permanency planning hearing in North Carolina

2021App. 509, 514 , 598 S.E.2d 658, 662 (2004)). ¶ 23 Respondent-mother argues the trial court erred in conducting a permanency planning hearing without providing adequate notice of the proceedings.

2021App. 509, 514 , 598 S.E.2d 658, 662 (2004)). ¶ 23 Respondent-mother argues the trial court erred in conducting a permanency planning hearing without providing adequate notice of the proceedings.

2021Id. at 180 , 752 S.E.2d at 462 (citations omitted) (cleaned up). ¶ 27 In a permanency planning hearing held pursuant to Chapter 7B, the trial court can only order the cessation of reunification efforts when it finds facts based upon credible evidence presented at the hearing that support its conclusion of law to cease reunification efforts.

2021Id. at 180 , 752 S.E.2d at 462 (citations omitted) (cleaned up). ¶ 27 In a permanency planning hearing held pursuant to Chapter 7B, the trial court can only order the cessation of reunification efforts when it finds facts based upon credible evidence presented at the hearing that support its conclusion of law to cease reunification efforts.

2026Opinion of the Court Respondent-Father argues that “the trial court . . . did not admit [the] GAL report into evidence.” However, “[a]s a type of dispositional hearing, a permanency planning hearing may be informal and the court may consider written reports or other evidence concerning the needs of the juvenile.” In re J.H., 244 N.C.

2025Therefore, “[a]s a type of dispositional hearing, a permanency planning hearing ‘may be informal and the court may consider written reports or other evidence concerning the needs of the juvenile.’ ” In re J.H., 244 N.C.

2014App. 398, 403, 576 S.E.2d 386, 390 (2003) (holding that the respondent-parents *141 waived their argument that certain testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay because they failed to object to the testimony at the permanency planning hearing); see also In re F.G.J., 200 N.C.

2005In In re Ivey, 156 N.C.App. 398, 402 , 576 S.E.2d 386, 389-90 (2003), this Court considered the argument that the trial court erroneously rendered findings of fact in a permanency planning hearing based upon reports that were not admitted into evidence.

2019App. 35 , 39, 613 S.E.2d 739 , 741 (2005) ("[I]n determining whether it is possible for the children to return home within six months of the permanency planning hearing, the court must look at the progress the parents have made in eliminating the conditions that [led] to the removal of the children.").

2009Gen.Stat. § 7B-907(b). "[I]n determining whether it is possible for the children to return home within six months of the permanency planning hearing, the court must look at the progress the parents have made in eliminating the conditions that [led] to the removal of the children." In re T.K., 171 N.C.App. 35, 39 , 613 S.E.2d 739, 741 (2005), aff'd, 360 N.C. 163 , 622 S.E.2d 494 (2005).

2014App. 344 , 644 S.E.2d 640 (2007).

2010We agree, and accordingly reverse this portion of the trial court's order. "`The purpose of a permanency planning hearing shall be to develop a plan to achieve a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within a reasonable period of time.'" In re D.C., 183 N.C.App. 344, 355 , 644 S.E.2d 640, 646 (2007) (quoting N.C.

2015"In a permanency planning hearing held pursuant to Chapter 7B, the [district] court can only order the cessation of reunification efforts when it finds facts based upon credible evidence presented at the hearing that support its conclusion of law to cease reunification efforts." In re Weiler, 158 N.C.App. 473 , 477, 581 S.E.2d 134 , 137 (2003) (citation omitted) (decided under prior statutes). 3 Respondent-mother contends the evidence from the hearing shows that she was not given a sufficient opportunity to make progress toward reunification.

2015"In a permanency planning hearing held pursuant to Chapter 7B, the [district] court can only order the cessation of reunification efforts when it finds facts based upon credible evidence presented at the hearing that support its conclusion of law to cease reunification efforts." In re Weiler, 158 N.C.App. 473 , 477, 581 S.E.2d 134 , 137 (2003) (citation omitted) (decided under prior statutes). 3 Respondent-mother contends the evidence from the hearing shows that she was not given a sufficient opportunity to make progress toward reunification.

2021AND K.A.E. 2021-NCSC-76 Opinion of the Court her ability to assist her attorney in support of her case”); see also In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. at 109 (stating that the respondent’s testimony at the permanency planning hearing was “cogent and gave no indication that she failed to understand the nature of the proceedings in which she was participating or the consequences of the decisions that she was being called to make”).

2021AND K.A.E. 2021-NCSC-76 Opinion of the Court her ability to assist her attorney in support of her case”); see also In re T.L.H., 368 N.C. at 109 (stating that the respondent’s testimony at the permanency planning hearing was “cogent and gave no indication that she failed to understand the nature of the proceedings in which she was participating or the consequences of the decisions that she was being called to make”).

2024See id. at 244–45.

2024See id. at 244–45.

2022Although there is a paucity of evidence in the record indicating how respondent-mother could have rebutted the grounds for termination found by the trial court at the termination hearing, counsel’s prolonged, repeated failure to adequately represent respondent-mother at every stage of these proceedings fatally undermined their validity as a mechanism for determining “the truth.” Therefore, I would hold that respondent-mother has demonstrated prejudice because she has IN RE B.B., S.B., S.B. 2022-NCSC-67 Earls, J., dissenting. shown that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defend

2022Although there is a paucity of evidence in the record indicating how respondent-mother could have rebutted the grounds for termination found by the trial court at the termination hearing, counsel’s prolonged, repeated failure to adequately represent respondent-mother at every stage of these proceedings fatally undermined their validity as a mechanism for determining “the truth.” Therefore, I would hold that respondent-mother has demonstrated prejudice because she has IN RE B.B., S.B., S.B. 2022-NCSC-67 Earls, J., dissenting. shown that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defend

2022Although there is a paucity of evidence in the record indicating how respondent-mother could have rebutted the grounds for termination found by the trial court at the termination hearing, counsel’s prolonged, repeated failure to adequately represent respondent-mother at every stage of these proceedings fatally undermined their validity as a mechanism for determining “the truth.” Therefore, I would hold that respondent-mother has demonstrated prejudice because she has IN RE B.B., S.B., S.B. 2022-NCSC-67 Earls, J., dissenting. shown that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defend

2022Although there is a paucity of evidence in the record indicating how respondent-mother could have rebutted the grounds for termination found by the trial court at the termination hearing, counsel’s prolonged, repeated failure to adequately represent respondent-mother at every stage of these proceedings fatally undermined their validity as a mechanism for determining “the truth.” Therefore, I would hold that respondent-mother has demonstrated prejudice because she has IN RE B.B., S.B., S.B. 2022-NCSC-67 Earls, J., dissenting. shown that “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defend

2021“To establish that the trial court’s failure to give additional time to prepare constituted a constitutional violation, [the] [respondent- mother] must show ‘how [her] case would have been better prepared had the continuance been granted or that [s]he was materially prejudiced by the denial of h[er] motion.’ ” State v. McCullers, 341 N.C. 19, 31 (1995) (quoting State v. Covington, 317 N.C. 127, 130 (1986)). ¶ 12 Here, the record demonstrates, and respondent-mother acknowledges in her brief, that the hearing was designated as a permanency planning hearing.

2021“To establish that the trial court’s failure to give additional time to prepare constituted a constitutional violation, [the] [respondent- mother] must show ‘how [her] case would have been better prepared had the continuance been granted or that [s]he was materially prejudiced by the denial of h[er] motion.’ ” State v. McCullers, 341 N.C. 19, 31 (1995) (quoting State v. Covington, 317 N.C. 127, 130 (1986)). ¶ 12 Here, the record demonstrates, and respondent-mother acknowledges in her brief, that the hearing was designated as a permanency planning hearing.

2021“To establish that the trial court’s failure to give additional time to prepare constituted a constitutional violation, [the] [respondent- mother] must show ‘how [her] case would have been better prepared had the continuance been granted or that [s]he was materially prejudiced by the denial of h[er] motion.’ ” State v. McCullers, 341 N.C. 19, 31 (1995) (quoting State v. Covington, 317 N.C. 127, 130 (1986)). ¶ 12 Here, the record demonstrates, and respondent-mother acknowledges in her brief, that the hearing was designated as a permanency planning hearing.

2021“To establish that the trial court’s failure to give additional time to prepare constituted a constitutional violation, [the] [respondent- mother] must show ‘how [her] case would have been better prepared had the continuance been granted or that [s]he was materially prejudiced by the denial of h[er] motion.’ ” State v. McCullers, 341 N.C. 19, 31 (1995) (quoting State v. Covington, 317 N.C. 127, 130 (1986)). ¶ 12 Here, the record demonstrates, and respondent-mother acknowledges in her brief, that the hearing was designated as a permanency planning hearing.

2021App. 612, 617 , 643 S.E.2d 70, 73 (2007) (trial court which received and considered department of social services home study reports complied with section 7B-600). ¶ 25 The trial court conducted the following colloquy with the maternal grandfather at the permanency planning hearing: THE COURT: Mr. Steele, do you understand that, if I appoint you the guardian of these two children that, first and foremost, you would be the one mainly financially responsible for them?

2021App. 612, 617 , 643 S.E.2d 70, 73 (2007) (trial court which received and considered department of social services home study reports complied with section 7B-600). ¶ 25 The trial court conducted the following colloquy with the maternal grandfather at the permanency planning hearing: THE COURT: Mr. Steele, do you understand that, if I appoint you the guardian of these two children that, first and foremost, you would be the one mainly financially responsible for them?

2007Specifically, during the permanency planning hearing, the trial court ruled that "[a]ll visits . . . are ceased." In its written order, however, the trial court provided that visitation between respondent and K.S. was to continue "contingent upon [respondent's] progress and compliance with [the] case plan" and that visitation was to take place "[a]ccording to the visitation schedule." It is well-established that "an order rendered in open court is not enforceable until it is `entered,' i.e., until it is reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk of court." In re L.L., 17

2007Specifically, during the permanency planning hearing, the trial court ruled that "[a]ll visits ... are ceased." In its written order, however, the trial court provided that visitation between respondent and K.S. was to continue "contingent upon [respondent's] progress and compliance with [the] case plan" and that visitation was to take place "[a]ccording to the visitation schedule." It is well-established that "an order rendered in open court is not enforceable until it is `entered,' i.e., until it is reduced to writing, signed by the judge, and filed with the clerk of court." In re L.L., 172

2007See J.S., 165 N.C.App. at 512 , 598 S.E.2d at 660 . [2] Respondent incorrectly asserts in her brief that "[t]he GAL was not in court for the permanency planning hearing." [3] See, e.g., Neil W.

2006Gen.Stat. § 7B-907(a). 165 N.C.App. 509 , 514, 598 S.E.2d 658 , 662 (2004).

2004"The purpose of the hearing is to `develop a plan to achieve a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within a reasonable period of time.'" In re Dula, 143 N.C.App. 16, 18 , 544 S.E.2d 591, 593 (quoting N.C.

2004“The purpose of the hearing is to ‘develop a plan to achieve a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within a reasonable period of time.’ ” In re Dula, 143 N.C.