14 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 2007–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Montgomery (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2021(Emphasis sic.) State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347 , 2016-Ohio-5487 , 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶ 196-197 (O’Neill, J., dissenting). 2021(Emphasis sic.) State v. Montgomery, 148 Ohio St.3d 347 , 2016-Ohio-5487 , 71 N.E.3d 180, ¶ 196-197 (O’Neill, J., dissenting). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Yeagergreen1 sentence2026See Yeager at ¶ 16-17 (rejecting a plain-error challenge to standby counsel’s participation in arguing a Crim.R. 29 motion because the appellant failed to articulate how the hybrid representation prejudiced him or affected the outcome of the trial). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McAlpingreen1 sentence2026See State v. McAlpin, 2022-Ohio-1567, ¶ 309 , citing Hackett at ¶ 61 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that standby counsel should assist in overcoming procedural or evidentiary obstacles and help ensure the defendant’s compliance with basic courtroom procedure and protocol). {¶37} Indeed, because the motion was argued outside the presence of the jury and properly tested the legal sufficiency of the State’s evidence, standby counsel’s limited participation was neither unsolicited nor excessively intrusive, and therefore did not compromise Montgomery’s defense. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hackett (Slip Opinion)green1 sentence2026See State v. McAlpin, 2022-Ohio-1567, ¶ 309 , citing Hackett at ¶ 61 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that standby counsel should assist in overcoming procedural or evidentiary obstacles and help ensure the defendant’s compliance with basic courtroom procedure and protocol). {¶37} Indeed, because the motion was argued outside the presence of the jury and properly tested the legal sufficiency of the State’s evidence, standby counsel’s limited participation was neither unsolicited nor excessively intrusive, and therefore did not compromise Montgomery’s defense. | 1 | 1 |
Smith-Knabb v. Vespergreen1 sentence2024Smith-Knabb v. Vesper, 2023-Ohio-259, ¶ 30 (12th Dist.). {¶ 19} For the reasons discussed above, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Montgomery's motion to vacate the default judgment. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Yates, 91580 (2-12-2009)green1 sentence2020No. 91580, 2009-Ohio-609, ¶ 17 (a trial court's decision that "merged its discussion" of two "interrelated * * * claims of ineffective assistance of counsel" both "fully addressed those claims and plainly satisfied the requirements" of the postconviction statute). {¶ 129} The trial court did not explicitly address Montgomery's claim of disproportionate sentencing but, as explained below, that claim was subject to res judicata and we find no error under R.C. 2953.21(H) for what both parties agree was its denial; we need not send the case back to the trial court for resolution of this issue. | 1 | 1 |
State ex rel. Keenan v. Calabresegreen1 sentence2018Keenan v. Calabrese, 69 Ohio St.3d 176, 178 (1994). {¶5} With regard to Judge Montgomery's motion to dismiss relator's request for a writ of prohibition, the magistrate found that: (1) the probate court has jurisdiction to render a determination under R.C. 3107.07(A) as to whether relator has failed without justifiable cause to provide more than de minimis contact with the minor for a period of at least one year, and (2) should the probate court render a determination pursuant to R.C. 3107.07(A) that is unfavorable to relator, he has an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal. | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2016See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 . 2016See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Maxwellgreen2 sentences2016First, defense counsel’s agreement to the admission of the three autopsy reports in this case was reasonable in light of this court’s decision, four years before Montgomery’s plea hearing, that “autopsy records are admissible as nontestimonial business records.” State v. Craig, 110 Ohio St.3d 306 , 2006-Ohio- 4571, 853 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 88 ; accord Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014-Ohio-1019 , 9 N.E.3d 930, at ¶ 59 (“although autopsy reports are sometimes relevant in criminal prosecutions, Craig rightly held that they are not created primarily for a prosecutorial purpose”). {¶ 94} Second, counsel’ 2016First, defense counsel’s agreement to the admission of the three autopsy reports in this case was reasonable in light of this court’s decision, four years before Montgomery’s plea hearing, that “autopsy records are admissible as nontestimonial business records.” State v. Craig, 110 Ohio St.3d 306 , 2006-Ohio- 4571, 853 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 88 ; accord Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014-Ohio-1019 , 9 N.E.3d 930, at ¶ 59 (“although autopsy reports are sometimes relevant in criminal prosecutions, Craig rightly held that they are not created primarily for a prosecutorial purpose”). {¶ 94} Second, counsel’ | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Foster
green
2 sentences2007He also contends that the imposition of a more-than-minimum sentence must be reversed in light of State v. Foster , 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470 . {¶ 3} We conclude that Montgomery's plea of guilty to the charges waived any error with respect to the denial of his motion to suppress. 2007He also contends that the imposition of a more-than-minimum sentence must be reversed in light of State v. Foster , 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470 . {¶ 3} We conclude that Montgomery's plea of guilty to the charges waived any error with respect to the denial of his motion to suppress. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Hampel v. Food Ingredients Specialties, Inc.
green
1 sentence2024It consists of a reference to “foregoing [deposition] testimony” that was “elected by Defendants’ counsel on cross-examination,” a brief criticism of the “self-serving” affidavits and salary spreadsheet appellees submitted in support of their motion for summary judgment, a reference to documents allegedly supporting her view of the case that Montgomery claims were requested in discovery but not produced by appellees and a recitation of the standard for summary judgment under Civ.R. 56(C). matter directly or indirectly related to employment.” R.C. 4112.02(A)’s prohibition of sexual discriminati | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc.
green
2 sentences2023We disagree. {¶64} The trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on Mr. Montgomery’s claim for loss of consortium because the loss of consortium claim is derivative of Jean Montgomery’s tort claim. “[A] claim for loss of consortium is derivative in that the claim is dependent upon the defendants having committed a legally cognizable tort upon the spouse who suffers bodily injury.” Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc., 63 Ohio St.3d 84 , 585 N.E.2d 384 (1992). 2023We disagree. {¶64} The trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on Mr. Montgomery’s claim for loss of consortium because the loss of consortium claim is derivative of Jean Montgomery’s tort claim. “[A] claim for loss of consortium is derivative in that the claim is dependent upon the defendants having committed a legally cognizable tort upon the spouse who suffers bodily injury.” Bowen v. Kil-Kare, Inc., 63 Ohio St.3d 84 , 585 N.E.2d 384 (1992). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Keith
green
2 sentences2016Dr. Fradkin’s bill does not reflect any charges for record review. {¶ 120} A trial attorney’s decision “to forgo the presentation of additional mitigating evidence does not itself constitute proof of ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 536 , 684 N.E.2d 47 (1997). 2016Dr. Fradkin’s bill does not reflect any charges for record review. {¶ 120} A trial attorney’s decision “to forgo the presentation of additional mitigating evidence does not itself constitute proof of ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Keith, 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 536 , 684 N.E.2d 47 (1997). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Craig
green
2 sentences2016First, defense counsel’s agreement to the admission of the three autopsy reports in this case was reasonable in light of this court’s decision, four years before Montgomery’s plea hearing, that “autopsy records are admissible as nontestimonial business records.” State v. Craig, 110 Ohio St.3d 306 , 2006-Ohio- 4571, 853 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 88 ; accord Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014-Ohio-1019 , 9 N.E.3d 930, at ¶ 59 (“although autopsy reports are sometimes relevant in criminal prosecutions, Craig rightly held that they are not created primarily for a prosecutorial purpose”). {¶ 94} Second, counsel’ 2016First, defense counsel’s agreement to the admission of the three autopsy reports in this case was reasonable in light of this court’s decision, four years before Montgomery’s plea hearing, that “autopsy records are admissible as nontestimonial business records.” State v. Craig, 110 Ohio St.3d 306 , 2006-Ohio- 4571, 853 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 88 ; accord Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12 , 2014-Ohio-1019 , 9 N.E.3d 930, at ¶ 59 (“although autopsy reports are sometimes relevant in criminal prosecutions, Craig rightly held that they are not created primarily for a prosecutorial purpose”). {¶ 94} Second, counsel’ | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Sandoval
green
1 sentence2016S-13-032, S-13-034, 2014-Ohio-4972, ¶ 13 , quoting Crim.R. 33(B). “[A] party is unavoidably prevented from filing a motion for 1 Montgomery captioned his motion in the trial court as a “Motion for New Trial.” The state moved to dismiss Montgomery’s motion, observing that Montgomery did not request leave of court to file a delayed motion and, as such, failed to comply with Crim.R. 33. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2013For example, in Smith, the court found prejudice where “the assistant prosecutor referred to defense evidence as ‘lies,’ ‘garbage,’ ‘garbage lies,’ ‘[a] smoke screen,’ and ‘a well conceived and well rehearsed lie[,]’ ” and “intimated that defense counsel had suborned perjury by manufacturing, conceiving and fashioning lies to be presented in court.” Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d at 14 , 470 N.E.2d 883 . {¶ 53} We note that after Montgomery’s objection, the trial court did instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s remarks. 2013For example, in Smith, the court found prejudice where “the assistant prosecutor referred to defense evidence as ‘lies,’ ‘garbage,’ ‘garbage lies,’ ‘[a] smoke screen,’ and ‘a well conceived and well rehearsed lie[,]’ ” and “intimated that defense counsel had suborned perjury by manufacturing, conceiving and fashioning lies to be presented in court.” Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d at 14 , 470 N.E.2d 883 . {¶ 53} We note that after Montgomery’s objection, the trial court did instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s remarks. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State ex rel. Grendell v. Davidson
green
2 sentences2012Grendell v. Davidson, 86 Ohio St.3d 629 , 716 N.E.2d 704 (1999). {¶7} Accordingly, we grant Judge Montgomery’s motion to dismiss. 2012Grendell v. Davidson, 86 Ohio St.3d 629 , 716 N.E.2d 704 (1999). {¶7} Accordingly, we grant Judge Montgomery’s motion to dismiss. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Montgomery, Unpublished Decision (2-2-2007)
green
1 sentence2008In State v. Montgomery , Montgomery App. No. 21508, 2007-Ohio-439 (hereinafter "Montgomery I" ), we concluded that Montgomery's plea of guilty to the charges in both cases waived any error with respect to the denial of his motion to suppress. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.