wise claim in Georgia

2023The statute of limitation begins to run against such a claim upon the creation of the nuisance once some portion of the harm becomes observable.’” Wise, 363 Ga. App. at 328 (1) (quoting Oglethorpe ————————————————————— 3 In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals explained that, because Wise’s claim for inverse condemnation by permanent nuisance was “premised on the Appellees’ intentional acts giving rise to an alleged nuisance” — not on claims of negligence — “the requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 to file an expert affidavit when a claim alleges damages for professional negligence [was] i

2023The statute of limitation begins to run against such a claim upon the creation of the nuisance once some portion of the harm becomes observable.’” Wise, 363 Ga. App. at 328 (1) (quoting Oglethorpe ————————————————————— 3 In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals explained that, because Wise’s claim for inverse condemnation by permanent nuisance was “premised on the Appellees’ intentional acts giving rise to an alleged nuisance” — not on claims of negligence — “the requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 to file an expert affidavit when a claim alleges damages for professional negligence [was] i

2023The statute of limitation begins to run against such a claim upon the creation of the nuisance once some portion of the harm becomes observable.’” Wise, 363 Ga. App. at 328 (1) (quoting Oglethorpe ————————————————————— 3 In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals explained that, because Wise’s claim for inverse condemnation by permanent nuisance was “premised on the Appellees’ intentional acts giving rise to an alleged nuisance” — not on claims of negligence — “the requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 to file an expert affidavit when a claim alleges damages for professional negligence [was] i

2023In dismissing the complaint, the trial court concluded as follows: (1) Wise’s per se taking claim “accrued at the time of the road widening project” in 2000 and was “barred by the four-year statute of limitation governing trespass to real property”; (2) Wise’s claim for inverse condemnation by abatable nuisance “provide[d] no basis for relief” because Wise did not claim that Appellees were “responsible for maintaining the pipe at issue”; (3) Wise’s claim premised on 42 USC § 1983 and its derivative claim for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 failed as a matter of law; and (

2013See Young v. State, 282 Ga. 735, 737 ( 653 SE2d 725 ) (2007). 2.

2013See Young v. State, 282 Ga. 735, 737 ( 653 SE2d 725 ) (2007). 2.

1998Stanley v. Hudson, 78 Ga. App. 834, 836 ( 52 SE2d 567 ).” Baine v. State, 181 Ga. App. 856, 858 (2) ( 354 SE2d 177 ) (1987).

1998Stanley v. Hudson, 78 Ga. App. 834, 836 ( 52 SE2d 567 ).” Baine v. State, 181 Ga. App. 856, 858 (2) ( 354 SE2d 177 ) (1987).

1989This court has previously held that exclusion of specific acts to prove a general trait of character is a wise rule [Cit.]” Baine v. State, 181 Ga. App. 856, 858 ( 354 SE2d 177 ) ) (1987).

1989This court has previously held that exclusion of specific acts to prove a general trait of character is a wise rule [Cit.]” Baine v. State, 181 Ga. App. 856, 858 ( 354 SE2d 177 ) ) (1987).

2023Doyle, P. J., and Brown, J., concur. 6 See Shadix v. Carroll County, 274 Ga. 560, 563 (1) ( 554 SE2d 465 ) (2001). 7 Wise’s claim under 42 USC § 1983 was premised on his per se taking claim. 3

2023Doyle, P. J., and Brown, J., concur. 6 See Shadix v. Carroll County, 274 Ga. 560, 563 (1) ( 554 SE2d 465 ) (2001). 7 Wise’s claim under 42 USC § 1983 was premised on his per se taking claim. 3

2022A “cause of action upon [taking] accrue[s] immediately upon the installation of the public works involved[,]” and is subject to a four-year statute of limitation.25 Because the McFarland Parkway Project was completed in 2000, the statute of limitation for Wise’s taking claim, as with its permanent nuisance claim, accrued 24 See Stroud, 339 Ga. App. at 42 (3). 25 Mitchell v. City of Atlanta, 217 Ga. 202, 203 (1) ( 121 SE2d 764 ) (1961) (punctuation omitted); accord Robinson v. Dept. of Transp., 195 Ga. App. 594 ( 394 SE2d 590 ) (1990). 11 upon completion of the public parkway, and thus, Wise’s

2022A “cause of action upon [taking] accrue[s] immediately upon the installation of the public works involved[,]” and is subject to a four-year statute of limitation.25 Because the McFarland Parkway Project was completed in 2000, the statute of limitation for Wise’s taking claim, as with its permanent nuisance claim, accrued 24 See Stroud, 339 Ga. App. at 42 (3). 25 Mitchell v. City of Atlanta, 217 Ga. 202, 203 (1) ( 121 SE2d 764 ) (1961) (punctuation omitted); accord Robinson v. Dept. of Transp., 195 Ga. App. 594 ( 394 SE2d 590 ) (1990). 11 upon completion of the public parkway, and thus, Wise’s

2022Those claims grounded on a professional’s intentional acts . . . are not required to be accompanied by an expert affidavit.”5 As Wise’s inverse condemnation claim is 3 See Estate of Nixon v. Barber, 340 Ga. App. 103, 105 (1) ( 796 SE2d 489 ) (2017) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss under “right for any reason” doctrine). 4 See OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (g) (21) (listing professional engineers as a category to which the code section applies). 5 Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 335-337 (3) ( 519 SE2d 672 ) (1999). 5 premised on the Appellees’ intentional acts giving rise to an alleged nuisance, and

2022Those claims grounded on a professional’s intentional acts . . . are not required to be accompanied by an expert affidavit.”5 As Wise’s inverse condemnation claim is 3 See Estate of Nixon v. Barber, 340 Ga. App. 103, 105 (1) ( 796 SE2d 489 ) (2017) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss under “right for any reason” doctrine). 4 See OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (g) (21) (listing professional engineers as a category to which the code section applies). 5 Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 335-337 (3) ( 519 SE2d 672 ) (1999). 5 premised on the Appellees’ intentional acts giving rise to an alleged nuisance, and

2022A “cause of action upon [taking] accrue[s] immediately upon the installation of the public works involved[,]” and is subject to a four-year statute of limitation.25 Because the McFarland Parkway Project was completed in 2000, the statute of limitation for Wise’s taking claim, as with its permanent nuisance claim, accrued 24 See Stroud, 339 Ga. App. at 42 (3). 25 Mitchell v. City of Atlanta, 217 Ga. 202, 203 (1) ( 121 SE2d 764 ) (1961) (punctuation omitted); accord Robinson v. Dept. of Transp., 195 Ga. App. 594 ( 394 SE2d 590 ) (1990). 11 upon completion of the public parkway, and thus, Wise’s

2022A “cause of action upon [taking] accrue[s] immediately upon the installation of the public works involved[,]” and is subject to a four-year statute of limitation.25 Because the McFarland Parkway Project was completed in 2000, the statute of limitation for Wise’s taking claim, as with its permanent nuisance claim, accrued 24 See Stroud, 339 Ga. App. at 42 (3). 25 Mitchell v. City of Atlanta, 217 Ga. 202, 203 (1) ( 121 SE2d 764 ) (1961) (punctuation omitted); accord Robinson v. Dept. of Transp., 195 Ga. App. 594 ( 394 SE2d 590 ) (1990). 11 upon completion of the public parkway, and thus, Wise’s

2022A “cause of action upon [taking] accrue[s] immediately upon the installation of the public works involved[,]” and is subject to a four-year statute of limitation.25 Because the McFarland Parkway Project was completed in 2000, the statute of limitation for Wise’s taking claim, as with its permanent nuisance claim, accrued 24 See Stroud, 339 Ga. App. at 42 (3). 25 Mitchell v. City of Atlanta, 217 Ga. 202, 203 (1) ( 121 SE2d 764 ) (1961) (punctuation omitted); accord Robinson v. Dept. of Transp., 195 Ga. App. 594 ( 394 SE2d 590 ) (1990). 11 upon completion of the public parkway, and thus, Wise’s

2022A “cause of action upon [taking] accrue[s] immediately upon the installation of the public works involved[,]” and is subject to a four-year statute of limitation.25 Because the McFarland Parkway Project was completed in 2000, the statute of limitation for Wise’s taking claim, as with its permanent nuisance claim, accrued 24 See Stroud, 339 Ga. App. at 42 (3). 25 Mitchell v. City of Atlanta, 217 Ga. 202, 203 (1) ( 121 SE2d 764 ) (1961) (punctuation omitted); accord Robinson v. Dept. of Transp., 195 Ga. App. 594 ( 394 SE2d 590 ) (1990). 11 upon completion of the public parkway, and thus, Wise’s

2022Those claims grounded on a professional’s intentional acts . . . are not required to be accompanied by an expert affidavit.”5 As Wise’s inverse condemnation claim is 3 See Estate of Nixon v. Barber, 340 Ga. App. 103, 105 (1) ( 796 SE2d 489 ) (2017) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss under “right for any reason” doctrine). 4 See OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (g) (21) (listing professional engineers as a category to which the code section applies). 5 Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 335-337 (3) ( 519 SE2d 672 ) (1999). 5 premised on the Appellees’ intentional acts giving rise to an alleged nuisance, and

2022Those claims grounded on a professional’s intentional acts . . . are not required to be accompanied by an expert affidavit.”5 As Wise’s inverse condemnation claim is 3 See Estate of Nixon v. Barber, 340 Ga. App. 103, 105 (1) ( 796 SE2d 489 ) (2017) (affirming grant of motion to dismiss under “right for any reason” doctrine). 4 See OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (g) (21) (listing professional engineers as a category to which the code section applies). 5 Labovitz v. Hopkinson, 271 Ga. 330, 335-337 (3) ( 519 SE2d 672 ) (1999). 5 premised on the Appellees’ intentional acts giving rise to an alleged nuisance, and

2022In light of our rulings in Divisions 1 through 3, supra, we need not consider the remainder of Wise’s claims of error. 26 See Mitchell, 217 Ga. at 203 (1); see also Oglethorpe Power Corp., 289 Ga. at 333 (2) (“The statute of limitation begins to run against [a permanent nuisance claim] upon the creation of the nuisance once some portion of the harm becomes observable.”). 27 See Eller, 327 Ga. App. at 774 (2); see also Mitchell, 217 Ga. at 204 (2) (“Mere ignorance of facts constituting a cause of action does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations.”). 28 See Eller, 327 Ga. App. at

2022In light of our rulings in Divisions 1 through 3, supra, we need not consider the remainder of Wise’s claims of error. 26 See Mitchell, 217 Ga. at 203 (1); see also Oglethorpe Power Corp., 289 Ga. at 333 (2) (“The statute of limitation begins to run against [a permanent nuisance claim] upon the creation of the nuisance once some portion of the harm becomes observable.”). 27 See Eller, 327 Ga. App. at 774 (2); see also Mitchell, 217 Ga. at 204 (2) (“Mere ignorance of facts constituting a cause of action does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations.”). 28 See Eller, 327 Ga. App. at

2017See generally McCoy v. State, 273 Ga. 568, 572 (8) ( 544 SE2d 709 ) (2001) (Where the court gave a curative instruction following a motion for mistrial, and the defendant neither objected to the curative instruction nor renewed his motion for mistrial, the alleged error was not preserved for appellate review.). 27 See Dye, 266 Ga. App. at 829 (2) (b); see also Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 670 (2) ( 763 SE2d 467 ) (2014) (“[T] he failure to make a meritless motion or objection does not provide a basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of counsel.”) (citation omitted). 28 Reid, 286 Ga.

2017See generally McCoy v. State, 273 Ga. 568, 572 (8) ( 544 SE2d 709 ) (2001) (Where the court gave a curative instruction following a motion for mistrial, and the defendant neither objected to the curative instruction nor renewed his motion for mistrial, the alleged error was not preserved for appellate review.). 27 See Dye, 266 Ga. App. at 829 (2) (b); see also Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 670 (2) ( 763 SE2d 467 ) (2014) (“[T] he failure to make a meritless motion or objection does not provide a basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of counsel.”) (citation omitted). 28 Reid, 286 Ga.

2017See generally McCoy v. State, 273 Ga. 568, 572 (8) ( 544 SE2d 709 ) (2001) (Where the court gave a curative instruction following a motion for mistrial, and the defendant neither objected to the curative instruction nor renewed his motion for mistrial, the alleged error was not preserved for appellate review.). 27 See Dye, 266 Ga. App. at 829 (2) (b); see also Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 670 (2) ( 763 SE2d 467 ) (2014) (“[T] he failure to make a meritless motion or objection does not provide a basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of counsel.”) (citation omitted). 28 Reid, 286 Ga.

2017See generally McCoy v. State, 273 Ga. 568, 572 (8) ( 544 SE2d 709 ) (2001) (Where the court gave a curative instruction following a motion for mistrial, and the defendant neither objected to the curative instruction nor renewed his motion for mistrial, the alleged error was not preserved for appellate review.). 27 See Dye, 266 Ga. App. at 829 (2) (b); see also Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 670 (2) ( 763 SE2d 467 ) (2014) (“[T] he failure to make a meritless motion or objection does not provide a basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of counsel.”) (citation omitted). 28 Reid, 286 Ga.

2017See generally McCoy v. State, 273 Ga. 568, 572 (8) ( 544 SE2d 709 ) (2001) (Where the court gave a curative instruction following a motion for mistrial, and the defendant neither objected to the curative instruction nor renewed his motion for mistrial, the alleged error was not preserved for appellate review.). 27 See Dye, 266 Ga. App. at 829 (2) (b); see also Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 670 (2) ( 763 SE2d 467 ) (2014) (“[T] he failure to make a meritless motion or objection does not provide a basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of counsel.”) (citation omitted). 28 Reid, 286 Ga.

2017See generally McCoy v. State, 273 Ga. 568, 572 (8) ( 544 SE2d 709 ) (2001) (Where the court gave a curative instruction following a motion for mistrial, and the defendant neither objected to the curative instruction nor renewed his motion for mistrial, the alleged error was not preserved for appellate review.). 27 See Dye, 266 Ga. App. at 829 (2) (b); see also Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 670 (2) ( 763 SE2d 467 ) (2014) (“[T] he failure to make a meritless motion or objection does not provide a basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of counsel.”) (citation omitted). 28 Reid, 286 Ga.

2017See generally McCoy v. State, 273 Ga. 568, 572 (8) ( 544 SE2d 709 ) (2001) (Where the court gave a curative instruction following a motion for mistrial, and the defendant neither objected to the curative instruction nor renewed his motion for mistrial, the alleged error was not preserved for appellate review.). 27 See Dye, 266 Ga. App. at 829 (2) (b); see also Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 670 (2) ( 763 SE2d 467 ) (2014) (“[T] he failure to make a meritless motion or objection does not provide a basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of counsel.”) (citation omitted). 28 Reid, 286 Ga.

2017See generally McCoy v. State, 273 Ga. 568, 572 (8) ( 544 SE2d 709 ) (2001) (Where the court gave a curative instruction following a motion for mistrial, and the defendant neither objected to the curative instruction nor renewed his motion for mistrial, the alleged error was not preserved for appellate review.). 27 See Dye, 266 Ga. App. at 829 (2) (b); see also Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 670 (2) ( 763 SE2d 467 ) (2014) (“[T] he failure to make a meritless motion or objection does not provide a basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of counsel.”) (citation omitted). 28 Reid, 286 Ga.

2017See generally McCoy v. State, 273 Ga. 568, 572 (8) ( 544 SE2d 709 ) (2001) (Where the court gave a curative instruction following a motion for mistrial, and the defendant neither objected to the curative instruction nor renewed his motion for mistrial, the alleged error was not preserved for appellate review.). 27 See Dye, 266 Ga. App. at 829 (2) (b); see also Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 670 (2) ( 763 SE2d 467 ) (2014) (“[T] he failure to make a meritless motion or objection does not provide a basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of counsel.”) (citation omitted). 28 Reid, 286 Ga.

2017See generally McCoy v. State, 273 Ga. 568, 572 (8) ( 544 SE2d 709 ) (2001) (Where the court gave a curative instruction following a motion for mistrial, and the defendant neither objected to the curative instruction nor renewed his motion for mistrial, the alleged error was not preserved for appellate review.). 27 See Dye, 266 Ga. App. at 829 (2) (b); see also Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 670 (2) ( 763 SE2d 467 ) (2014) (“[T] he failure to make a meritless motion or objection does not provide a basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of counsel.”) (citation omitted). 28 Reid, 286 Ga.

2017See generally McCoy v. State, 273 Ga. 568, 572 (8) ( 544 SE2d 709 ) (2001) (Where the court gave a curative instruction following a motion for mistrial, and the defendant neither objected to the curative instruction nor renewed his motion for mistrial, the alleged error was not preserved for appellate review.). 27 See Dye, 266 Ga. App. at 829 (2) (b); see also Hampton v. State, 295 Ga. 665, 670 (2) ( 763 SE2d 467 ) (2014) (“[T] he failure to make a meritless motion or objection does not provide a basis upon which to find ineffective assistance of counsel.”) (citation omitted). 28 Reid, 286 Ga.

2002Galvan v. State, 240 Ga. App. 608, 609 ( 524 SE2d 297 ) (1999); Kessler v. State, 221 Ga. App. at 371 . 2.

2002Galvan v. State, 240 Ga. App. 608, 609 ( 524 SE2d 297 ) (1999); Kessler v. State, 221 Ga. App. at 371 . 2.