13 California opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Krebsgreen1 sentence2023That is but one factor to be considered in applying the factual test of Mosley. . . . [¶] The real issue is whether defendant’s Miranda right to cut off the questioning was respected in the totality of the circumstances.” (People v. Warner (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1122 , 1130–1131; see also Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 315–316 [no Mosley violation even though post-invocation interview was about the same crime, reasoning that, “[w]ithout suggesting that all of the above must be present or that any of those factors is sufficient, we conclude that under these circumstances, the trial court did not | 1 | 1 |
People v. Castanedagreen1 sentence2015(People v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1348 [claim that an instruction correct in law should have been modified was forfeited for failure to request different language].) In any event, the trial court had no sua sponte duty to further instruct the jury. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Davisgreen2 sentences2012Again, an officer who intended to “scrupulously honor[]” (Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at p. 104 ) Z.A.’s invocation of her right to remain silent would have provided such an admonition, particularly since Z.A. was a minor with no prior criminal history. 15 (See People v. Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1169 [courts must consider minor’s age and background in analyzing Miranda claim of a juvenile]; compare with Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 950 [finding no Mosley violation where detectives reminded adult defendant of Miranda rights read to him the night before and “on at least four prior occasi 2012Again, an officer who intended to “scrupulously honor[]” (Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at p. 104 ) Z.A.’s invocation of her right to remain silent would have provided such an admonition, particularly since Z.A. was a minor with no prior criminal history. 15 (See People v. Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1169 [courts must consider minor’s age and background in analyzing Miranda claim of a juvenile]; compare with Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 950 [finding no Mosley violation where detectives reminded adult defendant of Miranda rights read to him the night before and “on at least four prior occasi | 1 | 1 |
People v. Albert R.green2 sentences2012Again, an officer who intended to “scrupulously honor[]” (Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at p. 104 ) Z.A.’s invocation of her right to remain silent would have provided such an admonition, particularly since Z.A. was a minor with no prior criminal history. 15 (See People v. Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1169 [courts must consider minor’s age and background in analyzing Miranda claim of a juvenile]; compare with Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 950 [finding no Mosley violation where detectives reminded adult defendant of Miranda rights read to him the night before and “on at least four prior occasi 2012Again, an officer who intended to “scrupulously honor[]” (Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at p. 104 ) Z.A.’s invocation of her right to remain silent would have provided such an admonition, particularly since Z.A. was a minor with no prior criminal history. 15 (See People v. Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1169 [courts must consider minor’s age and background in analyzing Miranda claim of a juvenile]; compare with Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 950 [finding no Mosley violation where detectives reminded adult defendant of Miranda rights read to him the night before and “on at least four prior occasi | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Pedro Montanagreen1 sentence2012Again, an officer who intended to “scrupulously honor[]” (Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at p. 104 ) Z.A.’s invocation of her right to remain silent would have provided such an admonition, particularly since Z.A. was a minor with no prior criminal history. 15 (See People v. Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1169 [courts must consider minor’s age and background in analyzing Miranda claim of a juvenile]; compare with Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 950 [finding no Mosley violation where detectives reminded adult defendant of Miranda rights read to him the night before and “on at least four prior occasi | 1 | 1 |
Fleming v. Metrishgreen1 sentence2012Again, an officer who intended to “scrupulously honor[]” (Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at p. 104 ) Z.A.’s invocation of her right to remain silent would have provided such an admonition, particularly since Z.A. was a minor with no prior criminal history. 15 (See People v. Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1169 [courts must consider minor’s age and background in analyzing Miranda claim of a juvenile]; compare with Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 950 [finding no Mosley violation where detectives reminded adult defendant of Miranda rights read to him the night before and “on at least four prior occasi | 1 | 1 |
People v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2012Again, an officer who intended to “scrupulously honor[]” (Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at p. 104 ) Z.A.’s invocation of her right to remain silent would have provided such an admonition, particularly since Z.A. was a minor with no prior criminal history. 15 (See People v. Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1169 [courts must consider minor’s age and background in analyzing Miranda claim of a juvenile]; compare with Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 950 [finding no Mosley violation where detectives reminded adult defendant of Miranda rights read to him the night before and “on at least four prior occasi 2012As noted in part III.A.1.b., ante, in the trial court, the People stated that in determining whether custodial statements are admissible under Edwards and Bradshaw, a court is required to undertake a “two-step” analysis, in which the “first prong asks whether the minor initiated further conversation,” and the “second prong asks . . . whether there was a valid waiver . . . [that] was made knowingly and voluntarily.” (Compare with Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 950 [noting that “[i]n Mosley , the time elapsed between the invocation of the right to silence and the reinterrogation was ‘more tha | 1 | 1 |
People v. Longwillgreen2 sentences1985In determining the weight to be given to Mosley in this state, the Supreme Court in People v. Pettingill, supra, 21 Cal.3d 231, 248 , invoked the settled doctrine that “decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental civil rights are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but are to be followed by California courts only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law.” (People v. Longwill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 943, 951, fn. 4 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 538 P.2d 753 ], disapproved on another point in People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 C 1985In determining the weight to be given to Mosley in this state, the Supreme Court in People v. Pettingill, supra, 21 Cal.3d 231, 248 , invoked the settled doctrine that “decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental civil rights are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but are to be followed by California courts only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law.” (People v. Longwill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 943, 951, fn. 4 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 538 P.2d 753 ], disapproved on another point in People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 C | 1 | 1 |
People v. Laiwagreen2 sentences1985In determining the weight to be given to Mosley in this state, the Supreme Court in People v. Pettingill, supra, 21 Cal.3d 231, 248 , invoked the settled doctrine that “decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental civil rights are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but are to be followed by California courts only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law.” (People v. Longwill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 943, 951, fn. 4 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 538 P.2d 753 ], disapproved on another point in People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 C 1985In determining the weight to be given to Mosley in this state, the Supreme Court in People v. Pettingill, supra, 21 Cal.3d 231, 248 , invoked the settled doctrine that “decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental civil rights are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but are to be followed by California courts only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law.” (People v. Longwill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 943, 951, fn. 4 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 538 P.2d 753 ], disapproved on another point in People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 C | 1 | 1 |
People v. MacKgreen2 sentences1983(Id. at pp. 249-251.) For these reasons we concluded that “the Fioritto rule, rather than the Mosley test, will remain the rule of decision in all state prosecutions in California.” (Id. at p. 251.) In the case at bar, as in Pettingill , defendant was arrested for one offense (possession of stolen property) committed in one county (Solano); when a police officer from that county gave him Miranda warnings and sought to question him about that offense, he asserted his right to remain silent; after defendant had been held in continuous custody for some 10 hours (compare People v. Mack (1980) 27 C 1983(Id. at pp. 249-251.) For these reasons we concluded that “the Fioritto rule, rather than the Mosley test, will remain the rule of decision in all state prosecutions in California.” (Id. at p. 251.) In the case at bar, as in Pettingill , defendant was arrested for one offense (possession of stolen property) committed in one county (Solano); when a police officer from that county gave him Miranda warnings and sought to question him about that offense, he asserted his right to remain silent; after defendant had been held in continuous custody for some 10 hours (compare People v. Mack (1980) 27 C | 1 | 1 |
People v. Burtongreen2 sentences1978However, the California Supreme Court in People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal.3d 231 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 861 , 578 P.2d 108 ] has held that the California Constitution imposes a stricter standard than required by Mosley when police seek to interrogate a suspect who has previously refused to waive his Miranda rights and ". . . the Fioritto rule, rather than the Mosley test, will remain the rule of decision in all state prosecutions in California." (P. 251.) Because police conducted an interrogation the morning following the minor's exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege, the confession obtained by the s 1978However, the California Supreme Court in People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal.3d 231 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 861 , 578 P.2d 108 ] has held that the California Constitution imposes a stricter standard than required by Mosley when police seek to interrogate a suspect who has previously refused to waive his Miranda rights and ". . . the Fioritto rule, rather than the Mosley test, will remain the rule of decision in all state prosecutions in California." (P. 251.) Because police conducted an interrogation the morning following the minor's exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege, the confession obtained by the s | 1 | 1 |
Fare v. Michael C.green2 sentences1978However, the California Supreme Court in People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal.3d 231 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 861 , 578 P.2d 108 ] has held that the California Constitution imposes a stricter standard than required by Mosley when police seek to interrogate a suspect who has previously refused to waive his Miranda rights and ". . . the Fioritto rule, rather than the Mosley test, will remain the rule of decision in all state prosecutions in California." (P. 251.) Because police conducted an interrogation the morning following the minor's exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege, the confession obtained by the s 1978However, the California Supreme Court in People v. Pettingill, 21 Cal.3d 231 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 861 , 578 P.2d 108 ] has held that the California Constitution imposes a stricter standard than required by Mosley when police seek to interrogate a suspect who has previously refused to waive his Miranda rights and ". . . the Fioritto rule, rather than the Mosley test, will remain the rule of decision in all state prosecutions in California." (P. 251.) Because police conducted an interrogation the morning following the minor's exercise of his Fifth Amendment privilege, the confession obtained by the s | 1 | 1 |
In Re Tahlgreen2 sentences1973All the same, for reasons which we shall now explain, we do not believe that we should make the outcome of this appeal depend on the length of the argument or the odds for its success. 4 The net effect of the constitutional principle recognized in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 314 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 ]; In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122, 129-131 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]; and In re Mosley, 1 Cal.3d 913 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 464 P.2d 473 ] is that when a defendant pleads guilty, quickly or slowly, a plea entered by co 1973All the same, for reasons which we shall now explain, we do not believe that we should make the outcome of this appeal depend on the length of the argument or the odds for its success. 4 The net effect of the constitutional principle recognized in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 314 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 ]; In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122, 129-131 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]; and In re Mosley, 1 Cal.3d 913 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 464 P.2d 473 ] is that when a defendant pleads guilty, quickly or slowly, a plea entered by co | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Pettingill
green
2 sentences1985In determining the weight to be given to Mosley in this state, the Supreme Court in People v. Pettingill, supra, 21 Cal.3d 231, 248 , invoked the settled doctrine that “decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental civil rights are persuasive authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but are to be followed by California courts only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law.” (People v. Longwill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 943, 951, fn. 4 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 297 , 538 P.2d 753 ], disapproved on another point in People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 C 1985The court then stated “the Fioritto rule, rather than the Mosley test, will remain the rule of decision in all state prosecutions in California.” (Id., 21 Cal.3d at p. 251 .) (See People v. Smith, supra, 34 Cal.3d 251, 265 .) Under Fioritto , once the privilege against self-incrimination is invoked, all further attempts at police interrogation must cease. | 4 | 1978–1985 |
Michigan v. Mosley
green
2 sentences2012Again, an officer who intended to “scrupulously honor[]” (Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at p. 104 ) Z.A.’s invocation of her right to remain silent would have provided such an admonition, particularly since Z.A. was a minor with no prior criminal history. 15 (See People v. Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1169 [courts must consider minor’s age and background in analyzing Miranda claim of a juvenile]; compare with Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 950 [finding no Mosley violation where detectives reminded adult defendant of Miranda rights read to him the night before and “on at least four prior occasi 1980Declining to follow the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Michigan v. Mosley (1975) 423 U.S. 96 [ 46 L.Ed.2d 313 , 96 S.Ct. 321 ], which held that a confession obtained under essentially similar circumstances did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a majority of this court held that the defendant’s confession was inadmissible under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. “[T]he Fioritto rule, rather than the Mosley test, will remain the rule of decision in all state prosecutions in California. | 2 | 1980–2012 |
People v. Warner
green
1 sentence2023That is but one factor to be considered in applying the factual test of Mosley. . . . [¶] The real issue is whether defendant’s Miranda right to cut off the questioning was respected in the totality of the circumstances.” (People v. Warner (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1122 , 1130–1131; see also Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 315–316 [no Mosley violation even though post-invocation interview was about the same crime, reasoning that, “[w]ithout suggesting that all of the above must be present or that any of those factors is sufficient, we conclude that under these circumstances, the trial court did not | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Laabs v. City of Victorville
green
2 sentences2015But under Laabs v. City of Victorville, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th 1242 , Mosley's motion was timely; therefore, the court abused its discretion by denying Mosley's motion to amend his complaint. 12 DISPOSITION The summary judgment is reversed and on remand the superior court is directed to allow Nicholas Mosley an opportunity to amend his complaint to state a cause of action for adverse possession. 2015But under Laabs v. City of Victorville, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th 1242 , Mosley's motion was timely; therefore, the court abused its discretion by denying Mosley's motion to amend his complaint. 12 DISPOSITION The summary judgment is reversed and on remand the superior court is directed to allow Nicholas Mosley an opportunity to amend his complaint to state a cause of action for adverse possession. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
In Re EJ
green
2 sentences2015That claim — unlike the “constitutional challenges to section 3003.5(b) as a parole condition” in In re E.J. (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1258 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 165 , 223 P.3d 31 ] (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1054, fn. 7, italics added) — requires us to decide whether the statute applies to registrants who are not on parole. 2015That claim — unlike the “constitutional challenges to section 3003.5(b) as a parole condition” in In re E.J. (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1258 [ 104 Cal.Rptr.3d 165 , 223 P.3d 31 ] (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1054, fn. 7, italics added) — requires us to decide whether the statute applies to registrants who are not on parole. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Shin v. Ahn
green
1 sentence2014DISCUSSION Standard of Review “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo; we must decide independently whether the facts not subject to triable dispute warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law.” (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348 .) “If no triable issue as to any material fact exists, the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. [Citations.] In ruling on the motion, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party. [Citation.] We review the record and the determination of the trial court de novo. [Citations.] | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi
green
1 sentence2014DISCUSSION Standard of Review “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo; we must decide independently whether the facts not subject to triable dispute warrant judgment for the moving party as a matter of law.” (Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1348 .) “If no triable issue as to any material fact exists, the defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. [Citations.] In ruling on the motion, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party. [Citation.] We review the record and the determination of the trial court de novo. [Citations.] | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Sassounian
green
1 sentence2013(See fn. 8, ante.) Mosley claimed this evidence was "material" and thus, " 'there is a reasonable probability that, had [the evidence] been disclosed to the 30 defense, the result . . . would have been different.' " (In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 544 .) Specifically, witnesses at the hearing on the renewed motions testified that on April 5, 2007, Roggeveen seized an X-Box during the criminal investigation in the Ortega case but failed to process it properly as evidence. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Hall
green
1 sentence2013(Hall, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 298 .) Mosley contends that the recently developed evidence about this key witness "tends to destroy [his] testimony by raising grave doubts about [his] veracity and credibility." ( Huskins, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d 859, 863 .) 34 In Huskins, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d 859, 861-864 , the court examined circumstances justifying the grant of a new trial, because in that case, the individual key witness whose credibility was challenged with newly discovered evidence was the sole adult witness to connect the defendant (Huskins) with the charged acts of child molestation | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Huskins
green
2 sentences2013(Hall, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 298 .) Mosley contends that the recently developed evidence about this key witness "tends to destroy [his] testimony by raising grave doubts about [his] veracity and credibility." ( Huskins, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d 859, 863 .) 34 In Huskins, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d 859, 861-864 , the court examined circumstances justifying the grant of a new trial, because in that case, the individual key witness whose credibility was challenged with newly discovered evidence was the sole adult witness to connect the defendant (Huskins) with the charged acts of child molestation 2013(Hall, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 298 .) Mosley contends that the recently developed evidence about this key witness "tends to destroy [his] testimony by raising grave doubts about [his] veracity and credibility." ( Huskins, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d 859, 863 .) 34 In Huskins, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d 859, 861-864 , the court examined circumstances justifying the grant of a new trial, because in that case, the individual key witness whose credibility was challenged with newly discovered evidence was the sole adult witness to connect the defendant (Huskins) with the charged acts of child molestation | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Smith
green
2 sentences1985The court then stated “the Fioritto rule, rather than the Mosley test, will remain the rule of decision in all state prosecutions in California.” (Id., 21 Cal.3d at p. 251 .) (See People v. Smith, supra, 34 Cal.3d 251, 265 .) Under Fioritto , once the privilege against self-incrimination is invoked, all further attempts at police interrogation must cease. 1985The court then stated “the Fioritto rule, rather than the Mosley test, will remain the rule of decision in all state prosecutions in California.” (Id., 21 Cal.3d at p. 251 .) (See People v. Smith, supra, 34 Cal.3d 251, 265 .) Under Fioritto , once the privilege against self-incrimination is invoked, all further attempts at police interrogation must cease. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Fioritto
green
2 sentences1985Where this rule is violated, “. . . we have no alternative but to hold that the confession thereafter secured constituted inadmissible evidence at trial.” (People v. Fioritto, supra, 68 Cal.2d 714, 719 .) In the instant case, defendant invoked his privilege against self-incrimination and the subsequent interrogation, even though on a totally different subject matter, was improper. 1985Where this rule is violated, “. . . we have no alternative but to hold that the confession thereafter secured constituted inadmissible evidence at trial.” (People v. Fioritto, supra, 68 Cal.2d 714, 719 .) In the instant case, defendant invoked his privilege against self-incrimination and the subsequent interrogation, even though on a totally different subject matter, was improper. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Boykin v. Alabama
green
2 sentences1973All the same, for reasons which we shall now explain, we do not believe that we should make the outcome of this appeal depend on the length of the argument or the odds for its success. 4 The net effect of the constitutional principle recognized in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 314 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 ]; In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122, 129-131 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]; and In re Mosley, 1 Cal.3d 913 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 464 P.2d 473 ] is that when a defendant pleads guilty, quickly or slowly, a plea entered by co 1973All the same, for reasons which we shall now explain, we do not believe that we should make the outcome of this appeal depend on the length of the argument or the odds for its success. 4 The net effect of the constitutional principle recognized in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 314 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 ]; In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122, 129-131 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]; and In re Mosley, 1 Cal.3d 913 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 464 P.2d 473 ] is that when a defendant pleads guilty, quickly or slowly, a plea entered by co | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Brookhart v. Janis
green
2 sentences1973All the same, for reasons which we shall now explain, we do not believe that we should make the outcome of this appeal depend on the length of the argument or the odds for its success. 4 The net effect of the constitutional principle recognized in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 314 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 ]; In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122, 129-131 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]; and In re Mosley, 1 Cal.3d 913 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 464 P.2d 473 ] is that when a defendant pleads guilty, quickly or slowly, a plea entered by co 1973All the same, for reasons which we shall now explain, we do not believe that we should make the outcome of this appeal depend on the length of the argument or the odds for its success. 4 The net effect of the constitutional principle recognized in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 314 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 ]; In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122, 129-131 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]; and In re Mosley, 1 Cal.3d 913 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 464 P.2d 473 ] is that when a defendant pleads guilty, quickly or slowly, a plea entered by co | 1 | 1973–1973 |
In Re Mosley
green
2 sentences1973All the same, for reasons which we shall now explain, we do not believe that we should make the outcome of this appeal depend on the length of the argument or the odds for its success. 4 The net effect of the constitutional principle recognized in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 314 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 ]; In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122, 129-131 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]; and In re Mosley, 1 Cal.3d 913 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 464 P.2d 473 ] is that when a defendant pleads guilty, quickly or slowly, a plea entered by co 1973All the same, for reasons which we shall now explain, we do not believe that we should make the outcome of this appeal depend on the length of the argument or the odds for its success. 4 The net effect of the constitutional principle recognized in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 274 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 ]; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 314 , 86 S.Ct. 1245 ]; In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122, 129-131 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ]; and In re Mosley, 1 Cal.3d 913 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 809 , 464 P.2d 473 ] is that when a defendant pleads guilty, quickly or slowly, a plea entered by co | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.