permanency planning hearing in California

2025(In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 .) A hearing under section 366.26 is designed to select a permanent plan, in order to “protect children’s ‘compelling rights . . . to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child.’ ” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45 , 52–53 (Celine R.).) At the permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court has several choices, ranked in order of preference. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) First in preferences is termination of parental rights and placement for adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1

2023(See Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609 , 623, fn. 2 [writ petition challenging the juvenile court’s decision to terminate reunification services was moot because the father did not appeal from the juvenile court’s subsequent order selecting a permanent plan of guardianship]; In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 [a section 388 petition “may be used to raise the [reunification] issue in the trial court prior to the section 366.26 hearing”]; cf. B.B. v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 563, 569-570 [if a court modifies or terminates a legal guardianship, it must hold a n

1993In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 629 ] held a parent could attack the sufficiency of the reunification plan by an appeal taken before the permanency planning hearing.

1993In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234 [ 271 Cal.Rptr. 629 ] held a parent could attack the sufficiency of the reunification plan by an appeal taken before the permanency planning hearing.

2026Father joins with mother’s argument and contends reversal of the order terminating her parental rights mandates reversal of the order terminating his. 8 At a permanency planning hearing, once the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a child is likely to be adopted, “the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption” unless it “finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more” enumerated exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1) & (c)(1)(B); see In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 , 6

2025(In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 .) A hearing under section 366.26 is designed to select a permanent plan, in order to “protect children’s ‘compelling rights . . . to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child.’ ” (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45 , 52–53 (Celine R.).) At the permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court has several choices, ranked in order of preference. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) First in preferences is termination of parental rights and placement for adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1

1993See also In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 228, 235-236 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 453 ].) If the juvenile court’s finding on the reasonableness of the reunification services does not constitute a contemporaneous ruling designed to overturn the juvenile court’s order setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing, then mother’s failure to appeal from the 12-month review hearing would preclude a consideration of that issue in this appeal since her challenge would be untimely.

1993See also In re Eli F. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 228, 235-236 [ 260 Cal.Rptr. 453 ].) If the juvenile court’s finding on the reasonableness of the reunification services does not constitute a contemporaneous ruling designed to overturn the juvenile court’s order setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing, then mother’s failure to appeal from the 12-month review hearing would preclude a consideration of that issue in this appeal since her challenge would be untimely.

2023(Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575 .) A.K. had been residing with Ms. C. from his 2018 detention to the permanency planning hearing in 2022.

2021(See, e.g., In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 .) But as the juvenile court impliedly recognized, mother failed to meet her additional burden of showing that terminating the relationship “would harm [Laylah] to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by the security of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631, 634.) At the permanency planning hearing, mother did not testify or offer any evidence that would support a finding that terminating her relationship with Laylah would be detrimental.

2019A. Legal Framework At a permanency planning hearing held in accordance with section 366.26, the juvenile court is charged with determining the most appropriate permanent plan of out-of-home care for a dependent child that has been unable to reunify. ( In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38 , 50, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 ( Casey D. ).) When reunification efforts with a parent fail, as they did in this case, the focus shifts from family preservation "to the needs of the child for permanency and stability." ( In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295 , 309, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 851 P.2d 826 ; In re G.B. (

2019A. Legal Framework At a permanency planning hearing held in accordance with section 366.26, the juvenile court is charged with determining the most appropriate permanent plan of out-of-home care for a dependent child that has been unable to reunify. ( In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38 , 50, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 ( Casey D. ).) When reunification efforts with a parent fail, as they did in this case, the focus shifts from family preservation "to the needs of the child for permanency and stability." ( In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295 , 309, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 851 P.2d 826 ; In re G.B. (

2025When a juvenile court terminates reunification services and orders a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26 at the 12-month hearing, “[t]he court shall continue to permit the parent . . . to visit the child pending the hearing unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (h).) Here, the court ordered continued visitation, so there is no statutory violation. 24 As for the frequency of visitation, the juvenile court has “great discretion in deciding issues relating to parent-child visitation,” the exercise of which “we will not disturb on a

2024(In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318–319.) On the eve of the permanency planning hearing (which had been continued multiple times over the course of close to two years), mother failed to show how her proposed change of order would promote daughter’s stability.

2021DISCUSSION A. Legal Framework “At a permanency planning hearing following a parent’s failure to reunify with a child, the juvenile court may appoint a legal guardian for a minor and issue letters of guardianship.” (B.B. v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 563, 569 (B.B.); see also § 366.26, subd. (b)(3).) Any minor for whom a guardianship has been established at a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26 “is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 366.4, subd. (a).) The court may either “continue dependency jurisdiction if it is in the child’s best interest or, as it did

2021Beneficial Relationship Exception to the Termination of Parental Rights At the permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court determines a permanent plan for the child, and may order one of three alternative plans: adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 528 .) “‘[T]here is strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans.’” (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 394-395 .) 11 Generally, if the juvenile court finds the child adoptable the court must terminate parental rights. “[T]o avoid term

2019A. Legal Framework At a permanency planning hearing held in accordance with section 366.26, the juvenile court is charged with determining the most appropriate permanent plan of out-of-home care for a dependent child that has been unable to reunify. ( In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38 , 50, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 ( Casey D. ).) When reunification efforts with a parent fail, as they did in this case, the focus shifts from family preservation "to the needs of the child for permanency and stability." ( In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295 , 309, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 851 P.2d 826 ; In re G.B. (

2019A. Legal Framework At a permanency planning hearing held in accordance with section 366.26, the juvenile court is charged with determining the most appropriate permanent plan of out-of-home care for a dependent child that has been unable to reunify. ( In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38 , 50, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 426 ( Casey D. ).) When reunification efforts with a parent fail, as they did in this case, the focus shifts from family preservation "to the needs of the child for permanency and stability." ( In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295 , 309, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 851 P.2d 826 ; In re G.B. (

2021DISCUSSION A. Legal Framework “At a permanency planning hearing following a parent’s failure to reunify with a child, the juvenile court may appoint a legal guardian for a minor and issue letters of guardianship.” (B.B. v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 563, 569 (B.B.); see also § 366.26, subd. (b)(3).) Any minor for whom a guardianship has been established at a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26 “is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 366.4, subd. (a).) The court may either “continue dependency jurisdiction if it is in the child’s best interest or, as it did

2020Applicable Law and Analysis At the permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court determines a permanent plan for the child, and may order one of three alternative plans: adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 528 .) “ ‘If the dependent child is adoptable, there is strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans.’ ” (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395 .) Generally, if the court finds the child adoptable the court must terminate parental rights. “[T]o avoid termination of parental r

1993(In re Megan B., supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 950 ; In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 563 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 483 ].) Thus, the crucial question is whether that finding was so closely aligned with the order setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing that a direct appeal challenging it would be precluded.

1993(In re Megan B., supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 950 ; In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 563 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 483 ].) Thus, the crucial question is whether that finding was so closely aligned with the order setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing that a direct appeal challenging it would be precluded.

2020(Id. at pp. 747-748, 758, 760, fn. 10; Guardianship of Ann S. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1110, 1130 ; Cynthia D. v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 254 ; In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 224 .) Where, as here, the parent at issue is non-offending and there has been no prior finding of detriment by the juvenile court, the court must make 10 the requisite detriment finding at the permanency planning hearing.

2013The essential purpose of the hearing is for the court “to provide stable, permanent homes for these children.” (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see In re Jose V. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1792 , 1797.) There are six statutory choices for the permanency plan; the preferred choice is that the child be ordered to be placed for adoption, coupled with an order terminating parental rights. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see also In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53 [“Legislature has thus determined that, where possible, adoption is the first choice”]; ibid. [where child is adoptable, “adoption is the norm”].) The co

2021Beneficial Relationship Exception to the Termination of Parental Rights At the permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court determines a permanent plan for the child, and may order one of three alternative plans: adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 528 .) “‘[T]here is strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans.’” (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 394-395 .) 11 Generally, if the juvenile court finds the child adoptable the court must terminate parental rights. “[T]o avoid term

2020Applicable Law and Analysis At the permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court determines a permanent plan for the child, and may order one of three alternative plans: adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 528 .) “ ‘If the dependent child is adoptable, there is strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans.’ ” (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395 .) Generally, if the court finds the child adoptable the court must terminate parental rights. “[T]o avoid termination of parental r

2015The children generally separated easily from Mother, and their primary attachment was with the foster parents, who had cared for them for 21 months at the time of the permanency planning hearing. 11 Based on this evidence, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude that Mother did not establish that she "occupies a parental role in the life of the child" (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527), and that Mother's relationship to the children "bears no resemblance to the sort of consistent, daily nurturing that marks a parental relationship." (Derek W., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 827

2013The essential purpose of the hearing is for the court “to provide stable, permanent homes for these children.” (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see In re Jose V. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1792 , 1797.) There are six statutory choices for the permanency plan; the preferred choice is that the child be ordered to be placed for adoption, coupled with an order terminating parental rights. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see also In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53 [“Legislature has thus determined that, where possible, adoption is the first choice”]; ibid. [where child is adoptable, “adoption is the norm”].) The co

2018B Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review At a permanency planning hearing, the court may order one of three *234 alternatives-adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care. ( In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289 , 296-297, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 .) If a child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans. ( Id . at p. 297, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 ; San Diego County Dept. of Social Services v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 882 , 888, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 396 , 919 P.2d 1329 .) If the court determines that a child is likely to be adopted, the bur

2018B Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review At a permanency planning hearing, the court may order one of three *234 alternatives-adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care. ( In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289 , 296-297, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 .) If a child is adoptable, there is a strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans. ( Id . at p. 297, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 449 ; San Diego County Dept. of Social Services v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 882 , 888, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 396 , 919 P.2d 1329 .) If the court determines that a child is likely to be adopted, the bur

2020At the permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court determines a permanent plan for the child, and may order one of three alternative plans: adoption, guardianship, or long-term foster care. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); see In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 528 .) “ ‘[T]here is strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans.’ [Citation.]” (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395 .) Generally, if the court finds the child adoptable the court must terminate parental rights. “[T]o avoid termination of parental rights and adoption, a parent has the burden of proving

2018II Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception to Adoption A After reunification services are terminated, the focus of a dependency proceeding shifts from preserving the family to promoting the best interests of the child, including the child's interest in a stable, permanent placement that allows the caregiver to make a full emotional commitment to the child. ( In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 529 , 534, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 511 .) At the permanency planning hearing, the court has three options: (1) terminate parental rights and order adoption as the permanent plan; (2) appoint a legal g

2023Legal Principles The permanency planning hearing aims “to end the uncertainty of foster care and allow the dependent child to form a long-lasting emotional attachment to a permanent caretaker.” (In re Emily L. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 734, 742 .) The Legislature prefers adoption where possible.

2023SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JUVENILE COURT’S FINDING THAT THE BENEFICIAL PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP EXCEPTION DID NOT APPLY A. General Legal Principles The permanency planning hearing aims “to end the uncertainty of foster care and allow the dependent child to form a long-lasting emotional attachment to a permanent caretaker.” (In re Emily L. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 734, 742 .) The Legislature prefers adoption where possible.

2016(In re Kerry O. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 326, 333 .) At the permanency planning hearing the court has numerous choices, with termination of parental rights and an order for the child to be placed for adoption, as the first choice. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1).) "Guardianship, while a more stable placement than foster care, is not irrevocable and thus falls short of the secure and permanent future the Legislature had in mind for the dependent child." (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1344 .) 7 To support this beneficial relationship exception to adoption, the court must find "a compelling r

2016(In re Kerry O. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 326, 333 .) At the permanency planning hearing the court has numerous choices, with termination of parental rights and placement for adoption as the first choice. (§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1).) To support an asserted beneficial relationship exception to adoption, the court must find "a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B); In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 553 (C.F.).) The juvenile court considers the detriment issue on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the many variables

1987Lorenzo T., supra, 190 Cal.App.3d 888 , involved a permanency planning hearing at which the court ordered the county counsel to initiate a proceeding under Civil Code section 232 to terminate parental rights.

1987As indicated in In re Lorenzo T., supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at page 893, the aggrieved parties “would be precluded in the superior court Civil Code section 232 proceedings, or on an appeal from those proceedings, from alleging any error the court made at the permanency planning hearing, e.g., not ordering legal guardianship in lieu of adoption.

1998In concluding the order denying services was not appealable, the court stated: “Because the juvenile court must promptly conduct a permanency planning hearing when it rejects reunification entirely [citation], a challenge to the complete denial of reunification ‘constitutes a direct attack’ on a provision in the disposition order which sets a section 366.26 hearing.” ( 227 Cal.App.3d at p. 836 , fn. omitted.) In so ruling, the court emphasized the need for timely review.

1998In concluding the order denying services was not appealable, the court stated: "Because the juvenile court must promptly conduct a permanency planning hearing when it rejects reunification entirely [citation], a challenge to the complete denial of reunification `constitutes a direct attack' on a provision in the disposition order which sets a section 366.26 hearing." ( 227 Cal. App.3d at p. 836 , fn. omitted.) In so ruling, the court emphasized the need for timely review.

2013(In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 953 , superseded by statute on other grounds [noting that trial courts are vested with broad discretion in matters concerning child custody and visitation, and applying a clear abuse of discretion standard to the order which reduced visitation following a permanency planning hearing].) Our Supreme Court describes the abuse of discretion test as “ ‘whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.’ ” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319 .) 2.

1993(In re Megan B., supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 950 ; In re Elizabeth M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 553, 563 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 483 ].) Thus, the crucial question is whether that finding was so closely aligned with the order setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing that a direct appeal challenging it would be precluded.