individualized sentencing hearing in Wyoming

2025As this Court later explained, Miller instead “requires an individualized sentencing hearing for every juvenile convicted of first-degree murder at which the sentencing court must consider the individual, the factors of youth, and the nature of the homicide in determining whether to order a sentence that includes the possibility of parole.” Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 44 , 294 P.3d 36, 47 (Wyo. 2013). [¶15] The Supreme Court made clear in Miller that its ruling applied to those under age eighteen at the time of their crimes.

2025As this Court later explained, Miller instead “requires an individualized sentencing hearing for every juvenile convicted of first-degree murder at which the sentencing court must consider the individual, the factors of youth, and the nature of the homicide in determining whether to order a sentence that includes the possibility of parole.” Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 44 , 294 P.3d 36, 47 (Wyo. 2013). [¶15] The Supreme Court made clear in Miller that its ruling applied to those under age eighteen at the time of their crimes.

2020See, e.g., Wiley v. State, 2020 WY 49 , 461 P.3d 413 (Wyo. 2020); Davis I, 415 P.3d 666 ; Sam v. State, 2019 WY 104 , 450 P.3d 217 (Wyo. 2019) (Sam II). 3 A Miller hearing is an individualized sentencing hearing in which the sentencing court must determine whether the defendant is “irreparably corrupt.” See Bear Cloud III, ¶¶ 27, 33, 334 P.3d at 141–42; Davis [I], ¶¶ 35–59, 415 P.3d at 679– 85.

2020We adopted the Miller holding in Bear Cloud II, where we held that in order to fulfill the requirements of Miller, a trial court must consider “the factors of youth and the nature of the homicide at an individualized sentencing hearing when determining whether to sentence the juvenile offender to life without the possibility of parole or to life according to law.” Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 42 , 294 P.3d 36, 47 (Wyo. 2013) (Bear Cloud II). [¶8] A Miller hearing is an individualized sentencing hearing in which the sentencing court must determine whether the defendant is “irreparably cor

2026For the misdemeanor stalking, the sentence recommendation was for time served. 2 [¶10] Sentencing in this case became an issue because of constitutional considerations related to juvenile sentencing arising from Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and its progeny cases, our Bear Cloud line of cases, and Wyoming statutes that generally prohibit life sentences for juveniles without an individualized sentencing hearing and a finding of permanent incorrigibility. 2 The Bear Cloud line of cases 3 and Wyoming statutes effectively define a juvenile life sentence as one without parole eligibility a

2026In the defense’s sentencing memorandum, Mr. Castaner argued a life sentence for a juvenile was 2 Under Miller, the United States Supreme Court did not categorically bar life without parole sentences for juveniles, but instead, required that before a life without parole sentence was imposed, the sentencing court hold an individualized sentencing hearing to consider “an offender’s youth and attendant circumstances.” 567 U.S. at 483 .

2020See, e.g., Wiley v. State, 2020 WY 49 , 461 P.3d 413 (Wyo. 2020); Davis I, 415 P.3d 666 ; Sam v. State, 2019 WY 104 , 450 P.3d 217 (Wyo. 2019) (Sam II). 3 A Miller hearing is an individualized sentencing hearing in which the sentencing court must determine whether the defendant is “irreparably corrupt.” See Bear Cloud III, ¶¶ 27, 33, 334 P.3d at 141–42; Davis [I], ¶¶ 35–59, 415 P.3d at 679– 85.

2020See, e.g., Wiley v. State, 2020 WY 49 , 461 P.3d 413 (Wyo. 2020); Davis I, 415 P.3d 666 ; Sam v. State, 2019 WY 104 , 450 P.3d 217 (Wyo. 2019) (Sam II). 3 A Miller hearing is an individualized sentencing hearing in which the sentencing court must determine whether the defendant is “irreparably corrupt.” See Bear Cloud III, ¶¶ 27, 33, 334 P.3d at 141–42; Davis [I], ¶¶ 35–59, 415 P.3d at 679– 85.

2026Under Wyoming law, permanent incorrigibility has been described as “irreparable corruption,” Sen v. State, 2013 WY 47, ¶ 51 , 301 P.3d 106, 127 (Wyo. 2013) (Sen I), and distinguished from “transient immaturity.” Davis v. State, 2018 WY 40 , ¶ 54, 415 P.3d 666, 684 (Wyo. 2018). 3 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 2020 WY 122 , 472 P.3d 1030 (Wyo. 2020); Sam v. State, 2019 WY 104 , 450 P.3d 217 (Wyo. 2019); Sen v. State, 2017 WY 30 , 390 P.3d 769 (Wyo. 2017); Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 1 , 334 P.3d 132, 135 (Wyo. 2014) (Bear Cloud III); Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 1 , 294 P.3d 36, 39 (W

2020We rejected his argument, holding that a thirty-five-year aggregate sentence “did not trigger the Miller protections.” Sam v. State, 2019 WY 104, ¶ 10 , 450 P.3d 217, 221 (Wyo. 2019) (Sam II) (citing Sen III, ¶¶ 19, 22, 390 P.3d at 775–76). [¶14] Mr. Wiley argues that his 1992 sentence is the functional equivalent of life without parole requiring an individualized sentencing hearing. 2 Mr. Wiley is eligible for parole 1 At the time of his appeal, Mr. Davis had “served almost thirty-four years on his life sentence when he was paroled” from that sentence to begin serving his consecutive twenty-

2026At the status conference, the State informed the district court that it believed the case was governed by Sam v. State, 2017 WY 98 , 401 P.3d 834 (Wyo. 2017).

2019That requirement has taken the form of a “Miller hearing,” an individualized sentencing hearing during which the sentencing court obtains information to make the threshold determination whether the offender is one of “[t]hose who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles [and] may turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for the duration of their lives.” Sam, ¶ 78, 401 P.3d at 859 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 , 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 2030, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010)); see also Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 42 , 294 P.3d 36, 47 (Wyo. 2013) (Bear Cloud II) (se

2020See, e.g., Wiley v. State, 2020 WY 49 , 461 P.3d 413 (Wyo. 2020); Davis I, 415 P.3d 666 ; Sam v. State, 2019 WY 104 , 450 P.3d 217 (Wyo. 2019) (Sam II). 3 A Miller hearing is an individualized sentencing hearing in which the sentencing court must determine whether the defendant is “irreparably corrupt.” See Bear Cloud III, ¶¶ 27, 33, 334 P.3d at 141–42; Davis [I], ¶¶ 35–59, 415 P.3d at 679– 85.

2020See, e.g., Wiley v. State, 2020 WY 49 , 461 P.3d 413 (Wyo. 2020); Davis I, 415 P.3d 666 ; Sam v. State, 2019 WY 104 , 450 P.3d 217 (Wyo. 2019) (Sam II). 3 A Miller hearing is an individualized sentencing hearing in which the sentencing court must determine whether the defendant is “irreparably corrupt.” See Bear Cloud III, ¶¶ 27, 33, 334 P.3d at 141–42; Davis [I], ¶¶ 35–59, 415 P.3d at 679– 85.

2019That requirement has taken the form of a “Miller hearing,” an individualized sentencing hearing during which the sentencing court obtains information to make the threshold determination whether the offender is one of “[t]hose who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles [and] may turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for the duration of their lives.” Sam, ¶ 78, 401 P.3d at 859 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 , 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 2030, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010)); see also Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 42 , 294 P.3d 36, 47 (Wyo. 2013) (Bear Cloud II) (se

2019That requirement has taken the form of a “Miller hearing,” an individualized sentencing hearing during which the sentencing court obtains information to make the threshold determination whether the offender is one of “[t]hose who commit truly horrifying crimes as juveniles [and] may turn out to be irredeemable, and thus deserving of incarceration for the duration of their lives.” Sam, ¶ 78, 401 P.3d at 859 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 , 75, 130 S.Ct. 2011 , 2030, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010)); see also Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 42 , 294 P.3d 36, 47 (Wyo. 2013) (Bear Cloud II) (se

2020See, e.g., Wiley v. State, 2020 WY 49 , 461 P.3d 413 (Wyo. 2020); Davis I, 415 P.3d 666 ; Sam v. State, 2019 WY 104 , 450 P.3d 217 (Wyo. 2019) (Sam II). 3 A Miller hearing is an individualized sentencing hearing in which the sentencing court must determine whether the defendant is “irreparably corrupt.” See Bear Cloud III, ¶¶ 27, 33, 334 P.3d at 141–42; Davis [I], ¶¶ 35–59, 415 P.3d at 679– 85.

2020See, e.g., Wiley v. State, 2020 WY 49 , 461 P.3d 413 (Wyo. 2020); Davis I, 415 P.3d 666 ; Sam v. State, 2019 WY 104 , 450 P.3d 217 (Wyo. 2019) (Sam II). 3 A Miller hearing is an individualized sentencing hearing in which the sentencing court must determine whether the defendant is “irreparably corrupt.” See Bear Cloud III, ¶¶ 27, 33, 334 P.3d at 141–42; Davis [I], ¶¶ 35–59, 415 P.3d at 679– 85.

2017Accordingly, Miller required an individualized sentencing hearing that takes into account “how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id., 567 U.S. at ___ , 132 S.Ct. at 2469 . [¶15] Most recently, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___ , 136 S.Ct. 718, 725 , 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the Court addressed the issue of whether Miller applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.

2017Accordingly, Miller required an individualized sentencing hearing that takes into account “how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id., 567 U.S. at ___ , 132 S.Ct. at 2469 . [¶15] Most recently, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___ , 136 S.Ct. 718, 725 , 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), the Court addressed the issue of whether Miller applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.

2026Under Wyoming law, permanent incorrigibility has been described as “irreparable corruption,” Sen v. State, 2013 WY 47, ¶ 51 , 301 P.3d 106, 127 (Wyo. 2013) (Sen I), and distinguished from “transient immaturity.” Davis v. State, 2018 WY 40 , ¶ 54, 415 P.3d 666, 684 (Wyo. 2018). 3 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 2020 WY 122 , 472 P.3d 1030 (Wyo. 2020); Sam v. State, 2019 WY 104 , 450 P.3d 217 (Wyo. 2019); Sen v. State, 2017 WY 30 , 390 P.3d 769 (Wyo. 2017); Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 1 , 334 P.3d 132, 135 (Wyo. 2014) (Bear Cloud III); Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 1 , 294 P.3d 36, 39 (W

2026Under Wyoming law, permanent incorrigibility has been described as “irreparable corruption,” Sen v. State, 2013 WY 47, ¶ 51 , 301 P.3d 106, 127 (Wyo. 2013) (Sen I), and distinguished from “transient immaturity.” Davis v. State, 2018 WY 40 , ¶ 54, 415 P.3d 666, 684 (Wyo. 2018). 3 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 2020 WY 122 , 472 P.3d 1030 (Wyo. 2020); Sam v. State, 2019 WY 104 , 450 P.3d 217 (Wyo. 2019); Sen v. State, 2017 WY 30 , 390 P.3d 769 (Wyo. 2017); Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 1 , 334 P.3d 132, 135 (Wyo. 2014) (Bear Cloud III); Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 1 , 294 P.3d 36, 39 (W

2026Under Wyoming law, permanent incorrigibility has been described as “irreparable corruption,” Sen v. State, 2013 WY 47, ¶ 51 , 301 P.3d 106, 127 (Wyo. 2013) (Sen I), and distinguished from “transient immaturity.” Davis v. State, 2018 WY 40 , ¶ 54, 415 P.3d 666, 684 (Wyo. 2018). 3 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 2020 WY 122 , 472 P.3d 1030 (Wyo. 2020); Sam v. State, 2019 WY 104 , 450 P.3d 217 (Wyo. 2019); Sen v. State, 2017 WY 30 , 390 P.3d 769 (Wyo. 2017); Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 1 , 334 P.3d 132, 135 (Wyo. 2014) (Bear Cloud III); Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 1 , 294 P.3d 36, 39 (W

2026Under Wyoming law, permanent incorrigibility has been described as “irreparable corruption,” Sen v. State, 2013 WY 47, ¶ 51 , 301 P.3d 106, 127 (Wyo. 2013) (Sen I), and distinguished from “transient immaturity.” Davis v. State, 2018 WY 40 , ¶ 54, 415 P.3d 666, 684 (Wyo. 2018). 3 See, e.g., Davis v. State, 2020 WY 122 , 472 P.3d 1030 (Wyo. 2020); Sam v. State, 2019 WY 104 , 450 P.3d 217 (Wyo. 2019); Sen v. State, 2017 WY 30 , 390 P.3d 769 (Wyo. 2017); Bear Cloud v. State, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 1 , 334 P.3d 132, 135 (Wyo. 2014) (Bear Cloud III); Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, ¶ 1 , 294 P.3d 36, 39 (W

2020See Barela v. State, 2016 WY 68, ¶ 8 , 375 P.3d 783 , 786–87 (Wyo. 2016) (quoting Pfeil v. State, 2014 WY 137 , ¶¶ 24–25, 336 P.3d 1206 , 1213–14 (Wyo. 2014)). 4 CONCLUSION [¶15] Mr. Wiley’s sentence is not a de facto life sentence entitling him to an individualized sentencing hearing under Miller.

2020See Barela v. State, 2016 WY 68, ¶ 8 , 375 P.3d 783 , 786–87 (Wyo. 2016) (quoting Pfeil v. State, 2014 WY 137 , ¶¶ 24–25, 336 P.3d 1206 , 1213–14 (Wyo. 2014)). 4 CONCLUSION [¶15] Mr. Wiley’s sentence is not a de facto life sentence entitling him to an individualized sentencing hearing under Miller.

2020A. Standard of Review [¶6] “A district court has discretion in ruling on a motion to correct an illegal sentence; consequently, we review the district court’s ruling for abuse of discretion.” Gould v. 1 State, 2006 WY 157, ¶ 7 , 151 P.3d 261, 264 (Wyo. 2006).

2020A. Standard of Review [¶6] “A district court has discretion in ruling on a motion to correct an illegal sentence; consequently, we review the district court’s ruling for abuse of discretion.” Gould v. 1 State, 2006 WY 157, ¶ 7 , 151 P.3d 261, 264 (Wyo. 2006).

2020See Barela v. State, 2016 WY 68, ¶ 8 , 375 P.3d 783 , 786–87 (Wyo. 2016) (quoting Pfeil v. State, 2014 WY 137 , ¶¶ 24–25, 336 P.3d 1206 , 1213–14 (Wyo. 2014)). 4 CONCLUSION [¶15] Mr. Wiley’s sentence is not a de facto life sentence entitling him to an individualized sentencing hearing under Miller.

2020See Barela v. State, 2016 WY 68, ¶ 8 , 375 P.3d 783 , 786–87 (Wyo. 2016) (quoting Pfeil v. State, 2014 WY 137 , ¶¶ 24–25, 336 P.3d 1206 , 1213–14 (Wyo. 2014)). 4 CONCLUSION [¶15] Mr. Wiley’s sentence is not a de facto life sentence entitling him to an individualized sentencing hearing under Miller.

2019And we held that “‘[t]he prospect of geriatric release . . . does not provide a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate the maturity and rehabilitation required to obtain release and reenter society as required by Graham. . . .’” Bear Cloud III, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 34 , 334 P.3d at 142 (quoting State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 71 (Iowa 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted)).