prejudicial effect error in California

2025(Accord, People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 821 [concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion to the extent it admitted evidence of a statement for its effect on defendant and notwithstanding that the statement was communicated to him seven months before the murders].) Even if the court erroneously admitted Quintero’s statement under Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (d)(2),2 in light of the overwhelming evidence of Jimenez’s guilt, the error was harmless under either the Watson standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ) for assessing the prejudicial effect

2022When a jury instruction omits an element of a charged offense, we review the prejudicial effect under the standard established by Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman).

2025(Accord, People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 821 [concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion to the extent it admitted evidence of a statement for its effect on defendant and notwithstanding that the statement was communicated to him seven months before the murders].) Even if the court erroneously admitted Quintero’s statement under Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (d)(2),2 in light of the overwhelming evidence of Jimenez’s guilt, the error was harmless under either the Watson standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ) for assessing the prejudicial effect

2015In light of this overwhelming evidence of appellants’ guilt, the error was harmless under either the Watson standard (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 ) for assessing the prejudicial effect of state error or the Chapman standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ) for evaluating the prejudicial effect of federal constitutional error.

2016(Necler v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 19 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 35 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ] (Neder); id. at pp. 8-15; see also People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ] [“when a trial court fails to instruct the jury on an element of a special circumstance allegation, the prejudicial effect of the error must be measured under the test set forth in Chapman v. California”].) Here, the trial court instructed the jury on the multiple-murder special circumstance (CALJIC No. 8.81.3) as follows: “To find the special circumstance referred to in these instructions as mu

2016(Necler v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 19 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 35 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ] (Neder); id. at pp. 8-15; see also People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ] [“when a trial court fails to instruct the jury on an element of a special circumstance allegation, the prejudicial effect of the error must be measured under the test set forth in Chapman v. California”].) Here, the trial court instructed the jury on the multiple-murder special circumstance (CALJIC No. 8.81.3) as follows: “To find the special circumstance referred to in these instructions as mu

2001(New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649, 655, fn. 5 [ 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2637 , 81 L.Ed.2d 550 ]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445 [86 S.Ct. at pp. 1612-1613].) We must determine the prejudicial effect of the error using the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 [ 87 S.Ct. 824, 826-827 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ], (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 292 [ 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1255-1256 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 ].) Defendant testified at trial.

2001(New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649, 655, fn. 5 [ 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2637 , 81 L.Ed.2d 550 ]; Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444-445 [86 S.Ct. at pp. 1612-1613].) We must determine the prejudicial effect of the error using the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt test of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 21-22 [ 87 S.Ct. 824, 826-827 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ], (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 292 [ 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1255-1256 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 ].) Defendant testified at trial.

2025(United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 162 ; Robert v. Stanford University (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 67, 72 [appellants must demonstrate both the presence of error and the prejudicial effect of that error].) We conclude appellant cannot establish prejudice.

2024(Oak Valley Hospital Dist. v. State Dept. of Health Care Services, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 228 [undeveloped arguments are forfeited on appeal]; Robert v. Stanford University (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 67, 72 [appellants must demonstrate both the presence of error and the prejudicial effect of that error].) Even considering the merits, we find no prejudice.

2020Accordingly, even if we assume that the trial court erred in failing to give CALCRIM No. 703, any error was not prejudicial and was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. “ ‘We have consistently held that when a trial court fails to instruct the jury on an element of a special circumstance allegation, the prejudicial effect of the error must be measured under the test set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .’ ” (Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 409 .) Any failure to instruct on the elements of being a major participant and acting with reckless indifference was harmless because thos

2016Was the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt? “‘[W]hen a trial court fails to instruct the jury on an element of a special circumstance allegation, the prejudicial effect of the error must be measured under the test set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 368 U.S. 18 , 24.’” ( Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th 5 However, the jury need not expressly make a finding as to each element of this special circumstance.

2012Accordingly, we consider the prejudicial effect of the error here in the context of cases dealing with the failure to instruct on all elements of an offense. “[A]n instructional error that improperly . . . omits an element of an offense . . . generally is not a structural defect in the trial mechanism that defies harmless error review and automatically requires reversal under the *663 federal Constitution.” (People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 502-503 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 ].) Instead, an erroneous instruction that omits an element of an offense is subject to harmless error an

2012Accordingly, we consider the prejudicial effect of the error here in the context of cases dealing with the failure to instruct on all elements of an offense. “[A]n instructional error that improperly . . . omits an element of an offense . . . generally is not a structural defect in the trial mechanism that defies harmless error review and automatically requires reversal under the *663 federal Constitution.” (People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 502-503 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180 , 957 P.2d 869 ].) Instead, an erroneous instruction that omits an element of an offense is subject to harmless error an

2016(People v. Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 801 .) He “must be aware of and willingly involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed, demonstrating reckless indifference to the significant risk of death his or her actions create.” (Ibid.) Thus, the special circumstance may be applied to those who “‘subjectively appreciated that their acts were likely to result in the taking of innocent life.’” (Id. at p. 802, quoting Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137 .) We hold that, although the trial court erred by not giving CALCRIM No. 703 to the jury, the error was harmless:

2016(Necler v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 19 [ 144 L.Ed.2d 35 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ] (Neder); id. at pp. 8-15; see also People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 689 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 , 941 P.2d 752 ] [“when a trial court fails to instruct the jury on an element of a special circumstance allegation, the prejudicial effect of the error must be measured under the test set forth in Chapman v. California”].) Here, the trial court instructed the jury on the multiple-murder special circumstance (CALJIC No. 8.81.3) as follows: “To find the special circumstance referred to in these instructions as mu

2003(See People v. Jennings (1991) 53 *1120 Cal.3d 334, 387 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 780 , 807 P.2d 1009 ]; People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 518 P.2d 913 ].) The finding of personal use, however, would not in itself prove defendant was the actual killer.

2003(See People v. Jennings (1991) 53 *1120 Cal.3d 334, 387 [ 279 Cal.Rptr. 780 , 807 P.2d 1009 ]; People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 721 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 518 P.2d 913 ].) The finding of personal use, however, would not in itself prove defendant was the actual killer.

1994Thus, any possible harm stemming from the in limine ruling is “ ‘wholly speculative.’ ” (Ibid.) Third, “when the trial court errs in ruling the conviction admissible the reviewing court cannot intelligently weigh the prejudicial effect of that error if the defendant did not testify.” {Ibid.) If such rulings were reviewable on appeal, “ ‘almost any error would result in the windfall of automatic reversal; the appellate court could not logically term “harmless” an error that presumptively kept the defendant from testifying.’ ” {Ibid., citing Luce, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 42 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 448]

1992“Third, when the trial court errs in ruling the conviction admissible the reviewing court cannot intelligently weigh the prejudicial effect of that error if the defendant did not testify.” (People v. Collins, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 384 (lead opn. by Mosk, J.), quoting Luce v. United States (1984) 469 U.S. 38, 41 [ 83 L.Ed.2d 443, 447 , 105 S.Ct. 460 ].) After consideration, we reject the claim at the threshold.

1997(People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 681 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26 , 919 P.2d 640 ]; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 45 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ].) Under that test, an error is harmless only when, beyond a reasonable doubt, it did not contribute to the verdict.

1997(People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 681 [ 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26 , 919 P.2d 640 ]; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 45 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ].) Under that test, an error is harmless only when, beyond a reasonable doubt, it did not contribute to the verdict.

1976(Clemens v. Regents of University of California, supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 366 ; Deward v. Clough, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d at p. 445 ; Noll v. Lee (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 81, 86-94 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 223 ], See also Wilkinson v. Southern Pacific Co. (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 478, 483 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 689 ].) The court in Deward succinctly stated the principle: “While it is true that many California cases have stated the trial court exercises a discretion in weighing the prejudicial effect of error (e.g., misconduct of a juror) and that its action will be disturbed only for an abuse of discretion, a more ac

1976(Clemens v. Regents of University of California, supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 366 ; Deward v. Clough, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d at p. 445 ; Noll v. Lee (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 81, 86-94 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 223 ], See also Wilkinson v. Southern Pacific Co. (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 478, 483 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 689 ].) The court in Deward succinctly stated the principle: “While it is true that many California cases have stated the trial court exercises a discretion in weighing the prejudicial effect of error (e.g., misconduct of a juror) and that its action will be disturbed only for an abuse of discretion, a more ac

2026(See People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378 .) This is because: (1) “an appellate court cannot review [the trial’s court’s] balancing process [concerning the probative value of the impeachment against its prejudicial effect] unless the record discloses ‘the precise nature of the [witness]’s testimony’ ” (id. at p. 384); (2) “when the [witness] does not testify, the reviewing court . . . has no way of knowing whether the prosecution would in fact have used the [evidence in question] to impeach” (ibid.); and (3) “the reviewing court cannot intelligently weigh the prejudicial effect of that error

1996Next, when the defendant does not testify, the reviewing court also has no way of knowing whether the prosecution would in fact have used the prior conviction to impeach: if the prosecution’s case is strong and the defendant is impeachable by other means, the prosecutor might elect not to use a questionable prior conviction in any event. [Citation.]” (People v. Collins, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 384 .) Third, “the reviewing court cannot intelligently weigh the prejudicial effect of that error if the defendant did not testify. . . . ‘Requiring that a defendant testify in order to preserve [claims

1976(Clemens v. Regents of University of California, supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 366 ; Deward v. Clough, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d at p. 445 ; Noll v. Lee (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 81, 86-94 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 223 ], See also Wilkinson v. Southern Pacific Co. (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 478, 483 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 689 ].) The court in Deward succinctly stated the principle: “While it is true that many California cases have stated the trial court exercises a discretion in weighing the prejudicial effect of error (e.g., misconduct of a juror) and that its action will be disturbed only for an abuse of discretion, a more ac

1976(Clemens v. Regents of University of California, supra, 20 Cal.App.3d at p. 366 ; Deward v. Clough, supra, 245 Cal.App.2d at p. 445 ; Noll v. Lee (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 81, 86-94 [ 34 Cal.Rptr. 223 ], See also Wilkinson v. Southern Pacific Co. (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 478, 483 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 689 ].) The court in Deward succinctly stated the principle: “While it is true that many California cases have stated the trial court exercises a discretion in weighing the prejudicial effect of error (e.g., misconduct of a juror) and that its action will be disturbed only for an abuse of discretion, a more ac

2013(People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 47 .) As stated in People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730 , “the prejudicial effect of the error on the trial as a whole depends on a multitude of factors, including the cumulative nature of the lost information, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, the degree of evidence corroborating the witness, and the overall strength of the prosecution case.” (Id. at p. 751, fn. 2, citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684 .) In this case, there was no other restriction placed on cross-examination of the victims, and the information a

1988(Id. [ 475 U.S. 673, 684 ].)” (People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 751, fn. 2 [ 230 Cal.Rptr. 667 , 726 P.2d 113 ].) Here the jury learned Rogers had been with Vasquez for eight years and had married him shortly after his arrest for McConnell’s murder; that they had a daughter together; that she was seeing Vasquez on a weekly basis at the time of trial; that she had been living with Vasquez and supporting him on the date of the murder; that she knew Vasquez was keeping company with other women at that time and nonetheless “didn’t do anything about it”; and that she did not come forward t

2013(People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 47 .) As stated in People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730 , “the prejudicial effect of the error on the trial as a whole depends on a multitude of factors, including the cumulative nature of the lost information, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, the degree of evidence corroborating the witness, and the overall strength of the prosecution case.” (Id. at p. 751, fn. 2, citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 684 .) In this case, there was no other restriction placed on cross-examination of the victims, and the information a

1990(Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1287.) Thus, “[t]he peculiarly normative and individualized nature of the jury’s sentence determination in each case makes it inappropriate and of no benefit to consider the sentence imposed in superficially similar cases for the purpose of determining the prejudicial effect of error.” (People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 57, fn. 31 [ 252 Cal.Rptr. 525 , 762 P.2d 1249 ]; see also People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 69-71 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 209 , 753 P.2d 1 ] [rejecting this precise argument].) Moreover, we observe that of the two assailants, defendant was the one w

1995See footnote 1, ante. 3 Subsequently, the Director of Corrections filed a petition for writ of mandate and/or prohibition in this court challenging the superior court’s ruling on subject matter jurisdiction, but met with summary denial. 4 See People v. Martinez, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d at page 22 : “[I]t is clear that the usual ‘harmless error’ tests for determining the prejudicial effect of an error (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-828 , 24 A.L.R.3d 1065 ]; People v. Watson [(1956)] 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]) are inapplicabl

1992On the other hand, since jury misconduct is not per se reversible, if a review of the entire record demonstrates that the appellant has suffered no prejudice from the misconduct, a reversal is not compelled.” (People v. Martinez, supra, 82 Cal.App.3d at p. 22 .) This court is well aware that if a presumption of prejudice has not been rebutted in a case involving jury misconduct, the “harmless error” tests for determining the prejudicial effect of an error are not applicable.

2025As we ourselves have noted, because the issue involves an error regarding jury instructions and the prejudicial effect of such error, “ ‘[w]e must assume that the jury, had it been given proper instructions, might have drawn different inferences more favorable to the losing [party] . . . .’ ” (Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 655 .) So, “we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the claim of instructional error [citations] and we assume the jury might have believed [Helfet’s] version of the facts . . . . [Citations.]” (Mize-Kurzman v. Marin Community College

2025(Accord, People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 821 [concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion to the extent it admitted evidence of a statement for its effect on defendant and notwithstanding that the statement was communicated to him seven months before the murders].) Even if the court erroneously admitted Quintero’s statement under Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (d)(2),2 in light of the overwhelming evidence of Jimenez’s guilt, the error was harmless under either the Watson standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 ) for assessing the prejudicial effect

2025(Accord, People v. Jablonski, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 820-821.) Here, such evidence included Jimenez’s response to the first altercation, when he threatened to get back at Quintero, and stated he would 2 Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (a)(2) provides: “(a) Subject to Section 1252, evidence of a statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation (including a statement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health) is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) The evidence is offered to prove or expl