Witherspoon-Witt standard in California

2020We have rejected the contention that Adams and Gray “ ‘made clear that when a prospective capital case juror gives equivocal responses, the state has not carried its burden of proving that the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror.” ’ ” (People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 263 (Schmeck).) We also have rejected the contention that Gray “suggests the high court intended to cast aside its view that ‘deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.’ ” (People v. Moon (2005) 68 PEOPLE v. MILES Opinion of the Court b

2012(People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 262-263 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 , 118 P.3d 451 ]; People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 14-15.) Furthermore, the high court has more recently reiterated its view that “[c]ourts reviewing claims of Witherspoon-Witt error . . . owe deference to the trial court, which is in a superior position to determine the demeanor and qualifications of a potential juror.” (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 22 [ 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 , 127 S.Ct. 2218 ].) 4 Alyn C. was divorced and the mother of two children.

2010On a number of occasions, either defense counsel or the prosecutor indicated his desire for the court to conduct further inquiry of the prospective juror at issue, which the court agreed to do. *1261 (16) The court stated the remaining prospective jurors should be dismissed immediately, to which defense counsel replied "no objection" or "submit it." Defendant now contends that seven prospective jurors were rejected because their responses to the questionnaires suggested some objection to the death penalty, which violated the Witherspoon-Witt rule that a prospective juror opposed to the death p

2010On a number of occasions, either defense counsel or the prosecutor indicated his desire for the court to conduct further inquiry of the prospective juror at issue, which the court agreed to do. *1261 (16) The court stated the remaining prospective jurors should be dismissed immediately, to which defense counsel replied "no objection" or "submit it." Defendant now contends that seven prospective jurors were rejected because their responses to the questionnaires suggested some objection to the death penalty, which violated the Witherspoon-Witt rule that a prospective juror opposed to the death p

2014“We have previously rejected this contention. [Citations.] Furthermore, the high court has more recently reiterated its view that ‘[cjourts reviewing claims of Witherspoon-Witt error . . . owe deference to the trial court, which is in a superior position to determine the demeanor and qualifications of a potential juror.’ (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 22 [ 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 , 127 S.Ct. 2218 ].)” (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 790-791, fn. 3 [ 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 533 , 269 P.3d 1109 ] (Thomas).) 1.

2014“We have previously rejected this contention. [Citations.] Furthermore, the high court has more recently reiterated its view that ‘[cjourts reviewing claims of Witherspoon-Witt error . . . owe deference to the trial court, which is in a superior position to determine the demeanor and qualifications of a potential juror.’ (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 22 [ 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 , 127 S.Ct. 2218 ].)” (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 790-791, fn. 3 [ 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 533 , 269 P.3d 1109 ] (Thomas).) 1.

2010On a number of occasions, either defense counsel or the prosecutor indicated his desire for the court to conduct further inquiry of the prospective juror at issue, which the court agreed to do. *1261 (16) The court stated the remaining prospective jurors should be dismissed immediately, to which defense counsel replied "no objection" or "submit it." Defendant now contends that seven prospective jurors were rejected because their responses to the questionnaires suggested some objection to the death penalty, which violated the Witherspoon-Witt rule that a prospective juror opposed to the death p

2010On a number of occasions, either defense counsel or the prosecutor indicated his desire for the court to conduct further inquiry of the prospective juror at issue, which the court agreed to do. *1261 (16) The court stated the remaining prospective jurors should be dismissed immediately, to which defense counsel replied "no objection" or "submit it." Defendant now contends that seven prospective jurors were rejected because their responses to the questionnaires suggested some objection to the death penalty, which violated the Witherspoon-Witt rule that a prospective juror opposed to the death p

2020(Gray v. Mississippi, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 665 (plur. opn. of Blackmun, J.) [“The nature of the jury selection process defies any attempt to establish that an erroneous Witherspoon-Witt exclusion of a juror is harmless”]; see id. at p. 672 (conc. opn. of Powell, J.); see People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 778 [Witherspoon-Witt error “requires automatic reversal of defendant’s sentence of death under existing United States Supreme Court precedent”].) Here, the trial court excluded no fewer than 13 jurors based on their general views about the death penalty, even though all 13 attested

2012Furthermore, even assuming she would have been questioned in court, N.K. might have been excusable for cause within the dictates of Witherspoon-Witt, or she might have been dismissed for cause for reasons completely unrelated to her views on the death penalty. 4 Alternatively, N.K. may have survived any challenges for cause but might have been subsequently removed by a peremptory challenge lodged by either the prosecution or defense, also for reasons unrelated to her views on the death penalty. 5 Thus, unlike the erroneously excused prospective juror in Gray , who had been called into the jury

2024The record here does not show any evidence of bias against the death penalty (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 60 ; People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 175 ) or inability to vote for capital punishment if the evidence warranted it (People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 255 ).

2024The record here does not show any evidence of bias against the death penalty (People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 60 ; People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 175 ) or inability to vote for capital punishment if the evidence warranted it (People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 255 ).

2020We have rejected the contention that Adams and Gray “ ‘made clear that when a prospective capital case juror gives equivocal responses, the state has not carried its burden of proving that the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror.” ’ ” (People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 263 (Schmeck).) We also have rejected the contention that Gray “suggests the high court intended to cast aside its view that ‘deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.’ ” (People v. Moon (2005) 68 PEOPLE v. MILES Opinion of the Court b

2014“We have previously rejected this contention. [Citations.] Furthermore, the high court has more recently reiterated its view that ‘[cjourts reviewing claims of Witherspoon-Witt error . . . owe deference to the trial court, which is in a superior position to determine the demeanor and qualifications of a potential juror.’ (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 22 [ 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 , 127 S.Ct. 2218 ].)” (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 790-791, fn. 3 [ 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 533 , 269 P.3d 1109 ] (Thomas).) 1.

2014“We have previously rejected this contention. [Citations.] Furthermore, the high court has more recently reiterated its view that ‘[cjourts reviewing claims of Witherspoon-Witt error . . . owe deference to the trial court, which is in a superior position to determine the demeanor and qualifications of a potential juror.’ (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, 22 [ 167 L.Ed.2d 1014 , 127 S.Ct. 2218 ].)” (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 790-791, fn. 3 [ 137 Cal.Rptr.3d 533 , 269 P.3d 1109 ] (Thomas).) 1.

2010"Hence, as a practical matter, he `did not object to the court's excusing the juror, but ... also refused to stipulate to it.'" ( People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 262 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 , 118 P.3d 451 ] ( Schmeck ), quoting People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 734 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236 , 86 P.3d 302 ].) Although this court has concluded that a failure to object does not forfeit the Witherspoon-Witt issue on appeal, the high court has recognized that a reviewing court "nevertheless take[s] into account voluntary acquiescence to, or confirmation of, a [prospective] juror's removal

2010"Hence, as a practical matter, he `did not object to the court's excusing the juror, but ... also refused to stipulate to it.'" ( People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 262 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397 , 118 P.3d 451 ] ( Schmeck ), quoting People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 734 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236 , 86 P.3d 302 ].) Although this court has concluded that a failure to object does not forfeit the Witherspoon-Witt issue on appeal, the high court has recognized that a reviewing court "nevertheless take[s] into account voluntary acquiescence to, or confirmation of, a [prospective] juror's removal

2008A prosecutor may exercise peremptory challenges against prospective jurors who are not so intractably opposed to the death penalty that they are *140 subject to challenge for cause under the Witherspoon-Witt standard, but who nonetheless are substantially opposed to the death penalty. ( Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1104-1109; People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 106 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 131 P.3d 400 ].) In other respects, the excused prospective jurors embodied characteristics, or communicated views, that justified the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges.

2008A prosecutor may exercise peremptory challenges against prospective jurors who are not so intractably opposed to the death penalty that they are *140 subject to challenge for cause under the Witherspoon-Witt standard, but who nonetheless are substantially opposed to the death penalty. ( Zambrano, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1104-1109; People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 106 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319 , 131 P.3d 400 ].) In other respects, the excused prospective jurors embodied characteristics, or communicated views, that justified the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges.

2000(People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 480-481 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 ].) It is also meritless.

2000(People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 480-481 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 ].) It is also meritless.

1997(See People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th 1, 61, fn. 22 .) We recognized that controlling federal precedent holds that Witherspoon error is not waived by “mere” failure to object in People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425, 443 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 306 , 606 P.2d 341 ], judgment vacated and case remanded sub nom.

1997(See People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th 1, 61, fn. 22 .) We recognized that controlling federal precedent holds that Witherspoon error is not waived by “mere” failure to object in People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425, 443 [ 162 Cal.Rptr. 306 , 606 P.2d 341 ], judgment vacated and case remanded sub nom.