role defense in California

2023Motomura acknowledged that information from cellphones “can be valuable for the prosecution just as it could be valuable for the defense.” Generally, “[d]ue process requires the state preserve evidence in its possession where it is reasonable to expect the evidence would play a significant role in the defense.” (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 878 .) The “evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” (Ca

2020“Due process requires the state preserve evidence in its possession where it is reasonable to expect the evidence would play a significant role in the defense.” (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 878 .) “The evidence must ‘possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.’” (Ibid., quoting Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 489 .) “If the evidence’s exculpatory value is apparent and no comparable evidence is reasonably available, d

2023Motomura acknowledged that information from cellphones “can be valuable for the prosecution just as it could be valuable for the defense.” Generally, “[d]ue process requires the state preserve evidence in its possession where it is reasonable to expect the evidence would play a significant role in the defense.” (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 878 .) The “evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” (Ca

2022(See People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 878 [“Due process requires the state preserve evidence in its possession where it is reasonable to expect the evidence would play a significant role in the defense.” (italics added)].) As the California Supreme Court has noted, “[i]t is not entirely clear that the failure to obtain evidence falls within ‘ “what might loosely be called the area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 943 .) Thus, while the Supreme Court “has suggested that there might be cases in which the failure to collect o

2021To determine where the blame lies for these delays, we consider in turn the role of the defense, the prosecution, and the trial court. 24 i. The defense As a general rule, “delays caused by defense counsel are properly attributed to the defendant, even where counsel is assigned.” (Vermont v. Brillon (2009) 556 U.S. 81, 94 (Brillon).) This rule, however, “is not absolute.

2021To determine where the blame lies for these delays, we consider in turn the role of the defense, the prosecution, and the trial court. 24 i. The defense As a general rule, “delays caused by defense counsel are properly attributed to the defendant, even where counsel is assigned.” (Vermont v. Brillon (2009) 556 U.S. 81, 94 (Brillon).) This rule, however, “is not absolute.

2010On appeal, defendant contends the procedure of altering the original drawings after the hypnosis session, rather than preserving them for comparison with any posthypnosis session versions, inhibited his ability to establish Bulman was, in fact, hypnotized during the session and recalled the mustache while under hypnosis. (5) Due process requires the state preserve evidence in its possession where it is reasonable to expect the evidence would play a significant role in the defense. ( People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 976 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 891 P.2d 153 ].) The evidence must "possess an

2010On appeal, defendant contends the procedure of altering the original drawings after the hypnosis session, rather than preserving them for comparison with any posthypnosis session versions, inhibited his ability to establish Bulman was, in fact, hypnotized during the session and recalled the mustache while under hypnosis. (5) Due process requires the state preserve evidence in its possession where it is reasonable to expect the evidence would play a significant role in the defense. ( People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 976 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607 , 891 P.2d 153 ].) The evidence must "possess an

1984The Supreme Court held that counsel’s action and inaction could “in no way be characterized as constituting effective assistance of counsel.” (Id., at p. 635.) The McKenzie court discussed the duties of trial counsel thusly: “ ‘The duty of a lawyer both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law. ’ (Italics deleted.) (Hawk v. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 108, 126 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 713 ] [cert. den. (1975) 421 U.S. 1012 ( 44 L.Ed.2d 680 , 95 S.Ct. 2417 )]; CPR of ABA, DR 7-101(A)(1), DR 7-102(A)(8).) More particularly, the role

1984The Supreme Court held that counsel’s action and inaction could “in no way be characterized as constituting effective assistance of counsel.” (Id., at p. 635.) The McKenzie court discussed the duties of trial counsel thusly: “ ‘The duty of a lawyer both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law. ’ (Italics deleted.) (Hawk v. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 108, 126 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 713 ] [cert. den. (1975) 421 U.S. 1012 ( 44 L.Ed.2d 680 , 95 S.Ct. 2417 )]; CPR of ABA, DR 7-101(A)(1), DR 7-102(A)(8).) More particularly, the role

1987The public defender’s role as defense counsel imposes a solemn obligation to zealously safeguard the rights and privileges of the accused (Ferri v. Ackerman (1979) 444 U.S. 193 [ 62 L.Ed.2d 355 , 100 S.Ct. 402 ]; People v. McKen zie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 668 P.2d 769 ]; Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 606 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 639 P.2d 248 , 18 A.L.R.4th 333 ]), an obligation which occasionally brings defense counsel into sharp conflict with the county.

1987The public defender’s role as defense counsel imposes a solemn obligation to zealously safeguard the rights and privileges of the accused (Ferri v. Ackerman (1979) 444 U.S. 193 [ 62 L.Ed.2d 355 , 100 S.Ct. 402 ]; People v. McKen zie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 462 , 668 P.2d 769 ]; Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982) 30 Cal.3d 606 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 639 P.2d 248 , 18 A.L.R.4th 333 ]), an obligation which occasionally brings defense counsel into sharp conflict with the county.

2023This is because “ ‘[w]henever potentially exculpatory evidence is permanently lost, courts face the treacherous task of divining the import of materials whose contents are unknown, and, very often, disputed.’ ” (Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (Youngblood).) In Youngblood, the United States Supreme Court hesitated to read the due process clause “as imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution.” (Id. at p. 58.) Therefore, “unless a criminal def

2011It is axiomatic that the constitutional due process guaranty is a bulwark against improper state action. “[T]he core purpose of procedural due process [is] ensuring that a citizen’s reasonable reliance is not frustrated by arbitrary government action.” (Castle Rock v. Gonzales (2005) 545 U.S. 748, 791, fn. 20 [ 162 L.Ed.2d 658 , 125 S.Ct. 2796 ] (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.).) If the state took no action, due process is not a consideration, because there is no “loss of evidence attributable to the Government.” (Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. at p. 57 .) The state “might transgress constitutional lim

2016(See Agent Orange, supra, 517 F.3d at pp. 94–96 [government exercised the necessary discretion, and created a significant conflict with state law, when it ordered and reordered product with knowledge of the alleged design defect; “reordering the same product with knowledge of its relevant defects plays the identical role in the defense as listing specific ingredients, processes, or the like”]; Dowd v. Textron, Inc. (4th Cir. 1986) 792 F.2d 409 , 410–412 [concluding pre- Boyle government contractor defense available where Army investigated problem with rotor system, manufacturer suggested modif

2016(See Agent Orange, supra, 517 F.3d at pp. 94-96 [government exercised the necessary discretion, and created a significant conflict with state law, when it ordered and reordered product with knowledge of the alleged design defect; “reordering the same product with knowledge of its relevant defects plays the identical role in the defense as listing specific ingredients, processes, or the like”]; Dowd v. Textron, Inc. (4th Cir. 1986) 792 F.2d 409, 410-412 [concluding pre-Boyle government contractor defense available where Army investigated problem with rotor system, manufacturer suggested modific

2002The court cited a line of cases emphasizing the significance of such evidence as distinct from an exclusive focus on "the degree to which the acts go beyond `mere preparation.'" ( 38 Cal.3d at p. 698 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 .) The court endorsed earlier judicial statements that when "`the design of a person to commit a crime is clearly shown, slight acts done in furtherance of that design will constitute an attempt, and the courts should not destroy the practical and common-sense administration of the law with subtleties as to what constitutes preparation and what constitutes an act

2002The court cited a line of cases emphasizing the significance of such evidence as distinct from an exclusive focus on "the degree to which the acts go beyond `mere preparation.'" ( 38 Cal.3d at p. 698 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 .) The court endorsed earlier judicial statements that when "`the design of a person to commit a crime is clearly shown, slight acts done in furtherance of that design will constitute an attempt, and the courts should not destroy the practical and common-sense administration of the law with subtleties as to what constitutes preparation and what constitutes an act

2002From this evidence, a rational jury could infer that he planned to act on his sexual interest in young boys by performing a lewd or lascivious act with [the victim]." ( Memro II, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 862, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219 , 905 P.2d 1305 .) In Memro I the Supreme Court noted that it had recently endorsed such an emphasis on criminal intent in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 455 , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 . ( 38 Cal.3d at p. 699 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 .) There a capital defendant contended that, at least where an attempt was relied upon as the predicate felony fo

2002From this evidence, a rational jury could infer that he planned to act on his sexual interest in young boys by performing a lewd or lascivious act with [the victim]." ( Memro II, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 862, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219 , 905 P.2d 1305 .) In Memro I the Supreme Court noted that it had recently endorsed such an emphasis on criminal intent in People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 455 , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d 697 . ( 38 Cal.3d at p. 699 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 .) There a capital defendant contended that, at least where an attempt was relied upon as the predicate felony fo

2024(See Hemady v. Long Beach Unified School Dist. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 566, 578 [being hit in the head by a golf club was not an inherent risk of playing golf; reducing the number of 20 students and providing more supervision in a physical education class would not chill a coach’s role to challenge a student nor would it discourage vigorous participation by fellow students]; Saffro v. Elite Racing, Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 173, 179 [holding a duty to provide adequate water and electrolyte fluids when the marathon race organizer represented to the participants that these will be available at s

2024(See Hemady v. Long Beach Unified School Dist. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 566, 578 [being hit in the head by a golf club was not an inherent risk of playing golf; reducing the number of 20 students and providing more supervision in a physical education class would not chill a coach’s role to challenge a student nor would it discourage vigorous participation by fellow students]; Saffro v. Elite Racing, Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 173, 179 [holding a duty to provide adequate water and electrolyte fluids when the marathon race organizer represented to the participants that these will be available at s

2024(See Hemady v. Long Beach Unified School Dist. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 566, 578 [being hit in the head by a golf club was not an inherent risk of playing golf; reducing the number of 20 students and providing more supervision in a physical education class would not chill a coach’s role to challenge a student nor would it discourage vigorous participation by fellow students]; Saffro v. Elite Racing, Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 173, 179 [holding a duty to provide adequate water and electrolyte fluids when the marathon race organizer represented to the participants that these will be available at s

2024(See Hemady v. Long Beach Unified School Dist. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 566, 578 [being hit in the head by a golf club was not an inherent risk of playing golf; reducing the number of 20 students and providing more supervision in a physical education class would not chill a coach’s role to challenge a student nor would it discourage vigorous participation by fellow students]; Saffro v. Elite Racing, Inc. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 173, 179 [holding a duty to provide adequate water and electrolyte fluids when the marathon race organizer represented to the participants that these will be available at s

2023This is because “ ‘[w]henever potentially exculpatory evidence is permanently lost, courts face the treacherous task of divining the import of materials whose contents are unknown, and, very often, disputed.’ ” (Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (Youngblood).) In Youngblood, the United States Supreme Court hesitated to read the due process clause “as imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution.” (Id. at p. 58.) Therefore, “unless a criminal def

2022(In re T.R., supra, at pp. 1211-1212.) There is a seductive appeal to the streamlined approach taken in In re T.R., but it would create a significant risk to the rights of the parents, children and relatives by permitting a court to find a father ineligible for reunification services, relative placement options, among other things, based on the vague basis that his conduct is antithetical to a parent’s role and in violation of parental responsibility, which are not criteria found in Family Code section 7611. 13 We decline to reach this question and we do not need to reach it because father fai

2022So he says these are not scientifically validated, and it’s just --.” “It is not misconduct to comment on the role of defense counsel as an advocate. [Citation.]” (People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136 , 172 (Powell).) “Argument may not denigrate the integrity of opposing counsel, but harsh and colorful attacks on the credibility of opposing witnesses are permissible. [Citations.] Thus, counsel is free to remind the jurors that a paid witness may accordingly be biased and is also allowed to argue, from the evidence, that a witness’s testimony is unbelievable, unsound, or even a patent ‘lie.’ [