiearnan, 165 Wash.2d at 780-81 , 203 P.3d 375 .

2011This principle was bluntly recapitulated in McKiearnan: “an invalid plea agreement cannot on its own overcome the one year time bar or render an otherwise valid judgment and sentence invalid.” McKiearnan, 165 Wn.2d at 782 .

2025In re Personal Restraint of Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d 255, 259 , 50 No. 39536-7-III In re PRP of Roetcisoender, Jr. (Dissent) 474 P.3d 524 (2020).

2025In re Personal Restraint of Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d 255, 259 , 50 No. 39536-7-III In re PRP of Roetcisoender, Jr. (Dissent) 474 P.3d 524 (2020).

2025Restraint of Bell, 187 Wn.2d 558, 564 , 387 P.3d 719 (2017) (this court will summarily dismiss a successive petition that does not overcome the one year time bar). 6

2025Restraint of Bell, 187 Wn.2d 558, 564 , 387 P.3d 719 (2017) (this court will summarily dismiss a successive petition that does not overcome the one year time bar). 6

2025State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 (2017), on which Roetcisoender substantively relies, represents a significant and material change in the law that applies retroactively, exempting Roetcisoender’s petition from the one-year time bar under RCW 10.73.100.

2021As mentioned above, our Supreme Court held in 2017 that “[t]rial courts must consider mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing and must have discretion to impose any sentence below the otherwise applicable SRA range and/or sentence enhancements.” Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 21 .

2024Id. 19 No. 102002-3 (consol. w/102003-1) Here, there is no doubt the cases were final, and the only question is whether the one-year time bar applies.

2020In In re Personal Restraint Petition of Skylstad, 160 Wn.2d 944, 946 , 162 P.3d 413 (2007), the court held that a judgment is not final for purposes of the one-year time- bar under RCW 10.73.090 when the appeal of the defendant’s sentence was still pending.

2018Further, in In re Personal Restraint of Thomas, 180 Wash.2d 951 , 953, 330 P.3d 158 (2014), we dismissed a PRP as mixed, but acknowledged, "We recognize that Thomas's claim premised on Miller may not be time barred; if we agreed with Thomas that the rule in Miller applies retroactively, then that claim satisfies the exception to the one-year time bar in RCW 10.73.100(6) and we could reach its merits." *1185 ¶ 11 The Supreme Court has recently declared in Montgomery that Miller applies retroactively.

2018Further, in In re Personal Restraint of Thomas, 180 Wash.2d 951 , 953, 330 P.3d 158 (2014), we dismissed a PRP as mixed, but acknowledged, "We recognize that Thomas's claim premised on Miller may not be time barred; if we agreed with Thomas that the rule in Miller applies retroactively, then that claim satisfies the exception to the one-year time bar in RCW 10.73.100(6) and we could reach its merits." *1185 ¶ 11 The Supreme Court has recently declared in Montgomery that Miller applies retroactively.

2019Richey also relied on In re Personal Restraint of Colbert, 186 Wn.2d 614 , 380 P.3d 504 (2016).

2019Richey also relied on In re Personal Restraint of Colbert, 186 Wn.2d 614 , 380 P.3d 504 (2016).

2018Thus, a rule requiring appointed counsel only for direct petitioners but not for administrative applicants would work against the State's position that insanity acquittees should follow the administrative process because that rule would encourage them to file direct petitions instead. '' Notably, however, under eurrent precedent, direct petitioners might face a one- year time bar from repetitioning for conditional release, Kolocotronis, 34 Wn.

2017Notably, however, under current precedent, direct petitioners might face a one-year time bar from repetitioning for conditional release, Kolocotronis, 34 Wash. App. at 622 -24 , 663 P.2d 1360 , whereas administrative applicants face only a six-month bar from reapplying for release, RCW 10.77.150(5).

2016App. 739, 747-48 , 201 P.3d 1040 (2009).

2016App. 739 , 747- 48, 201 P.3d 1040 (2009).

2016Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Dally appears to be the only Washington case that has addressed specifically the one-year time bar in RCW 62A.4-406(f ). 12 148 Wn.

2016Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Dally appears to be the only Washington case that has addressed specifically the one-year time bar in RCW 62A.4-406(f). 12 148 Wn.

2015App. 425 , 200 P.3d 266 (2009), rev 'd, 176 Wn.2d 1 , 288 P.3d 1113 (2012), constitutes a significant change in the law that is material and retroactively applicable to his case.

2015App. 425 , 200 P.3d 266 (2009), rev’d, 176 Wn.2d 1 , 288 P.3d 1113 (2012), constitutes a significant change in the law that is material and retroactively applicable to his case.

2015And such a claim in itself is not among the exemptions to the one-year time bar listed in RCW 10.73.100. 2 But Erhart argues that his public trial claim falls within RCW 10.73.100(6) because the Court of Appeals public trial decision in State v. Wise, 148 Wn.

2015And such a claim in itself is not among the exemptions to the one-year time bar listed in RCW 10.73.100. 2 ¶5 But Erhart argues that his public trial claim falls within RCW 10.73.100(6) because the Court of Appeals public trial decision in State v. Wise, 148 Wn.

2013Restraint of Runyan, 121 Wn.2d 432, 444-45 , 853 P.2d 424 (1993). 2 In re Personal Restraint of Adams (Devon), No. 87501-4 (Gordon McCloud, J., Concurrence/Dissent) would not necessarily have previously protected.

2011With regard to collateral attacks on judgments in criminal proceedings, history gives contextual meaning to what types of judgments and sentences have been considered without any time limits as well as what it means for a judgment and sentence to be “invalid on its face.” ¶53 The first time that RCW 10.73.090(1) came before us for interpretation was in Runyan, 121 Wn.2d 432 , where the principal claim was that the one-year time bar in RCW 10.73.090(1) violated the suspension clause of the Washington State Constitution.