one-year time bar in Pennsylvania

2026The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)).

2026The three narrow statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar are as follows: “(1) interference by government officials in the presentation of the claim; (2) newly discovered facts; and (3) an after-recognized constitutional right.” Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 233-34 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii)).

2026See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1275 (Pa. 2007) (holding that the PCRA petitioner was entitled to reinstatement of his appeal rights, nunc pro tunc, where he properly invoked the “newly-discovered fact” exception to the PCRA’s one-year time bar, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii), based upon his discovery of PCRA counsel’s abandonment).] PCRA Court Opinion, 7/8/25, at 3-4 (capitalization modified).

2026Thus, “[i]n cases involving ineffectiveness per se, [Section 9545](b)(1)(ii) is a limited extension of the one-year time requirement under circumstances when a petitioner has not had the review to which he [or she] was entitled due to a circumstance that was beyond his [or her] control.” Peterson, 192 A.3d at 1130 (emphasis added; original quotation marks omitted), quoting Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1273 . - 14 - J-A29021-25 Moreover, from our review of the Gamboa-Taylor and Bennett lines of cases, we are able to glean that, not only must the ineffectiveness cause the complete deprivation of appella

2025See Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d at 785 .

2018We indicated that to allow the filing of subsequent PCRA petitions based upon ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to assert every possible collateral claim would result in serial petitions and the one-year time bar would "effectively be eviscerated." Howard , 788 A.2d at 355 (citing Gamboa-Taylor , 753 A.2d at 785 ).

2016See also Commonwealth v. Riggle, 119 A.3d 1058 (Pa.Super. 2015) (declining to give Alleyne retroactive effect to cases on timely collateral review when the defendant’s judgment of sentence was finalized before Alleyne was decided); Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988 (Pa.Super. 2014) (concluding Alleyne does not satisfy the new retroactive constitutional right exception to the PCRA’s one-year time bar, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii)).

2016In concluding Alleyne does not satisfy the new retroactive constitutional right exception to the PCRA’s one year time bar, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii), the [Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 995 (Pa. Super. 2014)] Court explained: Even assuming that Alleyne did announce a new constitutional right, neither our Supreme Court, nor the United States Supreme Court has held that Alleyne is to be applied retroactively to cases in which the judgment of sentence had become final.

2021See Commonwealth v. Perry, 959 A.2d 932, 938 (Pa. Super. 2008). -2- J-S18009-21 and order denying the requested testing.

2016However, “the one-year time bar proscribed under the PCRA does not apply to petitions for post-conviction DNA testing….” Commonwealth v. Perry, 959 A.2d 932, 938 (Pa. Super. 2008).

2026Thus, “[i]n cases involving ineffectiveness per se, [Section 9545](b)(1)(ii) is a limited extension of the one-year time requirement under circumstances when a petitioner has not had the review to which he [or she] was entitled due to a circumstance that was beyond his [or her] control.” Peterson, 192 A.3d at 1130 (emphasis added; original quotation marks omitted), quoting Bennett, 930 A.2d at 1273 . - 14 - J-A29021-25 Moreover, from our review of the Gamboa-Taylor and Bennett lines of cases, we are able to glean that, not only must the ineffectiveness cause the complete deprivation of appella

2025On appeal, we affirmed the dismissal but concluded that Appellant had the right to file a second PCRA petition alleging the newly-discovered-fact exception to the PCRA’s one-year time bar pursuant to Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123, 1132 (Pa. 2018) (holding that the untimely filing of a PCRA petition constitutes per ____________________________________________ 1 As will be pertinent to our discussion, one of the issues Appellant raised on direct appeal was whether the trial court erred “by excluding from the trial record as irrelevant, any reference that [Ms. Doherty] . . . previously

2017In order to meet the PCRA’s jurisdictional timeliness requirements, a petitioner must file a petition within one year of the date on which his judgment of sentence becomes final, or plead and prove the applicability of one of the three statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

2017DID THE PROSECUTOR COMMIT A BRADY VIOLATION FOR (Footnote Continued Next Page) -3- J- S02030-17 jurisdictional timeliness provision requires that a petitioner must file a petition within one year of the date on which his judgment of sentence becomes final, or plead and prove the applicability of one of the three statutory exceptions to the one-year time bar. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1); Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).

2023Notably, he “cannot use Section 9543.1 to raise extraneous issues not related to DNA testing in an effort to avoid the one-year time bar [of a PCRA].” Commonwealth v. Brooks, 875 A.2d 1141, 1148 (Pa. Super. 2005). -5-

2019We may proceed to review this claim as “the PCRA's one-year time bar does not apply to motions for the performance of forensic DNA testing under Section 9543.1.” Commonwealth v. Walsh, 125 A.3d 1248, 1252 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brooks, 875 A.2d 1141, 1146 (Pa.Super. 2005) (emphasis in original)).

2008See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 508 , 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (2003). 3 Additionally, we note that in Peterkin the Court considered the one-year time bar in the context of the provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution restricting the government’s ability to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, see Pa. Const, art.

2008See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 508 , 837 A.2d 1157, 1161 (2003). 3 Additionally, we note that in Peterkin the Court considered the one-year time bar in the context of the provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution restricting the government’s ability to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, see Pa. Const, art.

2018All claims cognizable under the PCRA, including ineffectiveness claims, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final unless a statutory exception to the one-year time bar applies. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b); Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120 , 1127 ____________________________________________ 4 “The action established in this subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus . . .” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (em

2007The PCRA court properly followed a Williams -type process in Wharton when it issued a notice of intent to dismiss Wharton's petition, which was filed post- Robinson, on the basis that the petition was untimely and failed to assert an exception to the one-year time requirement. 886 A.2d at 1123 .

2023Compare Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (Pa. 2007) (remanding for a hearing where the PCRA petition included details of the facts that were unknown to the petitioner and what specific steps he took to learn them), with Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 178 (Pa.Super. 2015) (affirming dismissal of petition without a hearing where the petitioner failed to allege how he exercised due diligence). - 10 - J-S42006-22 Accordingly, the PCRA court properly ruled that Appellant’s petition failed to sufficiently allege the newly-discovered-facts exception to the PCRA’s one-year time bar.

2015See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 873 A.2d 1157 , 1162 (Pa. 2003) (stating that petitions alleging ineffectiveness of 1 To establish the exception at section 9545(b)(i)(ii), the petitioner must demonstrate “(a) the existence of facts that were unknown to him and (b) his exercise of due diligence in discovering those facts.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 179 (Pa. Super. 2015). -4- J-S38045-15 counsel are still subject to the one year time bar).2 We note that Rhine also raises illegality of sentence claims.

2024See Commonwealth v. Gandy, 38 A.3d 899, 905-06 (Pa. Super. 2012) (stating that section 9543.1 cannot be utilized “to raise extraneous issues not related to DNA testing in an effort to avoid the one-year time bar” under the PCRA, and concluding that “the destruction of evidence that likely occurred over 25 years ago” is not related to any DNA testing conducted under section 9543.1); see also Walsh, 125 A.3d at 1252 (noting that issues raised outside the request for DNA evidence “are unreviewable at this juncture”).

2022Despite [Appellant’s] averment of advances in many areas of technology including DNA testing, [Appellant] waited 27 years after his first conviction in 1993 and 24 years after his second conviction in 1996 to request any DNA testing. ____________________________________________ 3 “The PCRA’s one-year time bar does not apply to motions for the performance of forensic DNA testing under Section 9543.1.” Walsh, 125 A.3d at 1252 (citations omitted). - 11 - J-A06005-22 *** Since his first and second trial, [Appellant] has been aware of the evidence he now wishes to be tested. … No new evidence has c

2020However, an untimely petition may be received when the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and -6- J-S12006-20 (iii), is met.2 See Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2008) (to properly invoke a statutory exception to the one-year time- bar, the PCRA demands that the petitioner properly plead all required elements of the relied-upon exception).

2020However, an untimely petition may be received when the petition alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), is met.6 See Commonwealth v. Perrin, 947 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa. ____________________________________________ 6 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are: (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the

2025See Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (reiterating “the newly-discovered facts exception to the time limitations of the PCRA, as set forth in subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii), is distinct from the after-discovered evidence basis for relief delineated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)”).

2024See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi); see also Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (reiterating “the newly-discovered facts exception to the time limitations of the PCRA, as set forth in subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii), is distinct from the after-discovered evidence basis for relief delineated in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2)”).

2018See Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1200-01 (Pa. Super. 2012) (noting that “a majority of the Supreme Court agrees that issues of PCRA counsel effectiveness must be raised in a serial PCRA petition or in response to a notice of dismissal before the PCRA court[,]” and holding that “claims of PCRA counsel ineffectiveness cannot be raised for the first time after a notice of appeal has been taken from the underlying PCRA matter.”); Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032 , 1044 n.14 (Pa. 2011) (“While difficult, the filing of a subsequent timely PCRA petition is possible, and in situations where

2017Our Supreme Court has recognized that, “[w]hile difficult, the filing of a subsequent timely PCRA petition is possible, and in situations where an exception pursuant to § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii) can be established a second petition filed beyond the one-year time bar may be pursued.” Commonwealth v. Jette, 23 A.3d 1032 , 1044 n.14 (Pa. 2011).

2025Once jurisdiction over a PCRA claim has been properly invoked by establishing an exception to the one-year time bar, “the relevant inquiry becomes whether the claim is cognizable under the PCRA.” Cox, supra. Section 9543, titled “Eligibility for relief,” governs this inquiry.

2025Rather, the exception only requires a petitioner to prove that the facts were unknown to him and that he exercised due diligence in discovering those facts.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 227 (Pa. 2016) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). -6- J-S08005-25 Here, the PCRA court concluded that Appellant had not met any timeliness exceptions to the PCRA’s one-year time bar.

2025Timeliness The PCRA’s one-year time bar[4] does not apply to motions for DNA testing under [] 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1. [Commonwealth v. ____________________________________________ 4 “A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final, unless he pleads and proves one of the three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).” Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16 (Pa. 2012) (citation and footnote omitted).

2025Timeliness The PCRA’s one-year time bar[4] does not apply to motions for DNA testing under [] 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1. [Commonwealth v. ____________________________________________ 4 “A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of sentence became final, unless he pleads and proves one of the three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).” Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16 (Pa. 2012) (citation and footnote omitted).

2020This Court has explained that a petition for post-conviction DNA testing does not directly create an exception to the one- year time bar under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545; however, if granted, it “allows for a convicted individual to first obtain DNA testing which could then be used within a PCRA petition to establish new facts in order to satisfy the requirements of an exception under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).” Commonwealth v. Weeks, 831 A.2d 1194, 1196 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1(f)(1)). 5 An order granting or denying a motion for DNA testing disposes of all claims raised by all par

2019This Court has explained that a petition for post-conviction DNA testing does not directly create an exception to the one- year time bar under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545; however, if granted, it “allows for a convicted individual to first obtain DNA testing which could then be used within a PCRA petition to establish new facts in order to satisfy the requirements of an exception under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).” Commonwealth v. Weeks, 831 A.2d 1194, 1196 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1(f)(1)). -5- J-S79015-18 capitalization omitted).

2020See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brooks, 875 A.2d 1141, 1146 (Pa.Super. 2005); Commonwealth v. Young, 873 A.2d 720, 724 (Pa.Super. 2005).

2019See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Brooks, 875 A.2d 1141, 1146 (Pa.Super. 2005); Commonwealth v. Young, 873 A.2d 720, 724 (Pa.Super. 2005).

2019See Trial Ct. Opinion (TCO), 03/08/2018, at 2-4 (citing in support Commonwealth v. Murphy , 180 A.3d 402 , 405-06 (Pa.Super. 2018) (concluding that the substantive rule recognized in Muniz does not establish a timeliness exception to the PCRA) ).

2019Commonwealth v. Murphy , 180 A.3d 402 (Pa.Super. 2018).

2023See Commonwealth v. Gamboa- Taylor, 562 Pa. 70 , 753 A.2d 780, 785 (2000)(“[S]ubsequent counsel’s review of previous counsel’s representation and a conclusion that previous counsel was ineffective is not a newly discovered ‘fact’ entitling Appellant to the benefit of the exception for [newly]-discovered evidence.”); [Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911, 916-17 (Pa. 2000)] (finding claim of ineffectiveness assistance of counsel layered upon a claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness was based upon facts that existed at the time of trial, and did not fall within the “new facts” exception to the

2023See Commonwealth v. Gamboa- Taylor, 562 Pa. 70 , 753 A.2d 780, 785 (2000)(“[S]ubsequent -5- J-S12010-23 counsel’s review of previous counsel’s representation and a conclusion that previous counsel was ineffective is not a newly discovered ‘fact’ entitling Appellant to the benefit of the exception for [newly]-discovered evidence.”); [Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911, 916-17 (Pa. 2000)] (finding claim of ineffectiveness assistance of counsel layered upon a claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness was based upon facts that existed at the time of trial, and did not fall within the “new facts” e

2024Rejecting dictum to the contrary in Commonwealth v. Murray, 753 A.2d 201 (Pa. 2000), the Court in Brown observed that, under Section 9545(b)(3) of the PCRA, “a judgment of sentence is final for purposes of the one-year time bar upon the expiration of the time for seeking review in circumstances in which direct appellate review is unavailable.” Brown, 943 A.2d at 267 .

2007Indeed, the majority opinion displaces this Court's previous understanding that "a plain reading of the PCRA's timeliness requirements *1278 indicates that they are intended to apply to all PCRA petitions, regardless of the nature of the individual claims raised therein." Commonwealth v. Murray, 562 Pa. 1, 5 , 753 A.2d 201, 202 (2000). [2] Moving beyond the subject of plain meaning, the majority opinion appears to rest primarily on its conclusion that application of the one-year time bar in Appellant's circumstance represents a due process violation.

2018This one-year time bar is mandatory, meaning courts have “no authority to extend filing periods except as the statute permits.” Fahy, 737 A.2d at 222 .

2018Fahy, supra. This one-year time bar is mandatory, meaning courts ____________________________________________ 1 Section 9545 of the PCRA requires all petition “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545.

2024We reiterated that “an appellant’s ‘motion for DNA testing (filed in advance of utilizing the PCRA as a vehicle to obtain DNA results) avoids the one-year time bar of 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9545.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 835 A.2d 747, 750 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

2018We therefore held that a Section 9543.1 motion is not subject to the one-year time bar of Section 9545 that applies to PCRA petitions.9 Id.

2017Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 752 A.2d 868, 871 (Pa. 2000).

2016Commonwealth v. Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 1127 (Pa. 2005) (“It is well settled that allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel will not overcome the jurisdictional timeliness requirements of the PCRA.”); see also Commonwealth v. Gamboa- Taylor, 753 A.2d 780 (Pa. 2000); Commonwealth v. Bronshtein, 752 A.2d 868 (Pa. 2000); Commonwealth v. Pursell, 749 A.2d 911 (Pa. 2000).

2024See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (stating one-year time bar is absolute “unless the petition alleges and the petitioner proves” one of the three timeliness exceptions); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 234 A.3d 735, 738 (Pa. Super. 2020) (petitioner must successfully plead and prove PCRA timeliness exception to evade PCRA time bar); see also Peterson, 192 A.3d at 1132 (“Peterson has plead and proven an entitlement to invoke the subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii) exception to permit the filing of his second PCRA petition beyond the one-year time bar.”). -7- J-S15034-24 In any event, Appellant’s reliance on Peterson

2024See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (providing that any PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, must be filed within one year of the date on which the judgment of sentence becomes final unless the petitioner alleges and proves one of three enumerated exceptions); see also Anderson, 234 A.3d at 737 (Footnote Continued Next Page) -7- J-S34025-24 Order affirmed.