law applicable claim in California

1945Dist. (1895), 107 Cal. 55, 64 [ 40 P. 45 ]; Mohr v. Byrne (1901), 135 Cal. 87, 90 [ 67 P. 11 ]; Weiner v. Roof (1937), 10 Cal.2d 450, 452 [ 74 P.2d 736 ].) The rights of the defendant Harris as an assignee of such fund as against the claim of the plaintiff herein as the legal owner thereof may properly be tested in the light of the law applicable to a claim by such defendant that he is a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument.

1945Dist. (1895), 107 Cal. 55, 64 [ 40 P. 45 ]; Mohr v. Byrne (1901), 135 Cal. 87, 90 [ 67 P. 11 ]; Weiner v. Roof (1937), 10 Cal.2d 450, 452 [ 74 P.2d 736 ].) The rights of the defendant Harris as an assignee of such fund as against the claim of the plaintiff herein as the legal owner thereof may properly be tested in the light of the law applicable to a claim by such defendant that he is a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument.

1945Dist. (1895), 107 Cal. 55, 64 [ 40 P. 45 ]; Mohr v. Byrne (1901), 135 Cal. 87, 90 [ 67 P. 11 ]; Weiner v. Roof (1937), 10 Cal.2d 450, 452 [ 74 P.2d 736 ].) The rights of the defendant Harris as an assignee of such fund as against the claim of the plaintiff herein as the legal owner thereof may properly be tested in the light of the law applicable to a claim by such defendant that he is a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument. [4] As to negotiable instruments, it is the general rule that a transferee, purchaser or assignee, where there is nothing about the circumstances attending the

1945Dist. (1895), 107 Cal. 55, 64 [ 40 P. 45 ]; Mohr v. Byrne (1901), 135 Cal. 87, 90 [ 67 P. 11 ]; Weiner v. Roof (1937), 10 Cal.2d 450, 452 [ 74 P.2d 736 ].) The rights of the defendant Harris as an assignee of such fund as against the claim of the plaintiff herein as the legal owner thereof may properly be tested in the light of the law applicable to a claim by such defendant that he is a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument.

1945Dist. (1895), 107 Cal. 55, 64 [ 40 P. 45 ]; Mohr v. Byrne (1901), 135 Cal. 87, 90 [ 67 P. 11 ]; Weiner v. Roof (1937), 10 Cal.2d 450, 452 [ 74 P.2d 736 ].) The rights of the defendant Harris as an assignee of such fund as against the claim of the plaintiff herein as the legal owner thereof may properly be tested in the light of the law applicable to a claim by such defendant that he is a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument.

1945Dist. (1895), 107 Cal. 55, 64 [ 40 P. 45 ]; Mohr v. Byrne (1901), 135 Cal. 87, 90 [ 67 P. 11 ]; Weiner v. Roof (1937), 10 Cal.2d 450, 452 [ 74 P.2d 736 ].) The rights of the defendant Harris as an assignee of such fund as against the claim of the plaintiff herein as the legal owner thereof may properly be tested in the light of the law applicable to a claim by such defendant that he is a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument.

2019He was convicted in count 27 for taking fees from Janet and Robert and in count 28 for taking their real property. 17 p. 519 [holding that a defendant may be convicted of multiple counts of grand theft for a series of wrongful acts if the evidence shows that the offenses are separate and distinct and were not committed “pursuant to one intention, one general impulse, and one plan”]; People v. Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733, 735 (Whitmer) [reexamining Bailey and holding that “a defendant may be convicted of multiple counts of grand theft based on separate and distinct acts of theft, even if comm

2005The law applicable to a claim of insufficiency of the evidence is well settled: “ ‘In reviewing [a claim regarding] the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] “[T]he court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a r

2005The law applicable to a claim of insufficiency of the evidence is well settled: “ ‘In reviewing [a claim regarding] the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] “[T]he court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a r

2005The law applicable to a claim of insufficiency of the evidence is well settled: “ ‘In reviewing [a claim regarding] the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] “[T]he court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a r

2005The law applicable to a claim of insufficiency of the evidence is well settled: “ ‘In reviewing [a claim regarding] the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] “[T]he court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a r

2002Although there are, no doubt, some substantive differences between tribal sovereign immunity and the law applicable to waiver of immunity by foreign sovereigns, the court in C & L Enterprises, supra, 532 U.S. at page 421, footnote 3 [ 121 S.Ct. at page 1595 ] observed that reference to uniform federal law governing the waiver of immunities by foreign sovereigns is appropriate in deciding whether a particular act constitutes a waiver of tribal immunity.

2002Although there are, no doubt, some substantive differences between tribal sovereign immunity and the law applicable to waiver of immunity by foreign sovereigns, the court in C & L Enterprises, supra, 532 U.S. at page 421, footnote 3 [ 121 S.Ct. at page 1595 ] observed that reference to uniform federal law governing the waiver of immunities by foreign sovereigns is appropriate in deciding whether a particular act constitutes a waiver of tribal immunity.

1962See e.g., the pertinent observation of Mr. Justice (then Presiding Justice) Peters in People v. Krupa (1944) 64 Cal.App.2d 592, 597 [2] [ 149 P.2d 416 ], “The statements of the law applicable to the doctrine of double jeopardy are by no means clear, and in some respects inconsistent. ’ ’ Under the Practice Act (Compiled Laws of California) (1850-1852): “See. 236.

1962See e.g., the pertinent observation of Mr. Justice (then Presiding Justice) Peters in People v. Krupa (1944) 64 Cal.App.2d 592, 597 [2] [ 149 P.2d 416 ], “The statements of the law applicable to the doctrine of double jeopardy are by no means clear, and in some respects inconsistent. ’ ’ Under the Practice Act (Compiled Laws of California) (1850-1852): “See. 236.

1947As was said by this court in People v. Heddens, 12 Cal.App.2d 245, 247 [ 55 P.2d 230 ]: “It is the duty of the court in criminal cases to give of its own motion instructions on the general principles of law pertinent to such cases, even though they are not proposed or presented in writing by the parties themselves.” (Citing cases.) With the record in the condition in which we find it,, we must look into the effect of the error of the trial court in connection with the disposition of this appeal in the light of the provisions of section 4% of article VI of our state Constitution, which forbids