14 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 2014–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
The City of El Paso v. Lilli M. Heinrichgreen2 sentences2016Id. at 371-72 . - This case concerns the breadth of this ultra vires doctrine. 1 Specifically, it presents the question of whether a suit complaining “of a government officer’s exercise of- [limited] discretion” by alleging “that the officer acted without legal authority” is a viable ultra vires claim. 2016Retrospective Relief As we explained in City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex.2009), even though a suit may allege a viable ultra vires claim against a governmental official, the suit is, for all practical purposes, against the State. | 4 | 4 |
Wallace L. Hall, Jr., in His Official Capacity as a Regent for the University of Texas System v. William H. McRaven, in His Official Capacity as Chancellor for the University of Texas Systemgreen2 sentences2025“An ultra vires claim based on actions taken ‘without legal authority’ has two fundamental components: (1) authority giving the official some (but not absolute) discretion to act and (2) conduct outside of that authority.” Hall v. McRaven, 508 S.W.3d 232, 239 (Tex. 2017). 2020See Hall, 508 S.W.3d at 238 . | 2 | 2 |
Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co., Bnsf Railway Co., and Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. City of Houston, Texas and Daniel Krueger, in His Official Capacity as Director of Public Works and Engineeringgreen2 sentences2016But even if the Court were to find that the PIA provides Ms. Cook limited discretion to delay production (and it should not), that discretion does not automatically foreclose McLane’s ultra vires claim: Houston Belt states in no uncertain terms that a suit “complaining of a government officer’s exercise of limited discretion by alleging that the officer acted without legal authority is a viable ultra vires claim.” 487 S.W.3d at 158 (alteration and citations omitted; emphasis added); see also id. (“[G]overnmental immunity . . . does not protect every act by a government officer that requires so 2016But even if the Court were to find that the PIA provides Ms. Cook limited discretion to delay production (and it should not), that discretion does not automatically foreclose McLane’s ultra vires claim: Houston Belt states in no uncertain terms that a suit “complaining of a government officer’s exercise of limited discretion by alleging that the officer acted without legal authority is a viable ultra vires claim.” 487 S.W.3d at 158 (alteration and citations omitted; emphasis added); see also id. (“[G]overnmental immunity . . . does not protect every act by a government officer that requires so | 1 | 3 |
Andrade v. NAACP of Austingreen1 sentence2025Quality, 307 S.W.3d 505 , 515–16 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (noting that “if the claimant is attempting to restrain a state officer’s conduct on the grounds that it is unconstitutional, it must allege facts that actually constitute a constitutional violation” to fall within the ultra vires exception); Tabrizi v. City of Austin, 551 S.W.3d 290, 305 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (holding that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the pleaded facts did not allege a viable ultra vires claim); Andrade, 345 S.W.3d at 11 (holding that when an ultra vires claim is not “v | 1 | 1 |
Tabrizi v. City of Austingreen1 sentence2025Quality, 307 S.W.3d 505 , 515–16 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (noting that “if the claimant is attempting to restrain a state officer’s conduct on the grounds that it is unconstitutional, it must allege facts that actually constitute a constitutional violation” to fall within the ultra vires exception); Tabrizi v. City of Austin, 551 S.W.3d 290, 305 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (holding that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the pleaded facts did not allege a viable ultra vires claim); Andrade, 345 S.W.3d at 11 (holding that when an ultra vires claim is not “v | 1 | 1 |
City of Houston and Daniel W. Kruger, in His Official Capacity as Director of Public Works and Engineering Department v. Little Nell Apartments, L.P.green2 sentences2016See id. 2016See id. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Honors Acad., Inc. v. Tex. Educ. Agency
green
2 sentences2025The Ultra Vires Claims A viable ultra vires claim against a government official is an exception to sovereign immunity from suit. 12 An act is ultra vires if the official “acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.” 13 An act is “without 2 legal authority” if it requires discretion or judgment and the actor “exceeds the bounds of that authority, or the conduct conflicts with the law itself.” 14 An act is 3 ministerial if “the law prescribes and defines the duties to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion 2025The Ultra Vires Claims A viable ultra vires claim against a government official is an exception to sovereign immunity from suit. 12 An act is ultra vires if the official “acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act.” 13 An act is “without 2 legal authority” if it requires discretion or judgment and the actor “exceeds the bounds of that authority, or the conduct conflicts with the law itself.” 14 An act is 3 ministerial if “the law prescribes and defines the duties to be performed with such precision and certainty as to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda
green
2 sentences2021The court in Industrial Foundation allegations as true, as we must do, we conclude that outlined two requirements for whether particular she has alleged a viable ultra vires claim against information is “private” and thus confidential under the Chief Manley, see Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227 , PIA: (1) it contains “highly intimate or embarrassing and whether the booking photos are confidential is facts about a person's private affairs, such that its a merits determination on which we defer to the publication would be highly objectionable to a person trial court to make in the first instance. 2020Therefore, taking Doe’s factual allegations as true, as we must do, we conclude that she has alleged a viable ultra vires claim against Chief Manley, see Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227 , and whether the booking photos are confidential is a merits determination on which we defer to the trial court to make in the first instance. | 2 | 2020–2021 |
Creedmoor-Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
green
1 sentence2025Quality, 307 S.W.3d 505 , 515–16 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, no pet.) (noting that “if the claimant is attempting to restrain a state officer’s conduct on the grounds that it is unconstitutional, it must allege facts that actually constitute a constitutional violation” to fall within the ultra vires exception); Tabrizi v. City of Austin, 551 S.W.3d 290, 305 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.) (holding that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the pleaded facts did not allege a viable ultra vires claim); Andrade, 345 S.W.3d at 11 (holding that when an ultra vires claim is not “v | 1 | 2025–2025 |
in Re Sustainable Texas Oyster Resource Management, L.L.C.
green
1 sentence2020Id. 29 The Supreme Court of Texas granted the Commissioners’ petition for review. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co. v. City of Houston
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 673 . 2016Id. at 673 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Federal Sign v. Texas Southern University
red
1 sentence2016Id. at ___. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission v. IT-Davy
green
1 sentence2014Although TxDOT’s alleged representations to the Library indicated that the FHWA’s approval was the only barrier to federal funding for the Library’s project, TxDOT’s conduct “cannot waive immunity from suit.” IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 856 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |