Holley factors in Texas

2026Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted); see E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249 (stating that in reviewing a best-interest finding, “we consider, among other evidence, the Holley factors” (footnote omitted)); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 807 .

2026Id. (the “Holley factors,” citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976)).

2026Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted); see E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249 (stating that in reviewing a best-interest finding, “we consider, among other evidence, the Holley factors” (footnote omitted)); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 807 .

2026Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted); see E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249 (stating that in reviewing a best-interest finding, “we consider, among other evidence, the Holley factors” (footnote omitted)); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 807 .

2025CODE ANN. § 153.134(a)(7) (permitting a trial court to consider any other relevant factors); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002) (the Holley factors are not exhaustive and some cases may not have evidence of some factors at all).

2025CODE ANN. § 153.134(a)(7) (permitting a trial court to consider any other relevant factors); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002) (the Holley factors are not exhaustive and some cases may not have evidence of some factors at all).

2026Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted); see E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249 (stating that in reviewing a best-interest finding, “we consider, among other evidence, the Holley factors” (footnote omitted)); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 807 .

2026Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted); see E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249 (stating that in reviewing a best-interest finding, “we consider, among other evidence, the Holley factors” (footnote omitted)); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 807 .

2021Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72 . 24 In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002). 25 Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ). 26 Id. 10 address all nine of the Holley factors, particularly when, as here, “the evidence [is] undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.” 27 Analysis The evidence admitted during trial shows that the Department took custody of John and that he has been in the Department’s custody for most of his life.

2021Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72 . 24 In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002). 25 Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ). 26 Id. 10 address all nine of the Holley factors, particularly when, as here, “the evidence [is] undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.” 27 Analysis The evidence admitted during trial shows that the Department took custody of John and that he has been in the Department’s custody for most of his life.

2026The Holley factors are not exhaustive, not all factors must be proved, and a lack of evidence about some of the factors does not “preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence [was] undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002).

2026The Holley factors are not exhaustive, not all factors must be proved, and a lack of evidence about some of the factors does not “preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence [was] undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002).

2023See In re A.J.M., No. 10-14-00284-CV, 2016 WL 936869 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 10, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278 , 282 n.20 (Tex. 2000) (recognizing that intermediate appellate courts use Holley factors to ascertain best interest of child in conservatorship cases).

2023Mauldin v. Clements, 428 S.W.3d 247, 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976)); see also In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278 , 282 n.20 (Tex. 2000) (noting that intermediate appellate courts use Holley factors to ascertain best interest of child in conservatorship cases).

2026But even considering that evidence we conclude that, on balance, the evidence demonstrates that the applicable statutory and Holley factors weigh in favor of the trial court’s best-interest finding. 8 See, e.g., In re A.K.T., No. 01-18-00647-CV, 2018 WL 6423381 , at *16 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 6, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (mother’s extensive history of violent abusive conduct directed at child, father, and other individuals supported best-interest finding); In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 846 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (domestic violence, even when child is n

2025Evidence of domestic violence is a consideration in the Holley analysis, see In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 846 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.), as is parental drug abuse.

2018Id. at 266–67. 17 Here, Father argues that, when all of the evidence is considered in light of the Holley factors, “no rational trier of fact could have formed a strong conviction or belief that severing the father-child relationship is in his child’s best interest.” With respect to the desires of the child, there is no direct evidence about N.J.H.’s desires because he was less than two years old at the time of trial.

2018Id. at 266–67. 17 Here, Father argues that, when all of the evidence is considered in light of the Holley factors, “no rational trier of fact could have formed a strong conviction or belief that severing the father-child relationship is in his child’s best interest.” With respect to the desires of the child, there is no direct evidence about N.J.H.’s desires because he was less than two years old at the time of trial.

2018See In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 116 (citing Family Code Section 263.307 [“Factors in Determining Best Interest of Child”] and Holley as providing factors for consideration “when determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child” and also referencing Family Code section 153.131(b) which provides “a strong presumption that the best interest of a child is served by keeping the child with a parent”). 4 The Holley factors are: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical dang

2018See In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 116 (citing Family Code Section 263.307 [“Factors in Determining Best Interest of Child”] and Holley as providing factors for consideration “when determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child” and also referencing Family Code section 153.131(b) which provides “a strong presumption that the best interest of a child is served by keeping the child with a parent”). 4 The Holley factors are: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical dang

2026Id. (the “Holley factors,” citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976)).

2026Id. (the “Holley factors,” citing Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976)).

2024In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). 17 We review the Holley factors in light of the evidence at trial.

2024In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). 17 We review the Holley factors in light of the evidence at trial.

2025See, e.g., In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595 , 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied) (A continuing pattern of illegal drug use “implicates most of the Holley factors.”); E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d at 768 (A parent’s drug use supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.); In re S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877 , 887–88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (“A parent’s drug use, inability to provide a stable home, and failure to comply with his family service plan support a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child.”).

2025See, e.g., In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595 , 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied) (A continuing pattern of illegal drug use “implicates most of the Holley factors.”); E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d at 768 (A parent’s drug use supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.); In re S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877 , 887–88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (“A parent’s drug use, inability to provide a stable home, and failure to comply with his family service plan support a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child.”).

2020But that’s not this court’s role, given the trial court’s sole right to decide how much weight to give the testimony adduced on the various Holley factors during a trial. 37 Thus, while Father promises he will not return to his historical pattern, the trial court could reasonably have chosen to disagree given Father’s historical inability over the past two decades to control his need for alcohol. 38 On this record, we cannot say the trial 36 The testimony in the trial shows that Father had water service to the apartment where he was living when the case was tried. 37 See City of Keller v. Wils

2020But that’s not this court’s role, given the trial court’s sole right to decide how much weight to give the testimony adduced on the various Holley factors during a trial. 37 Thus, while Father promises he will not return to his historical pattern, the trial court could reasonably have chosen to disagree given Father’s historical inability over the past two decades to control his need for alcohol. 38 On this record, we cannot say the trial 36 The testimony in the trial shows that Father had water service to the apartment where he was living when the case was tried. 37 See City of Keller v. Wils

2026The record demonstrates that the parents’ endangering conduct was attributable to their daily drug use, which “implicates most of the Holley factors.” See In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595 , 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied).

2026The record demonstrates that the parents’ endangering conduct was attributable to their daily drug use, which “implicates most of the Holley factors.” See In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595 , 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied).

2025See, e.g., Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (factors two, three, four, and seven); In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822 , 834–36 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (father’s history of drug use and continued drug use during case bore on second, third, fourth, and seventh Holley factors—child’s emotional and physical needs, emotional and physical danger to the child, father’s parental abilities, and stability of home—and supported best-interest finding); In re A.C., 394 S.W.3d 633, 642 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (finding pattern of illegal drug use suggested mother was not

2021See, e.g., M.J. v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-20-00527-CV, 2021 WL 1045727 , at *10 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 19, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (toilet training); In re K.C.F., No. 01-13-01078-CV, 2014 WL 2538624 , at *14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 5, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (habitual drug use); In re A.C., 394 S.W.3d 633, 642 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (drug use during pregnancy); In re F.A.R., No. 11–04–00014–CV, 2005 WL 181719 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 13, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining that evidence of substance abuse implicates mul

2025See In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822 , 834–36 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (holding father’s history of drug use and continued drug use during case implicated second, third, fourth, and seventh Holley factors—child’s emotional and physical needs, emotional and physical danger to child, father’s 59 parental abilities, and stability of home—and supported best-interest finding); In re K.P., 498 S.W.3d 157 , 174–75 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (holding mother’s continuing drug use, evidenced by repeatedly testing positive for drugs, implicated third, fourth, a

2025See, e.g., Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72 (factors two, three, four, and seven); In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822 , 834–36 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (father’s history of drug use and continued drug use during case bore on second, third, fourth, and seventh Holley factors—child’s emotional and physical needs, emotional and physical danger to the child, father’s parental abilities, and stability of home—and supported best-interest finding); In re A.C., 394 S.W.3d 633, 642 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (finding pattern of illegal drug use suggested mother was not

2023J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573 . 4 Giving due deference to the trial court, we hold that, based on the evidence presented at trial and the Holley factors, the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be in the best interest of C.D.

2023J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573 . 4 Giving due deference to the trial court, we hold that, based on the evidence presented at trial and the Holley factors, the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be in the best interest of C.D.

2026See In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d 97, 116 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (“Evidence of domestic violence in the home is supportive of a trial court’s best interest finding under the third, fourth, and seventh Holley factors: the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future, parental abilities, and stability of the home.”).

2025See In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d 97, 116 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (“Evidence of domestic violence in the home is supportive of a trial court’s best-interest finding under the third, fourth, and seventh Holley factors: the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future, parental abilities, and stability of the home.” ).

2023As to the third, fourth, seventh, and eighth Holley factors, “[e]vidence of past misconduct or neglect can be used to measure a parent’s future conduct.” Id. (quoting In re I.R.K.-N., No. 10-13-00455-CV, 2014 WL 2069281 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Waco May 15, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Williams v. Williams, 150 S.W.3d 436, 451 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied); Ray v. Burns, 832 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tex. App.—Waco 1992, no writ) (“Past is often prologue.”)).

2023As to the fourth, seventh, and eighth Holley factors, “[e]vidence of past misconduct or neglect can be used to measure a parent’s future conduct.” Id. (quoting In re I.R.K.-N., No. 10- 13-00455-CV, 2014 WL 2069281 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Waco May 15, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Williams v. Williams, 150 S.W.3d 436, 451 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied); Ray v. Burns, 832 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tex. App.—Waco 1992, no writ) (“Past is often prologue.”)).

2025See In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101 , 116-17 (Tex. 2014) (recognizing that a mother’s tumultuous relationship with her mother — together with other evidence — was legally sufficient evidence to support the termination of the mother’s parental rights under the best interest prong); see also In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d 97, 116 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (“Evidence of domestic violence in the home is supportive of a trial court’s best-interest finding under the third, fourth, and seventh Holley factors: the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future, parental

2024See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976) (the “Holley factors”); In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d 251, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.); see also Tex. Fam.

2020See Holley, 19 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 832 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 18, 2018, pet. denied) (“[E]vidence of improved conduct, especially of short-duration, does not conclusively negate the probative value of a long history of . . . irresponsible choices.” (quoting In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346 )); see also In re D.W., 445 S.W.3d 913, 932 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (providing that evidence considered in other Holley factors may be relevant in analyzing the final two factors).

2020See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72; In re J.H.G., 313 S.W.3d at 900 (where a parent engaged very little with her child, had a “flat affect and did not seem excited to see [her child] when she arrived for her visits and showed no emotion when she left,” the parent’s acts and omissions weighed in favor of 24 termination); see also In re D.W., 445 S.W.3d 913, 932 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied) (providing that evidence considered in other Holley factors may be relevant in analyzing the final two factors).

2021See Spurck v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 396 S.W.3d 205, 222 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) (“Having determined that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding on one of the statutory grounds, we need not consider whether the evidence would support other grounds for termination.”). 20 evidence about some of the factors does not “preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence [was] undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.”

2021See Spurck v. Texas Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 396 S.W.3d 205, 222 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) (“Having determined that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding on one of the statutory grounds, we need not consider whether the evidence would support other grounds for termination.”). 20 evidence about some of the factors does not “preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence [was] undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.”

2026See In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118 (considering, in assessing 21 child’s physical and emotional needs, evidence that child had been in foster home for most of her life, foster family provided safe and stable home and planned to adopt her as evidence supporting trial court’s best interest finding); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372 (factors one, two, and seven).

2025See In re A.H., 679 S.W.3d 817 , 833 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2023, pet. denied) (“The circumstances that led to the child’s removal may be considered as part of the parent’s past neglect or inability to meet the child’s needs.”); In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118 ; A.S. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 394 S.W.3d 703, 714, 715 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.) (providing that evidence of a parent’s past misconduct or neglect and the parent’s current and future incarceration at the time of trial are relevant to the second and third Holley factors); In re K.C., 219 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. App.–Da

2009These are commonly referred to as “the Holley factors.” See, e.g., In re A.B., 269 S.W.3d 120, 126 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.); In re S.N., 272 S.W.3d 45 , (Tex. App.—Waco 2 … The factors relevant in this case include: (1) the children’s ages and physical and mental vulnerabilities, (2) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the children, (3) whether the children have been the victims of repeated harm after an initial report and intervention, (4) whether the children are afraid to return home, (5) the results of testing or evaluations of the children and parents, (6)

2009These are commonly referred to as “the Holley factors.” See, e.g., In re A.B., 269 S.W.3d 120, 126 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.); In re S.N., 272 S.W.3d 45 , (Tex. App.—Waco 2 … The factors relevant in this case include: (1) the children’s ages and physical and mental vulnerabilities, (2) the magnitude, frequency, and circumstances of the harm to the children, (3) whether the children have been the victims of repeated harm after an initial report and intervention, (4) whether the children are afraid to return home, (5) the results of testing or evaluations of the children and parents, (6)