14 Pennsylvania opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P.green2 sentences2016“An adhesion contract is a ‘standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position, usu[ally] a consumer, -7- J-A30037-15 who adheres to the contract with little choice about the terms.’” Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 2 A.3d 1174, 1190 (Pa.2010) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004), p. 342). “[T]he determination that an adhesion contract is at issue, by definition fulfills the second prong of the unconscionability test.” McNulty, 843 A.2d at 1273 n.6. 2016“An adhesion contract is a ‘standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position, usu[ally] a consumer, who adheres to the contract with little choice about the terms.’” Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 2 A.3d 1174, 1190 (Pa.2010) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004), p. 342). “[T]he determination that an adhesion contract is at issue, by definition fulfills the second prong of the unconscionability test.” McNulty, 843 A.2d at 1273 n.6. | 3 | 3 |
MacPherson v. Magee Memorial Hospital for Convalescencegreen2 sentences2020Hosp. for Convalescence, 128 A.3d 1209, 1221 (Pa.Super. 2015) (en banc)). 2019Cir. 1965)[.] An unconscionability analysis requires a two-fold determination: (1) that the contractual terms are unreasonably favorable to the drafter (“substantive unconscionability”), and (2) that there is no meaningful choice on the part of the other party regarding the acceptance of the provisions (“procedural unconscionability”). -6- J-A13007-18 MacPherson, 128 A.3d at 1221 (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Salley v. Option One Mortgage Corp.green2 sentences2013Corp., 592 Pa. 323 , 925 A.2d 115, 119 (2007) (stating, “doctrine of unconscionability has been applied in Pennsylvania as both a statutory and a common-law defense to the enforcement of an allegedly unfair contract or contractual provision[ ]”) (emphasis added); Witmer v. Exxon Corp., 260 Pa.Super. 537 , 394 A.2d 1276, 1287 (1978) (stating, “[u]n-conscionability may only be asserted as a defense in an action on a contract for the sale of goods. 2013Corp., 592 Pa. 323 , 925 A.2d 115, 119 (2007) (stating, “doctrine of unconscionability has been applied in Pennsylvania as both a statutory and a common-law defense to the enforcement of an allegedly unfair contract or contractual provision[ ]”) (emphasis added); Witmer v. Exxon Corp., 260 Pa.Super. 537 , 394 A.2d 1276, 1287 (1978) (stating, “[u]n-conscionability may only be asserted as a defense in an action on a contract for the sale of goods. | 1 | 2 |
Cardinal v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc.green2 sentences2023Id. (citation omitted). 2020The doctrine of unconscionability “has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” Cardinal v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., 155 A.3d 46, 53 (Pa.Super. -7- J-A25024-19 2017) (quoting MacPherson v. Magee Mem. | 1 | 2 |
Witmer v. Exxon Corp.green2 sentences2013Corp., 592 Pa. 323 , 925 A.2d 115, 119 (2007) (stating, “doctrine of unconscionability has been applied in Pennsylvania as both a statutory and a common-law defense to the enforcement of an allegedly unfair contract or contractual provision[ ]”) (emphasis added); Witmer v. Exxon Corp., 260 Pa.Super. 537 , 394 A.2d 1276, 1287 (1978) (stating, “[u]n-conscionability may only be asserted as a defense in an action on a contract for the sale of goods. 2013Corp., 592 Pa. 323 , 925 A.2d 115, 119 (2007) (stating, “doctrine of unconscionability has been applied in Pennsylvania as both a statutory and a common-law defense to the enforcement of an allegedly unfair contract or contractual provision[ ]”) (emphasis added); Witmer v. Exxon Corp., 260 Pa.Super. 537 , 394 A.2d 1276, 1287 (1978) (stating, “[u]n-conscionability may only be asserted as a defense in an action on a contract for the sale of goods. | 1 | 1 |
Denlinger, Inc. v. Dendlergreen2 sentences2007See 13 Pa.C.S. § 2302 (establishing the doctrine's applicability pertaining to contracts involving goods and services within the purview of the Pennsylvania Commercial Code); Denlinger, Inc. v. Dendler, 415 Pa.Super. 164, 175-77 , 608 A.2d 1061, 1067-68 (1992) (discussing the common-law conception of unconscionability). 2007See 13 Pa.C.S. § 2302 (establishing the doctrine's applicability pertaining to contracts involving goods and services within the purview of the Pennsylvania Commercial Code); Denlinger, Inc. v. Dendler, 415 Pa.Super. 164, 175-77 , 608 A.2d 1061, 1067-68 (1992) (discussing the common-law conception of unconscionability). | 1 | 1 |
Kugler v. Romaingreen2 sentences1990In Germantown Manufacturing Co. v. Rawlinson, supra, our Court also noted with approval the pronouncement of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 544 , 279 A.2d 640, 642 (1971), regarding the doctrine: “The standard of conduct contemplated by the unconscionability clause is good faith, honesty in fact, and observance of fair dealing.” As discussed earlier, the trial court in this case explained that it did not consider the issue of unconscionability because it had not been affirmatively pleaded by the Defendants. 1990In Germantown Manufacturing Co. v. Rawlinson, supra, our Court also noted with approval the pronouncement of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 544 , 279 A.2d 640, 642 (1971), regarding the doctrine: “The standard of conduct contemplated by the unconscionability clause is good faith, honesty in fact, and observance of fair dealing.” As discussed earlier, the trial court in this case explained that it did not consider the issue of unconscionability because it had not been affirmatively pleaded by the Defendants. | 1 | 1 |
Melso v. Texaco, Inc.green1 sentence1984See e.g., Melso v. Texaco, Inc., 532 F.Supp. 1280 (E.D.Pa.1982), aff’d 696 F.2d 983 (3rd Cir.1982) (dealership credit card agreement); Leasing Service Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F.Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (lease agreement); Stanley Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F.Supp. 807 (E.D.Pa.1981) aff’d 676 F.2d 688 (3rd Cir.1982) (franchise contract); In Re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Co., 253 F.Supp. 864 (E.D.Pa.1966) (security agreement); Albert Merrill School v. Godoy, 78 Misc.2d 647 , 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1974) (educational services agreement). | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. U. S. Bureau of Prisonsgreen1 sentence1984See e.g., Melso v. Texaco, Inc., 532 F.Supp. 1280 (E.D.Pa.1982), aff’d 696 F.2d 983 (3rd Cir.1982) (dealership credit card agreement); Leasing Service Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F.Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (lease agreement); Stanley Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F.Supp. 807 (E.D.Pa.1981) aff’d 676 F.2d 688 (3rd Cir.1982) (franchise contract); In Re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Co., 253 F.Supp. 864 (E.D.Pa.1966) (security agreement); Albert Merrill School v. Godoy, 78 Misc.2d 647 , 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1974) (educational services agreement). | 1 | 1 |
Pittsburgh Allied Fabricators, Inc. v. Habergreen2 sentences1978See Pittsburgh Allied Fabricators, Inc. v. Haber, 440 Pa. 545 , 271 A.2d 271 (1970). 1978See Pittsburgh Allied Fabricators, Inc. v. Haber, 440 Pa. 545 , 271 A.2d 271 (1970). *558 Appellants lastly contend that they are entitled to equitable relief for Exxon's violation of the Gasoline Act [22] in Count I of their complaints. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McNulty v. H&R BLOCK, INC.
green
2 sentences2016“An adhesion contract is a ‘standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position, usu[ally] a consumer, -7- J-A30037-15 who adheres to the contract with little choice about the terms.’” Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 2 A.3d 1174, 1190 (Pa.2010) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004), p. 342). “[T]he determination that an adhesion contract is at issue, by definition fulfills the second prong of the unconscionability test.” McNulty, 843 A.2d at 1273 n.6. 2016“An adhesion contract is a ‘standard-form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position, usu[ally] a consumer, who adheres to the contract with little choice about the terms.’” Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 2 A.3d 1174, 1190 (Pa.2010) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004), p. 342). “[T]he determination that an adhesion contract is at issue, by definition fulfills the second prong of the unconscionability test.” McNulty, 843 A.2d at 1273 n.6. | 3 | 2016–2016 |
Carll v. Terminix International Co., LP
green
2 sentences2023The doctrine of unconscionability has been applied in Pennsylvania as both a statutory and a common-law defense to the enforcement of an ____________________________________________ 2 We note this Court’s decision in Carll v. Terminix Int’l Co., L.P., 793 A.2d 921 (Pa. Super. 2002), in which we addressed a similar, but distinguishable, factual scenario. 2023The doctrine of unconscionability has been applied in Pennsylvania as both a statutory and a common-law defense to the enforcement of an ____________________________________________ 2 We note this Court’s decision in Carll v. Terminix Int’l Co., L.P., 793 A.2d 921 (Pa. Super. 2002), in which we addressed a similar, but distinguishable, factual scenario. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Witmer v. Exxon Corp.
green
2 sentences2013It is not a plaintiffs doctrine available for affirmative relief to enjoin the provisions of a lease of real estate[ ]”), affirmed, 495 Pa. 540 , 434 A.2d 1222 (1981). 2013It is not a plaintiffs doctrine available for affirmative relief to enjoin the provisions of a lease of real estate[ ]”), affirmed, 495 Pa. 540 , 434 A.2d 1222 (1981). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Albert Merrill School v. Godoy
green
2 sentences1984See e.g., Melso v. Texaco, Inc., 532 F.Supp. 1280 (E.D.Pa.1982), aff’d 696 F.2d 983 (3rd Cir.1982) (dealership credit card agreement); Leasing Service Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F.Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (lease agreement); Stanley Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F.Supp. 807 (E.D.Pa.1981) aff’d 676 F.2d 688 (3rd Cir.1982) (franchise contract); In Re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Co., 253 F.Supp. 864 (E.D.Pa.1966) (security agreement); Albert Merrill School v. Godoy, 78 Misc.2d 647 , 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1974) (educational services agreement). 1984See e.g., Melso v. Texaco, Inc., 532 F.Supp. 1280 (E.D.Pa.1982), aff’d 696 F.2d 983 (3rd Cir.1982) (dealership credit card agreement); Leasing Service Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F.Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (lease agreement); Stanley Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F.Supp. 807 (E.D.Pa.1981) aff’d 676 F.2d 688 (3rd Cir.1982) (franchise contract); In Re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Co., 253 F.Supp. 864 (E.D.Pa.1966) (security agreement); Albert Merrill School v. Godoy, 78 Misc.2d 647 , 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1974) (educational services agreement). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co.
green
1 sentence1984See e.g., Melso v. Texaco, Inc., 532 F.Supp. 1280 (E.D.Pa.1982), aff’d 696 F.2d 983 (3rd Cir.1982) (dealership credit card agreement); Leasing Service Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F.Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (lease agreement); Stanley Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F.Supp. 807 (E.D.Pa.1981) aff’d 676 F.2d 688 (3rd Cir.1982) (franchise contract); In Re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Co., 253 F.Supp. 864 (E.D.Pa.1966) (security agreement); Albert Merrill School v. Godoy, 78 Misc.2d 647 , 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1974) (educational services agreement). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co
green
1 sentence1984See e.g., Melso v. Texaco, Inc., 532 F.Supp. 1280 (E.D.Pa.1982), aff’d 696 F.2d 983 (3rd Cir.1982) (dealership credit card agreement); Leasing Service Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F.Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (lease agreement); Stanley Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F.Supp. 807 (E.D.Pa.1981) aff’d 676 F.2d 688 (3rd Cir.1982) (franchise contract); In Re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Co., 253 F.Supp. 864 (E.D.Pa.1966) (security agreement); Albert Merrill School v. Godoy, 78 Misc.2d 647 , 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1974) (educational services agreement). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
In Re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Company
green
1 sentence1984See e.g., Melso v. Texaco, Inc., 532 F.Supp. 1280 (E.D.Pa.1982), aff’d 696 F.2d 983 (3rd Cir.1982) (dealership credit card agreement); Leasing Service Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F.Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (lease agreement); Stanley Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F.Supp. 807 (E.D.Pa.1981) aff’d 676 F.2d 688 (3rd Cir.1982) (franchise contract); In Re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Co., 253 F.Supp. 864 (E.D.Pa.1966) (security agreement); Albert Merrill School v. Godoy, 78 Misc.2d 647 , 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1974) (educational services agreement). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Leasing Service Corp. v. Broetje
green
1 sentence1984See e.g., Melso v. Texaco, Inc., 532 F.Supp. 1280 (E.D.Pa.1982), aff’d 696 F.2d 983 (3rd Cir.1982) (dealership credit card agreement); Leasing Service Corp. v. Broetje, 545 F.Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (lease agreement); Stanley Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F.Supp. 807 (E.D.Pa.1981) aff’d 676 F.2d 688 (3rd Cir.1982) (franchise contract); In Re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Co., 253 F.Supp. 864 (E.D.Pa.1966) (security agreement); Albert Merrill School v. Godoy, 78 Misc.2d 647 , 357 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1974) (educational services agreement). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Ora Lee Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, William Thorne v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company
green
1 sentence1981The classic and oft-quoted definition of “unconscionability” was articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.