much more deferential standard in California

2023Wendz’s emphasis on substantial evidence “obscures the principle that courts are deferential of an agency’s determination of reasonable necessity.” (California Assn. of Medical Products Suppliers v. Maxwell-Jolly (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 286, 315 (Maxwell-Jolly).) “ ‘[R]easonable necessity . . . generally does implicate the agency’s expertise; therefore it receives a much more deferential standard of review.’ ” (Ibid.) That said, a regulation “may” be declared invalid for lack of substantial evidence to support an agency’s determination that the regulation is reasonably necessary to effectuate t

2014When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from those facts, the reviewing court has no power to substitute its deductions for those of the fact finder.” (Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 374 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 981 P.2d 499 ].) “ ‘[Reasonable necessity . . . generally does implicate the agency’s expertise; therefore it receives a much more deferential standard of review.’ ” (California Assn. of Medical Products Suppliers v. Maxwell-Jolly (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 286, 315 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 692 ].) In reviewing a finding o

2020An invitation to substitute the policy view of a court in this circumstance for a reasonable policy enacted in a statute [or regulation] is an invitation to return to the benighted days of substantive due process.” (California Trout, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 624-625; Light, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1485 [“the Board’s regulatory authority is coincident with that of the Legislature”].) We conclude the Board’s determination that, as the trial court put it, “allowing diversions to reduce flows below the minimum, ‘belly-scraping’ amounts necessary for fish migrations and survivability would

2020An invitation to substitute the policy view of a court in this circumstance for a reasonable policy enacted in a statute [or regulation] is an invitation to return to the benighted days of substantive due process.” (California Trout, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at pp. 624-625; Light, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1485 [“the Board’s regulatory authority is coincident with that of the Legislature”].) We conclude the Board’s determination that, as the trial court put it, “allowing diversions to reduce flows below the minimum, ‘belly-scraping’ amounts necessary for fish migrations and survivability would

2014This is a question particularly suited for the judiciary as the final arbiter of the law, and does not invade the technical expertise of the agency.” (Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources Agency (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 98, 108-109 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 441 ], fns. omitted.) Second, the “reasonable necessity” prong “generally does implicate *1035 the agency’s expertise; therefore, it receives a much more deferential standard of review.

2014This is a question particularly suited for the judiciary as the final arbiter of the law, and does not invade the technical expertise of the agency.” (Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources Agency (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 98, 108-109 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 441 ], fns. omitted.) Second, the “reasonable necessity” prong “generally does implicate *1035 the agency’s expertise; therefore, it receives a much more deferential standard of review.

2014When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from those facts, the reviewing court has no power to substitute its deductions for those of the fact finder.” (Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 374 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 981 P.2d 499 ].) “ ‘[Reasonable necessity . . . generally does implicate the agency’s expertise; therefore it receives a much more deferential standard of review.’ ” (California Assn. of Medical Products Suppliers v. Maxwell-Jolly (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 286, 315 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 692 ].) In reviewing a finding o

2014When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from those facts, the reviewing court has no power to substitute its deductions for those of the fact finder.” (Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 374 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 981 P.2d 499 ].) “ ‘[Reasonable necessity . . . generally does implicate the agency’s expertise; therefore it receives a much more deferential standard of review.’ ” (California Assn. of Medical Products Suppliers v. Maxwell-Jolly (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 286, 315 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 692 ].) In reviewing a finding o

2014When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from those facts, the reviewing court has no power to substitute its deductions for those of the fact finder.” (Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 374 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 981 P.2d 499 ].) “ ‘[Reasonable necessity . . . generally does implicate the agency’s expertise; therefore it receives a much more deferential standard of review.’ ” (California Assn. of Medical Products Suppliers v. Maxwell-Jolly (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 286, 315 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 692 ].) In reviewing a finding o

2014When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from those facts, the reviewing court has no power to substitute its deductions for those of the fact finder.” (Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco Airports Com. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 352, 374 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 654 , 981 P.2d 499 ].) “ ‘[Reasonable necessity . . . generally does implicate the agency’s expertise; therefore it receives a much more deferential standard of review.’ ” (California Assn. of Medical Products Suppliers v. Maxwell-Jolly (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 286, 315 [ 131 Cal.Rptr.3d 692 ].) In reviewing a finding o

2017The question is whether the agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or without reasonable or rational basis.’ ” (Morning Star Co. v. Board of Equalization (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 737, 744-745 (Morning Star).) In reviewing the regulations in this case, “We keep in mind that ‘the burden is on the party challenging a regulation to show its invalidity.’ ” (California School Bds.

2017The question is whether the agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or without reasonable or rational basis.’ ” (Morning Star Co. v. Board of Equalization (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 737, 744-745 [ 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 ] (Morning Star).) In reviewing the regulations in this case, “We keep in mind that ‘the burden is on the party challenging a regulation to show its invalidity.’ ” (California School Bds.

2011The question is whether the agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or without reasonable or rational basis.” (Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources Agency (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 98, 108-109 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 441 ], fns. omitted; see Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1 , 11 & fn. 4 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 960 P.2d 1031 ].) A regulation which interprets a statute may be declared invalid if the agency’s determination that the regulation is reasonably necessary to effectuate the statutory purpose is not supported by substantial evidence.

2011The question is whether the agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or without reasonable or rational basis.” (Communities for a Better Environment v. California Resources Agency (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 98, 108-109 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 441 ], fns. omitted; see Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1 , 11 & fn. 4 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 960 P.2d 1031 ].) A regulation which interprets a statute may be declared invalid if the agency’s determination that the regulation is reasonably necessary to effectuate the statutory purpose is not supported by substantial evidence.

2009(See Mooney, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 679 [applying predecessor to Gov.

2009(See Mooney, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 679 [applying predecessor to Gov.

2002(See Centinela Hospital Assn. v. City of Inglewood (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1586, 1601 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 901 ]; Dehne v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d at pp. 844-84S.) 9 This application of the ordinary substantial evidence test is obviously a much more deferential standard, and as such, more favorable to the agency making the determination.

2002(See Centinela Hospital Assn. v. City of Inglewood (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1586, 1601 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 901 ]; Dehne v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 115 Cal.App.3d at pp. 844-84S.) 9 This application of the ordinary substantial evidence test is obviously a much more deferential standard, and as such, more favorable to the agency making the determination.

1999(U.S. v. Hamilton (6th Cir. 1997) 128 F.3d 996 ; U.S. v. Lloyd (6th Cir. 1993) 10 F.3d 1197, 1216 , cert. den. 513 U.S. 883 [ 115 S.Ct. 219 , 130 L.Ed.2d 147 ]; U.S. v. Hernandez (9th Cir. 1991) 937 F.2d 1490, 1493 ; see State of Ohio v. Barron (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 62, 67 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 342 ] [constitutional issues are generally reviewed de nova].) On the other hand, if the decision is quasi-legislative, we apply a much more deferential standard of review.

1999(U.S. v. Hamilton (6th Cir. 1997) 128 F.3d 996 ; U.S. v. Lloyd (6th Cir. 1993) 10 F.3d 1197, 1216 , cert. den. 513 U.S. 883 [ 115 S.Ct. 219 , 130 L.Ed.2d 147 ]; U.S. v. Hernandez (9th Cir. 1991) 937 F.2d 1490, 1493 ; see State of Ohio v. Barron (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 62, 67 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 342 ] [constitutional issues are generally reviewed de nova].) On the other hand, if the decision is quasi-legislative, we apply a much more deferential standard of review.

1999“As to the quasi-legislative acts of administrative agencies, ‘judicial review is limited to an examination of the proceedings before the officer to determine whether his action has been arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether he has failed to follow the procedure and give the notices required by law.’ [Citations.]” (Pitts v. Perluss (1962) 58 Cal.2d 824, 833 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 19 , 377 P.2d 83 ].) This standard only requires that there be some reasonable basis for a decision in order to pass muster on review. “ ‘If reasonable minds may well be divided as to t

1999“As to the quasi-legislative acts of administrative agencies, ‘judicial review is limited to an examination of the proceedings before the officer to determine whether his action has been arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether he has failed to follow the procedure and give the notices required by law.’ [Citations.]” (Pitts v. Perluss (1962) 58 Cal.2d 824, 833 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 19 , 377 P.2d 83 ].) This standard only requires that there be some reasonable basis for a decision in order to pass muster on review. “ ‘If reasonable minds may well be divided as to t

1990Administrative regulations that alter or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope are void . . . .” (Ontario Community Foundations, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1984) 35 Cal.3d 811, 816-817 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 678 P.2d 378 ], italics, citations and internal quotation marks deleted.) By contrast, the second standard of reasonable necessity for a regulation, which generally does implicate the agency’s expertise, receives a much more deferential standard, essentially requiring only reasonability of the promulgating agency.

1990Administrative regulations that alter or amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope are void . . . .” (Ontario Community Foundations, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1984) 35 Cal.3d 811, 816-817 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 678 P.2d 378 ], italics, citations and internal quotation marks deleted.) By contrast, the second standard of reasonable necessity for a regulation, which generally does implicate the agency’s expertise, receives a much more deferential standard, essentially requiring only reasonability of the promulgating agency.

1990“In the review of quasi-legislative actions of administrative agencies, judicial review is limited to a determination whether the agency’s action is arbitrary, capricious, lacking in evidentiary support, or contrary to procedures provided by law. . . .” (International Business Machines v. State Bd. of Equalization (1980) 26 Cal.3d 923, 931, fn. 7 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 782 , 609 P.2d 1 ], italics supplied and citations deleted; accord California State Employees' Assn., supra 135 Cal.App.3d at p. 1065.) Although petitioners have disputed the adequacy of the Division’s rationale for the amendments, its

1990“In the review of quasi-legislative actions of administrative agencies, judicial review is limited to a determination whether the agency’s action is arbitrary, capricious, lacking in evidentiary support, or contrary to procedures provided by law. . . .” (International Business Machines v. State Bd. of Equalization (1980) 26 Cal.3d 923, 931, fn. 7 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 782 , 609 P.2d 1 ], italics supplied and citations deleted; accord California State Employees' Assn., supra 135 Cal.App.3d at p. 1065.) Although petitioners have disputed the adequacy of the Division’s rationale for the amendments, its