role defense in New York

2016The Record Refutes Defendant’s Unsupported Assertions “It is well settled that a guilty plea will be upheld if it was entered knowingly, voluntarily and with an understanding of the consequences thereof (see, People v Moissett, 76 NY2d 909, 910-911 ), especially when the defendant makes a complete factual allocution in the presence of counsel and after the trial court apprises the defendant of the consequences of his plea . . . .” (People v Hanley, 255 AD2d 837, 837 [3d Dept 1998], lv denied 92 NY2d 1050 [1999].) Such are the circumstances in the present case.

2012A majority of Appellate Division justices affirmed (Matter of New York County Lawyers’ Assn. v Bloomberg, 95 AD3d 92 [1st Dept 2012]), finding, as did Supreme Court, that section 722 (2) authorized the City to assign conflict cases to institutional providers without petitioners’ consent, that section 722 (3) as amended did not reserve exclusive authority over the provision of conflict counsel to the county bar associations and that the City’s indigent defense plan “is a lawful ‘combination’ plan under County Law § 722 (4)” (id. at 95).

2012The City answered, asserting that its indigent defense plan is a combination plan pursuant to County Law § 722 (4), that the second addendum indicating otherwise was a misstatement, that “the criminal defense panels of private attorneys continue to be administered in the same manner [as prescribed by the 1965 Bar Plan] and [that] the role of the bar associations has not been changed or modified by the City in any way.” The City cross-moved for summary judgment. 5 Supreme Court granted the petition to an extent not relevant to this appeal, otherwise dismissed the petition with prejudice and gra

1996Defense counsel failed to object to the prosecution’s statement that the role of defense counsel was to cloud the picture of defendant’s guilt; therefore, this claim is unpreserved for appellate review (see, People v Dawson, 50 NY2d 311, 324 ).

1996Defendant failed to object to the allegedly improper bolstering of police witnesses during the summation at the time that this objection could have been addressed most readily (see, People v Michael, 48 NY2d 1, 6 ), though defense counsel later moved for a mistrial on this ground.

1995Any prejudice to defendant, however, was cured by the prompt admonition of the court that it disapproved of the prosecutor’s characterization and its appropriate explanation of the proper role of defense counsel (see, People v Plant, 138 AD2d 968 , lv denied 71 NY2d 1031 ).

1993Because People v Skinner and its predecessors ( supra ) deal not with the role of defense counsel in preserving our adversary system of criminal justice, but rather "`[p]reserving the integrity of an accused's choice to communicate with police only through counsel'" ( Minnick v Mississippi , 498 US 146, 153 [quoting Patterson v Illinois , 487 US 285, 291 ]), they have no precedential value for extending the State's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel to a suspect, such as defendant, *82 at the preaccusatory stage.

1993Because People v Skinner and its predecessors (supra) deal not with the role of defense counsel in preserving our adversary system of criminal justice, but rather " '[preserving the integrity of an accused’s choice to communicate with police only through counsel’ ” (Minnick v Mississippi, 498 US 146, 153 [quoting Patterson v Illinois, 487 US 285, 291 ]), they have no precedential value for extending the State’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel to a suspect, such as defendant, at the preaccusatory stage.

1993More to the point are our holdings in Claudio I and in People v Beam ( 57 N.Y.2d 241 ).

1993More to the point are our holdings in Claudio I and in People v Beam ( 57 NY2d 241 ).

1987Having knowingly and willingly participated in an attempt to obstruct justice through perjured testimony, he is not in a position to ask this court to undo the consequences of his own conscious wrongdoing on the ground that he was encouraged in this attempt by his defense attorney (see, People v Nelli, 29 AD2d 725, 726 ).

1987Thus, whatever the role of defense counsel may have been in promoting the defense strategy employed at trial, it is abundantly clear that defendant made an informed decision to " 'go for broke’ ” (see, People v Lane, 60 NY2d 748, 751 [Meyer, J., concurring]), with awareness of the risks that his specious defense of duress might prove unsuccessful and of the adverse consequences thereof (see, People v Harris, 109 AD2d 351, 363 ; see also, People v Natal, 102 AD2d 496, 502-503 ).

1987The alternate ground raised by the defendant for affirming Criminal Term’s dismissal of the indictment, to wit, the purported deficiency of the instructions on the role of a presumption, may not be considered on this appeal by the People (CPL 470.15 [1]; People v Goodfriend, 64 NY2d 695 ).

1986In re Winship, 397 US 358 ; former Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 5), and fails accurately to reflect the realities of criminal litigation and the role of defense counsel therein (see, Kaus & Mallen, The Misguiding Hand of Counsel — Reflections on ”Criminal Malpractice”, 21 UCLA L Rev 1191, 1200-1209).

1979It is also well recognized that a determination as to what constitutes an appropriate sentence is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the sentence imposed by that court should not be reduced on appeal unless there was a clear abuse of discretion (see People v Junco, 43 AD2d 266 , affd 35 NY2d 419 , cert den 421 US 951 ; People v Dittmar, 41 AD2d 788 ; People v Caputo, 13 AD2d 861 ).

1979It is also well recognized that a determination as to what constitutes an appropriate sentence is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the sentence imposed by that court should not be reduced on appeal unless there was a clear abuse of discretion (see People v Junco, 43 AD2d 266 , affd 35 NY2d 419 , cert den 421 US 951 ; People v Dittmar, 41 AD2d 788 ; People v Caputo, 13 AD2d 861 ).

1979It is also well recognized that a determination as to what constitutes an appropriate sentence is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the sentence imposed by that court should not be reduced on appeal unless there was a clear abuse of discretion (see People v Junco, 43 AD2d 266 , affd 35 NY2d 419 , cert den 421 US 951 ; People v Dittmar, 41 AD2d 788 ; People v Caputo, 13 AD2d 861 ).

1979It is also well recognized that a determination as to what constitutes an appropriate sentence is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the sentence imposed by that court should not be reduced on appeal unless there was a clear abuse of discretion (see People v Junco, 43 AD2d 266 , affd 35 NY2d 419 , cert den 421 US 951 ; People v Dittmar, 41 AD2d 788 ; People v Caputo, 13 AD2d 861 ).

1979It is also well recognized that a determination as to what constitutes an appropriate sentence is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the sentence imposed by that court should not be reduced on appeal unless there was a clear abuse of discretion (see People v Junco, 43 AD2d 266 , affd 35 NY2d 419 , cert den 421 US 951 ; People v Dittmar, 41 AD2d 788 ; People v Caputo, 13 AD2d 861 ).