favorable presumption (Washington) · Go Syfert
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favorable presumption in Washington

14 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2026 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Graygreen
washctapp · 2009 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026See, e.g., Gray, 151 Wn.

11
In Re: Gretchen Ruff (fka Gretchen Worthley) v. William Worthleygreen
washctapp · 2017 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018See In re Marriage of Worthley, 198 Wn.

11
State v. Thompsongreen
wash · 2012 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014Thompson, 173 Wn.2d at 873-74 . ¶21 Imposing a favorable presumption when deciding a motion for postconviction DNA testing affects only whether the DNA will be tested; it does not affect whether the individual will be granted a new trial.

2014Nothing in Riofta supports a reading of the statute that would allow the petitioner in a case such as this to rest on the presumption of favorable test results alone. ¶34 Further, the majority contends that the present case is factually analogous to Thompson , where the court “found that even in the context of all the strong evidence of guilt, DNA testing should be granted because if the DNA did not match, the convicted individual was most likely innocent.” Majority at 261. 9 I disagree. ¶35 In Thompson , we overturned the trial court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s motion for postconviction D

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Crumpton green
wash · 2014
2 sentences

2026However, the Supreme Court also engaged in the proper substantive analysis and expressly concluded that, applying the proper favorable presumption, “Crumpton’s motion for testing must be granted.” Id. at 261 .

2015And, while the judge’s conclusion that RCW 10.73.170 does not impose a favorable presumption of exculpatory DNA test results is clearly wrong in light of our recent decision in State v. Crumpton, 181 Wn.2d 252, 255 , 332 P.3d 448 (2014), the ultimate holding denying further DNA testing is sustainable.

52015–2026
State v. Riofta green
wash · 2009
2 sentences

2014In Riofta, the movant sought DNA testing of a white hat that was worn by the perpetrator of a shooting for which he was convicted. 4 166 Wn.2d at 361 .

2014In Riofta , the movant sought DNA testing of a white hat that was worn by the perpetrator of a shooting for which he was convicted. 4 166 Wn.2d at 361 .

32014–2014
State v. Crumpton green
washctapp · 2012
2 sentences

2014State v. Crumpton, 172 Wn.

2014State v. Crumpton, 172 Wn.

32014–2014
United States v. Bagley green
scotus · 1985
2 sentences

2011Id. at 680 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 .

2011Id. at 680 , 105 S.Ct. 3375 .

22011–2011
State v. Gentry green
wash · 2015
2 sentences

2016State v. Gentry. 183 Wn.2d 749, 764 , 356 P.3d 714 (2015). -3- No. 72850-4-1/4 Here, there is no indication in the record that the trial court applied the favorable presumption in ruling on Dublin's motion.

2016State v. Gentry. 183 Wn.2d 749, 764 , 356 P.3d 714 (2015). -3- No. 72850-4-1/4 Here, there is no indication in the record that the trial court applied the favorable presumption in ruling on Dublin's motion.

12016–2016
State v. Moser green
· 1952
2 sentences

1989State v. Moser, 41 Wn.2d 29, 31 , 246 P.2d 1101 (1952).

1989State v. Moser, 41 Wn.2d 29, 31 , 246 P.2d 1101 (1952).

11989–1989
United States v. Frank Squires green
ca2 · 1971
2 sentences

1984In United States v. Squires, supra , the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant did not waive his right to challenge an instruction which he had requested at trial in response to a similar but less favorable instruction proposed by the prosecution.

1984In United States v. Squires, supra, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant did not waive his right to challenge an instruction which he had requested at trial in response to a similar but less favorable instruction proposed by the prosecution.

11984–1984

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.170 (9) USC § 18u.s.c.3600 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

AL 78 (1942–2011) MA 55 (1984–2026) CA 22 (1902–2025) IL 15 (1915–2013) WA 14 (1984–2026) SC 13 (2010–2025) NY 10 (1917–2017) OK 8 (1918–2016) TX 7 (1902–2012) OH 7 (1929–2026) WI 6 (1888–2024) MN 6 (1941–2024) CT 5 (1980–2026) TN 5 (1981–2004) NV 5 (2013–2018) OR 5 (1937–1966) NJ 5 (1959–2011) VA 4 (1996–2009) FL 4 (1992–2018) AZ 4 (2011–2016) MO 4 (1908–2006) LA 3 (1932–1982) MI 3 (1970–1977) MT 3 (1898–1935) NH 3 (1988–2008) DC 2 (2020–2020) ND 2 (1997–1997) DE 2 (2018–2025) MD 2 (1970–1987) WY 2 (1940–2019) AR 2 (1879–1922)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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