udot motion in Utah

2018We are therefore unconvinced that our holding in Sleepy Holdings , which deals specifically with discovery sanctions , binds us to conclude that, when ruling on a motion to reopen discovery and for a new trial , a trial court must completely reopen discovery when potentially new evidence is discovered. ¶30 To the contrary, when a party moves for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, as UDOT did here, the party must demonstrate that the evidence is "of sufficient substance that with it there is a reasonable likelihood that there would have been a different result." In re L.M. , 2003 U

2018We are therefore unconvinced that our holding in Sleepy Holdings , which deals specifically with discovery sanctions , binds us to conclude that, when ruling on a motion to reopen discovery and for a new trial , a trial court must completely reopen discovery when potentially new evidence is discovered. ¶30 To the contrary, when a party moves for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, as UDOT did here, the party must demonstrate that the evidence is "of sufficient substance that with it there is a reasonable likelihood that there would have been a different result." In re L.M. , 2003 U

2026The court denied the rule 59 motion, and the Estate has not appealed that portion of the court’s ruling. 20240638-CA 7 2026 UT App 50 Abdelgader v. UDOT ¶23 Following oral argument, the district court issued a written ruling granting UDOT’s motion for summary judgment.

2026The court denied the rule 59 motion, and the Estate has not appealed that portion of the court’s ruling. 20240638-CA 7 2026 UT App 50 Abdelgader v. UDOT ¶23 Following oral argument, the district court issued a written ruling granting UDOT’s motion for summary judgment.

2018Everyone here involved—apparently 20160704-CA 26 2018 UT App 86 True v. Utah Department of Transportation even including UDOT and the majority—appears to agree that the issue was initially properly and comprehensively raised, briefed, and argued, under the law as it existed at that time. ¶53 As the majority notes, the district court ruled from the bench at the conclusion of the argument, and granted UDOT’s motion, determining that the “permit exception” (and the “inspection exception”) applied because there was a sufficiently strong causal relationship between UDOT’s grant of the permit (and i

2018Specifically, they contend that UDOT’s issuance of the construction permit did not proximately cause the accident and their injuries; therefore, UDOT did not have immunity under the permit exception. ¶13 “We review the district court’s decision granting summary judgment de novo, affording it no deference,” and in doing so, “we determine whether UDOT has established that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Barneck v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2015 UT 50, ¶ 8 , 353 P.3d 140 ; see also Utah R.

2018Specifically, they contend that UDOT’s issuance of the construction permit did not proximately cause the accident and their injuries; therefore, UDOT did not have immunity under the permit exception. ¶13 “We review the district court’s decision granting summary judgment de novo, affording it no deference,” and in doing so, “we determine whether UDOT has established that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Barneck v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2015 UT 50, ¶ 8 , 353 P.3d 140 ; see also Utah R.

2016The District Court Erred in Declining to Consider Boggess- Draper’s Extrinsic Evidence. ¶18 Boggess-Draper next contends that “the district court erred in holding that it would be improper to consider relevant extrinsic evidence in determining whether the 2005 Final Judgment is ambiguous.” We conclude that Boggess-Draper’s extrinsic evidence indicated the existence of a latent ambiguity in the 2005 Final Judgment and therefore hold that the district court committed reversible error by declining to consider the extrinsic evidence. ¶19 The following rules outline Utah’s standards “for the use of

2016The District Court Erred in Declining to Consider Boggess- Draper’s Extrinsic Evidence. ¶18 Boggess-Draper next contends that “the district court erred in holding that it would be improper to consider relevant extrinsic evidence in determining whether the 2005 Final Judgment is ambiguous.” We conclude that Boggess-Draper’s extrinsic evidence indicated the existence of a latent ambiguity in the 2005 Final Judgment and therefore hold that the district court committed reversible error by declining to consider the extrinsic evidence. ¶19 The following rules outline Utah’s standards “for the use of

2016ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶12 Boggess-Draper first argues that the district court erred in rejecting its argument that Utah Department of Transportation v. 20140650-CA 5 2016 UT App 93 UDOT v. Boggess-Draper Company Ivers (Ivers II), 2009 UT 56 , 218 P.3d 583 , required UDOT to raise its argument that Boggess-Draper had already conveyed the rights appurtenant to the Subject Property “at the outset of the condemnation action.” “A district court’s interpretation of case law . . . presents an issue of law, which we review for correctness.” Torres v. Madsen, 2015 UT App 34, ¶ 8 , 344 P.3d 652

2016ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶12 Boggess-Draper first argues that the district court erred in rejecting its argument that Utah Department of Transportation v. 20140650-CA 5 2016 UT App 93 UDOT v. Boggess-Draper Company Ivers (Ivers II), 2009 UT 56 , 218 P.3d 583 , required UDOT to raise its argument that Boggess-Draper had already conveyed the rights appurtenant to the Subject Property “at the outset of the condemnation action.” “A district court’s interpretation of case law . . . presents an issue of law, which we review for correctness.” Torres v. Madsen, 2015 UT App 34, ¶ 8 , 344 P.3d 652

2016ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶12 Boggess-Draper first argues that the district court erred in rejecting its argument that Utah Department of Transportation v. 20140650-CA 5 2016 UT App 93 UDOT v. Boggess-Draper Company Ivers (Ivers II), 2009 UT 56 , 218 P.3d 583 , required UDOT to raise its argument that Boggess-Draper had already conveyed the rights appurtenant to the Subject Property “at the outset of the condemnation action.” “A district court’s interpretation of case law . . . presents an issue of law, which we review for correctness.” Torres v. Madsen, 2015 UT App 34, ¶ 8 , 344 P.3d 652

2016However, UDOT’s motion in limine, despite clearly being an afterthought, was timely. 20140650-CA 8 2016 UT App 93 UDOT v. Boggess-Draper Company II.

2016Ford, 2004 UT 70, ¶ 33 , 98 P.3d 15 .

2016Ford, 2004 UT 70, ¶ 33 .

2016ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶12 Boggess-Draper first argues that the district court erred in rejecting its argument that Utah Department of Transportation v. 20140650-CA 5 2016 UT App 93 UDOT v. Boggess-Draper Company Ivers (Ivers II), 2009 UT 56 , 218 P.3d 583 , required UDOT to raise its argument that Boggess-Draper had already conveyed the rights appurtenant to the Subject Property “at the outset of the condemnation action.” “A district court’s interpretation of case law . . . presents an issue of law, which we review for correctness.” Torres v. Madsen, 2015 UT App 34, ¶ 8 , 344 P.3d 652

2016ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW ¶12 Boggess-Draper first argues that the district court erred in rejecting its argument that Utah Department of Transportation v. 20140650-CA 5 2016 UT App 93 UDOT v. Boggess-Draper Company Ivers (Ivers II), 2009 UT 56 , 218 P.3d 583 , required UDOT to raise its argument that Boggess-Draper had already conveyed the rights appurtenant to the Subject Property “at the outset of the condemnation action.” “A district court’s interpretation of case law . . . presents an issue of law, which we review for correctness.” Torres v. Madsen, 2015 UT App 34, ¶ 8 , 344 P.3d 652

2015Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ¶ 21 , 190 P.3d 1269 ; Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W.

2015Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, ¶ 21 , 190 P.3d 1269 ; Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty W.

2014Monarrez now appeals. 20130378-CA 3 2014 UT App 219 Monarrez v. Utah Department of Transportation ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶5 Monarrez contends that summary judgment was improperly granted in favor of UDOT and the Doe defendants.

2014UDOT's brief on appeal focuses almost exclusively on the authority prong and relies heavily on the same case that the district court appears to have read as suggesting that an authorization need not be formal for the Licensing Exception to apply-Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Commission, 2007 UT 99 , 175 P.3d 1042 .

2014UDOT's brief on appeal focuses almost exclusively on the authority prong and relies heavily on the same case that the district court appears to have read as suggesting that an authorization need not be formal for the Licensing Exception to apply-Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Commission, 2007 UT 99 , 175 P.3d 1042 .

2014Generally, "[iJn reviewing the exclusion of evidence, we grant a trial court broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence and will disturb its ruling only for abuse of discretion." Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49, ¶ 43 , 221 P.3d 205 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2014Generally, "[iJn reviewing the exclusion of evidence, we grant a trial court broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence and will disturb its ruling only for abuse of discretion." Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49, ¶ 43 , 221 P.3d 205 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2004"When reviewing a grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, this court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true; we then consider such allegations 'and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff" Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., 1999 UT 91, ¶ 2 , 991 P.2d 584 (citation omitted). " '[Wle affirm the grant of such motion only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged'" Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).

2004"When reviewing a grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, this court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true; we then consider such allegations 'and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff" Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., 1999 UT 91, ¶ 2 , 991 P.2d 584 (citation omitted). " '[Wle affirm the grant of such motion only if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged'" Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).