form of title presumption in California

2020(See, e.g., Estate of Levine (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 701, 705 [applying Siberell presumption to joint tenancy property acquired after January 1, 1975]; cf. Estate of Blair (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 161, 167 , quoting Levine, at p. 705 [“Before January 1, 1985, the form of title presumption”—i.e., Siberell’s presumption—“could be rebutted by showing the character of the property had been changed by oral or written ‘agreement or common understanding between the spouses.’ ”]; maj. opn., ante, at pp. 22–23.) Legislative history accompanying relevant statutory amendments in 1983 suggests the Legislature

1988(Tomaier v. Tomaier (1944) 23 Cal.2d 754, 757 [ 146 P.2d 905 ].) Before January 1, 1985, the form of title presumption could be rebutted by showing the character of the property had been changed by oral or written “agreement or common understanding between the spouses.” (Estate of Levine (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 701, 705 [ 178 Cal.Rptr. 275 ].) Agreement could also be inferred from the conduct or declarations of the parties.

2022(In re Marriage of Delaney (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 991, 998 ; In re Marriage of Fossum, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 345 [“the form of title presumption simply does not apply in cases in which it conflicts with the presumption that one spouse has exerted undue influence over the other”].) The undue influence presumption can trump the “default rule that form of title controls at death . . . .” (In re Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 934.) In Lintz v. Lintz (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1353 , the appellate court concluded that the probate court should have applied the undue influence presumption “to

2022(In re Marriage of Delaney (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 991, 998 ; In re Marriage of Fossum, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 345 [“the form of title presumption simply does not apply in cases in which it conflicts with the presumption that one spouse has exerted undue influence over the other”].) The undue influence presumption can trump the “default rule that form of title controls at death . . . .” (In re Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 934.) In Lintz v. Lintz (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1353 , the appellate court concluded that the probate court should have applied the undue influence presumption “to

2015(Id. at p. 813; see, e.g., Socol v. King (1950) 36 Cal.2d 342, 345-346 [ 223 P.2d 627 ]; Tomaier v. Tomaier (1944) 23 Cal.2d 754, 757-759 [ 146 P.2d 905 ].) The form of title presumption could be rebutted by evidence of a contrary agreement, but not simply by tracing the source of the property.

2015(Id. at p. 813; see, e.g., Socol v. King (1950) 36 Cal.2d 342, 345-346 [ 223 P.2d 627 ]; Tomaier v. Tomaier (1944) 23 Cal.2d 754, 757-759 [ 146 P.2d 905 ].) The form of title presumption could be rebutted by evidence of a contrary agreement, but not simply by tracing the source of the property.

2011Referring to In re Marriage of Moore (1980) 28 Cal.3d 366 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 662 , 618 P.2d 208 ], and In re Marriage of Marsden (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 426 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 910 ], Significantly, when it applies, the form of title presumption may not be “rebutted by evidence that title was taken in a particular manner merely to obtain a loan.” (Brooks, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 190 ; cf. In re Marriage of Kahan (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 63, 69 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 700 ] [when title was taken by spouses as joint tenants to obtain loan, property was presumptively held in joint tenancy].) Edward does not dis

2011Referring to In re Marriage of Moore (1980) 28 Cal.3d 366 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 662 , 618 P.2d 208 ], and In re Marriage of Marsden (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 426 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 910 ], Significantly, when it applies, the form of title presumption may not be “rebutted by evidence that title was taken in a particular manner merely to obtain a loan.” (Brooks, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 190 ; cf. In re Marriage of Kahan (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 63, 69 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 700 ] [when title was taken by spouses as joint tenants to obtain loan, property was presumptively held in joint tenancy].) Edward does not dis

2021(In re Marriage of Delaney (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 991, 998 [“In cases such as this, involving interspousal property transactions, the ‘irreconcilable conflict’ between the two presumptions established by section 721 and Evidence Code section 662 has been resolved in favor of section 721, based on the intent of the Legislature in enacting fiduciary protections for interspousal transactions and general rules of statutory construction”]; In re Marriage of Fossum (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 336, 345 [“the form of title presumption simply does not apply in cases in which it conflicts with the presumptio

2015In support of this contention, appellant repeatedly cites the case of In re Marriage of Brooks & Robinson (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 176 (Marriage of Brooks), which stated: “According to the ‘form of title’ presumption, the description in a deed as to how title is held is presumed to reflect the actual ownership interests in the property.” (Id. at pp. 184-185.) Based on this concept, the Marriage of Brooks court found that “the mere fact that property was acquired during marriage does not . . . rebut the form of title presumption; to the contrary, the act of taking title to property in the name of

2021(In re Marriage of Delaney (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 991, 998 [“In cases such as this, involving interspousal property transactions, the ‘irreconcilable conflict’ between the two presumptions established by section 721 and Evidence Code section 662 has been resolved in favor of section 721, based on the intent of the Legislature in enacting fiduciary protections for interspousal transactions and general rules of statutory construction”]; In re Marriage of Fossum (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 336, 345 [“the form of title presumption simply does not apply in cases in which it conflicts with the presumptio

2014Code, § 760; In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 290-291 .) However, under the form of title presumption codified in Evidence Code section 662, “[t]he owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title,” and such “presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof.” (Evid.

2022(In re Marriage of Delaney (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 991, 998 ; In re Marriage of Fossum, supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 345 [“the form of title presumption simply does not apply in cases in which it conflicts with the presumption that one spouse has exerted undue influence over the other”].) The undue influence presumption can trump the “default rule that form of title controls at death . . . .” (In re Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 934.) In Lintz v. Lintz (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1353 , the appellate court concluded that the probate court should have applied the undue influence presumption “to

2021(In re Marriage of Delaney (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 991, 998 [“In cases such as this, involving interspousal property transactions, the ‘irreconcilable conflict’ between the two presumptions established by section 721 and Evidence Code section 662 has been resolved in favor of section 721, based on the intent of the Legislature in enacting fiduciary protections for interspousal transactions and general rules of statutory construction”]; In re Marriage of Fossum (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 336, 345 [“the form of title presumption simply does not apply in cases in which it conflicts with the presumptio

2015(Id. at p. 813; see, e.g., Socol v. King (1950) 36 Cal.2d 342, 345-346 [ 223 P.2d 627 ]; Tomaier v. Tomaier (1944) 23 Cal.2d 754, 757-759 [ 146 P.2d 905 ].) The form of title presumption could be rebutted by evidence of a contrary agreement, but not simply by tracing the source of the property.

2015(Id. at p. 813; see, e.g., Socol v. King (1950) 36 Cal.2d 342, 345-346 [ 223 P.2d 627 ]; Tomaier v. Tomaier (1944) 23 Cal.2d 754, 757-759 [ 146 P.2d 905 ].) The form of title presumption could be rebutted by evidence of a contrary agreement, but not simply by tracing the source of the property.

2020(See Socol, supra, 36 Cal.2d at pp. 345–346; Estate of Petersen, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 1747 ; Estate of Blair, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at p. 167 ; Bibb, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at pp. 464–465.) But such litigation is not an artifact of what we hold in this case.

2014(See Estate of Petersen (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1742, 1754-1755 ["reference to joint tenancy on [a money market] account 28 statement does not satisfy the requirement of an express written declaration" because "there are no signatures on the statement," "the account statement does not reveal that the legal effect of the joint tenancy designation was to alter the character or ownership of community funds," and "the statement does not indicate [husband and wife] consented to such a change"]; In re Marriage of Barneson (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 583, 590 [husband's transfer of his separate property stoc

2021(In re Marriage of Delaney (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 991, 998 [“In cases such as this, involving interspousal property transactions, the ‘irreconcilable conflict’ between the two presumptions established by section 721 and Evidence Code section 662 has been resolved in favor of section 721, based on the intent of the Legislature in enacting fiduciary protections for interspousal transactions and general rules of statutory construction”]; In re Marriage of Fossum (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 336, 345 [“the form of title presumption simply does not apply in cases in which it conflicts with the presumptio

2020(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548(f)(5) [this court may restate a question posed to it by a court of another jurisdiction]; see also Peabody v. Time Warner Cable, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 662, 665, fn. 1 (Peabody) [example and explanation of rule 8.548(f)(5) in context].) The answer determines how much property a bankruptcy trustee can reach to satisfy a spouse’s debts.

2014(See Estate of Petersen (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1742, 1754-1755 ["reference to joint tenancy on [a money market] account 28 statement does not satisfy the requirement of an express written declaration" because "there are no signatures on the statement," "the account statement does not reveal that the legal effect of the joint tenancy designation was to alter the character or ownership of community funds," and "the statement does not indicate [husband and wife] consented to such a change"]; In re Marriage of Barneson (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 583, 590 [husband's transfer of his separate property stoc

2014(See Estate of Petersen (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1742, 1754-1755 ["reference to joint tenancy on [a money market] account 28 statement does not satisfy the requirement of an express written declaration" because "there are no signatures on the statement," "the account statement does not reveal that the legal effect of the joint tenancy designation was to alter the character or ownership of community funds," and "the statement does not indicate [husband and wife] consented to such a change"]; In re Marriage of Barneson (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 583, 590 [husband's transfer of his separate property stoc

2008(See In re Marriage of Rives (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 138, 162 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 572 ].) 7 In its current form, Family Code section 2581 provides: “For the purpose of division of property on dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties, property acquired by the parties during marriage in joint form, including property held in tenancy in common, joint tenancy, or tenancy by the entirety, or as community property, is presumed to be community property.

2008(See In re Marriage of Rives (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 138, 162 [ 181 Cal.Rptr. 572 ].) 7 In its current form, Family Code section 2581 provides: “For the purpose of division of property on dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties, property acquired by the parties during marriage in joint form, including property held in tenancy in common, joint tenancy, or tenancy by the entirety, or as community property, is presumed to be community property.

2008(Haines, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 297 & fn. 11; cf. In re Marriage of Ashodian (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 43, 47 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 555 ].) That is, the party asserting that title is other than as stated in the deed (here, Brooks) has the burden of proving that fact by clear and convincing evidence.

2008(Haines, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 297 & fn. 11; cf. In re Marriage of Ashodian (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 43, 47 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 555 ].) That is, the party asserting that title is other than as stated in the deed (here, Brooks) has the burden of proving that fact by clear and convincing evidence.

1988(Ante, p. 167; see also Beck v. Beck (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 396, 407 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 491 ].) If the court finds no transmutation before 1985, only an express written declaration by Nancy and Ray will successfully rebut the form of title presumption.

1988(Ante, p. 167; see also Beck v. Beck (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 396, 407 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 491 ].) If the court finds no transmutation before 1985, only an express written declaration by Nancy and Ray will successfully rebut the form of title presumption.