individualized sentencing hearing in South Carolina

2021Aiken held that juvenile offenders were entitled to an individualized sentencing hearing if they were "convicted for homicides committed while they were juveniles" and "were sentenced to [LWOP] according to existing sentencing procedures, which made no distinction between defendants whose crimes were committed as an adult and those whose crimes were committed as a juvenile." 410 S.C. at 537 , 765 S.E.2d at 573 .

2021Aiken held that juvenile offenders were entitled to an individualized sentencing hearing if they were "convicted for homicides committed while they were juveniles" and "were sentenced to [LWOP] according to existing sentencing procedures, which made no distinction between defendants whose crimes were committed as an adult and those whose crimes were committed as a juvenile." 410 S.C. at 537 , 765 S.E.2d at 573 .

2021See Aiken, 410 S.C. at 537 , 765 S.E.2d at 573 (declaring juvenile offenders were entitled to an individualized sentencing hearing if they were 2 560 U.S. 48 (2010). (1) convicted for homicide offenses while they were juveniles and (2) were sentenced to LWOP according to existing sentencing procedures that made no distinction between defendants whose crimes were committed as an adult and those whose crimes were committed as a juvenile).

2021Id. at 477–78.

2021In South Carolina, Byars mandates only that trial courts hold an individualized sentencing hearing in which all the "mitigating hallmark features of youth are fully explored." 410 S.C. at 545 , 765 S.E.2d at 578 ; see also Miller, 567 U.S. at 480 ("Although we do not foreclose a [trial court's] ability to [impose a sentence of life without parole] in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.").

2020See State v. Smith, 387 S.C. 619, 622 , 693 S.E.2d 415 , 417 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The [circuit] court's decision to deny a motion for continuance is a matter within the [circuit] court's discretion."); State v. Hicks, 377 S.C. 322, 325 , 659 S.E.2d 499, 500 (Ct. App. 2008) ("A judge or other sentencing authority is to be accorded very wide discretion in determining an appropriate sentence, and must be permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant, given the crime committed.").

2020See State v. Smith, 387 S.C. 619, 622 , 693 S.E.2d 415 , 417 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The [circuit] court's decision to deny a motion for continuance is a matter within the [circuit] court's discretion."); State v. Hicks, 377 S.C. 322, 325 , 659 S.E.2d 499, 500 (Ct. App. 2008) ("A judge or other sentencing authority is to be accorded very wide discretion in determining an appropriate sentence, and must be permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant, given the crime committed.").

2020See State v. Smith, 387 S.C. 619, 622 , 693 S.E.2d 415 , 417 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The [circuit] court's decision to deny a motion for continuance is a matter within the [circuit] court's discretion."); State v. Hicks, 377 S.C. 322, 325 , 659 S.E.2d 499, 500 (Ct. App. 2008) ("A judge or other sentencing authority is to be accorded very wide discretion in determining an appropriate sentence, and must be permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant, given the crime committed.").

2020See State v. Smith, 387 S.C. 619, 622 , 693 S.E.2d 415 , 417 (Ct. App. 2010) ("The [circuit] court's decision to deny a motion for continuance is a matter within the [circuit] court's discretion."); State v. Hicks, 377 S.C. 322, 325 , 659 S.E.2d 499, 500 (Ct. App. 2008) ("A judge or other sentencing authority is to be accorded very wide discretion in determining an appropriate sentence, and must be permitted to consider any and all information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant, given the crime committed.").

2019App. 2014); Shalouei v. State, 524 S.W.3d 766, 767 (Tex. App. 2017), cert. denied, July 31, 2017; State v. Barbeau, 883 N.W.2d 520, 532 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016) (collecting cases); see also State v. Zarate, 908 N.W.2d 831, 846 (Iowa 2018) (reaching the same result under the state constitution so long as a juvenile offender was given an individualized sentencing hearing, similar to South Carolina's Aiken hearings).

2019App. 2014); Shalouei v. State, 524 S.W.3d 766, 767 (Tex. App. 2017), cert. denied, July 31, 2017; State v. Barbeau, 883 N.W.2d 520, 532 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016) (collecting cases); see also State v. Zarate, 908 N.W.2d 831, 846 (Iowa 2018) (reaching the same result under the state constitution so long as a juvenile offender was given an individualized sentencing hearing, similar to South Carolina's Aiken hearings).

2019App. 2014); Shalouei v. State, 524 S.W.3d 766, 767 (Tex. App. 2017), cert. denied, July 31, 2017; State v. Barbeau, 883 N.W.2d 520, 532 (Wis. Ct. App. 2016) (collecting cases); see also State v. Zarate, 908 N.W.2d 831, 846 (Iowa 2018) (reaching the same result under the state constitution so long as a juvenile offender was given an individualized sentencing hearing, similar to South Carolina's Aiken hearings).

2019Ct. App. 2019) (determining the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence of life with the possibility of parole on a juvenile homicide offender without an individualized sentencing hearing was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment); State v. Houston-Sconiers, 391 P.3d 409, 420 (Wash. 2017) (en banc) (holding a sentencer was required to have complete discretion to sentence a juvenile as it felt appropriate, including below any statutorily-required mandatory minimums). 7 As we stated in Slocumb, the General Assembly has introduced legislation that would update juvenile sentencing practic

2016However, Roberts failed to raise this argument to the circuit court or otherwise obtain a ruling from the sentencing court as to this issue.1, 2 See State v. Passmore, 363 S.C. 568, 583 , 611 S.E.2d 273, 281 (Ct. App. 1 See Aiken, 410 S.C. at 545 , 765 S.E.2d at 578 ("[A]ny individual affected by our holding may file a motion for resentencing within one year from the filing of this opinion in the court of general sessions where he or she was originally sentenced."). 2005) ("The general rule of issue preservation states that if an issue was not raised and ruled upon below, it will not be consid

2016However, Roberts failed to raise this argument to the circuit court or otherwise obtain a ruling from the sentencing court as to this issue.1, 2 See State v. Passmore, 363 S.C. 568, 583 , 611 S.E.2d 273, 281 (Ct. App. 1 See Aiken, 410 S.C. at 545 , 765 S.E.2d at 578 ("[A]ny individual affected by our holding may file a motion for resentencing within one year from the filing of this opinion in the court of general sessions where he or she was originally sentenced."). 2005) ("The general rule of issue preservation states that if an issue was not raised and ruled upon below, it will not be consid