unconscionability doctrine in New Mexico

2023See 2020- NMSC-010, ¶¶ 10-12, 18-19, 20-21; Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 15-16 .

2015Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033, ¶¶ 50-52 .

2012See Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033 , ¶ 16 (stating that the FAA mandates that arbitration agreements be placed on “equal footing” with other contracts (quoting Concepcion,__U.S. at__, 131 S. Ct. at 1745)).

2012See Rivera, 2011-NMSC-033 , ¶ 16 (stating that the FAA mandates that arbitration agreements be placed on “equal footing” with other contracts (quoting Concepcion, ___ U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1745)).

2012See, e.g., Bowlin’s, Inc. v. Ramsey Oil Co., 99 N.M. 660, 668 , 662 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1983) (discussing substantive unconscionability as applied to all contracts, stating that it applies to “contract clauses which are illegal or contrary to public policy” and that “‘[u]nconscionability has generally been recognized to include . . . contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party,”’ (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.

2012See, e.g., Bowlin’s, Inc. v. Ramsey Oil Co., 99 N.M. 660, 668 , 662 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1983) (discussing substantive unconscionability as applied to all contracts, stating that it applies to “contract clauses which are illegal or contrary to public 9 policy” and that “‘[u]nconscionability has generally been recognized to include . . . contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party,’” (quoting Williams v. Walker- Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.

2012See, e.g., Bowlin’s, Inc. v. Ramsey Oil Co., 99 N.M. 660, 668 , 662 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1983) (discussing substantive unconscionability as applied to all contracts, stating that it applies to “contract clauses which are illegal or contrary to public policy” and that “‘[u]nconscionability has generally been recognized to include . . . contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party,”’ (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.

2012See, e.g., Bowlin’s, Inc. v. Ramsey Oil Co., 99 N.M. 660, 668 , 662 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1983) (discussing substantive unconscionability as applied to all contracts, stating that it applies to “contract clauses which are illegal or contrary to public policy” and that “‘[u]nconscionability has generally been recognized to include . . . contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party,”’ (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C.

2015See Figueroa v. THI of N.M. at Casa Arena Blanca, LLC, 2013-NMCA-077 , ¶¶ 33-35, 306 P.3d 480 (invalidating a clause that exempted all guardianship proceedings as well as collections and eviction actions); Ruppelt v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLC, 2013-NMCA-014, ¶¶ 10-18 , 293 P.3d 902 (invalidating a clause that exempted disputes pertaining to collections or discharge of residents); cf. Bargman v. Skilled Healthcare Group, Inc., 2013-NMCA-006, ¶ 24 , 292 P.3d 1 (examining a clause identical to that in Ruppelt but remanding to give the defendant an opportunity to present evidence that the o

2014See Figueroa v. THI of N.M. at Casa 10 Arena Blanca, LLC, 2013-NMCA-077 , ¶¶ 33-35, 306 P.3d 480 (invalidating a clause 11 that exempted all guardianship proceedings as well as collections and eviction 12 actions); Ruppelt v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLC, 2013-NMCA-014, ¶¶ 10-18 , 13 293 P.3d 902 (invalidating a clause that exempted disputes pertaining to collections 14 or discharge of residents); cf. Bargman v. Skilled Healthcare Group, Inc., 2013- 15 NMCA-006, ¶ 24, 292 P.3d 1 (examining a clause identical to that in Ruppelt but 16 remanding to give the defendant an opportunity to presen

2011Id. at 2779 (“[U]nless [the employee] challenged the delegation provision specifically, we must treat it as valid under [section] 2 [of the FAA], and must enforce it under [sections] 3 and 4, leaving any challenge to the validity of the [a]greement as a whole for the arbitrator.”).

2011Id. at 2779 ("[U]nless [the employee] challenged the delegation provision specifically, we must treat it as valid under [section] 2 [of the FAA], and must enforce it under [sections] 3 and 4, leaving any challenge to the validity of the [a]greement as a whole for the arbitrator.").

2020See Dalton, 2016-NMSC-035, ¶ 21 (emphasizing that fairness is the key consideration in the unconscionability analysis); Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 22 (“The substantive analysis focuses on such issues as whether the contract terms are commercially reasonable and fair[.]”). {22} In the case at bar, both the Court of Appeals and the district court engaged in an analysis consistent with the approach clarified above.

2012There, the Court concluded that the consideration to support the contract was not illusory, and therefore, the proper analysis of the alleged unfair terms should be examined “through the framework of a traditional unconscionability analysis.” Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 16 .

2017Substantive Unconscionability Defense is Not Preempted by Federal Law 4 {15} Finally, Appellants argue that the district court erred in ruling that the Federal 5 Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-6 (2012), does not preempt our state law 6 analysis of substantive unconscionability as applied to arbitration clauses. “[F]ederal 7 preemption is a legal question, which is reviewed de novo.” Hadrych v. Hadrych, 8 2007-NMCA-001, ¶ 5 , 140 N.M. 829 , 149 P.3d 593 . 9 {16} Specifically, Appellants argue that a recent federal decision by the Tenth Circuit 10 determined that our state courts are apply

2015The parties argue the merits of a recent decision of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which determined that our state courts are applying the unconscionability doctrine based on an impermissible “perceived inferiority of arbitration to litigation as a means of vindicating one’s rights.” THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Patton, 741 F.3d 1162, 1169 (10th Cir. 2014).

2024See Robertson, 2004-NMCA-056, ¶ 25 ; Rule 1-052(A). {12} Moreover, while we decline to make an argument on Plaintiff’s behalf by conducting an unconscionability analysis of the above provisions, see Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 2013-NMSC-040, ¶ 70 , 309 P.3d 53 , we note that there is nothing on the face of the asserted provisions that rises to the level of one-sidedness that has been held to be sufficiently unfair and unreasonable so as to be considered unconscionable.

2022See Hennessy v. Duryea, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24 , 124 N.M. 754 , 955 P.2d 683 (“Our courts have repeatedly held that, in summary calendar cases, the burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly point out errors in fact or law.”).

2022See Hennessy v. Duryea, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24 , 124 N.M. 754 , 955 P.2d 683 (“Our courts have repeatedly held that, in summary calendar cases, the burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly point out errors in fact or law.”).

2020See Dalton, 2016-NMSC-035, ¶ 21 (emphasizing that fairness is the key consideration in the unconscionability analysis); Cordova, 2009-NMSC-021, ¶ 22 (“The substantive analysis focuses on such issues as whether the contract terms are commercially reasonable and fair[.]”). {22} In the case at bar, both the Court of Appeals and the district court engaged in an analysis consistent with the approach clarified above.