isolated violation in West Virginia

2026Va. 1 , 491 S.E.2d 1 (1996) (citation modified) (“More than a single isolated violation of West Virginia Code § 33-11-4(9), must be shown in order to meet the statutory requirement of an indication of a general business practice, which requirement must be shown in order to maintain the statutory implied cause of action.”).

2026Va. 1 , 491 S.E.2d 1 (1996) (citation modified) (“More than a single isolated violation of West Virginia Code § 33-11-4(9), must be shown in order to meet the statutory requirement of an indication of a general business practice, which requirement must be shown in order to maintain the statutory implied cause of action.”).

2026Va. 323 , 352 S.E.2d 73 (1986). 5 under other portions of the insurance policy coverage; (n) Failing to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis in the insurance policy in relation to the facts or applicable law for denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement[.] The circuit court further noted that in order to prevail on a UTPA claim, an insured cannot rely solely on an insurer’s isolated violation of West Virginia Code § 33-11-4(9), but rather, it must be demonstrated that an insurer violated the statute with such frequency as to indicate a “general business pr

2026Va. 323 , 352 S.E.2d 73 (1986). 5 under other portions of the insurance policy coverage; (n) Failing to promptly provide a reasonable explanation of the basis in the insurance policy in relation to the facts or applicable law for denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement[.] The circuit court further noted that in order to prevail on a UTPA claim, an insured cannot rely solely on an insurer’s isolated violation of West Virginia Code § 33-11-4(9), but rather, it must be demonstrated that an insurer violated the statute with such frequency as to indicate a “general business pr

2011The isolated instruction contained in the jury’s charge appears to come from the case of State v. Beck, 167 W.Va. 830 , 286 S.E.2d 234 (1981).

2011The isolated instruction contained in the jury’s charge appears to come from the case of State v. Beck, 167 W.Va. 830 , 286 S.E.2d 234 (1981).

1992In Syllabus Point 3 of Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656 , 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991), we listed among the factors that the jury could consider in awarding punitive damages *629 "whether/how often the defendant engaged in a similar conduct in the past[.]” 11 .

1992In Syllabus Point 3 of Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656 , 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991), we listed among the factors that the jury could consider in awarding punitive damages *629 "whether/how often the defendant engaged in a similar conduct in the past[.]” 11 .

1991See note 11, supra. The policy in McCullough provided: "`No suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements of this policy have been complied with, and unless commenced within two years after inception of the loss.'" 424 N.W.2d at 544 . [15] For the text of the pertinent regulation, see note 9, supra. [16] Moreover, in Syllabus Point 3 of Jenkins , we held that a single violation of the Act was not sufficient to maintain the cause of action: "More than a single isolated violation of W.Va.

1989Invocation and waiver are entirely distinct inquiries, and the two must not be blurred by merging them together.” 469 U.S. at 97-98 , 105 S.Ct. at 494 , 83 L.Ed.2d at 495 . 4 Thus, in substance, the Supreme Court in Smith held that the invocation of the right to counsel is an isolated inquiry entirely separate from the waiver question.

1989Invocation and waiver are entirely distinct inquiries, and the two must not be blurred by merging them together.” 469 U.S. at 97-98 , 105 S.Ct. at 494 , 83 L.Ed.2d at 495 . 4 Thus, in substance, the Supreme Court in Smith held that the invocation of the right to counsel is an isolated inquiry entirely separate from the waiver question.