mandated instruction in Texas

2010See Cagle v. State, 23 S.W.3d 590, 594 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref’d); Battaglia v. State, No. 05-06-00798-CR, 2007 WL 4098905 , at *3 (Tex. App.–Dallas Nov. 19, 2007, no pet.) (op., not designated for publication) (cases rejecting identical argument).

2010See Cagle v. State , 23 S.W.3d 590, 594 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref'd); Battaglia v. State , No. 05-06-00798-CR, 2007 WL 4098905 , at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 19, 2007, no pet.) (op., not designated for publication) (cases rejecting identical argument).

2008In assessing the legal sufficiency (2) of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, the mandated standard is set out in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). "[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." This standard accounts for the factfinder's duty "to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Therefore, in analyzi

2008In assessing the legal sufficiency2 of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, the mandated standard is set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 318–19 (1979). "[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." This standard accounts for the factfinder's duty "to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Therefore, in analyzing

2025In Luquis v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the same complaint as Appellant advances here. 72 S.W.3d at 363 ; see also Wagner v. State, No. 08-09-00021-CR, 2010 WL 15 2163845, at *6–7 (Tex. App.—El Paso May 28, 2010, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (concluding court did not err by including the mandated instruction “[a]lthough the instruction may appear to conflict with the court’s duty to properly set forth the law applicable to the case, the instruction refers to parole and good conduct time only as possibilities, not certainties[;] the charge included language ad

2017See id. at 363 .

2008In assessing the legal sufficiency (2) of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, the mandated standard is set out in Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979). "[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." This standard accounts for the factfinder's duty "to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Therefore, in analyzi

2008In assessing the legal sufficiency2 of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, the mandated standard is set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 318–19 (1979). "[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." This standard accounts for the factfinder's duty "to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Therefore, in analyzing

2020This dispute centers on the Act’s mandated claim process for one such policy claimant—an air-ambulance service. 1 See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 , 502–03 (1993); see also Fredericksburg Care Co. v. Perez, 461 S.W.3d 513, 522 (Tex. 2015) (“Examples of practices that fall within the scope of [the business of insurance] include . . . . the writing of insurance contracts and the actual performance of those contracts.”).

2020This dispute centers on the Act’s mandated claim process for one such policy claimant—an air-ambulance service. 1 See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 , 502–03 (1993); see also Fredericksburg Care Co. v. Perez, 461 S.W.3d 513, 522 (Tex. 2015) (“Examples of practices that fall within the scope of [the business of insurance] include . . . . the writing of insurance contracts and the actual performance of those contracts.”).

2012Cf. In re Mays-Hooper, 189 S.W.3d 777, 778 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (interpreting "Troxel[, the premier case governing grandparent access,] to mean that when there is no evidence that (1) the child's parent is unfit; (2) the child's health or emotional well-being would suffer if the court defers to her decisions; and (3) the parent intended to exclude the grandparent's access completely, a trial court abuses its discretion by granting grandparent access against the parent's wishes"); In re D.K.B., No. 13-08-00177-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 6336 , *14-15 12 (Tex. App.—Corpus Ch

2007See Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (orig. proceeding.) Indeed, all of the cases that the majority cites for its remedy of a mandated instruction hold that the trial court has discretion in choosing a remedy.

2007See Ex parte Rich, 194 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (orig. proceeding.) Indeed, all of the cases that the majority cites for its remedy of a mandated instruction hold that the trial court has discretion in choosing a remedy.

2007See State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82 , 774 P.2d 252, 266-67 (1989), limited on other grounds, State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542 , 798 P.2d 1, 12 (1990); State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tenn.1999); cf. Pena I, 166 S.W.3d at 282 .

2007See State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82 , 774 P.2d 252, 266-67 (1989), limited on other grounds, State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542 , 798 P.2d 1, 12 (1990); State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tenn.1999); cf. Pena I, 166 S.W.3d at 282 .

2007See State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82 , 774 P.2d 252, 266-67 (1989), limited on other grounds, State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542 , 798 P.2d 1, 12 (1990); State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tenn.1999); cf. Pena I, 166 S.W.3d at 282 .

2007See State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82 , 774 P.2d 252, 266-67 (1989), limited on other grounds, State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542 , 798 P.2d 1, 12 (1990); State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tenn.1999); cf. Pena I, 166 S.W.3d at 282 .

2007See State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82 , 774 P.2d 252, 266-67 (1989), limited on other grounds, State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542 , 798 P.2d 1, 12 (1990); State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tenn.1999); cf. Pena I, 166 S.W.3d at 282 .

2007See State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82 , 774 P.2d 252, 266-67 (1989), limited on other grounds, State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542 , 798 P.2d 1, 12 (1990); State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tenn.1999); cf. Pena I, 166 S.W.3d at 282 .