14 Pennsylvania opinions name it 5 courts 1924–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Upset Sale, Tax Cl. Bureau of Berksgreen1 sentence2023Section 4303(a) of the Judicial Code states that “[a]ny judgment or other order of a court of common pleas for the payment of money shall be a lien upon real property on the conditions, to the extent and with the priority provided by statute . . . when it is entered of record.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 4303(a).14 “A judgment lien becomes dormant after five years.” Mid-State Bank & Trust Co. v. 14 A judgment lien “constitutes a liquidated claim,” secures an underlying debt, and “prevents a debtor from encumbering or conveying any property he might own in such a way as to divest the effect of the judgment, | 1 | 1 |
Mid-State Bank & Trust Co. v. Globalnet International, Inc.green1 sentence2023Section 4303(a) of the Judicial Code states that “[a]ny judgment or other order of a court of common pleas for the payment of money shall be a lien upon real property on the conditions, to the extent and with the priority provided by statute . . . when it is entered of record.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 4303(a).14 “A judgment lien becomes dormant after five years.” Mid-State Bank & Trust Co. v. 14 A judgment lien “constitutes a liquidated claim,” secures an underlying debt, and “prevents a debtor from encumbering or conveying any property he might own in such a way as to divest the effect of the judgment, | 1 | 1 |
Majorsky v. Douglasgreen1 sentence2021Therefore, Myers’ appellate issue is waived.20 See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a), 1925(b)(i), (ii), (vii); see generally Majorsky v. Douglas, 58 A.3d 1250, 1257-58 (Pa. Super. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Tri-State Telecommunications, Inc.green2 sentences1999Moreover, the party to whom insurance policy limits have been tendered in a civil suit has an “immediate right to the money.” Sun Pipe Line v. Tri-State Telecommunications Inc., 440 Pa. Super. 47, 65 , 655 A.2d 112, 121 (1994). 1999Moreover, the party to whom insurance policy limits have been tendered in a civil suit has an “immediate right to the money.” Sun Pipe Line v. Tri-State Telecommunications Inc., 440 Pa. Super. 47, 65 , 655 A.2d 112, 121 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co.green2 sentences1999The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Company, 300 Pa. Super. 528, 536 , 446 A.2d 1284, 1288 (1982) in discussing the nature of tender states: “Money paid into court becomes the absolute property of the other party, Baldwin Township School District v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corporation, 328 Pa. 17, 18-19 [ 194 A. 900 ] (1937), and the tenderer cannot ordinarily withdraw it or recover any part of it, even if he eventually prevails in the action. 15 Standard Pennsylvania Practice, ch. 74, §24, Berkheimer v. Geise, 82 Pa. 64, 67 (1876).” Defendants’ assertion the settlem 1999The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Company, 300 Pa. Super. 528, 536 , 446 A.2d 1284, 1288 (1982) in discussing the nature of tender states: “Money paid into court becomes the absolute property of the other party, Baldwin Township School District v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corporation, 328 Pa. 17, 18-19 [ 194 A. 900 ] (1937), and the tenderer cannot ordinarily withdraw it or recover any part of it, even if he eventually prevails in the action. 15 Standard Pennsylvania Practice, ch. 74, §24, Berkheimer v. Geise, 82 Pa. 64, 67 (1876).” Defendants’ assertion the settlem | 1 | 1 |
Berkheimer v. Geisegreen1 sentence1999The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Company, 300 Pa. Super. 528, 536 , 446 A.2d 1284, 1288 (1982) in discussing the nature of tender states: “Money paid into court becomes the absolute property of the other party, Baldwin Township School District v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corporation, 328 Pa. 17, 18-19 [ 194 A. 900 ] (1937), and the tenderer cannot ordinarily withdraw it or recover any part of it, even if he eventually prevails in the action. 15 Standard Pennsylvania Practice, ch. 74, §24, Berkheimer v. Geise, 82 Pa. 64, 67 (1876).” Defendants’ assertion the settlem | 1 | 1 |
Baldwin Township School District v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corp.green2 sentences1999The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Company, 300 Pa. Super. 528, 536 , 446 A.2d 1284, 1288 (1982) in discussing the nature of tender states: “Money paid into court becomes the absolute property of the other party, Baldwin Township School District v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corporation, 328 Pa. 17, 18-19 [ 194 A. 900 ] (1937), and the tenderer cannot ordinarily withdraw it or recover any part of it, even if he eventually prevails in the action. 15 Standard Pennsylvania Practice, ch. 74, §24, Berkheimer v. Geise, 82 Pa. 64, 67 (1876).” Defendants’ assertion the settlem 1999The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Company, 300 Pa. Super. 528, 536 , 446 A.2d 1284, 1288 (1982) in discussing the nature of tender states: “Money paid into court becomes the absolute property of the other party, Baldwin Township School District v. Pittsburgh Terminal Coal Corporation, 328 Pa. 17, 18-19 [ 194 A. 900 ] (1937), and the tenderer cannot ordinarily withdraw it or recover any part of it, even if he eventually prevails in the action. 15 Standard Pennsylvania Practice, ch. 74, §24, Berkheimer v. Geise, 82 Pa. 64, 67 (1876).” Defendants’ assertion the settlem | 1 | 1 |
Ludwick v. Huntzingergreen1 sentence1952In Ludwick v. Huntzinger, 5 W. & S. 51, 59, 60 , it was said: “A question also arose, on the trial of this cause, as to the rate of interest that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover from the time that the bond became payable. . . . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Educational Soc. of Yozgad, Inc. v. W. D. Gordon
neutral
2 sentences2010Gordon, 310 Pa. 470 , 166 A. 499 (1933), which has value to the judgment creditor. 1993Gordon, 310 Pa. 470 , 166 A. 499 (1933), which has value to the judgment creditor. | 4 | 1984–2010 |
McAfee v. Dix
neutral
2 sentences1938In the former case, at page 316, the Supreme Court said: “In some jurisdictions it is held that, if the only issue is whether plaintiff should recover a liquidated claim on which interest would follow as matter of law, and the jury has been instructed to allow interest but returns a verdict for the amount of the claim merely, the court may add interest: McAfee v. Dix, 101 App. Div. 69 , 91 N. Y. 1938In the former case, at page 316, the Supreme Court said: “In some jurisdictions it is held that, if the only issue is whether plaintiff should recover a liquidated claim on which interest would follow as matter of law, and the jury has been instructed to allow interest but returns a verdict for the amount of the claim merely, the court may add interest: McAfee v. Dix, 101 App. Div. 69 , 91 N. Y. | 2 | 1933–1938 |
Marsh v. Kendall
neutral
2 sentences1938Supp. 464 ; Marsh v. Kendall, 65 Kansas 48, 68 Pac. 1070 .” In the Tibbetts case, however, the trial court had failed to charge the jury on interest, and the Supreme Court said: “This record however presents a different question; it deals with the power of the judge to supplement the verdict after trial, when he has failed to instruct the jury that interest shall be allowed in the event of recovery of a liquidated debt.” The court decided that, in the absence of instructions to the jury concerning interest, the court could not supplement the verdict by adding interest. 1933Supp. 464 ; Marsh v. Kendall, 65 Kansas 48, 68 Pac. 1070 . | 2 | 1933–1938 |
Shearer v. Naftzinger
green
1 sentence2023A “judgment lien may nonetheless be revived after the five-year statute of limitations period for revival, however its priority against intervening liens, if any, is lost.” Shearer v. Naftzinger, 747 A.2d 859 , 860 n.1 (Pa. 2000). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Smalls v. Pittsburgh-Corning Corp.
green
1 sentence2021Id. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In Re Francis Edward McGillick Foundation
green
2 sentences2020Even if she had a liquidated claim against Norman at this time, she would have no standing to complain about the trustees[] not making payments to him from the Gertrude Testamentary Trust because of the spendthrift clause in Article Eight, paragraph 8.04.[5] Barbara cites In re: Francis Edward McGillick Foundation, 537 Pa. 194 , 642 A.2d 467 (Pa. 1994) and In re: Milton Hershey School, 590 Pa. 35 , 911 A.2d 1258 (Pa. 2006) for the propositions that one need not be a beneficiary or creditor to have standing to object to the actions of a trustee and one merely need show he is aggrieved by showin 2020Even if she had a liquidated claim against Norman at this time, she would have no standing to complain about the trustees[] not making payments to him from the Gertrude Testamentary Trust because of the spendthrift clause in Article Eight, paragraph 8.04.[5] Barbara cites In re: Francis Edward McGillick Foundation, 537 Pa. 194 , 642 A.2d 467 (Pa. 1994) and In re: Milton Hershey School, 590 Pa. 35 , 911 A.2d 1258 (Pa. 2006) for the propositions that one need not be a beneficiary or creditor to have standing to object to the actions of a trustee and one merely need show he is aggrieved by showin | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In Re Milton Hershey School
green
2 sentences2020Even if she had a liquidated claim against Norman at this time, she would have no standing to complain about the trustees[] not making payments to him from the Gertrude Testamentary Trust because of the spendthrift clause in Article Eight, paragraph 8.04.[5] Barbara cites In re: Francis Edward McGillick Foundation, 537 Pa. 194 , 642 A.2d 467 (Pa. 1994) and In re: Milton Hershey School, 590 Pa. 35 , 911 A.2d 1258 (Pa. 2006) for the propositions that one need not be a beneficiary or creditor to have standing to object to the actions of a trustee and one merely need show he is aggrieved by showin 2020Even if she had a liquidated claim against Norman at this time, she would have no standing to complain about the trustees[] not making payments to him from the Gertrude Testamentary Trust because of the spendthrift clause in Article Eight, paragraph 8.04.[5] Barbara cites In re: Francis Edward McGillick Foundation, 537 Pa. 194 , 642 A.2d 467 (Pa. 1994) and In re: Milton Hershey School, 590 Pa. 35 , 911 A.2d 1258 (Pa. 2006) for the propositions that one need not be a beneficiary or creditor to have standing to object to the actions of a trustee and one merely need show he is aggrieved by showin | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Fifth Mutual Building Society of Manayunk's Appeal
green
2 sentences1999Therefore, it was a liquidated claim capable of exact measurement as defined in Fifth Mutual Building Society of Manayunk ’s Appeal, 317 Pa. 161 , 176 A. 494 (1935). 1999Therefore, it was a liquidated claim capable of exact measurement as defined in Fifth Mutual Building Society of Manayunk ’s Appeal, 317 Pa. 161 , 176 A. 494 (1935). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Hunt v. Gilmore
green
1 sentence1936As now existent, it could not be enforced in an action at law, nor is it capable at the present time of liquidation by any known legal standard, which is the accepted test for allowance of a set-off: Hunt v. Gilmore, 59 Pa. 450 ; Both et al. v. Pechin, 260 Pa. 450 , 103 A. 894 . | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Ross v. Eyre
neutral
1 sentence1936As now existent, it could not be enforced in an action at law, nor is it capable at the present time of liquidation by any known legal standard, which is the accepted test for allowance of a set-off: Hunt v. Gilmore, 59 Pa. 450 ; Both et al. v. Pechin, 260 Pa. 450 , 103 A. 894 . | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Roth v. Pechin
neutral
1 sentence1936As now existent, it could not be enforced in an action at law, nor is it capable at the present time of liquidation by any known legal standard, which is the accepted test for allowance of a set-off: Hunt v. Gilmore, 59 Pa. 450 ; Both et al. v. Pechin, 260 Pa. 450 , 103 A. 894 . | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Commonwealth v. Marsh
neutral
1 sentence1926The doctrine is well established that where, a surety pays the debt of his principal, he is subrogated in equity not only to the securities of the creditor, but to all his rights of priority: 25 Ruling Case Law, 1382, § 65; Com. v. Marsh, 149 Pa. 239 . | 1 | 1926–1926 |
American Surety Co. v. Carbon Timber Co.
neutral
1 sentence1924The surety on a bond given to the United States who has paid the principal’s debt to the government in a definite sum, has a liquidated claim against the principal for the amount paid with interest from the date of payment: American Surety Co. v. Carbon Timber Co., 263 Fed. 295 . | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.