favorable standard in California

2017(See People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572 , 582-583, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 [ineffective assistance of defense counsel]; People v. Drake (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 92 , 97-98, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 790 [prosecution withheld identity of a favorable defense witness].) Accordingly, even though lay jurors may not know it is impermissible to consider the defendant's failure to testify in the absence of an appropriate instruction, when a proper motion has been made, a defendant may be entitled to a new trial if he or she can establish by admissible evidence that an extended discussion of the defend

2017(See People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572 , 582-583, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 [ineffective assistance of defense counsel]; People v. Drake (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 92 , 97-98, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 790 [prosecution withheld identity of a favorable defense witness].) Accordingly, even though lay jurors may not know it is impermissible to consider the defendant's failure to testify in the absence of an appropriate instruction, when a proper motion has been made, a defendant may be entitled to a new trial if he or she can establish by admissible evidence that an extended discussion of the defend

2017(See People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572 , 582-583, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 [ineffective assistance of defense counsel]; People v. Drake (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 92 , 97-98, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 790 [prosecution withheld identity of a favorable defense witness].) Accordingly, even though lay jurors may not know it is impermissible to consider the defendant's failure to testify in the absence of an appropriate instruction, when a proper motion has been made, a defendant may be entitled to a new trial if he or she can establish by admissible evidence that an extended discussion of the defend

2017(See People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572 , 582-583, 189 Cal.Rptr. 855 , 659 P.2d 1144 [ineffective assistance of defense counsel]; People v. Drake (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 92 , 97-98, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 790 [prosecution withheld identity of a favorable defense witness].) Accordingly, even though lay jurors may not know it is impermissible to consider the defendant's failure to testify in the absence of an appropriate instruction, when a proper motion has been made, a defendant may be entitled to a new trial if he or she can establish by admissible evidence that an extended discussion of the defend

2025(See People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 [“the circumstances must be ‘extraordinary . . . by which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation of which the law was meant to attack’ ”].) I do not read the majority to explain otherwise.

2009Water Dist. (1995) 38 *987 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1620 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 688 ].) "A project opponent cannot obtain a more favorable standard of review by arguing that the EIR failed to disclose the conflicting evidence, and therefore the lead agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law; the project opponent must also show that the failure to disclose the conflicting evidence precluded informed decisionmaking or informed public participation." ( Ibid. ; accord, National Parks, at p. 1353; but see Association of Irritated Residents v. County of Madera (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1392 [ 133 C

2009(Sierra Club v. State Bd. of Forestry, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1236 .) We review such procedural violations de novo.

2009Water Dist. (1995) 38 *987 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1620 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 688 ].) "A project opponent cannot obtain a more favorable standard of review by arguing that the EIR failed to disclose the conflicting evidence, and therefore the lead agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law; the project opponent must also show that the failure to disclose the conflicting evidence precluded informed decisionmaking or informed public participation." ( Ibid. ; accord, National Parks, at p. 1353; but see Association of Irritated Residents v. County of Madera (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1392 [ 133 C

2009Water Dist. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1620 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 688 ].) “A project opponent cannot obtain a more favorable standard of review by arguing that the EIR failed to disclose the conflicting evidence, and therefore the lead agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law; the project opponent must also show that the failure to disclose the conflicting evidence precluded informed decisionmaking or informed public participation.” (Ibid.; accord, National Parks, at p. 1353; but see Association of Irritated Residents v. County of Madera (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1392 [ 133 Cal.Rptr

2009Water Dist. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1609, 1620 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 688 ].) “A project opponent cannot obtain a more favorable standard of review by arguing that the EIR failed to disclose the conflicting evidence, and therefore the lead agency has not proceeded in a manner required by law; the project opponent must also show that the failure to disclose the conflicting evidence precluded informed decisionmaking or informed public participation.” (Ibid.; accord, National Parks, at p. 1353; but see Association of Irritated Residents v. County of Madera (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1392 [ 133 Cal.Rptr

2006(See Scott II, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at pp. 595-596.) The Governor’s decision rests on factors that (1) the murder was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner (§ 2402, subd. (c)(1)), and (2) Elkins was initially unwilling to accept full responsibility for the murder, an issue that has been treated as working against showing remorse (§ 2402, subd. (d)(3); Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 674).* *** 5 We examine the second factor first.

2004(See Solis v. Kirkwood Resort Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 354, 360-361 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 265 ] [contrasting deferential review of trial court’s assessment of extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguity in release with independent review of summary judgment ruling].) Vine’s point is well taken.

2004(See Solis v. Kirkwood Resort Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 354, 360-361 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 265 ] [contrasting deferential review of trial court’s assessment of extrinsic evidence to resolve ambiguity in release with independent review of summary judgment ruling].) Vine’s point is well taken.

2003In the case before us now, however, the record is equivocal, with conflicting stories and inferences proffered by the respective parties. *1154 This case comes to us on a favorable standard of review in which reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the trial court’s decision, regardless of whether the trial court acted under the authority of subdivision (b) of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 or the inherent power of a court to set aside a judgment procured by the extrinsic fraud of keeping an adversary out of court (see Cross v. Tustin (1951) 37 Cal.2d 821, 824-825 [ 236 P.2d 142 ]

2003In the case before us now, however, the record is equivocal, with conflicting stories and inferences proffered by the respective parties. *1154 This case comes to us on a favorable standard of review in which reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the trial court’s decision, regardless of whether the trial court acted under the authority of subdivision (b) of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 or the inherent power of a court to set aside a judgment procured by the extrinsic fraud of keeping an adversary out of court (see Cross v. Tustin (1951) 37 Cal.2d 821, 824-825 [ 236 P.2d 142 ]

2003In the case before us now, however, the record is equivocal, with conflicting stories and inferences proffered by the respective parties. *1154 This case comes to us on a favorable standard of review in which reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the trial court’s decision, regardless of whether the trial court acted under the authority of subdivision (b) of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 or the inherent power of a court to set aside a judgment procured by the extrinsic fraud of keeping an adversary out of court (see Cross v. Tustin (1951) 37 Cal.2d 821, 824-825 [ 236 P.2d 142 ]

2003In the case before us now, however, the record is equivocal, with conflicting stories and inferences proffered by the respective parties. *1154 This case comes to us on a favorable standard of review in which reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the trial court’s decision, regardless of whether the trial court acted under the authority of subdivision (b) of Code of Civil Procedure section 473 or the inherent power of a court to set aside a judgment procured by the extrinsic fraud of keeping an adversary out of court (see Cross v. Tustin (1951) 37 Cal.2d 821, 824-825 [ 236 P.2d 142 ]

2000(See ante, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 725, 12 P.3d at p. 1131 et seq.) Those cases, however, do not establish the rule plaintiffs seek.

2000(See ante, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 725, 12 P.3d at p. 1131 et seq.) Those cases, however, do not establish the rule plaintiffs seek.

1991As we have stated in a related context, “When a trial court proposes to discharge a jury without legal necessity therefor, the defendant is under no duty to object in order to claim the protection of the constitutional guarantee [against double jeopardy], and his mere silence in the face of an ensuing discharge cannot be deemed a waiver. [Citations.]” (Curry v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 713 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 470 P.2d 345 ]; People v. Upshaw (1974) 13 Cal.3d 29, 34 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 668 , 528 P.2d 756 ]; cf. United States v. Scott (1978) 437 U.S. 82, 98-99 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 79 , 98 S.

1991As we have stated in a related context, “When a trial court proposes to discharge a jury without legal necessity therefor, the defendant is under no duty to object in order to claim the protection of the constitutional guarantee [against double jeopardy], and his mere silence in the face of an ensuing discharge cannot be deemed a waiver. [Citations.]” (Curry v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 713 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 470 P.2d 345 ]; People v. Upshaw (1974) 13 Cal.3d 29, 34 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 668 , 528 P.2d 756 ]; cf. United States v. Scott (1978) 437 U.S. 82, 98-99 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 79 , 98 S.

1991As we have stated in a related context, “When a trial court proposes to discharge a jury without legal necessity therefor, the defendant is under no duty to object in order to claim the protection of the constitutional guarantee [against double jeopardy], and his mere silence in the face of an ensuing discharge cannot be deemed a waiver. [Citations.]” (Curry v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 713 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 470 P.2d 345 ]; People v. Upshaw (1974) 13 Cal.3d 29, 34 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 668 , 528 P.2d 756 ]; cf. United States v. Scott (1978) 437 U.S. 82, 98-99 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 79 , 98 S.

1991As we have stated in a related context, “When a trial court proposes to discharge a jury without legal necessity therefor, the defendant is under no duty to object in order to claim the protection of the constitutional guarantee [against double jeopardy], and his mere silence in the face of an ensuing discharge cannot be deemed a waiver. [Citations.]” (Curry v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 713 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 470 P.2d 345 ]; People v. Upshaw (1974) 13 Cal.3d 29, 34 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 668 , 528 P.2d 756 ]; cf. United States v. Scott (1978) 437 U.S. 82, 98-99 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 79 , 98 S.

1991As we have stated in a related context, “When a trial court proposes to discharge a jury without legal necessity therefor, the defendant is under no duty to object in order to claim the protection of the constitutional guarantee [against double jeopardy], and his mere silence in the face of an ensuing discharge cannot be deemed a waiver. [Citations.]” (Curry v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 713 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 470 P.2d 345 ]; People v. Upshaw (1974) 13 Cal.3d 29, 34 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 668 , 528 P.2d 756 ]; cf. United States v. Scott (1978) 437 U.S. 82, 98-99 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 79 , 98 S.

1991As we have stated in a related context, “When a trial court proposes to discharge a jury without legal necessity therefor, the defendant is under no duty to object in order to claim the protection of the constitutional guarantee [against double jeopardy], and his mere silence in the face of an ensuing discharge cannot be deemed a waiver. [Citations.]” (Curry v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 713 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 361 , 470 P.2d 345 ]; People v. Upshaw (1974) 13 Cal.3d 29, 34 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 668 , 528 P.2d 756 ]; cf. United States v. Scott (1978) 437 U.S. 82, 98-99 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 65, 79 , 98 S.

1989However, he found that a more favorable defense verdict was not reasonably probable under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].

1989However, he found that a more favorable defense verdict was not reasonably probable under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].

1989Presiding Justice Franson dissented on grounds that Kelly/Frye has never been applied to expert opinion offered to prove mental or psychological state, citing People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 372-373 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 236 , 690 P.2d 709 , 46 A.L.R.4th 1011 ].

1989Presiding Justice Franson dissented on grounds that Kelly/Frye has never been applied to expert opinion offered to prove mental or psychological state, citing People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 372-373 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 236 , 690 P.2d 709 , 46 A.L.R.4th 1011 ].

1988But in view of the statements made on the record, the court will not give the instruction pertaining to 190.3 subparagraph (h).” On the face of the record it seems plain that defense counsel “express[ed] a deliberate tactical purpose in objecting to . . . [the] instruction . . . .” (People v. Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 333 .) Defendant argues, in substance, that counsel mistakenly assumed that section 190.3(h) was no broader than the then-applicable insanity test stated in People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 339-348 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 275 , 583 P.2d 1318 ], and that his mistake vitiated

1988But in view of the statements made on the record, the court will not give the instruction pertaining to 190.3 subparagraph (h).” On the face of the record it seems plain that defense counsel “express[ed] a deliberate tactical purpose in objecting to . . . [the] instruction . . . .” (People v. Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 333 .) Defendant argues, in substance, that counsel mistakenly assumed that section 190.3(h) was no broader than the then-applicable insanity test stated in People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333, 339-348 [ 149 Cal.Rptr. 275 , 583 P.2d 1318 ], and that his mistake vitiated